Civil society assistance in Central and Eastern Europe by Abele, Christine
Civil Society Assistance in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
The Cases of Poland and Slovakia 
Dissertation  
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil) 
Eingereicht an der Philosophischen Fakultät III der Humboldt - Universität zu Berlin 
Von 
Christine Abele 
geb. 7.12.1970 in Vaihingen an der Enz 
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Prof. Dr. Jürgen Mlynek 
Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät III Prof. Dr. Gert-Joachim Glaeßner 
Gutachter:    1. Prof. Claus Offe 
   2. Prof Wolfgang Merkel 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:  21.04.2006 
 2
Acknowledgements 
This work had not been possible without the encouragement, assistance and advice of 
various people. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Prof. Claus Offe, whose stimulating 
suggestions and encouragement proved extremely valuable. I also want to thank Prof. 
Wolfgang Merkel who attended the dissertation as second supervisor.  
I want to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Phillippe Schmitter, Imco Brouwer, Nicolas 
Guilhot and Bernard Gbikpi for their help, support, interest and valuable hints. Without our 
common research project on “Democracy Promotion and Protection” this dissertation had 
hardly taken shape. Indeed, this work was made possible in part by a research grant from the 
VW-Stiftung supporting not only our DPP project but also a four weeks field trip to Poland. 
Two research assistants, Anke Wilde and Christoph Zarft, provided invaluable help.  
Susanne Fuchs, Kathrin Schwalb and Erika Jakab read the text and provided indispensable 
(and mostly constructive) criticism. Michael Dobbins looked closely at the final version of the 
thesis for English style and grammar. I am further grateful to Bernd Schüler who encouraged 
me to go ahead with my thesis.  
I also have to thank the various people in Germany, Poland and Slovakia who were willing to 
be interviewed on the topic and who shared their insights into civil society assistance in 
Poland and Slovakia with me.  
Finally I would like to give my special thanks to my husband Jens and my parents who 
always supported me and without whose assistance as baby sitters I had never been able to 




Acknowledgements  2 
Content   3 
Tables   9 
List of Abbreviations  10 
1 Introduction 12 
1.1 The Rise of Civil Society Assistance 12 
1.2 Key Interests and Concerns 16 
1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation 20 
1.4 Research 25 
2 The Concept of Civil Society 26 
2.1 Contemporary Understandings of Civil Society 26 
2.1.1 Liberal Approaches - Civil Society as a Realm Outside the State 28 
2.1.2 The Pluralist Approach - Civil Society and the Plurality of Organized 
Collective Interests 30 
2.1.3 Critical Democracy Theory - Civil Society and the Political Public Sphere 31 
2.1.4 Civil Society and Social Capital 33 
2.1.5 Communitarian Approaches - Civil Society and Small Communities 34 
2.1.6 The Third Sector Approach - Civil Society and Effectiveness 35 
2.1.7 Summary 37 
2.2 Studying Civil Society 38 
2.2.1 Defining Civil Society 39 
2.2.2 A Dynamic Model of Civil Society 43 
2.2.3 Indicators for Research 47 
2.2.4 Summary 51 
2.3 Civil Society in Post-Communism 52 
2.4 Conclusion and Implications for Research 57 
3 Civil Society Assistance: Actors, Objectives, Concepts and Strategies 60 
3.1 Defining Civil Society Assistance 60 
3.2 Objectives of Assistance: Civil Society - a Remedy to Various Illnesses 64 
3.3 Donor Concepts of Civil Society - One Term, Various Meanings 67 
3.4 Strategies of Civil Society Assistance 71 
 4
3.4.1 Institution-Building 71 
3.4.2 Capacity Building 73 
3.4.3 Project-specific Support 75 
3.5 Conclusion: Problems of Civil Society Assistance 78 
4 Theoretical Framework: Civil Society Assistance as Externally Driven 
Intentional Institutional Transfer 82 
4.1 Two Distinct Approaches to Civil Society Assistance 82 
4.2 A Sociological Understanding of Institutions 87 
4.3 Institutional Transfer – Doing What Cannot Be Done? 88 
4.4 Coercive Imposition versus Slavish Imitation: Conditions of Successful 
Gardening 91 
4.4.1 Actors and Interactions 93 
4.4.2 Two Modes of External Influence: Empowerment and Learning 95 
4.4.3 Conditions of ‘Successful’ Transfer 99 
4.5 Conclusion: Working Hypothesis, Key Claims and Implications for 
Research 100 
5 Methodology 106 
5.1 The Comparative Method and the Small N - Many Variables Problem 107 
5.2 The Selection of Cases 110 
5.3 What to Observe 112 
5.3.1 Leading Research Questions 112 
5.3.2 Objects of Research 117 
5.4 Measurement Technique 119 
6 Donors in Focus: Major Donors and Donor - Recipient Interactions 122 
6.1 Major Donors of Civil Society Assistance in Central and Eastern Europe 122 
6.1.1 Civil Society Assistance as Part of an Integration Strategy – The 
European Union and its Phare Program 122 
6.1.2 Forerunners in the Promotion of Democracy: United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) 127 
6.1.3 The Enlargement of European Networks – The German Transform-
Program and the German Political Foundations 130 
6.1.4 Private Actors – Efforts “From Below” 135 
6.2 The Network of Donor-Recipient Relationships 138 
7 Analyzing Civil Society Assistance in Poland 144 
7.1 The Domestic Context - Historical and Cultural Legacies 146 
 5
7.1.1 Solidarity and the Legacies of a “Successful” Opposition 146 
7.1.2 Summary: Preconditions of Civil Society in Poland 152 
7.2 Ten Years After – The Reemerging Civil Society in Poland 153 
7.2.1 Quantity of Non-Governmental Organizations 154 
7.2.2 Composition 155 
7.2.3 Regional Distribution 157 
7.2.4 Civic Participation and Volunteerism 157 
7.2.5 Relationship between Non-Governmental Organizations and State 
Authorities 158 
7.2.6 Relationships Among NGOs and Inside Civil Society 162 
7.2.7 Summary 162 
7.3 The External Push – Forms and Types of Civil Society Assistance in 
Poland 164 
7.3.1 The Quantity of Civil Society Assistance – A Minor Financial Item 165 
7.3.2 The Marriot Brigades and Some Favored Cliques: The Years 1990-1993 167 
7.3.3 From Macro to Micro – The Donor Learning Curve: The Years 1994 - 
1998 170 
7.3.4 Withdrawal of Donors and the Europeanization of Assistance: The End of 
the 1990s 173 
7.4 The Output and Outcome of Assistance – Recipients in Focus 176 
7.4.1 Types of Main Recipients 177 
7.4.2 Sustainability of Main Recipients 186 
7.4.3 Legitimacy of Main Recipients 188 
7.4.4 Main Recipients as Carriers of Civil Society? 188 
7.4.5 Recipient Benefits – Did Civil Society Assistance Make a Difference? 193 
7.4.6 Summary 197 
7.5 Conclusion: Civil Society Assistance in Poland – A Success Story by 
Accident or Skill? 199 
8 Analyzing Civil Society Assistance in Slovakia 205 
8.1 The Domestic Context - Historical and Cultural Legacies 208 
8.1.1 Pre-Communist Legacies 208 
8.1.2 Communist Legacies 210 
8.1.3 Summary: Cultural Preconditions of Civil Society in Slovakia 213 
8.2 The belated Liberalization – The Rise of Civil Society in Slovakia 214 
 6
8.2.1 Quantity of Non-Governmental Organizations 214 
8.2.2 Composition 216 
8.2.3 Regional Distribution 218 
8.2.4 Civic Participation and Volunteerism 218 
8.2.5 Ties Between Non-Governmental Organizations and Within Civil Society 219 
8.2.6 Relations Between Non-Governmental Organizations and State 
Authorities 225 
8.2.7 Summary: The Belated Rise of Civil Society in Slovakia 228 
8.3 The External Push – Forms and Types of Civil Society Assistance in 
Slovakia 230 
8.3.1 Main Donors and their Interests 230 
8.3.2 The Quantity and Timing of Assistance 234 
8.3.3 Strategy of Assistance 236 
8.4 The Output and Outcome of Civil Society Assistance in Slovakia – 
Recipients in Focus 238 
8.4.1 Types of Main Recipients 240 
8.4.2 Sustainability of NGOs in Slovakia 243 
8.4.3 Legitimacy of Main Recipients 245 
8.4.4 Main Recipients as Carriers of Civil Society? 246 
8.4.5 Recipient Benefits – Did Civil Society Assistance Make a Difference? 254 
8.4.6 Summary 259 
8.5 Conclusion: Civil Society Assistance in Slovakia: Western Political 
Intervention From Below? 260 
9 Conclusion 265 
9.1 Core Conclusions and Results 267 
9.2 Implications for Practitioners of Civil Society Assistance 277 
9.3 Research Outlook 282 
Bibliography   285 
Literature   285 
Documents and Donor Materials 302 
Recipient Materials  305 
Internet Sources   307 
Appendix to the Dissertation 309 
Appendix 1 The German Political Foundations 310 
Portray 1 The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 310 
Portray 2 The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) 310 
 7
Portray 3 Hans Seidel Stiftung (HSS) 310 
Portray 4 The Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) 311 
Portray 5 The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) 311 
Appendix 2 Overall Assistance to Poland and Slovakia: Selected Donors 312 
Table 1 Distribution of the German Transform-Program by  country in 1998 312 
Table 2 Distribution of Transform Allocations by Area of Assistance, 1998 312 
Table 3 Phare Funding by Area in Poland, 1990-1997 313 
Table 4 Phare Funding by Area in Slovakia, 1990-1997 314 
Table 5 USAID Overall Assistance by Area in Poland and Slovakia, SEED 
Program, 1990-2000 315 
Appendix 3 Phare Civil Society Assistance to Poland and Slovakia 316 
Table 6 Phare Programs in Favor of Civil Society Development in Poland and 
Slovakia (in MECU) 316 
Table 7 Allocations and Number of Phare Democracy, Lien and Partnership Micro 
Grants Awarded in Poland and Slovakia (in 1000 Euro) 317 
Table 8 Civic Dialogue Phare Program (Poland) – Allocations and Number of 
Grants Awarded (Implementation Period 1992-1998) 317 
Table 9 Regional Disparity of NGO directed Phare Programs in Poland in 1996/97 318 
Portray 6 Activities of the Cooperation Fund – Local  Implementation of NGO 
directed Phare Programs in Poland 318 
Portray 7 Implementation of NGO directed Phare Programs in Slovakia - Activities 
of the Civil Society Development Foundation and Phare Macro Projects 320 
Appendix 4 The Stefan Batory Foundation and the Open Society Foundation 322 
Portray 8 History of a Local Donor with Foreign Funds – The Development of the 
Stefan Batory Foundation, 1988-2000 322 
Table 10 Objectives and Priority Areas of Assistance of the Stefan Batory 
Foundation, 1988 – 1999 325 
Portray 9 The Open Society Foundation, Bratislava 327 
Appendix 5 US-American Civil Society Assistance 329 
Table 11 USAID Democracy Assistance per Area in Poland, SEED Program, 1990-
2000 329 
Table 12 USAID Democracy Assistance per Area in Slovakia, SEED Program, 
1990-2000 329 
Table 13 NED Funding by Area in Poland, 1990-1998 330 
Table 14 NED Funding by Area in Slovakia, 1990-1999* 331 
Table 15 NED Grants by Year and Area in Poland, 1990 – 1998 332 
Table 16 NED Grants by Year and Area in Slovakia, 1990 – 1999 337 
Portray 10 The USAID funded Democracy Network Project (DemNet) in Poland 341 
Portray 11 The USAID funded Democracy Network Project (DemNet) in Slovakia 343 
 8
Appendix 6 The German Political Foundations in Poland and Slovakia – An illustrative 
Overview 344 
Portray 12 The Activities of the FES and KAS in Poland 344 
Portray 13 The Activities of the KAS in Slovakia – A Case Study 347 
Appendix 7 Polish and Slovakian Recipients of Civil Society Assistance by Donor 353 
Table 17 Examples of Partner Organizations of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
in Poland 353 
Table 18 Examples of Partner Institutions of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 
Slovakia 354 
Table 19 Phare “Infrastructural” Recipients in Poland 355 
Table 20 Examples of Phare Recipients in Slovakia 356 
Table 21 Examples of NED Non-Governmental Recipients in Poland (1990-1998) 357 
Table 22 Examples of NED Non-Governmental Recipients in Slovakia (1993-2000) 358 
Table 23 Examples of USAID Non-Governmental Recipients in Poland 359 
Table 24 Examples of USAID Non-Governmental Recipients in Slovakia 360 
Table 25 Recipients of the Stefan Batory Foundation (Institutional Grants only) 362 
Appendix 8 Survey on Non-Governmental Organizations in Poland and Slovakia 366 
Table 26 Results of the Survey on NGOs in Poland and Slovakia in % 369 
Table 27 Interpretation of Results 379 
Appendix 9 List of Interview Partners 384 
Table 28 List of Interview Partners relevant for the Polish Case 384 
Table 29 List of Interview Partners Relevant for the Slovak Case 385 
Table 30 List of Interviewees in Germany 386 




Table  1 Ideal Types of Civil Society Development ..............................................45 
Table  2 Civil Society: Indicators for Research ....................................................50 
Table  3 Phare Programs in Favor of Civil Society Development 1991- 
1997(MECU) ........................................................................................127 
Table  4  Donor-Recipient Relationships (by Direction of Money Flows). ...........141 
Table  5   Cvil Society Assistance in Relation to other Forms of DPP in Poland, 
Slovakia and CEE Average, 1990 – 2000............................................166 
Table  6 NGOs Relying Partially on Foreign Funds by Core Area of Activity in 
Poland 1994.........................................................................................183 
Table  7 Types of Main Recipients .....................................................................185 
Table  8 New Registrations of NGOs per Year ..................................................216 
Table  9 Topics and Participation on the Stupava Conferences.........................222 
 
 10
List of Abbreviations 
BMZ  Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany)  
BORIS The Support Office for the Movement of Self-Help Initiatives (Poland) 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CIM Institute for International Relations (Poland) 
CIPE Center for International Private Enterprise (USA) 
CSA  Civil Society Assistance 
CSD Civil Society Development Program (Slovakia) 
CSDF Civil Society Development Foundation (Poland) 
DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance 
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom) 
DPP Democracy Promotion and Protection 
ECF European Cultural Foundation 
EDI Economic Development Institute, World Bank 
EFC European Foundation Center (Brussels) 
ETP Environmental Training Partnership Foundation (Slovakia) 
EU European Union 
FED  Fundacja Edukacja dla Demokracji (Foundation for the Education of 
Democracy, Poland) 
FIP Associations for the Forum of Non-Governmental Initiatives (Forum 
Inicjatyw Pozarzadowych, Poland) 
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany) 
FNS Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Germany) 
FSLD The Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (Poland) 
FTUI Free Trade Union Institute (USA) 
G3S Gremium of the Third Sector (Slovakia) 
GTZ Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
HBS  Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Germany) 
HFHR Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights (Poland) 
HSS Hans Seidel Stiftung (Germany) 
HZDS “Movement for a democratic Slovakia” (Hnuti za Demokraticke Slovensko) 
IDEE  Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (Poland) 
 11
IRI International Republican Institute (USA) 
ISP Instytut Spraw Publicznych (Institute for Public Affairs, Poland) 
IVO Inštitút pre verejné otázky (Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia) 
KAS Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany) 
KfW  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany) 
KOZ Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions 
NDI National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (USA) 
NED National Endowment for Democracy (USA) 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
NPOA Civil Society Development Foundation (Slovakia) 
OSF Open Society Foundation (Slovakia) 
PDCS Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (Slovakia) 
Phare Poland Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy 
SAIA-SCTS Slovak Academic Information Agency – Service Center of the Third Sector 
(Slovakia) 
SEED Support for East European Democracy (USAID Program, United States of 
America) 
SEQUA Stiftung für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und berufliche Qualifizierung 
(Foundation in support of economic development and professional 
qualification, Germany) 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
SNS Slovak National Party (Slovakia) 
SPACE the Social Policy Analysis Center (Slovakia) 
SPLOT The Network of Information and Support (Poland) 
USAID United States Agency for International Development (USA) 
VENRO Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen 
VPN Public Against Violence (Verejnost’ Proti Nasili) (Slovakia 
WRZOS Working Community of Associations of Social NGOs in Poland (Poland) 
ZRS Association of Workers of Slovakia (Slovakia) 
ZPMP Association for the Assistance of People With Mental Handicaps in the 




                                                
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Rise of Civil Society Assistance  
Is it feasible to promote and strengthen civil society from abroad? This is the main question 
of this dissertation. Since the middle of the 1990s this question is of utmost importance for 
practitioners and theorists alike. With the end of the communist bloc and the transformations 
taking place in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the New Independent States the 
promotion and protection of democracy from abroad has become a major challenge for 
democratic states. With hardly any experience in the field and after only a few not very useful 
lessons in development aid, donors quickly move eastwards with the ambitious aim of 
promoting democracy and little idea how to do so. The main actors were state agencies of 
international assistance such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) or the British Department for International Development (DFID), and international 
organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union. Additionally, non-state 
actors such as charity organizations, foundations, trade unions and associations went 
abroad, as well as quasi-independent but fully state financed “democracy foundations”. 
These are foundations that specialize in extending political assistance to other states such as 
the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED) or the German political foundations. But 
neither the former nor the latter donors had any instruments at hand to master the challenge. 
Even the German political foundations that were very active in the democratization 
processes in Southern Europe1 could not draw on previous experiences – the situations 
were too different in post-communist countries that faced the “triple transition” (Offe 1991) of 
simultaneously transforming the economy and political system, and sometimes even the 
territory.  
The theoretical debates of the time failed to provide answers and concepts how to master the 
task ahead. The international scholarly community was taken by surprise by the fall of 
Communism and the peaceful transformations taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. 
International Relations theorists, on the one hand, provided theories explaining an 
international system marked by bipolarity, and hardly focused on the question how the 
political system of a tate was affected by international processes.2 In consequence they 
offered no answers to the pressing question how to support democracy from the outside. 
1 Powell (1996) e.g. stresses the important role of the German political foundations in the 
democratization process in Spain.  
2 For an excellent review of the international relations literature tackling the question of 
international influences on the political system, see: Hartmann (1997). 
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Comparative analysts concerned with democratization, on the other hand, neglected the 
impact of international factors on democratization and exclusively focused on domestic 
factors of democratization. Broadly speaking, scholars approached democratization 
processes in two different ways, stressing either the importance of structural factors in 
explaining regime change (see e. g. Lipset 1981) or the importance of actor choices and 
constellations (see e.g. O’Donnell/Schmitter 1987). Common to both approaches, however, 
is the assumption that the origins of regime change lie exclusively in the domestic realm. 
Both approaches thus fail to integrate international factors into the analysis of 
democratization processes, a task which has been identified as one of the major current 
challenges to democratization theory (Remmer 1995). Only in the middle of the 1990s did 
comparative analysts start to investigate the “international dimension of democracy” 
(Whitehead 1996) and recognize the importance of international factors in explaining regime 
change such as “demonstration effects” (Pridham 1994), “contagion through proximity” 
(Whitehead 1996), processes of diffusion of democratic institutions, practices and ideas 
(Diamond 1997, Whitehead 1996), conditionality (Schmitter 1996), or the efforts of 
international state and non-state actors to directly promote and protect democracy from 
abroad (Offe/Schmitter forthcoming). The prominence of international factors in explaining 
regime change thus is, in the words of Alex Pravda, “the result of a long academic journey” 
(Pravda 2001: 1) and comes as a reaction to transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 
which can hardly be explained without accounting for developments in and the final collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  
In 1989/90, however, practitioners that aimed to assist the new democracies at their Eastern 
borders were left with few concepts on how best to assist democracy abroad. Nonetheless 
they were eager to help, and moreover, faced a massive demand of international assistance 
and advice, as is evident in the following quote:  
“We need advice, here, now, immediately” (President Vaclav Havel to a NDI 
delegation in December 1989 cited in: Glenn 1999: 6).  
In face of an immense international eagerness to assist the historic developments in Central 
and Eastern Europe and a pressing appeal for assistance, donors largely resorted to the 
models they knew best: their own democratic system was used as a template that donors 
aimed to transfer to other places. As a consequence, “institutional-modeling” became the 
prevailing donor strategy (Carothers 1997). Donors approached democratization processes 
with an internal checklist in mind made up of the major institutional features of democracy: 
free and fair elections, competing political parties, an independent judiciary, an effective 
public administration, independent media etc., and established institutions according to this 
 14
                                                
checklist (Carothers 1996a: 98p). According to Wedel (1998), donors thus perceived 
democracy assistance as a transmission belt that transmitted missing links into other places.  
The initial focus on institutions, however, did not deliver the desired results. Although formal 
democratic rules were in place, the new structures often did not perform like their Western 
role models. The rise of “democracies with adjectives” (Collier/Levitsky 1997) such as 
“delegative” (O’Donnell 1994), “defective” (Merkel 1999) or “illiberal” (Zakaria 1997) 
increasingly raises the awareness that formal institutions alone do not constitute a sufficient 
basis for a consolidated, representative and legitimate democracy. O’Donnell points out that 
new democracies often fail to consolidate. Although elections are in place and ensure 
“vertical accountability”, “horizontal accountability” that prevents the abuse of power and the 
misuse of authority is missing. Informal practices and habits of the previous regime often 
persist and prevent the effective functioning of formal institutions, thus resulting in “formal 
institutions with informal practices” (Olson 1999). With regard to the consolidation phase in 
particular, the academic attention thus shifts to forces outside the institutional arena of 
parliaments and parties highlighting the importance of “informal rules” (O’Donnell 1996), 
“social capital” (Putnam 1993), associations and neo-corporatist arrangements (Schmitter 
1992), and civil society. Civil society is thus recognized as a crucial element that guarantees 
a successful transition to democracy.3 The proclaimed virtues of civil society are manifold: 
Civil society and its institutions trigger democratic behavior or a ‘civic ethos’, result in inter-
personal trust and ‘social capital’. A vibrant civil society acts as a ‘watch-dog’ controlling the 
power of the state. It also ensures accountable government by providing an intermediary 
sphere between the state and the people. And finally, civil society enhances public discourse 
and generates a public sphere in which citizens can debate freely and independently over 
the state and other authorities.4  
As regards the prominence of the concept of civil society, it comes as no surprise that donors 
supplemented their initial emphasis on institutions in the middle of the 1990s and 
increasingly focused on citizens and civil society. Bottom-up strategies to assist democracy 
that aimed to strengthen democratic forces inside society seemed to be a more valuable 
device than building democracy from the top-down. This is even more so, as the euphoria 
concerning the “reemergence of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe”, to cite a book 
title of the time (Rau 1991), quickly dwindled. Civil society and citizens’ activities leveraged 
3 See e.g.: Diamond (1994), Linz/Stepan (1996), Lauth/Merkel (1997), Fagin (1998).  
4 For the democratic functions attributed to civil society see e.g.: Diamond (1994), Fagin (1998), 
Croissant Lauth/Merkel (2000), Kraus (1999).  
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democracy in countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic.5 Hopes were thus high that 
the reemerged civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe would act as a catalyst for 
regime change. This was, however, not the case. In contrast, civic participation in CEE 
remained low (Howard 2003). Several analysts point to the weakness of civil society in post-
communist countries and to likely negative consequences for the consolidation of 
democracy.6 Triggering the development of civil society thus became a major concern of 
donors interested in democracy assistance. Carothers points out (1999b: 59):  
“Many aid providers have come to see civil society development as the key to 
unblocking stagnant or failing transitions over the long term”.  
As a result, we witness an immense rise of civil society assistance in CEE. Santiso (2001: 
12) even characterizes civil society assistance as the “most rapidly expanding pillar of 
democracy aid”. There is no donor that does not provide programs focusing on civil society. 
The PHARE democracy program of the EU, the British Know-how Fund, parts of the SEED 
program of the USA (Support for East European Democracy), and the activities of German 
political foundations are just a few examples. On top of that, a wide spectrum of private 
actors supports civil society in CEE, many of which have never been involved in international 
aid before (Quigley 1997). Schmitter (1996: 39) notices:  
“The international context surrounding democratization has shifted from a primary 
reliance on public, inter-governmental channels of influence toward an increased 
involvement of private, non-governmental organizations ...”.  
5 See for the importance of citizens’ activities and mass protests in bringing about regime change 
in CEE, e.g. Ekiert/Kubik (1999). 
6 See e.g. Ost (1993), Sztompka (1993), Wesolowski (1995), Wiesenthal (1997), Merkel (2000), 
Offe (2000a),  Howard (2003).  
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1.2 Key Interests and Concerns 
The burgeoning phenomenon of civil society assistance requires academic contemplation. 
The question arises whether it is at all feasible to trigger and sustain civil society 
development from the outside. Civil society is commonly understood as  
“The realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-
supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules” (Diamond 1994:5). 
It is truly domestic and endogenous in character and thus not easily open to external design. 
Civil society is more than a collection of non-governmental, formally structured, independent, 
voluntary, and self-organized organizations. Additionally, civil society necessitates an ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) (Hegel), a “civic ethos” (Offe 2000a), or “civilizational competence” 
(Sztompka 1993). Civil society thus relies on certain patterns of behavior, moral qualities, and 
liberal values that developed in Western Europe over centuries. One may doubt that such 
patterns of behavior and moral qualities come as a result of externally conducted programs 
and projects. The question thus is: what is the outcome of civil society assistance? Does civil 
society result in more civil society, despite everything said above, or does it trigger 
unintended and surprising effects?  
The literature at hand provides few answers to these questions. The great magnitude of civil 
society assistance contrasts with the little scholarly attention to this new phenomenon. 
Existing studies on civil society assistance mainly focus on donors, their strategies, projects 
and programs (Wedel 1998).7 The “question of strategy” (Carothers 1997) stands in the 
forefront. More often than not, research is driven the concern of donors to “… devise effective 
strategies to support a wide variety of democratization processes” (Santiso 2001: 1). The 
focus on donor activities, projects and programs, however, reduces assistance merely to a 
business of right strategies and best practices. Moreover, this approach accounts for nothing 
more than an assessment of the output rather than the outcome of assistance. The 
overemphasis on donors falls short of capturing the various ways how recipients respond to 
the efforts of donors, and how civil society assistance is perceived, adopted, and adapted in 
different domestic contexts. Donors do feel the need to evaluate their activities and are eager 
to find effective tools to assess the outcome of assistance. They ways and means how this is 
7 Examples of studies that largely focus on donors, in particular American donors, and on donor 
strategies are: Carothers (e.g. 1997, 1999a), Crawford (1996), Diamond (1997), Glenn (1999), Guilhot 
(2003), Hansen (1996), Jenkins (2001), Ottaway/Chang (1999), Quigley (1997), Santiso (2001). 
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done are, however, generally inadequate.8 Besides the methodological problems of finding 
measurable indicators and isolating causal effects, the problem has much to do with donor 
wants. In general, evaluation is the final event in a project. Although a full assessment is only 
feasible years after the activity and the funding came to end, this is rarely done. Moreover, 
donors fail to appreciate that the outcome of assistance is more than anything the result of 
the combined efforts of international assistance on the one hand, and domestic processes on 
the other. However, no donor wants to hear that his activity together with the efforts of the 
Americans, British and the European Union had this or that result. International assistance 
largely remains a national enterprise (Guilhot 2003) and this leaves little room for donor-
funded evaluations that focus on the combined efforts of international actors in certain issue 
areas.  
Only recently case studies have been presented that aim to grasp the outcome of assistance 
in single countries or issue areas.9 These studies provide, however, mixed results.10 Some 
studies jump to the conclusion that international assistance makes a valuable contribution to 
the transformation processes in the East and helps to consolidate democracy and civil 
society,11 or argue at least that the small impact of international aid is the result of 
inappropriate donor strategies and approaches:  
“The current crisis of development cooperation and debate on aid effectiveness 
should not overshadow the significant and decisive influence international assistance to 
democracy and good governance has had on the shape and direction of 
democratisation. It nevertheless requires us to revisit traditional strategies and devised 
innovative approaches to foster democracy” (Santiso 2001: 20). 
Others, however, point out that the effect of international assistance ranges from modest to 
negligible (Carothers 1996a: 95pp), or even argue that Western assistance had negative 
effects:  
8 This is the conclusion of Golub (1993) who analyses the evaluation practice of donors and 
highlights the various problems in current practices of evaluating democracy and civil society 
assistance. One must note that most of the problems he identified in evaluation practices are still 
relevant today. See for a new attempt to put the issue on the agenda: Bartsch et al (2003). 
9 Examples are Chandler (2004) who investigates civil society assistance in Bosnia, Henderson 
(2002) who focuses on the case of Russia, Ekiert/Kubik (2000) who analyze international aid to 
Poland or McMahon (2004) who studies Western assistance to Women’s NGOs in CEE.  
10 See for example the various case studies on Western impact on democratization in CEE in 
Zielonka/Pravda (2001), summarized in Smith (2001: 53pp): “The extent to which the West has had … 
an impact on democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe has varied from case to case. The West’s 
influence has been both indirectly and directly wielded, and to greater or lesser extent, depending on 
the country in consideration (ibid: 53).  
11 See for example: Ekiert/Kubik (2000), Coston (1998), several case studies in Pravda/Zielonka 
(2001).    
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“The grant game encourages donors as well as grant recipients to behave in ways 
that hinder rather than facilitate civic development” (Henderson 2002: 140p) … „ … 
“Although aid has been crucial in expanding NGO capacity, it has discouraged groups 
from functioning as a civil society” (ibid: 143).  
The most puzzling question facing scholars of civil society assistance is thus not only if civil 
society can be developed externally, but moreover when, and under what conditions this may 
happen? In other words, what are the causal mechanisms running from international 
assistance to domestic outcomes? Representatives of donor agencies conducting civil 
society programs are often puzzled by the paradox that the very same projects and 
measures produce lasting results in one country and remain without any effect in another 
country. The question is: What determines the fruitful ground on which civil society 
assistance falls? 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide robust answers to these questions. The 
dissertation thus aims to assess the outcome of civil society assistance in two case studies 
and to identify conditions that ensure that international assistance contributes to a vibrant 
civil society. In order to do so, emphasis is placed less on donors and their programs and 
projects. Instead, the main beneficiaries of civil society assistance are the main focus of the 
analysis. The aim of the dissertation is not to evaluate the effectiveness of different donors, 
rather to determine to what extent international assistance shaped civil society development 
in recipient countries. Which institutions, ideas, attitudes and concepts found their way into 
domestic settings? How has the assistance been perceived, adopted and adapted internally? 
In other words, the dissertation aims to grasp the outcome in contrast to the output of 
assistance. The outcome of assistance is, however, evident in recipient organizations, and 
especially in their activities and achievements. Moreover, a focus on recipients and their 
activities allows us to pinpoint unintended outcomes and consequences of civil society 
assistance. For all these reasons, this analysis will concentrate on a small number of 
recipients, so-called “main recipients” that may be, and often are, supported by a wide range 
of different donor organizations. Only the focus on the rooting of recipient organizations in 
society and a clarification of the consistency of recipient’s achievements with the normative 
concept of civil society allows us to reveal the effects of external assistance. The dissertation 
thus clarifies to what extent main recipient organizations act as carriers of civil society, 
whether they transmit the interests of their constituency into politics, whether they fulfill a 
watch-dog function and whether they are connected to society. In brief, the dissertation 
project aims to determine whether major recipients of aid fulfill democratic functions 
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attributed to civil society. This study therefore analyzes main recipients, their sustainability, 
legitimacy and effectiveness as carriers of civil society. 12  
The focus on recipients, however, does not imply that the donor side is neglected. In order to 
determine to what extent civil society development is shaped by foreign actors, resources 
and advice, the inflow of foreign assistance needs to be assessed on a quantitative as well 
as qualitative basis. A descriptive approach to donors, their programs and projects is thus 
necessary. In order to attain a broad picture of civil society assistance in CEE, the analysis 
concentrates on four major donors that have been of special importance in the region.  
The chosen examples are the European Union as the largest supranational actor, the United 
States as the largest non-European national donor, and Germany as the largest European 
national donor active in CEE. Finally, the Soros foundation provides an example of private 
commitment. As for civil society, the research focuses on so-called ‘infrastructural 
organizations’ who aim to strengthen civil society by providing necessary infrastructure and 
support. The main reason for this sample lies in the heavy emphasize given to those 
organizations by donors.  
The dissertation project will do all this by assessing the outcome of foreign assistance on civil 
society in two case studies: Poland and Slovakia. Being geographically close to the EU, the 
two countries Poland and Slovakia have been chosen because the prospect of EU 
membership is an important factor on democratization processes in both countries.  
“The emphasis which most East European countries have given to joining European 
multilateral institutions has provided a powerful imperative for continuing with 
democratization so that they can meet the membership conditions” (Smith 2001: 54). 
The interest of the dissertation is, however, less to assess the impact of possible EU 
membership on civil society in democratizing countries, but rather to analyze the outcome of 
financial and technical assistance directly granted to domestic actors. Therefore the impact of 
EU membership will be held constant with a most-similar systems approach. However, 
among the countries geographically close to the EU, Poland and Slovakia are the most 
dissimilar.  
12 Main recipients have been identified by analyzing available project lists of the following donors: 
USAID, NED, EU (Phare), and the largest two German political foundations (FES, KAS). Thereby only 
programs and projects are covered that are explicitly designed by donors with the goal of supporting 
civil society. Main recipients are defined as NGOs that (1) are frequently supported by Western funds, 
hat (2) receive assistance from at least three of the donor organizations under investigation, and (3) 
whose budget relies to at least 30% on foreign sources. 
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On the one hand Poland, which is culturally homogenous, has a firm national identity and no 
major ethical or cultural cleavages. It is the country in the former communist block with the 
most encompassing dissident movement, a forerunner with regard to democratic reforms 
with no major drawbacks on its way to becoming a consolidated democracy. On the other 
hand Slovakia, which is a rather small and ethnically heterogeneous country characterized 
by late independence and a late and feeble national awakening. Slovakia showed only weak 
traces of dissident culture during communism, and was governed by a repressive 
communism system that left little room for experiments with liberalization. Furthermore, 
Slovakia faced an authoritarian reverse wave between 1994 and 1998. One has to note, 
however, that both countries are among the most Catholic countries in Europe and that both 
were at least partly part of the Habsburg Empire. Nonetheless, a comparison of both 
countries is capable of revealing the effects of foreign assistance in two different domestic 
settings that are additionally shaped by thoroughly different cultural and historical 
developments structuring civil society development. A comparison of civil society assistance 
in Poland and Slovakia thus provides the possibility to analyze the effects of foreign 
assistance in two different domestic settings.  
The core of the claim developed in subsequent chapters is that civil society assistance may 
well contribute to a vibrant civil society. The empowerment of democratically oriented non-
state actors and their inclusion into the range of decision-makers as well as the introduction 
of new ideas into domestic settings are the main mechanisms that can bring about change 
and result in a rise of associational life. The outcome of assistance depends, however, on 
certain facilitating conditions. These are firstly the type of transaction between donor and 
recipient. Secondly, domestic actor constellations determine the attractiveness of new ideas 
to the range of decision-makers and thus their introduction into domestic settings. 
1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation begins with three chapters that are mainly theoretical and conceptual. Here 
theoretical clarifications, key claims and hypothesis that are central to this project will be 
developed. Then the methodology guiding the empirical research is presented. Finally, civil 
society assistance is analyzed in the two case studies Poland and Slovakia.  
The first chapter focuses on the concept of civil society. More often than not, civil society is 
defined vaguely. Additionally, civil society is understood in various ways.  
“Present-day political models that use the concept of civil society not only contradict 
one another but are also relatively poor in categories” (Cohen/Arato 1992: 83).  
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As a result, the concept is not easily open to empirical scrutiny (Beyme 2000). For the 
envisaged research project, a clarification of the term is therefore as crucial as an 
identification of observable indicators of a ‘vibrant civil society’. An empirical analysis of civil 
society is, however, problematic due to the normative character of the concept. A review of 
the literature on civil society quickly reveals that the concept hardly refers to a given 
observable state but rather to a utopian ideal. In order to solve the problem of empirically 
analyzing a normative concept, the dissertation distinguishes two dimensions of civil society: 
(1) a structural dimension, and (2) a cultural dimension. Whereas the former points to the 
observable features of civil society, i.e. voluntary organizations of social life between state 
and market, the latter refers to the moral qualities on which civil society is built. This 
distinction allows us to observe the actual state of civil society in a given country by focusing 
on both dimensions separately. While the structural dimension is determined by the number 
and plurality of non-governmental organizations, the cultural dimension is apparent in civic 
participation, the relationships between different groups of society and the type of relationship 
between self-organized forms of social life and the state. Active citizens who are able and 
willing to represent their interests, cross-cutting cleavages among groups of civil society, a 
relationship between associations based on cooperation, tolerance and trust, the existence 
of peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms, the capacity for common action, and a 
relationship between self-organized social life and the state that is based on cooperation and 
mutual recognition are factors that originate in the cultural dimension of civil society. 
The second chapter aims to determine civil society assistance in greater detail. Civil society 
assistance is defined as deliberate, direct and explicit involvement of external actors into 
domestic settings. Civil society assistance focuses exclusively on societal actors of the 
recipient state and is thus always transnational in character. While recipients are thus 
exclusively non-state actors, donors may be state or non-state actors. The chapter 
approaches civil society assistance from a donor perspective acknowledging the fact that civil 
society assistance is first and foremost an enterprise driven by external actors. The chapter 
thus highlights the objectives, concepts and strategies of external donors. It will be clear that 
donors do not support civil society as an end in itself but as a means to achieve other ends 
such as democracy or good governance. Civil society assistance is thus always intentional 
and interest-driven. Additionally, donors base their assistance on vague concepts of civil 
society and comprehend civil society assistance largely as NGO support. Thereby donors 
support NGOs with two major strategies. Donors firstly aim to strengthen the institutions of 
civil society and thus focus on the structure of civil society. So called ‘institution building‘ is 
inspired by the assumption that associations and non-governmental organizations will 
automatically result in a vibrant civil society. Secondly, donors may apply a more fine-tuned 
approach and target a change in the behavioral and evaluative attitudes of recipients. This 
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strategy labeled ‘capacity building‘ aims to ‘make people democratic‘ and focuses on the 
orientations of actors. Moreover, it aspires to trigger processes of learning and cognitive 
change. Additionally, donors largely rely on project-specific support in their efforts to assist 
civil society. The chapter concludes that civil society assistance and the strategies donors 
apply often yield unintended and even negative effects. Having own interests at stake raises 
doubt about the credibility of the donor. This even more so, as civil society assistance is 
always selective and political. The selectivity of donors that equips some with resources, 
know-how and contacts abound and leaves others with nothing generates not seldom envy 
and resentment as well as fierce competition among NGOs. As a result, civil society 
assistance often weakens rather than strengthens ties inside civil society. Moreover, project-
specific support nurtures opportunistic behavior of recipients. In view of the scarce financial 
resources available, only NGOs that flexibly adapt to altering donors’ wants guarantee their 
financial existence. The intentional and selective character of civil society assistance thus 
may translate into nothing more than a supplementary stratum of donor-driven NGOs that fail 
to address their local constituencies. Additionally, by empowering certain domestic actors, 
donors intervene into the domestic power struggle. Civil society assistance is thus always 
political in nature, although donors try hard to appear nonpartisan and impartial. Civil society 
assistance thus risks being perceived as an illegitimate form of political intervention from 
without. Donors may be seen as unwelcome intruders, recipients as traitors and puppets of 
alien interests. 
The fourth chapter is concerned with theory. The aim is to theoretically derive plausible 
answers to the question of the outcome of civil society assistance. In doing so, the theoretical 
considerations are not based on one encompassing or holistic theory. They rather make use 
of a range of theoretical insights from different disciplines, thus accepting the fact that the 
analysis investigates international factors impacting on domestic structures and hence lies at 
the edge of international relations theory and comparative science (Hartmann 1997). The 
research thus follows the suggestion of Fritz Scharpf (1997: 16):  
“… we need to make greater investments in the theoretical quality of the working 
hypotheses we use. Moreover, since we also cannot deduce our working hypotheses 
from comprehensive theories, we need to combine more limited partial theories or well-
understood “mechanisms” in modular explanations of complex cases”.  
Based on sociological assumptions that stress the importance of the cultural basis of civil 
society and of recipient responses, the chapter aims to identify the conditions under which 
change occurs. In other words, what makes it possible that civil society can travel in contexts 
that lack a “civilizational competence”? To answer this question the dissertation puts actors 
and their interactions in the center of analysis in line with actor-centered institutionalism 
developed by Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz (Scharpf/Mayntz 1995, Scharpf 1997). 
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Emphasis is placed on how institutions are the result of social interaction. Although actors, 
their capabilities, orientations and interactions are affected by institutional settings, they do 
not determine, but only structure actors’ choices and strategic options. Such a framework 
leaves room for actor choices that may result in institutional and cultural change and also 
acknowledges the possibility and importance of cognitive change, that is, of learning. 
Following the insights of actor-centered institutionalism, two modes of external intervention 
will be identified and labeled ‘empowerment‘ and ‘learning‘. External actors may first alter the 
capabilities of domestic actors, i.e. “all action resources that allow an actor to influence an 
outcome in certain respects and to a certain degree” (Scharpf 1997: 43). By providing 
finances, technical equipment but also important information and know-how, donors may 
increase the action resources of chosen domestic actors, thus altering domestic actor 
constellations. A change in political outcomes is the likely consequence. Secondly, external 
actors may impact upon the orientations, that is, the perceptions and preferences, of 
domestic actors. The work of Peter Haas (1992) on “ephistemic communities” and Kathrin 
Sikkink (1993) on “principled-issue networks” reveal how this may happen and how a transfer 
of ideas and values into different cultural settings is possible. Transnational networks that are 
based on a core consensus of shared principles or common professional backgrounds have 
been identified as the main factor behind processes of cognitive convergence and cognitive 
change across national borders. Transnational networks of donors and recipients that are 
based on a core consensus are thus a promising mechanism when it comes to creating 
“civilizational competence”, “civic ethos” or an “appropriate spirit” (Offe 2000a) among 
recipients. Whether new ideas find their way into domestic settings depends, however, on the 
action resources of the “learners” on the one hand and on the attractiveness of the new 
orientations to other players of the political game on the other hand. In brief, transnational 
“principled issue networks” on the one hand, and domestic actor constellations and 
interactions on the other determine the outcome of civil society assistance.  
The fifth chapter describes the methodology and research design of the empirical analysis. 
The chapter exposes the rationale behind the selection of the two country cases under 
investigation, and determines what to observe and how. Five questions that guide the 
empirical analysis are identified: First, what types of non-governmental organizations receive 
foreign attention? Are main recipients of assistance identifiable? Second, are such “main 
recipients” self-sustainable in the long run? Third, do their constituencies and the population 
at large accept them as legitimate domestic actors? Fourth, do the main recipients of 
assistance contribute to the advancement of civil society on the structural or cultural 
dimension in the countries under investigation? In other words, can they be labeled “carriers 
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of civil society”? And finally and most importantly, to what extent does foreign support assist 
the main recipients in fulfilling their role as carriers of civil society? 
The sixth chapter describes the four main donors of civil society assistance identified above 
and their major programs and activities of civil society assistance in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The seventh and eight chapters finally conduct the two case studies. In order to 
verify or falsify the hypothesis that civil society assistance promotes and strengthens civil 
society via the mechanisms empowerment and learning, this study has investigated civil 
society assistance to Poland and Slovakia throughout the 1990s. Both case studies proceed 
in the following steps. First, the analysis identifies the cultural legacies and preconditions of 
civil society in each case. Second, the state of civil society roughly ten years after transition 
will be portrayed. In doing so, the analysis highlights the distinction between the “structural” 
and the “cultural” dimension of civil society and makes us of the indicators identified in the 
first chapter.13 The third section then gives an overview of the history of civil society 
assistance in each country throughout the 1990s. Finally each case study focuses on the 
output and outcome of external assistance to civil society. Special emphasis will be placed 
here on major recipients, their sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness in advancing the 
structural and the cultural dimension of civil society. The role of these “main recipients” in 
advancing a relationship between civil society and the state, in acting as intermediaries of 
assistance and in building networks and horizontal links among various civil society groups is 
of particular importance. The study thus aims to clarify the extent to which civil society 
assistance supports non-governmental organizations that act as carriers of civil society. 
However, the analysis does not stop here. The relationship between donors and recipients 
also requires clarification. Thus, the extent to which major recipients benefited from external 
assistance will be assessed. The final chapter will summarize the major results, and draw 
implications for further efforts to support civil society from abroad.  
 
13 The identified indicators are: (1) number of NGOs and associations, (2) thematic distribution of 
NGOs, (3) regional distribution of NGOs, (4) civic participation and volunteerism, (5) relationship 
between civil society and state, (6) horizontal relationships between NGOs. 
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1.4 Research 
The study relies on four different sources of information. First, the analysis makes use of the 
extensive secondary literature on civil society development in Poland and Slovakia and 
studies focusing on NGO campaigns and civil society achievements in both countries. 
Second, databases of NGOs such as the KLON/JAWOR database in Poland, and the SAIA 
database in Slovakia were a valuable source of information as well as several surveys on the 
NGO sector in both countries. The study highly benefits from a survey conducted among 
Polish and Slovak NGOs in the context of a research project that focused on “democracy 
promotion and protection in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa” 
(DPP).14 The survey in which 72 Polish and 93 Slovak non-governmental organizations 
participated and which took place in 2002/03 inquires into characteristics of NGOs in Poland 
and Slovakia and in their relationships with foreign donors (see appendix 8). In addition, 
materials of donors and recipients proved to be valuable sources of information on donor and 
recipients’ strategies, objectives, underlying concepts and activities. Last but not least, the 
study relies heavily on qualitative expert interviews conducted by the author in both countries 
under investigation. In order to get a broad as possible picture, experts have been chosen 
from four different groups: (1) representatives of donor organizations in the home country (if 
possible) and especially in the recipient country; (2) representatives of recipient 
organizations; (3) local scholars working on civil society in their country; (4) politicians and 
representatives of NGOs in the country under investigation (see appendix 9). 
14 The project was a combined effort of Professor Claus Offe at the Humboldt-University, Berlin 
and Professor Philippe C. Schmitter at the European University Institute in Florence and their 
respective research staff conducted in 1999-2002. It was inspired by the question whether 
democratization from the outside was at all feasible and aimed to clarify the actual outcome of external 
involvement in processes of democratization. A part of the project focused on external activities to 
support civil society assistance.  
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2 The Concept of Civil Society 
The concept of civil society requires clarification. As will be clear in the following, definitions 
of civil society usually do not provide clear characteristics or indicators. Instead they define 
civil society negatively and say what it is not or normatively and highlight its beneficial 
influences on society and state. Civil society always was and still is a normative concept. Its 
aim is less to describe an actual state, but to point to a utopian ideal or the way reality should 
be. In consequence, the concept has rightly been criticized for escaping any analytical and 
empirical verification (Hann 2000, Beyme 2000). Any study on civil society, however, needs 
to close the gap between reality and ideal. The analysis thus faces the dilemma of observing 
and describing what actually is without diluting the normative concept of civil society.  
The following chapter aims to solve this dilemma and investigates the concept of civil society. 
It explores the role of civil society in sustaining and stabilizing democracy and 
democratization and aims to identify indicators for research. The roots of civil society in post-
communist societies will additionally be highlighted. The chapter proceeds in three steps. It 
starts with a brief summary of contemporary understandings of civil society. A review of 
various approaches to civil society helps to comprehend what civil society is and what it 
does. Second, the chapter proposes a working definition of civil society and tackles the tricky 
question how the normative concept of civil society can be studied empirically. In doing so, 
the chapter differentiates between a ‘structural’ and a ‘cultural’ dimension of civil society. This 
distinction makes clear that civil society consists on the one hand of formally established 
non-governmental organizations, associations and groups, but requires on the other hand a 
respective cultural basis, a civil ethos or “Sittlichkeit” without which the concept remains 
hollow and fails to live up to its normative ideal. The chapter argues that the differentiation 
into a structural and cultural dimension allows us to study the development of civil society in 
different cultural settings and to pinpoint indicators for research. Finally, the chapter explores 
the preconditions of civil society in post-communist settings.  
2.1 Contemporary Understandings of Civil Society 
The concept of civil society understood as a realm distinct of the state developed in the 18th 
and 19th century. Previously the terms civil and political society were used as synonyms in 
relation to the classical concept of Aristotele’s politiké koinonia or societas civilis in which the 
public realm of equal citizens was at the same time the realm of politics and the state. As a 
result, the term civil society was less determined by the distinction between society and the 
state than by the distinction between the public and the private. In the 18th century political 
thinkers such as Ferguson, Tocqueville, Paine, Locke or Hegel raised the question of the 
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relationship between civil society and political authority anew and differentiated between civil 
society and the state.15 The concept of civil society was then grounded in concerns with 
problems inherent in complex societies based on modern economic production on the one 
hand and the dangers inherent in state despotism on the other.16  
Starting in the end of the 19th far into the 20th century, the concept of civil society was nearly 
forgotten. However, it celebrated a glorious renaissance in the last 20 years. “A strange 
coalition between Eastern-European ‘dissidents’ and left-wing oriented intellectuals of the 
West” (Hann 2000: 87) revitalized and renewed the concept. Eastern dissidents such as 
Adam Michnik, Vaclav Havel, György Konrad or Elemer Hankiss (re-) discovered the concept 
of civil society as a realm independent of the state, implying a dualism between the people 
and the repressive authoritarian state. One should note that the renewed concept of civil 
society in Central and Eastern Europe had – in the words of Alexander Smolnar – “never (…) 
much to do with the grand theoretical debates that one may trace across two centuries in the 
works of Locke, Adam Smith, Hegel, Tocqueville, Marx …” (Smolnar 1996: 24). Instead civil 
society was defined in opposition to the communist system, it was understood as one unitary 
agent determined by autonomy and solidarity. Civil society was regarded as ‘the reality as it 
should be’ connected with the strong conviction of a lost normality associated with the 
West.17 Civil society thus described a utopian state, namely the utopia of a society free of 
communist rule. Furthermore, the renewed concept lost the fears and risks attached to it in 
the 18th century by Hegel and later Marx.18 The new authors were less concerned with the 
dangers and risks of a commercialized, bourgeois society; social conflict, self-interest, 
corruption were no issues; they were instead concerned with the dangers of unlimited state 
power just like the naturalists and authors of the Scottish enlightenment. The negative 
connotations of the term ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ described by Hegel and Marx vanished.19  
15 See Keane (1988) for a detailed description of how this distinction developed.  
16 For classical writers on civil society see: Arato / Cohen (1992); Keane (1988).  
17 For a description of this “ethical model” of civil society see: Ogrodzinski (1995). 
18 For Hegel civil society is not a natural condition of freedom but rather a historically produced 
sphere of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) positioned between household and state. However, civil society 
cannot remain civil unless it is ordered politically by a supreme public authority, by the law, the police 
and by corporations which remedy injustices inherent in a ‘system of needs’ and which synthesizes 
particular interests (see e.g. Keane 1988).  
19 This fact becomes obvious in the German language due to the new usage of the term 
‘Zivilgesellschaft’ instead of ‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’. While the former is associated with citoyen, a 
citizen that strives for the common good, the latter focuses on the bourgeois, who strives for his 
economic well-being.   
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The West (re-)imported the concept of civil society from the East. While in the East the 
concept was re-vitalized in response to the totalitarian state, for the West the concept was 
highly welcomed as a response to a growing disillusionment with the state. Firstly, it was 
adopted by leftist intellectuals who saw the concept as a socio-democratic answer to the 
controversies of the Keynesian Welfare-State and as a “plausible surrogate for the illusionary 
visions of revolution of the new left” (Arato 1990: 110; translation by the author). Civil society 
– and a theory thereof - seemed to be a way to overcome theoretical debates between 
pluralists, liberals and communitarians, as Arato / Cohen (1992) stated in the introduction to 
their book. Soon the concept was used by scholars and politicians of different theoretical and 
political backgrounds. However, the concept did not develop as one theory encompassing 
different approaches (as Arato/Cohen presumed). The term civil society is instead associated 
with various meanings and based on divergent assumptions.  
The following section outlines various contemporary understandings of the term. It will be 
evident that the visions of civil society described below are all based on different 
understandings of the “self”, the state, state-society relationships and democracy. Some 
approaches apply a broad definition of the term. Accordingly, civil society is regarded as a 
realm outside the state that incorporates a wide range of organized entities. By contrast, 
others define civil society narrowly and point to segments of society that act as carriers of 
civil society (Kocka 2000:22). What all concepts have in common, however, is that they 
describe a normative ideal, i.e. they portray, albeit not explicitly, how reality should be. 
Moreover, this reality as it should be is more often than not a democratic state. However, the 
mechanisms by which civil society is assumed to strengthen democracy are rather diverse.  
2.1.1 Liberal Approaches - Civil Society as a Realm Outside the State 
Traditionally civil society is a truly liberal concept aiming to guarantee the freedom of the 
individual. The major driving force behind the concept was the aim to fight despotism. The 
concept of civil society is hence established as the opposite of despotism, as “a space in 
which social groups could exist and move – something which exemplified and would ensure 
softer, more tolerable conditions of existence” (Hall 1995:1). As a bastion of free citizens 
against despotic rule, the concept is in this view inevitably rooted in individualism (ibid: 15). 
Without a “modular man”, an individual neither caged by kings nor kin-ship who “takes his 
own promises and commitments seriously”… and “can combine into specific-purpose, ad hoc 
limited association without binding himself by some blood ritual” (Gellner 1995: 41p), and 
without “civil qualities” “engendering a sense of obligation to (…) anonymous members of the 
same civil society” (Shils 1997: 71) a civil society is not feasible.  
 29
Such a perspective defines civil society broadly. It does not regard a small segment of 
society which acts as the main carrier of ethical life as most suitable in bringing about the 
merits of civil society. Civil society is instead seen as a realm independent of the state, 
including all the spheres of society juxtaposed to the state. Civil society thus encompasses 
the inseparable roles of the individual as a private family member, an economically active 
bourgeois and political citizen (Arato / Cohen 1992: 219).  
From a classical rights-oriented liberal perspective in line with John Locke, civil society is 
seen as the sphere of individual citizens doing their business freely and independently of 
state interventions. Civil society is a sphere in which the rights of the individual to private life, 
freedom and property is protected from state arbitrariness. The free individuals transfer parts 
of their rights to the government in order to ensure the security of life, property and freedom. 
However, only those parts necessary to guarantee this security and to make peaceful co-
existence possible are transferred. The role of government is consequently reduced to a 
guarantor of peace and stability, upholding the social order approved by majority.20 Civil 
society is consequently the sphere of all societal life apart from the state. It is neither in 
opposition to nor in control of the state, nor does it complement it. It simply stands outside a 
minimal state. In fact, neither control nor opposition to the state is necessary, as civil society 
determines the boundaries of governmental rule. In this sense  
“Civil society is the governor which regulates both the economy and the government 
although both are, to some degree, autonomous” (Shils 1997: 74). 
From this standpoint, civil society and the market economy cannot be divided. Individual 
rights to privacy, the public sphere (free speech and association), and equality before the law 
are to be protected, and governmental rule is restricted to limited spheres.  
A slightly different view, albeit grounded in individualism and a broad definition of civil society, 
goes one step further. Civil society is more than a sphere outside the state that is protected 
from governmental rule. It also acts as a countervailing force, which balances and 
subsequently controls state power. In this perspective, a civil society counterbalancing and 
controlling the state is essential to complement democratic state institutions, ensure the 
functioning of democratic rules and regulations, and prevent the centralization of state 
powers.  
The interpretation of civil society as a countervailing power is based on Tocqueville and 
Montesquieu, both liberal thinkers concerned with the dangers of despotism. Legitimate rule 
based on checks and balances as evident in Montesquieu’s division of powers was regarded 
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as the effective mechanism to counter despotism. Tocqueville was also concerned with the 
dangers inherent in an egalitarian society and feared “democratic despotism”. In his view, the 
equality and the rule of the many was undermining the achievements of cultural life and 
endangering the freedom of the individual. His solution entails the reinforcement of liberal 
institutions as e.g. local self-government, free press, and independent associations in order 
to balance the power of the state. Subsequently, civil society is understood as the 
organization of strong and autonomous groups that balance the state.21 Such a view is 
evident in the following definition: 
“Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong 
enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling 
its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests can nevertheless 
prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (Gellner 1995: 32). 
Civil society is consequently a strong force able to counterbalance and to control the state 
without preventing it from fulfilling its necessary tasks.  
2.1.2 The Pluralist Approach - Civil Society and the Plurality of Organized 
Collective Interests 
A different viewpoint stresses the importance of the plurality of civil society organizations and 
associations as the building block for modern democracy. Similarly to Hegel, who in his 
Philosophy of Rights assigned corporations the important task of mediating between civil 
society and the powers of the state, major importance is given to organizations and 
associations that act as an intermediary sphere between society and state and mediate the 
plurality of interests to the state (Streek 1987: 472). Such a viewpoint applies an all-
embracing understanding of civil society including particular and economic interests. 
The basic element that links society and state is not the individual citizen and his/her 
interests but large organizations and organized collective interests. These organizations 
mediate citizen’s interest to the state and thus ensure accountable government. One must 
note, however, that this holds only if certain assumptions apply: (1) individual citizens in their 
position as organizational members equally determine the politics of their organization, and 
(2) the various organizations enjoy equal opportunities to influence decision making 
 
20 For more on the works of John Locke, see: Braun/Heine/Opolka (1990: 136pp), Schmidt (2000: 
66pp). 
21 For more on the works of  works of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, see: Hall (1995: 7pp), 
Naßmacher (1997: 297pp, 317pp), Braun/Heine/Opolka (1990: 154), Schmidt (2000).  
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processes, and that the various interests of society are equally represented and accounted 
for by political power holders.  
Critics point out that neither assumption is supportable. Large organizations are seldom run 
by their individual (often inactive) members, rather by small and powerful committees. 
Moreover, the degree of organizational representation as well as the capacity for collective 
action varies strongly in different sectors. Depending on the size of the organization and the 
availability of resources, some find it easier to organize effectively than others.22  
Pluralist approaches additionally point to the capacity of an organized civil society to 
peacefully resolve conflicts by mediating various interests. Social group conflict that runs 
along the line of major cleavages has the potential of disintegrating society in a way that 
makes democracy an uncertain goal. This is especially the case if different cleavages mix 
and accumulate: 
“Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create the basis for ideological 
politics, democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such politics does not 
include the concept of tolerance” (Lipset 1981: 74).  
However, a society that is organized in a way that crosscuts major historical cleavages 
stabilizes a democratic system, if individuals are members of different associations, and 
espoused to cross-pressures: 
”The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are 
enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, 
politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the 
population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing 
the intensity of political conflict” (ibid: 77p.). 
Multiple membership in various organizations thus results in a readiness for compromise and 
the integration of interests. A plurality of civil society organizations is therefore regarded as a 
guarantor of peaceful conflict-resolution. 
2.1.3 Critical Democracy Theory - Civil Society and the Political Public 
Sphere 
At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s the concept of civil society was 
revitalized as ”the primary locus for the potential expansion of democracy under ’really 
existing‘ liberal-democratic regimes“ (Arato/Cohen 1992:viii). The “democratic question” was 
raised again and civil society as a means to self-organization and self-government was seen 
22 See e.g. Olson (1968), Offe (1972). 
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as the solution to problems inherent in contemporary democratic systems endangered by 
neo-corporatist arrangements cast by influential interest groups.  
Civil society was hence potentially a way of achieving “more democracy” (Rödel / 
Frankenberger / Dubiel 1989) and “deliberative democracy” (Habermas 1996). Based on the 
discourse ethics developed by Habermas and applying the theory of communicative action, 
in this view the critical potential of civil society is rooted in its capacity to create autonomous 
forms of discourse and to facilitate the institutionalization of discourses.  
Civil society is thus the sphere in which citizens can debate freely and independently of the 
state and other authorities. In other words, it connects private citizens with a public sphere 
“dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market and opinion research, 
and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and advertising of political parties 
and groups” (Habermas 1996: 367). This ability is of utmost importance as the public sphere 
is regarded as the major element linking the private segments of society and state:  
”In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary structure 
between the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of the lifeworld 
and functional systems, on the other” (ibid: 373).  
Civil society enables citizens to contribute and shape the discourse taking place in the 
political public sphere and gain public influence on the political process. It therefore has the 
potential to legitimize democratic decision making, to enhance the acceptance of democratic 
procedures and to contribute to deliberate, i.e. publicly debated and legitimized decision-
making. Moreover, actors of civil society are concerned with revitalizing and enlarging civil 
society and the public sphere.  
Civil society therefore obtains a radical democratic and emancipatory potential. However, this 
is relatively limited. Only if the gained influence passes through the filters of the 
institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion and will formation and is channeled 
through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking, public influence is transformed into 
what Habermas calls “communicative power” (ibid: 371). The public sphere and civil society 
consequently only have radical democratic potential within and with the constitutionally 
institutionalized decision-making process, in other words, within the democratic state.  
The concept of civil society put forward by writers such as Arato/Cohen and Habermas differs 
greatly from the traditional Hegelian model of a bürgerliche Gesellschaft, pictured as a 
‘system of needs’, or more specifically as a market system with social labor and commodity 
exchange. Civil society is understood as a third sphere distinct from political and economic 
society and independent of both: state and market. It is private in content and public in 
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character and consists of the public spheres of societal communication and voluntary 
association. 23 
”Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems 
resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form 
to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that 
institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the 
framework of organized public spheres” (Habermas 1996: 367).  
 Social movements and citizens initiatives are regarded as “the dynamic element in 
processes that might realize the positive potentials of modern civil societies” (Arato/Cohen 
1992: 492), for the main reason that they “are capable of influencing policy and molding 
political culture without entry into the field of power politics and without necessarily 
endangering liberal or democratic institutions” (ibid: xviii). In contrast to formalized institutions 
of the state and large mass organizations, social movements and citizens’ initiatives by 
intellectuals, concerned citizens, radical professionals, and self-proclaimed “advocates” have 
the “advantage of greater sensitivity in detecting and identifying new problem situations” 
(Habermas 1996: 381). They have the capacity to mobilize the public by effectively and 
dramatically presenting new issues, while relying in part on sensational actions, mass 
protests, and persistent campaigning.  
2.1.4 Civil Society and Social Capital  
The work of Alexis deTocqueville points to a further aspect of civil society: The capacity of 
civil society to act as a ‘school of democracy’. In this sense, a variety of voluntary and free 
associations form, habituate and enshrine in their members civil qualities such as tolerance, 
trust and the willingness to compromise, subsequently creating a political-participatory 
potential that immunizes society against illegitimate interventions. Civil society organizations 
thus stimulate the civil qualities necessary to prevent despotic rule. They consist of citizens 
capable and willing to stand up for their rights and to participate in democratic politics. 
 As a result, voluntary organizations stabilize a democratic order and subsequently build the 
heart of a functioning democracy. Following this perspective, civil society socializes its 
members by developing civil qualities inevitable for democracy. 24 
The most famous contemporary scholar, who falls back on and modifies this basic idea is 
Robert Putnam. He sees “social capital” as the key to making democracy work (Putnam 
1993). Social capital is thereby defined as follows:  
23 See Habermas (1996: 366, Cohen/Arato (1992: 410p). 
24 See Croissant / Lauth / Merkel (2000: 12), Gabriel et al (2002: 20pp).  
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“Social capital (…) refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam 1993: 167).  
Social capital and its elements social trust, norms of generalized reciprocity and horizontal 
networks of civic activity contribute to economic as well as institutional success by facilitating 
coordinated actions and spontaneous cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital is thus 
the basic clue that holds society together.  
Social networks and networks of civic commitment are conceived as an essential element of 
social capital as they play a major role in creating both mutual trust and norms of generalized 
reciprocity. Networks of civic commitment have this powerful effect for various reasons:  
“Networks of civic commitment increase the potential costs to a defector in any 
individual transaction (…), (…) foster robust norms of reciprocity (…), (…) facilitate 
communication and improve the flow of information about trustworthiness of individuals 
(…) (and) (…) embody past success at collaboration”…(ibid: 173p). 
Social networks, voluntary associations and organizations are the important elements that 
bring about a stable democracy. However, not all associations are equally equipped in 
facilitating social cooperation. Only organizations that are horizontally structured are capable 
to achieve that goal. Horizontally ordered groups such as sport clubs, cooperatives, mutual 
aid society or cultural associations are best suited to positively contribute to good 
governance. In summary, civil society consists of small, non-hierarchical self-organized 
entities, which ensure personal contact. Only then can inter-personal trust and stable social 
norms and values develop. In the words of Putnam: “Good government in Italy is a by-
product of singing groups and soccer clubs, not prayer” (ibid: 176).  
Putnam’s analysis, however, provides a bitter bill for countries that lack deep traditions of 
civic life and cannot look back to a history marked by a flourishing community life, guilds, 
neighborhood associations, tower societies or other forms of civic commitment. The only 
advice left to them is “get a history” (Pridham 1994). Pointing to the persistency and 
astonishing constancy of traditions of civic involvement even in times of extensive social 
change (1993: 148pp), Putnam leaves countries with the “wrong” history little hope for a 
stable democratic order.  
2.1.5 Communitarian Approaches - Civil Society and Small Communities 
Communitarians stress a further function of civil society: the ability of civil society to create 
identity, solidarity and an encompassing interest. 
Communitarianism evolved from the criticism of liberalism. As a result, communitarians can 
not be comprehended as a coherent school, rather as a group of diverse critics of liberalism. 
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The main argument common to all states that a liberal society undermines the very 
conditions on which it relies and consequently cannot unfold its functions. The critic circles 
around the perception of individuals seen as “unencumbered selves” (Sandel 1984) or 
‘atomized individuals’. Humans are instead social beings whose identity is formed in 
communities. Without an interest oriented at the common good and without a (republican) 
civic virtue, civic commitment, solidarity and an encompassing interest, the very basis on 
which individuals and individual rights rely will be undermined.25  
The communitarian literature on civil society is nurtured by the fear that associational life in 
the “advanced” capitalist and social democratic countries is at risk (see e.g. Sandel 1984; 
Walzer 1995). The steady attenuation of everyday cooperation and civic friendship as well as 
networks through which civility is produced and reproduced have been neglected. Only social 
networks and communities have the capacity to build a social character and a civic virtue 
inevitable for collective life and democracy by re-producing codex of behavior. Not universal 
values postulated in a Kantian tradition, rather traditions of protest and reform are decisive. 
Communitarians thus stress the importance of small communities and networks on identity 
and on social life.  
Civil society is seen as the autonomous sphere on which communities and a collective 
identity can take shape. Walzer (1995) comprehends civil society as the re-vitalization of 
social networks and as a society with collective identity which is oriented at the public good 
and at an encompassing interest. Civil society incorporates on the one hand institutions and 
organizations of societal self-organization, on the other hand, a political culture based on 
civic virtue.  
2.1.6 The Third Sector Approach - Civil Society and Effectiveness  
A further approach to civil society that is disconnected to classical accounts of civil society 
became prominent under the heading of the “Third Sector” and thus placed emphasis on the 
distinction of civil society organizations from the state and market. In contrast to critical 
democracy theory that stresses the participatory potential and political role of NGOs, the 
Third Sector approach originally underlines the efficiency of NGOs in providing services. Civil 
society and its organizations are in this sense more efficient than the state and the market in 
performing certain tasks. The research on the “third” or “nonprofit” sector thus originated from 
the “crisis of the state” and in particular the crisis of the welfare state (Anheier/Salamon 1999: 
4) and points to the capacity of NGOs to compensate for state as well as market failure. Non-
25 See Reese-Schäfer (2001). 
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governmental organizations, so the argument goes, possess comparative advantages over 
the state and market. On the one hand, NGOs enjoy more public confidence and trust than 
the market. On the other hand, NGOs are seen as more flexible, innovative and cost-efficient 
than the state in providing services (see e.g. Brunnengräber/Walk 2000). Although the 
research on the Third Sector is grounded in concerns of the diminishing state capacity to 
fulfill social services, its scope widened in recent years due to the rise and growing 
importance of NGO activities in policy fields such as development, environment, minority 
issues and so forth. Attention shifts to the political and participatory role of NGOs and to the 
role of NGOs as carriers of civil society. This shift is evident in a new terminology that is 
increasingly applied: the term “non-governmental organization” is increasingly replaced by 
the term “civil society organizations” stressing the postulated civil society potential of NGOs. 
Third Sector organizations are thereby defined as follows: “formally structured, independent, 
voluntary, self-organized and non-profit oriented non-governmental organizations” (Piller 
1999: 13, see also Anheier/Salamon 1999: 3/4). 26  
Despite the shift of the Third Sector research from an exclusive focus on NGOs as savior of 
the Welfare state to the democratic potential of civil society organization one important 
feature of the literature prevails: efficiency. NGOs or CSOs are regarded as more efficient 
than state and market in providing services. It has been argued that the service function of 
civil society is responsible for its global attractiveness. Keane (1998:34p), for example, 
attributes the global spread and attractiveness of the concept to a disillusionment with state-
centered concepts. Global markets, transnational relations penetrating state borders, and 
global problems shed doubt on the ability of the territorial nation-state to fulfill basic functions. 
“The current ‘globalization’ of the language of civil society is overdetermined … by 
the dysfunctions resulting from “the overreach of the state” (Chandhoke), and by the 
spreading conviction that only civil societies can do certain things, or perform certain 
functions best” (ibid.).  
As a result “the NGO” is perceived as a strange amalgamation of an efficient “service 
deliverer” and a politically active “advocacy group” that contributes to stable democracy by 
minimizing state activity on the one hand and by increasing citizen participation on the other.  
26 See the literature on the Third Sector: e.g. Klein (1997), Anheier et al (2000), Brunnengräber / 
Walk (2000),  Anheier /Salamon (1999). 
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2.1.7 Summary 
It was made clear that the concept of civil society has traveled far through time and space 
thus acquired various connotations and different meanings. One similarity of various 
approaches can be identified however. The concept of civil society is and has always been 
normative and refers to a democratic ideal. The outlined visions of civil society all point to the 
importance of a vibrant civil society for a stable, legitimate and efficient democratic system.  
The mechanisms that allow for the democratic contribution of civil society are, however, 
poles apart. Reduced to bare bones, the various virtues of civil society can be summarized 
under labels that refer to the major beneficial influence of civil society on democracy: In this 
way, seven major functions of civil society can be identified: (1) the protective function (the 
ability to create a space independent of and protected from the state); (2) the control function 
(the ability to build a countervailing power, inhibiting the centralization of state powers); (3) 
the coordination and mediation function (the ability to represent various interests of society, 
act as an intermediary between state and the individual and provide conflict resolution 
mechanisms); (4) the communicative function (the ability to communicate people’s concerns 
to the public sphere and reflexively stabilize and widen civil society and the public sphere); 
(5) the socialization function (the ability to “teach” democratic behavior and to mobilize 
society), (6) the solidarity function (the ability to build identity and solidarity), and (7) the 
service function (the ability to fulfill certain tasks more efficiently than the state and the 
market).  
It is not the purpose of this study to examine, verify or falsify these democratic virtues of civil 
society.27 For this work the connection between civil society and democracy is only of 
importance in this regard as it is responsible for the prominence of the concept among 
scholars and practitioners alike. Without the widely believed positive effects of civil society on 
democracy , external actors would hardly aim to strengthen civil society from the outside. 
Civil society assistance would not exist and arouse our interest.  
Before I embark upon the problem of defining and operationalizing the normative concept of 
civil society, one caveat is in order. One should restrain from aggregating the democratic 
27 One should note that the positive correlation between civil society and democracy has been 
challenged recently (see e.g. Ekiert/Kubik 1999; Lauth/Merkel 1997, Hann 2000). Critics point to a 
potential “dark side” or “uncivil” sides of civil society (e.g. Lauth/Merkel 1997: 28p). We may, however, 
conclude with Howard (2003: 44), who points out: “But in the end, while they (the critics of a strong 
positive relationship between civil society and democracy) might dispute the relative emphasis placed 
on civil society when compared to other factors, few would actually deny its importance in establishing 
and sustaining a vibrant and healthy democratic system. And fewer still, if any, would suggest that a 
weaker civil society would actually be more beneficial for a democracy”. 
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virtues of civil society regardless of the theoretical contemplation on which each beneficial 
influence is based. Abstracting the democratic functions of civil society from the underlying 
understandings of civil society and thus neglecting that these interpretations are based on 
diverse assumptions of the self, society and the state, leaves the concept of civil society 
open to arbitrariness. One may doubt whether civil society can fulfill all functions 
simultaneously. Being involved as a representative of particular interests in the political 
decision making process impedes the ability to act as a ‘watch-dog’ of state decisions. A civil 
society organization is therefore unlikely to simultaneously play the role of a countervailing 
power and an intermediary. An uncritical accumulation of the different functions is thus not 
possible (Lauth/Merkel 1997: 29). 
2.2 Studying Civil Society  
In the following I aim to solve the puzzle how the normative concept of civil society can be 
studied empirically. In this regard, three main problems are at stake: First, a definition of civil 
society is needed that is open to empirical research, on the one hand, and preserves the 
normative orientation of the concept on the other hand. As made clear above, the concept of 
civil society points to a utopian ideal how society should be. Most accounts stress the 
beneficial effects of civil society on democracy. However, they fail to identify clear indicators 
for research. Second, one may raise doubt whether the concept of civil society is at all 
applicable in transforming societies and newly established democracies. Critics point to the 
origins of civil society as a purely Western concept that does not travel easily in other cultural 
and historical contexts (see e.g. Hann 2000). Not only has the concept been developed in 
Western Europe, civil society in the West also grew over a long period of time, in a historic 
process that is inevitably connected to the establishment of a bourgeois middle class, and an 
economy based on commodity production in the 18th and 19th century. For all these reasons, 
one needs to pose the question whether civil society can be transferred into other contextes. 
Third, an empirical analysis of civil society requires observable indicators.  
This section argues that these problems can be solved if we disconnect the organizations of 
civil society from the cultural basis of civil society and study both separately. To differentiate 
between what I call the ‘structural dimension’ and the ‘cultural dimension’ of civil society is 
promising in two aspects. First, a distinction between the structural and the cultural 
dimension of civil society allows us to pinpoint different stages of civil society development, 
and thus to focus on civil society in transforming societies. This method thus reconciles 
empirical and normative claims, and enables us to describe the actual in relation to the ideal. 
Second, concentrating on both dimensions separately facilitates the search for adequate 
indicators of research. Before I proceed to propose a dynamic model of civil society 
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development and identify appropriate indicators of research, in the following I clarify how civil 
society will be understood in this analysis.  
2.2.1 Defining Civil Society  
Every empirical research that focuses on civil society faces the problem of defining what civil 
society is and which entities and qualities characterize a vibrant civil society. As made clear 
above, this endeavor is problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, most accounts of civil 
society lack definitional clarity. On the other hand, civil society is taken as a means to 
achieve anything desirable. Due to the sharp contrast between the vague definition of the 
term and the idealistic image of civil society, the concept has been criticized for risking 
arbitrariness, and lacking empirical scrutiny. In the words of Keane (1998: 36): 
“There are even signs that the meanings of the term “civil society” are multiplying to 
the point where, like a catchy advertising slogan, its risks imploding through overuse”. 
In general, civil society refers to a sphere between the state and the individual and to formally 
organized forms of societal life. Most theorists agree that civil society consists of freely 
generated, voluntary (unforced), autonomous (independent), self-organized (self-constituted, 
self-mobilized), formally institutionalized (through laws and subjective rights) spheres of 
social life. A further main definitional characteristic of civil society on which all modern 
definitions of civil society agree is negative: civil society is not the state or independent of the 
state.28 
There is disagreement whether civil society incorporates the private or intimate sphere (as 
e.g. assumed by Walzer (1995) or Arato/Cohen (1992)) and the market (as e.g. postulated by 
Diamond (1994), Shils (1997)).  
This study only focuses on formally established organizations that act publicly. As outlined 
above, the term civil society traditionally refers to the distinction between the private and the 
public sphere. The factor that characterizes a civil society is that citizens interact and trust 
28 For example, Diamond (1994: 5) defines civil society as: “the realm of organized social life that 
is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal 
order or set of shared rules.” According to Arato/Cohen (1992: ix) civil society is “… a sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of 
public communication. Modern Civil Society is created through forms of self-constitution and self-
mobilization. It is institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, that 
stabilize social differentiation…”. Walzer (1995: 7) sees civil society as …”the space of un-coerced 
human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, 
interest, and ideology – that fill this space”. According to Howard (2003: 34) “civil society refers to the 
realm of organizations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally protected, 
autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens”. 
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others they do not know. Civil society is thus the realm where citizens leave their close 
circles of family and friends and interact not on the basis of sympathy or clan loyalty but in 
order to achieve a common interest or to advocate a common idea. For these reasons, the 
understanding of civil society applied in this study excludes the private and intimate sphere of 
the family and relational networks.  
Furthermore, civil society as understood in this work is distinct from what has been called 
“political society” and “economic society” (see Linz/Stepan (1996); Merkel et al (2000), 
Howard (2003)). Whereas the former encompasses societal actors that participate in politics 
(e.g. leadership of political parties), the latter refers to economically oriented societal 
organizations such as firms or financial institutions. Following the line of argument of 
Habermas (1996) and Arato/Cohen (1992), civil society is the sphere where people organize 
not primarily in order to make a profit, as is the rationale of economic actors, or to achieve 
power, the driving force behind actors of the political society (although power and profit may 
be a side-effect). Instead citizens group together in order to jointly and autonomously solve 
their daily problems and press through their common interests without relying on the state or 
the market. Howard (2003: 35) further separates economic and political society on the one 
hand and civil society on the other by the distinction between the elite and mass level. 
“In civil society, individual members can effect or prevent change by acting through 
their organization. In both economic society and political society, however, individual 
elites still have the power to control policies, even when they are not acting within, or 
on behalf of, an organization” (ibid).  
In other words, civil society is the realm that enables citizens to participate in politics and to 
pursue their interests despite their lack of power and financial resources.29  
So far I have defined civil society as a sphere between the state and market that consists of 
freely established, voluntary, autonomous, self-organized, formally established associations, 
groups and non-governmental organizations. Although this definition corresponds with how 
most people (as e.g. donors, see chapter 3.4) comprehend civil society, it still does not 
suffice to fully grasp the notion of civil society. A definition that merely focuses on non-state 
associations and organizations fails to enshrine the normative assumptions of the concept. 
Critics point out that the mere existence of independent and voluntary associations and 
organizations does not suffice to stabilize a democratic system (e.g. Berman 1997). 
Organizations that fit the above definition may threaten or undermine a democratic system – 
terrorist, nationalist or racist organizations such as the ETA or the Ku Klux Klan are unlikely 
to contribute to more democracy. Additionally, society may organize along ethical or racial 
29 One should note that political, economic and civil society may overlap. See Howard (2003: 
35pp).  
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lines. In such a case, civil society is not cross-cutting, but instead cements and even 
intensifies social conflict (Lauth/Merkel 1997: 28). Membership in various independent and 
cross-cutting organizations is therefore regarded as a major building block of civil society: 
“Civil society must depend upon the ability to escape any particular cage; 
membership of autonomous groups needs to be both voluntary and overlapping if 
society is to become civil” (Hall 1995: 15).  
If we define civil society by a mere focus on its organizations, neglecting the purpose of these 
organizations, their internal structure and membership, we have to take into account that civil 
society may reveal dark sides which undermine or hinder democratization.  
In answering this criticism Gellner (1995: 32) points out that not every set of autonomous 
groups creates a civil society: 
“Such (broad) definition would include under the notion of ‘civil society’ many forms 
of social order which in fact would not satisfy us, or those who have in recent years felt 
inspired by this slogan”. 
Gellner’s answer points to a ‘modular man’, a free individual neither caged by kings nor by 
kinship groups. Others, such as Habermas, stress the importance of a liberal political cultural 
as a necessary basis of civil society: 
”A robust civil society can develop only in the context of a liberal political culture and 
the corresponding patterns of socialization, and on the basis of an integral private 
sphere; it can blossom only in an already rationalized lifeworld. Otherwise, populist 
movements arise that blindly defend the frozen traditions of a lifeworld endangered by 
capitalist modernization” (Habermas 1996: 371) 
Similarly, different writers point to an attached morality, a cultural, moral or ethical basis, an 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) (Hegel), a “civic ethos” (Offe 2000a), a “civic culture” (Almond/Verba 
1963), or “civilizational competence” (Sztompka 1993) as inevitable characteristics of civil 
society.30 Without the basis of appropriate moral qualities and patterns of behavior, civil 
society is not “civil” and fails to exert the beneficial influence on democracy outlined above. 
Civil society ensures coordinated action and peaceful conflict resolution under the condition 
of anonymity in complex societies. Complex societies are characterized by the fact that it is 
impossible for the citizens to know each other on a personal basis. This anonymity severely 
constrains collective action. How can I be sure that the other does not deceive me if I never 
have seen him before and cannot be sure of ever seeing him again? The answer points to 
the cultural basis of civil society that generates mutual trust and reciprocity. A civic ethos here 
does not consist of a common set of mutually shared values. Civil society is not a community 
of faith inspired by a common public good, a corporatist ideal, for which each individual is 
30 See for example: Lauth/Merkel (1997:22); Hildermeier et al (2000: 7p). 
 42
                                                
willing to sacrifice him or herself. Instead it is a culture of a society of “modular man” who 
trust their fellow citizens not because they follow the same vision of the future but because 
one can trust that they do not damage one’s own vision of the future. The cultural basis of 
civil society thus consists first and foremost of a mutually shared understanding on what is 
wrong and what is right and the strong confidence that legal regulations are legitimate and 
binding and that (unknown) others equally comply with the same set of rules that ensure a 
“civilized” co-existence (see e.g. Offe 2000a). In this way, civil society generates reciprocal 
trust, respect and tolerance of others, merits without which peaceful conflict resolution is 
hardly possible.31 Besides the trust in others, civil society also relies on the trust in oneself, 
i.e. in one’s ability to bring about change or to inhibit changes that are not in one’s interest. 
The inevitable consequence this contemplation suggests is that civil society consists of more 
than structural features, i.e. voluntary and independent associations and organizations of 
social life. It additionally requires a certain culture consisting of moral qualities such as 
tolerance and trust as well as a declared conviction that conflict can be solved in a peaceful 
manner and that citizens have the right and the might to criticize the state and to participate 
in politics if they see a necessity to do so. Moreover, civil society is in need of rule and law 
and a legitimate political system. Without the conviction that legal rules are binding and that 
political leaders are accountable to the same rules and respond to societal needs, actors of 
civil society soon lose the confidence that their actions will make a difference. The 
relationship between state and civil society is thus not one of confrontation and threat, rather 
reciprocal and interactive (Howard 2003: 38). Hall (1995: 16) describes this relationship as 
follows:  
“The image of the state that suits civil society is that of eighteenth-century Britain in 
which state and society interacted continuously, with state capacity being increased by 
the ability to work through notables who accepted this because they trusted an 
institution – their institution – that they could control. The expression that catches this 
notion best is that applied by Samuels (…) a ‘politics of reciprocal consent’”. 
In summary, civil society as understood in this analysis is a sphere of organized social life 
between the state and market. It is composed of freely created, voluntary, autonomous, self-
organized, formally established associations, groups and non-governmental organizations, 
31 One should note that the cultural basis of civil society can be understood in two ways. Following 
a Kantian interpretation morality is seen as a universal obligation. Morality is determined by a state of 
nature and describes reality as it should be. As already pointed out, this perception is contrasted by 
the Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit. Here morality is the achievement of a historical development. 
Morality and civil behavior do not exist in a state of nature; rather they are the result of education and 
the process of social interchange. The concept of civil society thereby points to the importance of 
associations in developing this ethical life. This analysis will apply the second understanding of the 
term. The cultural basis of civil society is understood as Sittlichkeit which is the result of the historical 
development a society has undergone. Rather than the universal claim of a Kantian ‘Sollen’, this 
second perspective allows for different development paths in various societies. 
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and based on a certain culture, a civic ethos, i.e. moral qualities and patterns of behavior 
without which it fails to exert its beneficial influences on democracy. Finally, civil society 
needs a legitimate and legal order to flourish.  
Civil society thus needs what is assumed to generate: a civic ethic and moral qualities such 
as tolerance and trust, on the one hand, and a democratic order and stable democratic 
institutions on the other. This reciprocity is the very reason why the concept of civil society is 
criticized for lacking empirical scrutiny. In the words of Hall (1995: 2), one can conclude:  
“Civil society is complicated, most notably in being at one and the same time a 
social value and a set of social institutions.”  
2.2.2 A Dynamic Model of Civil Society  
With the definition of civil society derived above in mind, we now may raise the question: how 
can the originally Western concept of civil society develop in different cultural settings? If a 
democratic order as well as an appropriate cultural basis is a prerequisite for a vibrant civil 
society, how can we expect civil society to develop in contexts that lack these conditions? 
Furthermore, the institutions and moral qualities of civil society have been developed in the 
West over a long period of time and not for instrumental reasons – i.e. means to stabilize a 
democratic and capitalist system - but for their own sake as a value in itself (Offe 2000a: 92). 
Lauth/Merkel (1997: 16) rightly point out that the protagonists of civil society who point to the 
democratic virtues of civil society as a means of stabilizing new democracies obliterate the 
fact that theoretical approaches to civil society concentrate on established democracies. In 
transforming societies, where democratic institutions as well as institutions of civil society are 
weak, civil society does not contribute to democracy per se, but the beneficial effects of civil 
society on democracy vary. For all these reasons, civil society is – according to its critics - 
unlikely to take root in other historical and cultural settings. Contradicting this view, Keane for 
example (1998) points to the prominence of the concept in other cultures and proclaims the 
adoptability of the concept. Schmitter (1997: 251) argues:  
“While the historical origins are unequivocally rooted in Western Europe, the norms 
and practices of civil society are relevant to the consolidation of democracy in all 
cultural and geographic areas of the world…”.  
The question arises, however, how civil society originates in contexts that are unfavorable to 
its development. How can the above citied norms and practices of civil society that are 
relevant to the consolidation of democracy develop, if neither citizens with an “appropriate 
spirit” nor binding democratic regulations are in place? How do we solve the puzzle that civil 
society needs what it is assumed to generate?  
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The solution of Croissant/Lauth/Merkel (2000) points to different types of civil society with a 
varying impact on democratization. They identify five criteria which determine the degree to 
which civil society impedes or enhances democratization.32 Depending on these five criteria 
civil society is either “ambivalent”, i.e. less beneficial to democracy, or “reflexive”, meaning 
that it contributes to the consolidation of democracy. Kocka (2000: 15) makes the point that in 
the 18th century civil society was seen as a process of continuing civilization. Civil society 
described the utopian vision of a future society (ibid: 16). Following both arguments, this 
study proposes a dynamic model of civil society, which conceives civil society as a process. 
On the one hand civil society is an (unattainable) utopian ideal. On the other hand it relates 
to the process of civil society development. In this regard civil society is not a fixed and 
unchangeable state of society, but may take various forms which are more or less ‘civil’. 
These forms are best described by the state of the two dimensions of civil society: the 
structural and cultural dimension of civil society. It is plausible that in transforming societies 
and new (and even old) democracies the two dimensions of civil society are not equally well 
developed. Four ideal types of civil society development are thus conceivable (see table 1).33  
32 The five criteria read as follows: (1) civil society can or cannot be organized around societal 
cleavages and is hence more or less likely to deepen social conflict and to undermine democratic rule. 
(2) The relationship between actors of civil society is more or less determined by hierarchical power 
relationships. (3) Civil society is more or less affected by particular interests. (4) The internal structure 
of civil society organizations is more or less characterized by democratic procedures in contrast to 
clientelism. (5) Civil society is more or less representative of society as a whole. 
33 One should note that in reality the applied distinction is not as clear cut as proposed here. The 
structural and cultural dimensions of civil society are connected. On the one hand, a fully inclusive and 
representative structure is not thinkable without an appropriate cultural basis of tolerance and trust and 
a belief in the necessity and feasibility of participation. On the other hand an appropriate civic spirit 
cannot develop outside organizations of civil society. 
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Table  1 Ideal Types of Civil Society Development 
 
The unlikely first case determines a lack of non-state associations and organizations as well 
as a lack of the moral qualities and civic spirit of civil society.  
Secondly, civil society in a given country may consist of various associations and 
organizations, while its citizens lack the moral qualities and patterns of behavior that typify a 
vibrant civil society. In this case, an elaborated structural dimension of civil society contrasts 
with a poor cultural dimension of civil society. Croissant et al (2000: 37) speak in this regard 
of an ambivalent society, i.e. organizations of civil society are based on particular interests, 
clientelism or ethnic or national bonds. This type of ‘uncivil’ society cements national or 
ethical or other societal cleavages and is highly conflict-ridden. In the context of this study, a 
further case of a structural civil society is of importance. Organizations of civil society may be 
detached from society and local demands. In this case, non-state organizations and 
associations have no local constituencies and are not driven by indigenous concerns. They 
are not the result of the self-organization of society, but have been formed to satisfy the 
interests of other actors. On the one hand, these may be political or economic elites that use 
non-governmental organizations as a means to get power or to make profit – in this regard 
we speak of GONGOs (governmental oriented NGOs). On the other hand, external actors, 
namely foreign donor organizations, use NGOs in order to implement their programs (see in 
detail chapter 3). Such DONGOs, thus donor-oriented NGOs or GONGOs, are like a 
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supplementary social stratum or façade of civil society and cannot develop the virtues of civil 
society described above.  
In the third case, organizations of civil society reveal the above mentioned ”civic ethos”. 
Those are few in number though. In this case, which I label as elite civil society, only few 
citizens are organized and only a limited number of rather homogenous groups based on a 
set of shared values and norms exist. An elite civil society is based on solidarity and trust 
between its members. Social diversity is downplayed. Civil society is regarded as a unitary 
agent in order to achieve a high degree of solidarity and identity needed to preserve the 
(largely informal) organizations in spite of lacking (formal) rights. The circles of Central and 
Eastern European dissidents and illegal protest movements that opposed communist 
regimes before 1989 are a case in point (see Ogrodzinski 1995). The small number of 
(informal) groups and organizations here is the result of an authoritarian state which does not 
grant free citizen rights and suppresses the development of free spheres independent of the 
state. Nonetheless, throughout the communist period partly legal, partly illegal citizen 
initiatives existed that were outside the control of the communist state. These “small circles of 
freedom” acted as if the free organization of society were possible, and aimed to “be 
constantly and incessantly visible in public life” (Michnik 1985 cit. in Matynia 2001: 921). 
Their actions were based on a moral concept of society as the sphere of citizens living in 
“truth” and “dignity”. Values within society were contrasted with the ambiguities of the 
Communist regime thus praising the former and de-legitimizing the latter.34  
Finally, an elaborated structural and cultural dimension describes the last ideal type of civil 
society development, what has been called a “classical” (Ogrodzinski 1995) or “reflexive” 
(Croissant et al 2000) civil society. Here the connection with democratization is appropriate 
as civil society fully contributes to more democracy. However, this ideal is to be 
comprehended as a utopian stage which can hardly be observed in any country, neither in 
the East nor the West. 
The proposed dynamic model of civil society which conceptualizes civil society as a process 
to a future ideal and not as a fixed state allows to us to study civil society empirically, without 
losing the normative orientation of the concept. Civil society always contributes to 
democracy. However, civil society is the concept that describes the ideal we aim to achieve 
while the state of associational life may be elite-oriented or structural.  
34 One should note that an elite civil society may not only exist in authoritarian states. If the 
relationship with the state is one of close cooperation rather than conflict, an under-structured civil 
society is equally possible. Here small and well organized segments of society maintain regular 
contact and numerous connections and neo-corporatist arrangements with the state. Intransparency, 
corruption, nepotism and a lack of representation are likely risks. 
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2.2.3 Indicators for Research  
The following section tackles the question how to analyze the structural and the cultural 
dimension of civil society empirically. What observable indicators describe the two 
dimensions of civil society? While the observation of the structural features of civil society, 
i.e. voluntary and autonomous associations and organizations, does not seem very 
problematic, the empirical description of a “civic ethos” poses a challenge. 
As understood in this analysis, the structural component of civil society encompasses any 
institutionalized form of societal life that is freely created, formally established, voluntary, 
autonomous, self-organized and is neither the state nor market. The structural dimension of 
civil society thus coincides with what has recently been labeled the “non-governmental 
sector”, the “Third Sector” or the “nonprofit sector”. The Third Sector, and thus the structural 
dimension of civil society, is commonly described by using the number of organizations and 
their distribution according to major fields of activity as indicators.35 Studies that concentrate 
on civil society in CEE often additionally include the registration date of NGOs in the analysis 
in order to demonstrate the development and the growth of non-governmental civil activity in 
these countries.36 Additionally, the regional distribution of NGOs is important in transition 
states. More often than not, NGOs firstly form in the capital and in large cities. An equal 
regional distribution of NGOs is thus a sign of a more advanced civil society. Howard (2003: 
52pp) further points to the importance of organizational membership in describing civil 
society. He makes clear that the exclusive focus upon registered organizations neglects the 
fact that many of those organizations may simply exist on paper but in fact have ended their 
activities. Additionally, many organizations often have a small membership, a phenomenon 
that is especially striking in post-communist states. The number of members often barely 
exceeds the minimum number of members required for registration (usually three to seven 
members) (ibid). In sum, the more people are freely and voluntarily organized or participate 
in and contribute to institutionalized forms of social life and the more organizations exist and 
the more pluralistic they are, the more developed the structure of civil society will be. The 
indicators for the structural dimension of civil society are therefore size, inclusiveness and 
plurality, which are evident in the absolute number of organizations, in organizational 
membership, in the variety of fields of activity, and in the regional distribution of 
organizations.  
35 Several empirical studies on civil society or the ‘non-profit sector’ make use of quantitative data 
on the number, distribution or registration date of NGOs and associations. See e.g. Anheier/Salamon 
(1999), Jenkins (1999), Hankiss (1990), Ekiert/Kubik (1999) or the country studies in Civicus (1997).  
36 See e.g. Ekiert/Kubik (1999), Miszlievetz/Jensen (1998), see also chapters 7.2.1. and 8.2.1. in 
this analysis.  
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An exclusive focus on non-governmental organizations and the structural dimension of civil 
society assumes, however, that any NGO is fruitful to democracy – regardless of its internal 
structure or mission. Critics question the claim that NGOs are “more democratic and better” 
(Schmidt / Take 1997) than other segments of society and point to the lacking empirical basis 
of this assumption (e.g. Beyme 2000, Hann 2000). No evidence exists that suggests that 
NGOs act per se as carriers of civil society.  
As pointed out above, civil society consists of more than non-governmental organizations. It 
additionally requires a civic ethos in order for its virtues to manifest themselves . The cultural 
dimension of civil society, however, is not easily open to empirical design. This study 
restrains from using quantitative data on political attitudes and perceptions of the population, 
a method applied by scholars investigating in political culture.37 Instead I will focus on 
behavior not attitudes, as the cultural dimension of civil society is evident in moral qualities 
as well as patterns of behavior. Three main aspects are of relevance in this regard: (1) civic 
participation and volunteerism; (2) the type of horizontal relationships between NGOs; and 
(3) the type of relationship between self-organized forms of social life and political leaders 
and state authorities.  
Civic participation and volunteerism go one step further than simple membership, as both 
describe the active involvement of citizens in associational life. The willingness of citizens to 
participate in and to contribute to non-governmental organizations is a valuable indicator to 
measure the degree to which people trust in the usefulness and efficiency of NGOs in 
bringing about desired changes. If I am not convinced that my actions can make a difference 
and that NGOs have the capacity to influence politics and to enforce my interests, I am 
hardly willing to dedicate my time and strength to non-governmental organizations. Civic 
participation, volunteerism and trust in NGOs thus explain the active citizenry on which civil 
society relies. Moreover, one should note that organizational membership can be a 
misleading indicator in CEE. People often prefer to contribute to NGOs without being formal 
members. This fact is grounded in the thoroughly discredited image of associations that goes 
back to communist times, when membership in certain organizations was compulsory (see 
section 2.3. below).  
As we saw above, the cultural dimension of civil society ensures mutual trust and facilitates 
collective action and the mediation of conflicting interests in complex societies. In the words 
of Hall (1995: 6):  
37 See e.g. Almond /Verba (1965). 
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“Civil society is thus a complex balance of consensus and conflict, the valuation of 
as much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum of consensus necessary for 
settled existence.” 
As a consequence, the type of relationships among the organizations of civil society serves 
as an indicator of a ‘civil’ society. The question is whether cooperative ties among NGOs 
exist, whether NGOs are capable of common action and whether the self-organization of 
society overcomes or cements societal cleavages. If the relationship between NGOs is 
characterized by growing tension, animosity, envy and distrust and if neither cross-cutting 
membership nor cooperative networks or umbrella organizations exist and if mechanisms 
that ensure peaceful conflict resolution and compromise are lacking, non-governmental 
organizations are hardly based on a civic ethos described above.  
Finally, the relationship between actors of civil society and state actors expose the cultural 
dimension of civil society. As already indicated, mutual trust would not be possible without 
trust in rules and institutions. The relationship between society and the state is therefore an 
important aspect of the concept of civil society. Without the state as guarantor of certain 
liberties, free and voluntary self-organization of society is not possible. A vibrant civil society 
requires more than the mere existence of liberal rights, though. A responsive government and 
politicians who believe in the importance of civic participation and who value civil society for 
its own sake are additionally required. In the words of Claus Offe (2000a: 94): 
“…what is needed (for democratic consolidation) is a kind of civic ethos … which … 
leads sufficiently large parts of the political community to take collective concerns into 
consideration and to develop some measure of ‘positive external preferences’”. 
In the same vein, a vibrant civil society is evident in the strong conviction of leaders of non-
governmental organizations that political decision-makers are not acting on their own behalf 
but in response to societal concerns and that they are accountable to democratic institutions.  
“Democracy works best where civil society is in a constructive and mutually 
supportive relationship with the state, and where citizens take their civic responsibilities 
seriously” (Bryant/Mokrzycki 1995: 26). 
Indicators for such a constructive and mutually supportive relationship are on the one hand 
the information, consultation or even inclusion of NGO actors in political decision-making. If 
NGOs are neither informed nor consulted in legislative processes that concern their field of 
activity, we can hardly assume that they are accepted by state bureaucracy as 
representatives of society. Moreover, the willingness on the side of state actors to provide a 
fruitful legal environment for NGOs and to fund public benefit activities of NGOs are 
indicators of the type of relationship between NGOs and state. On the other hand, NGO 
actors should trust in democratic institutions and accept state actors as legitimate actors that 
are accountable to societal interests. Table 2 summarizes the indicators of research. 
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Table  2 Civil Society: Indicators for Research 
Dimension of 
civil society 
Parameter Indicators for Research 
Quantity Number of civil society organizations 
Plurality Regional distribution of NGOs 
Distribution according to area of activity 
Structural 
Dimension 
Inclusiveness  Membership 
Civic participation Volunteerism 
Trust in NGOs 
Horizontal relationship among 
NGOs 
Networks, cooperative ties, umbrella 
organizations 




Vertical relationship between 
NGO actors and state actors 
Consultation / Information or Inclusion of 
NGO actors in decision making processes
Willingness on behalf of state actors to 
provide a fruitful legal environment for 
NGOs 
Public funding opportunities for NGOs 
NGO actors trust in democratic order and 




The aim of this section was to clarify what civil society is and how it can be studied. The main 
problem in studying civil society lies in the sharp contrast between a vague definition of the 
term, which mainly points to the organizations of civil society, and the virtues civil society is 
widely assumed to represent. More often than not, civil society is described less by 
observable characteristics than by the beneficial influences on democracy which theorists 
attribute to civil society. It became clear that the concept of civil society describes the utopian 
ideal of a future state of society and is thus not easily open to empirical scrutiny.  
This section argued that the puzzle to empirically analyze a normative concept can be solved 
by focusing separately on two dimensions of civil society: On the one hand, civil society 
understood as a sphere of organized social life between the state and market is composed of 
freely created, voluntary, autonomous, self-organized, formally established associations, 
groups and non-governmental organizations. This “structural dimension” of civil society thus 
corresponds with what has been called the “Third Sector” or the “NGO sector”. On the other 
hand, civil society is based on a certain culture, a civic ethos, i.e. moral qualities and patterns 
of behavior. Without this “cultural dimension”, civil society fails to exert its beneficial 
influences on democracy.  
The differentiation of the structural and the cultural dimension of civil society has two main 
advantages. First, it allows us to describe in greater detail the various images of 
associational life in transforming societies, and relates them to the utopian ideal of civil 
society. Civil society is thus understood as a process rather than a fixed state of society. 
Depending on the development of the two dimensions, different states of organized social life 
can be identified with varying effects on democracy. A structural civil society characterized by 
a magnitude of non-governmental organizations and a lacking civic ethos may deepen 
societal conflict as membership may not be cross-cutting. A structural civil society may also 
be detached from society serving not interests of local constituencies but of external or 
political actors. An elite civil society characterized by a highly developed cultural but poorly 
developed structural dimension either points to a small circle of opponents in conflict with an 
(authoritarian) state or to neo-corporatists arrangements. Finally, a classical civil society 
describes the (unreachable) utopian ideal of a society that continuously contributes to more 
democracy (see table 1, page 39). Second, the distinction between the structural and the 
cultural dimension of civil society allows us to identify indicators of research more clearly. The 
number of NGOs, the thematic and regional distribution of NGOs and organizational 
membership determine the structural dimension of civil society. The cultural dimension of civil 
society is evident in (1) civic participation and volunteerism, in (2) the type of horizontal 
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relations between civil society organizations observable in existing networks and umbrella 
organizations and the capacity for common action, and in (3) the vertical relationship 
between organizations of civil society and the state, observable in existing animosities on 
both sides, in the information, consultation or inclusion of NGO actors in political decision 
making processes, in the willingness on side of state actors to provide a fruitful legal 
environment for NGOs, and in public funding opportunities for NGOs (see table 2, page 44).  
The dynamic model of civil society suggests that the outcome of civil society assistance 
depends on the cultural and structural preconditions of civil society in the recipient country. 
Depending on whether the starting point is no civil society, a structural, or an elite civil 
society, the outcome of civil society assistance will be different. In other words, the domestic 
context, and the historic and cultural preconditions of civil society in the respective country 
are decisive. The following will investigate the preconditions of civil society in the post-
communist phase. 
2.3 Civil Society in Post-Communism  
The beginning of the 1990s celebrated the glorious victory of civil society over the communist 
systems in Central and Eastern Europe. Mass protests and opposition movements in the 
East peacefully brought the end of 40 years of communism and they did this in the name of 
civil society (see e.g. Ekiert/Kubik 1999). Figures such as Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, 
Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik in Poland or János Kis in Hungary employed the concept of 
civil society to mark the sharp contrast between the people on the one hand and the hated 
government on the other. Civil society, so has been argued, was the realm of citizens “living 
in truth” (Havel), who finally overcame their authoritarian governments.  
Several years later, this euphoria was followed by disillusionment. Aleksander Smolnar 
(1996: 33) points out:  
“The ideology of the moral civil society placed its hopes in self-organization, self-
help, and citizens’ activities. These hopes stemmed from the belief that “totalitarian” 
restraints had bound potent social forces which were yearning to operate freely…. 
however, levels of autonomous social activity have been disappointing.”  
Howard (2003) finds out that a strong civil society measured in participation in voluntary 
organizations is observable in none of the post-communist states in Eastern Europe. Instead 
his study concludes that with the exception of labour unions, membership in non-
governmental organizations in post-communist countries is significantly lower than in post-
authoritarian countries and in older democracies (ibid: 63pp). The weakness of civil society in 
all of Central and Eastern Europe suggests that an existing democratic structure and the right 
to freely organize and join organizations do not suffice to create a vibrant civil society. What 
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is needed is an active citizenry that is not only willing to organize but also convinced that 
organized forms of social life can bring about desired changes.  
The weakness of civil society in CEE is largely attributed to the legacies of the previous 
regime. The cultural heritages of the communist past left their strain in political traditions, 
attitudes and behavioral patterns apparent in post-communist societies and are widely 
believed to inhibit the upspring of self-organized social activity.38 The experiences under 
communism and the on-going reinterpretation of those experiences (Howard 2003), the 
effectiveness of the communist regimes in destroying or greatly weakening traditions and 
moral norms of civil society (Smolnar 1996: 33p), direct indoctrination, totalitarian control and 
defensive patterns developed by the citizenry against indoctrination and control (Sztompka 
1993: 89) have been named as factors behind the weakness of civil society in post-
communism.  
Piotr Sztompka (1993: 89) even argues that real socialism not only hinders the appearance 
of what he calls “civilizational competence”, that is, the cultural basis on which civil society 
relies, but also results in the reverse, in “civilizational incompetence”. Four main “socialist 
legacies” discussed below are seen as obstructive to civil society development: (1) the image 
of social homogeneity and a resulting lack of interest differentiation and representation, (2) a 
thoroughly discredited image of associations, (3) citizens’ passiveness tied with exceeding 
claims toward the state as protector and care-taker, and (4) a deep state-society divide.  
Socialist societies are marked by social homogenization and the image thereof. The 
monocentric concept of the state and society engraved in the dictum “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” stresses the monopoly of political leadership on the one hand and social 
homogenization on the other. The socialist system seeks the control of society by the state, 
praises social homogenization, and blocks social differentiation. The official ideology and 
practice blurs group interests, the planned economy paralyzes entrepreneurship, and the 
repressive state apparatus preserves the image of a homogenized society39:  
“The omnipotent centralized state was in a real fact the main source of all good and 
evil, thus all social groups... were in a similar position of submission vis a vis the 
communist state. This was widely known, and it brought about a tendency to perceive 
the society as homogeneous....” (Frentzel-Zagorska 1993: 167).  
38 See for a discussion of the obscuring effects of socialist legacies on civil society development 
and democratization among others: Howard (2003), Schmolnar (1996), Sztompka (1993), Lauth / 
Merkel (1997), Crawford/Lijphart (1995), Schöpflin (1993: 256pp), Kurzewska/Bojar (1995: 187pp), 
Wesolowski (1995), Ost (1993), Fagin (1998), Frentzel-Zagórska (1993: 165pp).  
39 For a description of the socialist state system see: Fehr (1996: 50pp), Wedel (1992).  
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It has been argued that the inherited communist image of social homogeneity poses a threat 
to interest representation and to civil society development. Staniszkis (1991) point to the far-
reaching consequences of constituting a polity and policies in the absence of clear interests, 
as has been the case in post-communist states after regime change. During transition no 
intermediary organizations exist, which legitimatize the reform steps taken via the 
mechanisms of conflict mediation, communication and government control. What evolves are 
“politics in a vacuum” (Staniszkis 1991: 184), politicians that theoretically define non-existing 
group interests without knowing their constituencies nor their voters.40 Moreover, there are 
the attitudinal legacies inherent to such a practice. Why should politicians who once used to 
define “the public good” invest in the development of interest groups that subsequently will 
interfere with policy formulation? The absence of certain social groups may thus hinder 
respective state policies that nurture the establishment of interest groups. Or, even worse, it 
may generate the feeling among politicians that they know best what is in the interest of the 
people, and that intermediary organizations are superfluous and unwanted competitors. 
What evolves is ”exclusionary corporatism“, and new authorities that are convinced that 
“society is not ripe for democracy” (Staniszkis 1991: 21). Ost (1993) points to a further legacy 
of social homogeneity. In post-communist countries people are largely unaware of what is in 
their interest and what is not. The lack of interest organization and the lacking awareness 
thereof leave little room for social mobilization. Protest movements, mostly directed toward 
the state, are more common practice than effective interest mediation between conflicting 
groups.41 Furthermore, in communist societies social homogeneity is perceived and valued 
as a desirable state of society. Equality is thus largely perceived in economic rather than in 
political terms. A kind of “negative egalitarianism” (Schöpfling 1993: 271) prevails among the 
population who tends to distrust the representation of the interests of some against the public 
good of the many. For all these reasons, social homogeneity of post-communist states and 
especially the image thereof are seen as obstructive to the development of civil society 
based on the articulation, representation and mediation of pluralist interests. 
Another factor that hampers collective action is the thoroughly discredited image of 
associations apparent in post-communist societies. Under communism the ‘freedom of 
association’ is replaced by an ‘obligation of association’. Civic organizations and foundations 
40 In Poland this puzzle became evident in the words of the first candidate for the Minister of 
Industry, T. Syryjczyk during the hearings before the Sejm Commission in 1989: “I represent subjects 
that do not yet exist” (cit. in Staniszkis 1991: 184). 
41 This phenomenon is for example studied by Ost for the case of workers protests in Poland after 
transition. Ost points out that the protests were exclusively directed toward the state and not toward 
management, despite the withdrawal of the state from firm management (1993: 460). Also a later 
study confirmed that more often than not, workers protested jointly with the management against the 
state revealing the malfunctioning of trade unions as workers representation (Ost/Weinstein 1999). 
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are forbidden or nationalized, and the organizations that do exist function under the control of 
and for the state. These “social organizations” are neither voluntary nor self-organized but 
quasi - state organizations, functioning as transmission-belt organizations to ensure the 
identification and socialization of their members with the state and the official state ideology 
(Matynia 2001: 920). Social activity and “social actions” are compulsory. Their major aim is 
not the articulation of individual interests or opinions but to render a service to the collectivity, 
a collectivity that is regarded as superior to the individual (Schöpflin 1993: 282). After the 
compulsive duty to join trade unions or youth organizations has been lifted, people choose to 
use their new freedom negatively and not to associate at all. Citizen participation is thus 
widely regarded as an unnecessary and useless effort (Fagin 1988).  
“Society is still convinced that new forms of civil activity are not any different from 
the previous pattern of “social actions” which were usually quite unnecessary and 
ineffective… and which were actually enforced and given their ideology by the state” 
(Kurczewska / Bojar 1995: 188).  
The communist patronage stage is widely seen as a further source of cultural legacies 
destructive for civic activities. A patronage state has been defined as follows:  
“In exchange for the promise of personal provision and security, the patronage state 
demands (the) surrender of the right to choose and to self-determine” (Baumann 1993: 
139).42  
Under communism the people thus are free from solving the small daily problems associated 
with satisfying basic needs. It is the duty of the state to do so. More than that, the state sees 
itself as best suited to take care for its subjects. In this sense and quite in contrast to the 
relationship between citizens and state in liberal societies, it is the state that defines the 
needs of the citizens. The price for the guaranteed safety, need provision, and ‘freedom from 
choice’, is high: the subjects have to give up basic rights, most importantly, the right to self-
determination, and the right to decide over one’s own fate.  
The consequences of such an arrangement are twofold. First, the exchange of guaranteed 
state supplies for the abandonment of the right of self-determination results in passive 
subjects with extensive demands toward the state.  
“The state was expected to play a near-impossible role. Both initiator and arbitrator, 
guardian of social welfare and guarantor of freedom” (Schöpflin 1993: 280).  
Guaranteeing the satisfaction of basic needs, the patronage state creates citizens that 
confront the state with extensive demands, which the young democracies are unable to fulfill 
in face of tight economic budgets. Frustration with the state, who does not meet the high 
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expectations of the people, is thus a consequence that the new governments also feel. 
Moreover, the resulting passivity and incapability on behalf of the citizens to take care of 
themselves contradicts the notions of self-organization and social activity and thus obstructs 
the re-emergence of civil society.  
Second, the patron who fails to render the guaranteed services risks losing the legitimacy on 
which his rule is based. In the words of Zygmunt Bauman (1993: 139): 
“...the patron cannot shake off his responsibility for the misfortune of his clients. 
Frustration is immediately re-forged into a grievance which ‘naturally’ hits back at the 
patron and his policy as obvious causes of suffering.” 
For example by the 1970s in Poland as a result of the deep economic crisis, it became clear 
that the communist states largely failed to bear the responsibility of the patronage state. This 
was especially evident in comparison to the developments of the West (Di Palma 1991).43 
The increasingly felt illegitimacy of the socialist system contradicted the demanded surrender 
of basic rights which left no space for free articulation in the public sphere. In consequence, 
people withdrew from official organizations and returned to the sphere of the family and 
private life (Matynia 2001: 920). Michnik described this process as a “life in hiding” or as an 
“inner migration” (cit in Frantz 2000: 163). The evolving gap between the public life that was 
felt as living an “official lie” and the private life on which the aspirations were focused has 
been best described by Stefan Nowak at the beginning of the 1970s as a “social vacuum” 
between the sphere of the family and the nation.44 The discrepancy between “us”, the 
collective of private and personal ties, and “us”, the nation, in contrast to “them”, the 
illegitimate political system and the politicians as its representatives, manifested itself in a 
deep distrust of the state that survived “real socialism”. In the words of Zygmunt Bauman:  
 
42 This exchange of protection for the abandonment of rights has also been called a “new social 
contract” (Liehm cit in Matynia 2001: 919), ignoring the fact that one party to the contract, the people, 
had no real choice whether to sign the contract or not. 
43 According to Di Palma (1991) the increasing technological and economic superiority of the West 
demolished the communist myth of the cognitive superiority of “real socialism” and thus contributed to 
the loss of legitimacy of the communist patronage state. 
44 In a survey Nowak discovered that the Polish people, alienated from the political system of “real 
socialism”, identified either with their private life and the primary groups of family and friends or with 
the nation as a whole. Other identities – be it class, regional or occupational identities were non-
existent, a fact that resulted in a “social vacuum” between the sphere of the family and the nation (cit. 
in Frentzel-Zagórska 1993: 167). 
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“According to every ‘surface’ observation as well as ‘in-depth’ survey of political 
attitudes, the notorious ‘us’ and ‘them’ posture which many considered as the most 
pernicious socio-psychological product of the patronage state, survived virtually 
unscathed one of the most profound political shift in recent history “(1993: 149).45  
In summary, the cultural legacies of communism do not give much hope for the re-
emergence of civil society in post-communist states. Communism - the monocentric concept 
of state and society, the image of social homogeneity, and the patronage state - seems to 
leave behind passive and alienated citizens who deeply distrust associations as much as 
state institutions, and who are incapable of identifying their interests and unwilling to 
articulate and represent them. One has to note, however, that “no absolutely perfect 
totalitarian system has ever existed” (Kolakowski cit. in Klein 2001: 40). Communist regimes 
in CEE revealed different shades of “totalitarity”, experienced liberalization periods and were 
faced with different dissident and oppositional movements. It is left to the case studies of 
Poland and Slovakia to portray these differences (see chapter 7.1. and 8.1.). 
2.4 Conclusion and Implications for Research  
Civil society is a concept with various meanings and connotations. It may include the family 
and relational ties, the market and economic activity, or contain merely formal organizations 
that operate outside state and market. Some stress the importance of civil society as a realm 
free of state intervention, others underline the role of civil society as an intermediary between 
citizens and the state. Regardless of how civil society is understood, it always has a positive 
connotation. The opinion that civil society is beneficial to democracy is widely shared by 
scholars and practitioners alike. More often than not, the term does not describe the actual 
state of society, but points to a utopian ideal how society should be.  
Civil society is understood in this analysis as a sphere of organized social life between the 
state and market. It is composed of freely generated, voluntary, autonomous, self-organized, 
formally established associations, groups and non-governmental organizations, and based 
on a certain culture, a civic ethos, that is, moral qualities and patterns of behavior without 
which it fails to generate its beneficial influences on democracy. Finally, civil society needs a 
legitimate and legal order to flourish. The concept of civil society thus contains a structural 
and a cultural dimension. While the structural dimension points to the organizations of civil 
45 See also Schöpflin (1993: 267): “… the relationship between the individual and the state was 
badly distorted in this way. Not surprisingly, the state came to be regarded as remote and abstract, 
beyond the will and control of the individual, and the institutions of the state as not much more than 
facades. The elimination of communist systems did not, in itself, change this”. According to Schöpflin 
this distrust resulted in week institutions due to a continuing belief of the people in persons and not in 
institutions (ibid: 268). Not the office a person holds, but the personal relationship counts.   
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society, one could also speak of the “NGO sector” or “Third Sector”, the cultural dimension 
stresses the importance of an appropriate culture, a “civic ethos” (Offe 2000a) or 
“civilizational competence” (Sztompka 1993) that ensures a peaceful coexistence among 
societal groups, tolerance and trust, and a reciprocal and interactive relationship with the 
state.  
The theoretical distinction between the structural and the cultural dimension of civil society 
has methodological advantages. It allows us to study the connection between associational 
life and democracy more clearly. Studies of civil society often focus primarily on the 
organizations of civil society. Counting of organizations, however, reveals little about the 
stabilizing effect of civil society on democracy. Without an elaborated cultural dimension, a 
structural civil society may be conflict ridden or detached from societal interests. Similarly, 
organizations of civil society which are few in number and encompass only a few citizens 
may be based on moral qualities and civil patterns of behavior. The limitation to a small 
organized elite, however, does not conform to the idea of a democratic and representative 
civil society. Depending on the development of the structural and the cultural dimension of 
civil society, different types of associational life are thus conceivable with varying effects on 
democracy. In this way, civil society can be analyzed in transforming societies where the pre-
conditions for civil society, i.e. its cultural basis and a democratic order, are not yet in place.  
What implications do the considerations above have for the subsequent analysis?  
The identified indicators of research enable us to analyze the effects of civil society 
assistance more clearly. Civil society assistance contributes to more civil society if it (1) 
increases the number and types of non-governmental organizations, (2) contributes to 
cooperative ties and networks of non-governmental organizations, and (3) facilitates the 
cooperation and communication between civil society and the state. Civil society assistance 
is thus successful if it is conducive to the development of the structural and/or the cultural 
dimension of civil society. The question arises, however, whether civil society assistance will 
be successful in promoting both dimensions of civil society simultaneously. One may expect 
that the effects are more likely to be on the structural than the cultural dimension. Building 
institutions of civil society and thus contributing to a greater number of NGOs appears to be 
an easy endeavor that can be achieved in a relative short period of time. The allocation of 
funds that support NGO activities is often sufficient to stir NGO development, especially in a 
society with a shortage of goods. We thus may expect civil society assistance to result in a 
strong Third Sector in recipient countries, a sector characterized by well equipped and 
professional organizations that may even be heard by political actors depending on the 
openness of the ruling elite. The alternation of moral qualities and patterns of behavior, 
however, is a more complicated endeavor. It was made clear above that the cultural 
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preconditions for civil society in post-communist states are rather unfavorable. Analysts name 
passive and alienated citizens as a major legacy of communist rule that severely hampers 
the upspring of civil society. They are neither willing to nor capable of organizing and 
articulating their interests. They deeply distrust state authorities and exclusively rely on 
personal links. Nonetheless, they still accepte state decisions as something given, regardless 
whether good or bad. This “civilizational incompetence” of post-communist societies needs to 
be overcome by civil society assistance and replaced with moral qualities and patterns of 
behavior identified above as necessities for a vibrant civil society. Changing the ways people 
think and behave is, however, a tricky task. One can assume that it is only to be achieved in 
a long period of time if at all and may even require change in generations. One may thus 
expect civil society assistance to simply result into what has been labeled “structural civil 
society” above and in the development of a NGO sector that remains detached from local 
constituencies and is mainly concerned with its own interests. It is up to the case studies to 
reveal whether this expectation holds true and to what extent civil society assistance has 
been successful in contributing to the development of the cultural dimension of civil society.  
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3 Civil Society Assistance: Actors, Objectives, Concepts 
and Strategies  
This chapter investigates civil society assistance. It will further specify how civil society 
assistance is understood in this analysis and what kind of activities are associated with civil 
society assistance. It will be clear that civil society assistance is first and foremost driven by 
external actors, often referred to as donors. Since donors are the driving force behind civil 
society assistance, they are the main focus of this chapter.  
The section tackles the following questions, in particular: who and what type of ‘donating 
agency’ engages in civil society assistance, for what reasons, and with what expectations? 
What approaches do donors choose in order to assist civil society in other countries? The 
chapter thus focuses on donors, their objectives, concepts and strategies. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the extent to which the approaches actors use in their effort to nurture civil society 
abroad are suitable to trigger the development of civil society. It will be shown that the 
strategies applied often have unintended side effects that hinder rather than foster civil 
society development.  
It should be noted that the following provides a theoretical approach to donors. A description 
of major donors active in CEE will be given at a later point of the dissertation (see chapter 6). 
3.1 Defining Civil Society Assistance  
The following defines civil society assistance more clearly. The section will show that civil 
society assistance is first and foremost driven by (external) actors. Secondly, civil society 
assistance refers to transnational relations. Thirdly, it aims to build democracy from the 
bottom-up. Finally, civil society assistance stands for a deliberate attempt to transfer a certain 
image, namely civil society, from one place to another. 
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Civil society assistance is actor driven, i.e. it refers to various endeavors of international 
actors that aim to support domestic societal actors. While the first group commonly entails 
donors, who grant aid, assistance and advice, the latter group refers to recipients who 
receive aid and assistance.46  
The relationships between donors and recipients are always transnational in character. This 
is shown by the following definition which describes transnational relations as:  
“… regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-
state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
intergovernmental organization” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3). 47 
In other words, transnational relations may include state actors, but not exclusively though. 
As regards civil society assistance, recipients are per definition non-state actors, i.e. actors of 
civil society. Donors, in contrast, may be public or private, state or non-state actors.  
This becomes more clear, when we consider the strategic options of democratic states who 
wish to foster democracy and civil society beyond their borders. We can identify two 
genuinely different approaches as to how to assist democracy and civil society by deliberate 
46 Although this terminology is commonly applied in the literature dealing with international 
assistance, to which this study is no exception, it has several shortcomings. Above all, the wording 
tells us nothing about the organizational structure, the legal status or any other characteristics of 
donors or recipients. Moreover, it neglects that on both sides, donors as well as recipients, we are 
confronted with different types of actors driven by various motivations. Third, the major distinction 
between donors and recipients implies an asymmetric relationship between the two, ignoring the 
leverage recipients possess. In some countries, a large inflow of donors eager to spent their funds 
encounter only a few recipient organizations. In this situation we have the paradox that it is not the 
recipients who compete for scarce resources. Rather, donors compete for scare recipients of aid. 
Moreover, the distinction between donors and recipients is often not as clear-cut as the terminology 
suggests. Often we observe intermediary organizations that are donors and recipients at the same 
time (see in greater detail chapter 6.2.). 
47 One should note that transnational relations are a burgeoning phenomenon that is increasingly 
shaping international relations. Sub-national actors, be it non-governmental organizations, or separate 
entities of the governmental apparatus, form an important part of the international environment. 
Associations, foundations, trade unions, and enterprises but also ministries, counties, municipalities, 
or parties are increasingly involved in the crucial issues of world politics. Their activities are of 
international relevance and have to be taken into account by other international actors such as states. 
Examples of international activities of sub-national actors include transnational co-operation and 
networks between trade unions but also between other interest groups or parties; partnerships 
between cities and counties as well as internationally active NGOs which launch international 
campaigns. The rise of internationally active non-governmental actors is best illustrated by the fact that 
their number increased from 134 in 1905 to 2470 in 1972 and to more than 4600 by 1990 
(Russett/Starr 1996: 68). As a result, the system of states (Staatenwelt) dominating the 19th century 
has been classified a ‘system of societies’ (Gesellschaftswelt) (Czempiel 1995: 419). See for research 
on transnational relations: Risse-Kappen (1995). 
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acts of intervention from the outside, commonly referred to as top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to democracy assistance. 48  
Firstly, democratic states may chose to target state actors, and put pressure on the 
government of the respective state to liberalize and to install democratic institutions and a 
respective state policy that triggers the self-organization of societal interest from the top-
down. In the absence of a global supreme authority and binding and enforceable 
international rights and rules, coercion and conditionality have been identified as the major 
ways to apply pressure on other states (see Whitehead 1996, Schmitter 1996). Coercion 
refers to cases where governments adopt respective policies in response to the threat of 
military force or negative sanctions such as barriers to trade in the case of non-compliance.49 
Conditionality, in contrast, relies on incentives and rewards rather than on sanctions and 
force. In the case of conditionality, political reforms are enforced in anticipation of promised 
merits and benefits in the form of financial resources such as loans, direct grants or 
development aid or membership in international organizations.50 
Secondly, rather than putting pressure on the government to liberalize, external state actors 
may aim to trigger democratization from the bottom-up and impact directly upon the society 
of authoritarian regimes or new democracies. According to the underlying assumption, a 
strong civil society will subsequently stand up for civic and human rights, demand respective 
political reforms, and insist on accountable government. A government that respects and 
protects civil society and that meets citizens’ demands is thus not the origin but the 
consequence of a vibrant civil society. Accordingly, actors inside civil society are the major 
partners of external agents. Primarily non-governmental organizations of various 
backgrounds and concerned with different issues are the chief beneficiaries of aid. On the 
donor side, private and public organizations are active. State agencies, and especially 
48 Considering various ways of democratically oriented external intervention, Czempiel (1995: 
423pp) draws a similar distinction between direct and indirect strategies (mittelbare und unmittelbare 
Strategien) to promote democracy.    
49 Coercion thus presupposes the existence of a dominant state, a hegemon, who possess 
sufficient power resources to enforce and uphold a normative order. The hegemonic power is thus 
capable of imposing a political structure or policy of his interest on other states, and to control their 
domestic political processes  Examples for imposition from the outside by means of coercion or control 
include the US involvement in West Germany after 1945, the endeavors of Great Britain to export the 
Westminster model to its colonies but also the efforts of the Soviet Union to built its satellite states in 
CEE after its own model (Whitehead 1996: 10). For the concept of a hegemonic power that enforces 
common international standards and rules on which an ‚international society’ is based, see  Bull 
(1977). 
50 One should note that political conditionality is in contrast to economic conditionality a relatively 
new phenomenon. Especially the IMF has a long practice to make aid conditional to economic stability 
measures. In contrast, political conditionality connects rewards to political conditions such as good 
governance, democratization or respect for human rights. For this reason, political conditionality has 
been called “2nd generation” conditionality (Stokke 1995).  
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national development aid agencies, run programs for civil society assistance. Along with that 
non-governmental actors are deliberately encouraged and funded in order to enter 
transnational partnerships and networks with the aim of supporting civil society in other 
countries.51 Finally, non-governmental actors without a public mandate and financing are 
active. Examples are philanthropic foundations as well as trade unions or charity 
organizations that aim to support and empower civil society actors abroad.  
The major distinction between the top-down and the bottom-up approach lies in the type of 
transaction involved. While top-down forms of democratic assistance are restricted to 
multilateral and bilateral forms of international relations which take the state as the main 
addressee of assistance, bottom-up approaches to democratization explicitly make use of 
transnational relations and networks and directly focus upon civil society organizations and 
thus actors inside the domestic sphere of the recipient state. The latter option consequently 
targets domestic politics and directly intervenes into domestic power struggles. 
The various forms of international relations are illustrated as follows. The red arrows indicate 
donor-recipient transactions.  
 
Civil society assistance refers to the deliberate attempt to transfer formal and informal 
structures that proved valuable in the ‘Western’ world to another time and/or space. For this 
reason, the dissertation conceptualizes civil society assistance as a transfer, whereas an 
encompassing interpretation of the term ‘transfer’ is applied as put forward by 
Dolowitz/March (1991: 349p):  
“… we identify seven objects of transfer: policy goals, structure and content; policy 
instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and 
concepts; and negative lessons” (Dolowitz / March 1991: 350).  
                                                
51 For example, the Phare and Tacis Democracy Program of the European Union includes on the 
one hand small grant schemes for NGOs in transformation states. The lion's share of funds is 
restricted to West-Eastern partnerships, or is administered by West-European NGOs (see chapter 6). 
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The notion of transfer has the advantage that it allows us to incorporate the international and 
the domestic sides of the transfer into the analysis. Transnational pressure does not 
automatically result in domestic reply. Risse-Kappen et al (1995: 4), for example, observe:  
“Transnational relations do not seem to have the same effects across cases”.  
Different countries respond differently to civil society assistance. Risse-Kappen et al. 
conclude that the impact of transnational relations depends on domestic as well as 
international factors.52 By the same token, research on foreign assistance to civil society in 
democratizing countries needs to incorporate the international as well as the domestic side 
into the analysis, interests of donors and recipients, the export and the import side of the 
transfer, external push and domestic pull.  
Civil society assistance thus has to be distinguished from other images of transfer such as 
convergence or diffusion. While the former refers to the spread of ‘the one best system’ 
assuming that previously divergent societies evolve towards a common endpoint, while the 
less developed society takes the advanced society as a template, the latter stress the point 
that institutions are usually copies and that institution building often involves some measure 
of imitation (Jacoby 2000: 4pp). However, neither focuses on both sides of the transfer. More 
importantly from the point of this study, both neglect the involvement of actors and their 
interests in the process. If actors’ perspectives are introduced, it is commonly assumed that 
domestic actors voluntarily emulate foreign models, whereas the possibility of external 
intervention is neglected (Dolowitz/March 1996). In contrast, civil society assistance refers 
not to emulation (although this might be involved), but to external intervention into domestic 
settings.  
In sum, civil society assistance is defined as the deliberate, direct and explicit involvement of 
external actors in domestic settings with the aim of transferring the Western concept of civil 
society as a means to build democracy from the bottom-up. Civil society assistance focuses 
exclusively on societal actors of the target state and is thus always transnational in character. 
3.2 Objectives of Assistance: Civil Society - a Remedy to 
Various Illnesses  
The following section investigates why external actors seek to support civil society beyond 
their borders.  
52 This conclusion is in line with the findings of scholars working on the international dimension of 
democratization. See e.g. Kümmel (1998), Drake (1994) and Pridham (1994). 
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As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, the attractiveness of the concept of civil 
society frequently has to do with its impreciseness and the diversity of meanings. Thanks to 
this very diversity and impreciseness, the concept of civil society serves as a means to reach 
various objectives. This is not only a reason for its popularity in domestic politics, but also in 
development cooperation and collaboration with transformation states. In the following the 
essential goals of civil society support stated by donor organizations will be briefly illustrated. 
Four main goals of civil society assistance can be identified: (1) democracy, (2) good 
governance, (3) efficient aid implementation, (4) market economy and economic 
development.53 
The main reason for the increasing interest in promoting civil society is certainly the 
significance attached to civil society as a foundation for stable democratic development. Civil 
society functions as a counterweight to the state, prevents state despotism, increases citizen 
participation, strengthens the efficiency of the state by taking away some of its burden and 
thus leads to a greater input as well as output legitimacy of a democracy.54 Furthermore, the 
transformation processes in the former Eastern block countries, which were carried in 
particular by the idea of a free civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, seem to confirm 
the democratic significance of the concept. There, in particular, the strengthening of civil 
society commitments is recognized as an important means of facilitating the difficult 
democratic transformation. However, in other parts of the world as well the external 
promotion of democracy and civil society is an explicit goal of foreign and developmental 
policies. The end of the Cold War brought back memories of Kant’s old theory, which has yet 
to be falsified: Democracies do not fight wars against one another. The end of bipolarity at 
the beginning of the 1990s created the necessity for a new foreign policy orientation and an 
alternative to the previous policy of containment, which seemed to be the world-wide 
promotion of democracy.55 The external support for and stabilization of democracy and civil 
society advanced to become a foreign policy objective and an important component of active 
peace and human rights policies.56 
“Viewed from this perspective, human rights and democracy are twin brothers. They 
originate from a common genesis. For this very reason, the existence or the 
establishment of civil society is a decisive factor for progress in the area of human 
53 For an illustration of the various goals of civil society assistance see, among others: Jenkins 
(2001: 253), Robinson (1996: 6). 
54 For the democratic significance of civil society, see Chapter 3.1; On output and input legitimacy, 
see Scharpf (1998). 
55 See Russett (1993). It must be pointed out that this euphoria of the first years after the end of 
the Cold War, by which in particular the domestic debate in the US was characterized, soon gave way 
to disillusionment and at least American policy of democracy promotion with peaceful means ended on 
September 11th, 2001 at the latest.   
56 See also: Merkel (1998). 
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rights. Wherever a "critical mass“ of the population wants to advance political change 
and promotes political participation, the means of state oppression to secure the 
outdated power structures are destined to fail in the long run. (...) Supporting civil 
society is one of the most important tasks of human rights policies. Strengthening it is 
in the very best interest of all states, because the equilibrium of societal interests 
attained by means of a functioning civil society is an important factor of stability.“57 
Furthermore, the promotion of civil society became part of a new development strategy, 
which recognizes the significance of political conditions for development. While a 
modernization approach, which emphasized the significance of economic development as a 
prerequisite for political stability and democracy, prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, hopes 
were disappointed on a large scale by the 1980s at the latest due to increasingly 
impoverished regions, corrupt forms of government and predominantly authoritarian 
structures. The crisis of previous developmental policies led donors – and above all the 
World Bank - to believe that overall political conditions and ‘good governance’ are an 
indispensable prerequisite for development. In this respect the promotion of civil society 
groups is based on the view that these more efficient and above all more transparent 
services can come to play where state or market-based activities have failed or do not 
function sufficiently and/or assume a kind of public monitoring function to achieve greater 
accountability on behalf of the government. In the course of the 1990s, though, the concept 
of ‘good governance’, which was initially limited to administrative activities, was increasingly 
replaced by ‘democratic governance’. In many donor documents, the view prevails that a 
“developed participatory and social democracy (can) be regarded (...) as a prerequisite for 
development“ (Windfuhr 1999: 2). Not only is the effectiveness of civil society emphasized 
here, but also its democratic potential.  
Moreover, the promotion of civil society is also viewed as a means to improve developmental 
cooperation. State developmental policy, which had fallen into a crisis, discovered civil 
society organizations and NGOs and pinned their hopes on them (Nuscheler 1996: 498). 
Besides the economic benefits, the proximity of NGOs to their target group is seen as a 
particularly decisive advantage. Their closeness to the poor and discriminated is labeled by 
most donor organizations as an important advantage of the NGOs. NGOs are thus promoted 
as a mouthpiece and interest representation of the underprivileged (Robinson 1996: 7). The 
catchword for this in the jargon of developmental cooperation is “empowerment“ - thus 
enabling disadvantaged societal groups, generally the poor, handicapped, and women. The 
capacity of civil society organizations to trigger sustainable development is regarded as 
another advantage of civil society promotion. 
57 Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, “Menschenrechte und gesellschaftliche 
Transformationsprozesse" (Human Rights and Social Transformation Processes); Fragments from a 
speech from March 2nd, 1999 in Jakarta.  
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“There is a general consensus that in order for any development effort to endure 
past the project period, the community must have the capacity to shape and continue 
the effort” (North-South Institute 1996: 8). 
Finally, the development of free market economies as well as positive economic growth is 
also stated by donor organizations as a goal of civil society support. Institutions such as 
chambers of commerce or regional development agencies are supposed to provide the 
necessary infrastructure to support smaller and mid-sized businesses in particular. Civil 
society institutions – understood here as organizations independent of the state, but not 
necessarily non-profit organizations – are to accompany the free interplay of market forces, 
hinder and prevent state intervention into the free market and thus facilitate economic 
development. The main slogan here is ‘deregulation’, which is attributed great importance in 
supporting the transformation in post-communist states in which the market and states were 
equated with one another.  
We should now keep in mind that the attractiveness of civil society and the reason why it 
seems so worthy of promoting primarily lies in the apparent capacity of civil society to reach 
several goals of the donors. Accordingly, civil society is reduced to a mere instrument, or a 
remedy for various diseases with which the main objectives of the donor organizations are to 
be reached. The following segment will elaborate on the civil society concepts on which the 
support programs are based. It will be shown that donors base their assistance on vague 
concepts and definitions of civil society that leave ample scope for interpretation.  
3.3 Donor Concepts of Civil Society - One Term, Various 
Meanings 
One must note that the various objectives and ambitious goals of donors of civil society 
assistance stand in contrast with the astonishing lack of concepts and vague definitions of 
civil society.  
“Relatively little strategizing takes place among donors on what organizations within 
civil society need to be supported to what purpose“ (Robinson 1996: 4).  
This section argues that although donors do not explicitly propose a profound concept of civil 
society, they stress different roles of civil society depending on their own national 
backgrounds and experiences. Despite these slight differences in understanding, most 
definitions of civil society given by donors still remain vague and leave ample leeway to 
interpret what civil society is and which groups act as carriers of civil society on a case to 
case basis.  
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One can note that donors largely employ a broad definition of civil society as a space 
independent of the state, which includes a variety of different organizations:  
“Civil society denotes a public space between the state and individual citizens where 
the latter develops autonomous, organized and collective activities (civic associations)” 
(OECD 1995 quoted in Robertson 1996: 4). 
“Civil society can be defined as the social structure which occupies the political 
space between the family and the state” (DANIDA, 1995: Support for civil society, 
Copenhagen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
“...(civil society refers to)... the broad spectrum of societal organizations, that are 
located outside the state and governmental sector and whose motives are not primarily 
profit-seeking. It encompasses voluntary services, women’s groups, communities, 
chambers of commerce, cooperatives, religious and clan-based groups, cultural 
groups, sport clubs, academic and research institutes, consumers and so forth” (DFID 
1999, cited in: FES 2001: 43 –own translation).  
Quigley (2000) points out that despite this lack of conceptual clarity, donors’ understanding of 
civil society is subject to their own social and political experiences. Depending on the nation 
of origin and the organizational purpose or the organizational culture of the donor we can 
thus identify different understandings of civil society which highlight varying roles of civil 
society.58  
Comparing American and European donors, Quigley jumps to the conclusion that the 
different support programs are oriented towards the own national model.59 According to him, 
American donors espouse an idealized image of civil society and stress the connection 
between civil society and democracy. Civil society corresponds with a large independent 
sector that is financially independent of the state, based on voluntary work, and composed of 
public-policy oriented NGOs that strive for the common good. This understanding is reflected 
in the definition of USAID (1996: 1):  
”Civil society consists of non-state organizations that are engaged in or have the 
potential for championing adoption and consolidation of democratic reforms”.  
According to USAID, so-called „civic advocacy organizations” frequently have this potential. 
These are a sub-group of civil society organizations which are most suited to generate public 
pressure for reform and to demand accountable government (Hansen 1996: 4). USAID 
basically considers a broad spectrum of organizations including “labor federations, business 
and professional associations, human rights and prodemocratic groups, environmental 
organizations or policy think tanks”.  
58 See also: Fagin (1998). 
59 This assessment is in line with the insight of Carothers (1997) regarding democracy assistance. 
Carothers identifies a strategy of ‘institutional-modeling’ as the main approach of democracy 
promotion and protection activities. Donors mainly attempt to sell ready-made solutions to recipients, 
often in the form of institutional templates modeling the democratic system of the donor country.  
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This spectrum is, however, quickly limited to organizations that “advocate on behalf of the 
public, analyze policy issues, mobilize constituencies in support of policy dialog, serve as 
watchdogs to ensure accountability in government functions (and)… act as agents of reform 
in strengthening and broadening democratic governance” (USAID 1996: 2). USAID stresses 
the ability of these organizations to generate the public push for political reform and to 
consolidate reform by holding the state accountable for what it does. In summary, civil society 
is understood as a (financially independent) sphere that countervails state power, with stress 
on the control- and socializing role of non-governmental organizations.  
According to Quigley (2000: 4) European support programs have a different understanding of 
civil society. In terms of absolute numbers the NGO sector in Western Europe is smaller than 
in the USA. Moreover, various NGOs maintain close cooperative ties with the government. 
Public financial support is as much common as regular consultation and the adoption of 
public tasks by non-state actors. Interest representation is not the object of small lobby-
groups that employ pressure on individual members of parliament, but is done by large 
associations that are closely connected with the political realm. Neo-corporatist 
arrangements are common practice. European donors thus often stress the role of civil 
society actors as intermediary and interest representative. This is evident in the following 
statement of the German political foundations:  
“Civil society comprises the (political) sphere that is not directly controlled by the 
state, but formed by societal forces. It is the area of active citizen participation and 
interest representation between state and market. Besides the classical non-
governmental organizations, trade unions, professional associations, women, human 
rights, farmers, environmental and other societal groups are part of civil society“ 
(Common statement of the German political foundations cited in: FES 2001: 29, own 
translation).” 
Finally, we can identify an understanding of civil society that persists in the so-called 
“development profession“ (Jenkins 2001: 250) that is close to international organizations and 
international NGOs. Here a narrow definition of civil society is visible, which is restricted to 
non-profit seeking, autonomous NGOs and which stresses the democratic and emancipatory 
importance of NGOs as well as NGOs’ efficiency (Windfuhr 1999: 2). The “democratic and 
better” NGO (Schmidt / Take 1997) that identifies politically relevant issues and initiates 
public debate, mostly by means of campaigning is at the same time a service provider that 
performs tasks more efficiently than the state. This connection between public policy oriented 
advocacy and efficient service provider is evident in the following definition of civil society 
proposed by the association of German NGOs.  
“As their (the NGOs’) objectives are aimed neither at taking over power, sharing 
state power nor at profit making economic interests, they constitute their own realm 
known as civil society, which is clearly distinguishable from market and state interests. 
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In our view the orientation towards universal norms such as peace, justice, human 
rights, democracy and ecological sustainability should be constitutive for the affiliation 
to civil society …. The starting point for the activities of NGOs is the satisfaction of 
needs or the provision of services. This happens normally as a reaction to the state’s 
inability to do so” (VENRO cited in FES 2001: 13f, translation by the author).  
We can thus conclude that depending on their national or organizational background, donors 
maintain slightly different understandings of civil society without making them explicit though. 
None of the examples given above clearly state which actors are regarded as the main 
actors or carriers of civil society and thus entitled to assistance. Donors mostly point to non-
governmental organizations’, civil society organizations’, ‘civic advocacy organizations’ or 
‘public voluntary organizations’ without a clear definition of those and provide long lists of 
groups that may belong to civil society. There is a lack of criteria which allow us to identify 
actors most suitable to advance civil society development and concepts on which such 
criteria are based.  
The impreciseness and vagueness of donors when it comes to the definition of civil society 
has been highly criticized. Jenkins (2001) makes the point that donors define civil society and 
identify actors of civil society depending on their interests and intentions. 
“... donor thinking relies not on one wrong or inappropriate definition, but on an array 
of detailed specifications, any one of which can be invoked depending on which 
developmental objective it seeks to achieve“ (ibid: 257). 
In other words, depending on the main objective of the donor, assistance is granted to a 
human rights organization, an economic interest representation or chamber of commerce, a 
party-affiliated trade union or foundation, or a think tank that provides detailed research on 
domestic politics in English. Jenkins points to a ”definitional inconsistency“ of some donors. 
According to him, USAID is willing to widen its definition of civil society in a way that 
encompasses even “first-tier associations”, namely clan, tribe or ethnical groups if this helps 
to overthrow an authoritarian regime (ibid: 258). According to Jenkins, the World Bank also 
uses the concept of civil society as a subtle means of pursuing its interests.  
”The Bank’s enthusiastic support for civil society ... is nothing less than a backdoor 
attempt to transform African societies from the ground up by substituting a new 
understanding of individual political subjectivity – for it is only through such a novel 
basis for the ‚self’ that the accompanying features of an open political sphere and a 
‚neutral state’ can perform the roles assigned to them in liberal political theory and neo-
liberal economic policy” (Jenkins 2001: 251). 
The described practice of interpreting civil society on a case to case basis and in a way that 
serves donors’ interests best undermines the credibility of donors. If the programs and the 
underlying concept of civil society appear arbitrarily exchangeable, we may suspect donors 
to exploit the normative concept of civil society as a subtle means to intervene in the internal 
affairs of another country. Suspicion arises that donors do not aim to promote civil society 
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development, but that they deliberately pick recipients and support only a small segment of 
civil society that consists of selected actors who enforce donor interests.  
3.4 Strategies of Civil Society Assistance 
In face of vague definitions and absent concepts, one may ask how donors translate the 
vague and normative concept of civil society into concrete support measures.  
Although donors fail to present clearly specified strategies, the growing literature on civil 
society assistance and democracy assistance identified three major approaches donors use 
to promote civil society:60 Institution building, capacity building, and project-specific 
support.61 The following will briefly highlight these strategies. It will be shown that in their 
well-intended effort to promote civil society, donors yield unintended negative side-effects. 
Some even argue that: 
“The grant game encourages donors as well as grant recipients to behave in ways 
that hinder rather than facilitate civic development” (Henderson 2002: 140p). 
3.4.1 Institution-Building 
Especially in the early years, civil society assistance largely involved institutional support. 
Financial and in-kind support to non-governmental organizations is widely regarded as an 
appropriate means to trigger civil society development. This practice is based on a moral 
image of NGOs as advocates of the poor, the suppressed and socially neglected who strive 
for the common good. NGOs are regarded as intrinsically motivated, and independent of 
political or economic interests. In such a view, the positive characteristics ascribed to NGOs, 
i.e. their watch-dog function, the ability to mobilize public support and to put issues on the 
political agenda as well as their ability to provide services more efficiently than the state and 
market recommends NGOs as the main carriers of civil society.62 The UN Secretary-
General’s ‘Agenda for Development’ Report points out:  
“A vigorous civil society is indispensable to creating lasting and successful 
development… Locally based NGOs, in particular, can serve as intermediaries and 
give people a voice and an opportunity to articulate their needs, preferences and vision 
60 For literature on democracy assistance and civil society assistance see: Barkan (1997), 
Carothers (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999a, 1999b), Chandler (2004), Diamond (1997), Ekiert/Kubik 
(2000), Gyimah-Boadi (1999), Henderson (2002), Holmes (1999), Kearns (1999), Lasota (1999), 
McMahon (2004), Ottaway/Chung (1999), Quigley (1996, 1997, 2000), Regulska (1998), Wedel 
(1998).  
61      See e.g. Quigley (1996: 109pp), McMahon (2004: 254p).  
62 See for the positive effects attributed to NGOs and a criticism of the moral image of NGOs: 
Nuscheler (1996: 503p), see also section 2.1.3 and 2.1.6 in this analysis. 
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of a better society” (UN Secretary-General’s ‘Agenda for Development’ Report, p. 107 
cited in Chandler 2004: 226). 
According to donors, civil society is thus primarily the result of the activities of NGOs. The 
more NGOs are active in a recipient country, the more vibrant civil society will be. From this 
standpoint, civil society assistance largely translates into NGO support. The success of 
assistance can be measured by counting NGOs active in a country.63  
In their support to NGOs, donors apply what has been called a strategy of “institutional-
modeling” (see Carothers 1997). Donors are highly influenced by their national background 
and experiences and tend to support Western-style organizations (Quigley 2000). In her 
analysis of assistance to women’s groups in CEE, McMahon (2004: 254) finds that donors 
quickly altered an initial reactive approach and became increasingly proactive. Instead of 
supporting existing institutions, donors increasingly encouraged the development of 
organizations that would not have formed otherwise, often by providing seed money.  
The initial focus of donors on institution building had unintended negative side-effects. 
McMahon (2004: 263) points out that the incentive for activists in the region to establish a 
new organization was higher than the incentive to work for an already existing organization. 
As a result, several small organizations came into being with similar goals and objectives, 
and sometimes even the same membership. Instead of joining forces and thus gaining 
political power, these organizations preferred to remain separate organizations. A fact 
McMahon largely attributes to the existence of foreign funds. Moreover, in light of scarce 
funding opportunities, intense competition among groups with similar objectives arose. 
Institution building thus resulted in a rise of small and largely superfluous organizations and 
additionally hindered the development of cooperative ties among NGOs or the ability for 
collective action outlined above as characteristics of a vibrant civil society (chapter 2.2.3). In 
her study on NGO support in Russia, Henderson (2002) comes to a similar conclusion. 
Recipient organizations in Russia largely failed to develop links with other groups of society 
or even with like-minded organizations:  
”Perhaps … aid is best at fostering groups’ abilities to perform civil society’s external 
functions of advocacy and interest articulation, but it does relatively little to improve 
how these groups perform civil society’s internal functions of developing networks of 
communication and trust” (Henderson 2002: 164). 
63 American donors, in particular, measure the success of assistance in the number and variety of 
domestic NGOs. See for example the “NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia”, which USAID has been publishing on an annual basis since 1996. See also a magnitude of 
directories of NGOs active in different issue areas in Central and Eastern Europe that are almost 
exclusively funded by American donors.  
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3.4.2 Capacity Building 
Besides financial and material support to organizations, donors invest in human resources 
and undertake what is called “capacity building” measures. Countless seminars, conferences 
or in-door training seminars have been carried out in CEE with the aim of teaching 
individuals and civil society activists what civil society is and how to run an NGO. While at the 
beginning seminars were largely run by foreign short-term consultation, the dissatisfaction 
with this practice quickly shifted the focus to “train the trainer” projects.64 From 1993 
onwards, donors qualified local trainers to carry out civic education and capacity-building 
measures.  
Training and education measures are motivated by two different objectives. Firstly, 
professional staff is regarded as important for the building of strong organizations. Capacity 
building thus also serves the objective of institution-building. Secondly, capacitiy building has 
the objective of ‘raising awareness’ and triggering an understanding of the democratic role 
and merits of civil society. As a  result, donors focus in their training efforts on the one hand 
on the transfer of basic techniques such as strategies for lobbying, campaigning or fund-
raising. On the other hand, they aim to trigger a proper understanding of the role of NGOs. 
What exactly the ‘right’ role is, however, is largely determined by donors who often point to 
public-policy orientation and advocacy as major tasks of NGOs.65 This practice has been 
criticized for ignoring domestic needs and experiences. Case studies on civil society 
assistance in different countries and issue areas suggest that the constant focus on 
advocacy and public policy orientation leads NGOs to ignore their constituencies and to 
refrain from building a support base. As a result, NGOs often fail to address the issues of 
interest for their constituencies. In his analysis of OSCE civil society assistance to Bosnia, 
Chandler (2004) points to a gap between supported organizations and the Bosnian people 
(ibid: 235). He explains this gap as follows:  
“The unintended consequence of creating civil society NGOs which are reliant on 
external support has been that they are never forced to build their own base of popular 
support … these NGOs … have no need to engage in discussion or create broader 
links to society” (ibid: 236).  
64 Central and Eastern European participants were frustrated with the fact that foreign 
consultations often revealed a shocking ignorance of domestic settings, experiences and needs. The 
short-term training measures have been identified as a fruitless enterprise with little effect. See Siegel 
/ Yancey (1992).  
65 As already mentioned (chapter 3.3.), USAID stresses the importance of “civic advocacy 
organizations”.  The OSCE also stresses the importance of advocacy NGOs: “The goal of the NGO 
development work is to assist local NGOs to become self-sufficient, participatory, and actively involved 
in working on behalf of their communities. The kind of local NGO projects which most closely reach 
this aim.. are those which focus on advocacy and are willing to tackle actual political or social 
issues…” (OSCE Democratization Branch, Monthly Report, 1, p. 5, cited in Chandler 2004: 231). 
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McMahon (2004) comes to a similar conclusion in her analysis of Western aid to women 
groups in CEE.  
“... this dependence on the international community has translated into a lack of 
accountability, if not interest, in grass-roots constituency building” (ibid: 262). (NGOs 
that receive Western assistance should) … “… engage and involve their local 
communities, not just seek to advocate on their behalf” (ibid: 259). 
According to her, women’s groups in CEE adopted the language and issues as well as the 
perception of gender equality based on American values and norms. In doing so they did not 
only fail to address their constituency, they also failed to develop their own ideas on equality 
and women’s rights in the post-communities context (ibid: 264).  
Nonetheless the various training and education activities of donors were still effective on the 
personal level. McMahon comes to the conclusion that donors succeeded in triggering 
learning through capacity building measures:  
“… Interviews with activists from the region … suggest that (American NGOs) have 
been crucial to skill development for particular individuals” (ibid: 256p).  
Similarly, in his study on democracy assistance in Romania, Carothers (1996a: 95pp) finds 
that the effect of political assistance ranges from modest to negligible. However, he illustrates  
what he calls “subjective effects”, i.e. “psychological, moral, and emotional effects at the 
personal level” (ibid: 95) that trigger recipient learning and increase recipients’ understanding 
of  democratic participation.  
Starting in the middle of the 1990s and in response to the criticism above, donors exceed the 
initial focus on training and education and increasingly aim to strengthen relationships within  
civil society and between civil society actors and other domestic actors. A research project on 
the matter conducted by the Canadian “North-South Institute” points out that strengthening 
the capacity of individual NGOs does not go far enough. If donors seek to strengthen the 
capacity of civil society as a whole, it is crucial to establish networks between the different 
organizations and to stipulate a dialogue among NGOs, governments, community groups, 
funding agencies and other actors (North-South Institute 1996). Capacity building thus 
includes a focus on networks and cross-cutting relationships and on the organizations’ ability 
to do their work in conjunction with other actors and forces. The aim is less on “brick making”, 
rather on “brick laying” (ibid: 12). Along the same lines, Carothers observes several years 
after his study on Romania:  
“Aid providers still interpreted promoting the development of civil society in terms of 
supporting NGOs, but the range of … NGO aid was expanded considerably … Aid 
providers began to support centers for NGO training and development as NGO sectors 
grew rapidly” (1999b: 59).  
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Carothers continues by stating that donors encourage NGOs to invest in horizontal ties 
between civil society organizations as well as in vertical ties with governments and citizens. 
Donors increasingly push NGOs to develop productive partnerships with central and local 
governments, to seek to ameliorate the political and legal environment enabling civil society 
activities, to invest in NGO networks, and to develop more direct ties to the citizens on whose 
behalf they act (ibid: 60).  
3.4.3 Project-specific Support 
Finally, donors largely rely on the support for specific projects with a given time-frame and 
identifiable objectives. The preference of project-specific support in contrast to institutional 
support, which finances the running costs of a recipient organization,66 has much to do with 
the accountability of donors for issued funds and their need for controlling mechanisms. 
Project-specific support, however, often has the negative side-effect that it breeds what it 
aims to avert, namely dependent recipients, the waste of resources, and opportunistic 
behavior. 
Donors either spent the money of tax-payers or of private contributors. In either case, the 
public is wary that funds are not wasted or embezzled. Donors are thus on a constant watch. 
They need to demonstrate on the one hand that their activities do not breed corruption, while 
on the other hand they are under pressure to present observable results. In the eyes of 
donors, project-specific support has the advantage that it firstly aims to yield immediate 
results in a given period of time, and thus secondly satisfies the donor’s need for controlling 
and evaluation. Financing a directory of NGOs is thus a safer enterprise for donors than 
support for workshops as in the former case the result is easily detected whereas the 
outcome of the latter activity is uncertain and not easily open to external inspection. 
Moreover, donors are aware of the fact that a trustworthy and suitable partner organization is 
not easily found in the post-communist context. In view of lacking finances, the incentive to 
establish a NGO for opportunistic reasons, i.e., in order to satisfy personal interests and 
motives, is high. Rather than supporting one single organization for a longer period of time 
and risking choosing an untrustworthy partner, donors prefer to support various projects of 
different organizations, thus minimizing the risk of corruption. In consequence, project-
specific support satisfies donors’ wish for control and supervision. Additionally, donors 
66 English-speaking donors usually differentiate between “project-grants” and “institutional grants”. 
In Germany the different strategies are more commonly know under the headings of “partner-
measures” (Partnermaßnahmen) or “regime-measures” (Regimemaßnahmen). Traditionally the KAS 
opts for the former, the FES for the latter approach (see chapter 6.1.3). In other words, the KAS 
prefers to work together with a small number of well-chosen partner organizations over a longer period 
of time, while the FES prefers to implement several project measures with different organizations.  
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believe that project-specific support is more appropriate to achieve their objectives than 
simply supporting an organization without a given purpose. In this way, donors can determine 
for which purposes recipients use their funds, and may chose projects they believe have the 
most impact on civil society development.  
However, the tendency of donors to support primarily projects has negative side-effects. One 
may even argue that donors breed what they aim to prevent, thus opportunistic behavior. 
First and foremost, recipient organizations become overly dependent on project funds, a 
dependence that prevents local sensibility, stability, continuity and even sustainability. As 
international aid mainly supports specific projects, which further are required to be original, 
innovative and exemplary, recipients are forced to ensure their existence by implementing 
one project after the other. Each project, however, has different objectives, encompasses 
different activities, and often even involves different staff. After the project ends, financial 
resources are lacking to continue the established service or activity or whatever the project 
objective was. Project-specific support thus hinders continuity, stability and sustainability. 
Recipients cannot work for the achievement of their statutory objectives, nor can they 
develop an appropriate organizational structure. Instead they live with permanent alteration 
of staff, objectives and the constant need to pay for the running costs of established services. 
As one recipient in the region put it:  
“Donors love to fund something original, innovative and unique. We (the recipients) 
need support to continue something proven and established” (interview with the 
author).  
This tendency is intensified as civil society assistance is shaped by fashion and trends - a 
fact that is again a by-product of the good intentions of donors. Although the prevailing 
criticism of analysts tells otherwise, the fact remains that donors more often than not want to 
satisfy local demand. However, they tend to forget that other donors follow the same line of 
thought. Therefore if corruption in a recipient country is high, all donors launch anti-corruption 
programs. If a country is said to have a minority problem, all donors launch minority-
programs. At the end of the day, more money is available to fund projects targeting the 
empowerment of ethnic minorities than NGOs focusing on minority issues. As a result, civil 
society assistance is seldom based on long-time strategic reflections. It instead follows short-
term objectives. Recipient organizations thus face the challenge of adapting to new donor 
objectives and wants. The example of democracy project funding illustrates this point. 
Although donors do not make this explicit,67 civil society assistance in an authoritarian state 
67 An exception is USAID who differentiates between pre-transition, early transition, late transition 
and consolidation phase of democratization. According to USAID each phase requires different 
strategies of civil society assistance (USAID 1996: 3pp). 
 77
                                                
must be different than civil society assistance in a new democracy. While in the former case 
the prevailing interest is the weakening and displacement of existing institutions and ruling 
elites, in the latter case the predominant aim is to stabilize and consolidate existing 
institutions and ruling elites. In both cases civil society plays a different role (see 
Lauth/Merkel 1997). In the first case, civil society is a counterweight and often a counter-elite 
to the ruling regime. External support to NGOs aims to support this counter-elite, to protect it 
from governmental arbitrariness and repression and to guarantee the material existence of 
oppositional NGOs. A further objective of NGO support in this phase might be to mobilize the 
masses. In new democracies, it cannot be the aim to protect a counter-elite to the state. 
Instead NGOs provide citizens with the opportunity to participate in political decisions, to 
represent societal interests, and to control state behavior. It has been argued that the 
different objectives of civil society assistance in different phases of democratization 
counteract the development of civil society (Jenkins 2001). This is firstly evident in a personal 
discontinuity. As the prevailing objective of NGO support in an authoritarian regime is the 
enforcement of a counter-elite, it is hardly surprising that NGO activists change their job 
against a seat in parliament or government once democracy is in place. As a result, 
organizations of civil society are left behind without leadership and objectives. Moreover, they 
are confronted with rather different donors’ wants and funding requirements. While up to now 
it was enough to be against the ruling regime, now donors ask them to be for something. 
Even worse, as donors often refrain from supporting particular interests, in order not to raise 
suspicions of taking sides,68 support is largely limited to service provision. NGOs are thus 
forced to provide services, which are, however, not aimed to serve interests of local 
constituencies, but what donors believe is in the interest of local constituencies. As a result, 
NGOs often shrivel to mere donor project-implementation organizations.  
For all these reasons and due to the high dependence on foreign funds, project-specific 
support leads to opportunistic behavior and prevents local sensibility. Rather than engaging 
in activities they regard as useful, recipients quickly learned that it is more fruitful to satisfy 
donors’ wants than local needs. Ottaway/Chung (1999) claim that the lacking sensibility of 
donors to domestic needs leads to “top-down” civil society organizations, “with programs and 
activities molded above all by what donors are willing to fund” (ibid: 107). The strong 
requirements donors developed in fear of corruption and a waste of resources had mainly 
one effect: recipients developed sophisticated skills in proposal writing and fund-raising. As a 
result, donors more often than not fund not the project best suited to reach the outlined 
objectives, but the one with the best-written proposal. In the words of McMahon (2004: 262): 
68 McMahon (2004: 260) makes the point that donors often restrain from funding political activities 
of recipients due to tax and legal requirements.  
 78
“The feverish efforts to keep their organization afloat and secure funding for the next 
year means that fund-raising and proposal writing are an organization’s main concern, 
while proposed activities and outreach must be secondary. Ironically, but not 
surprisingly, groups have to focus on keeping their organization going rather than 
undertaking programmes to help women or increase their domestic following”.  
3.5 Conclusion: Problems of Civil Society Assistance  
The aim of this chapter has been to approach the phenomenon of civil society assistance. 
Civil society assistance has been defined as the deliberate, direct and explicit involvement of 
external actors into domestic settings with the aim of nurturing and supporting civil society as 
a means to build democracy from the bottom-up. Civil society assistance focuses exclusively 
on the societal actors of the recipient state and is thus always transnational in character. 
While recipients are thus exclusively non-state actors, donors may be state or non-state 
actors.  
It became clear that civil society assistance is not the product of an altruist donor guided by 
humanistic ideals, rather satisfies rational interests and follows an instrumental reasoning. 
Civil society assistance is thus a highly interest driven enterprise. The intention of donors is 
less to promote civil society as a good in itself, rather as an instrument to achieve other ends 
such as democracy, good governance, efficient aid implementation or market economy. This 
is very evident when one looks at the concepts and definitions of civil society underlying 
donors’ activities. Most definitions of civil society given by donors are precise in describing 
the lofty goals civil society is able to achieve, remain, however, vague in outlining basic 
characteristics of civil society. Donors thus maintain the possibility of interpreting what civil 
society is on a case to case basis. In doing so, donors largely rely on institutional support to 
NGOs in their efforts to promote civil society development. The definitional vagueness thus 
leaves ample scope when it comes  to identifying the organizations belonging to civil society 
that will subsequently be the main beneficiaries of assistance. In other words, depending on 
the interest of donors either the one of the other organization receives aid. Donors thus 
always make a selection – a selection of eligible organizations, or of a trust-worthy partner 
with whom one aims to implement a project. It goes without saying that an interest-driven 
and selective approach to civil society assistance is perfectly legitimate in principle. Why 
should civil society assistance not serve both, recipients and donors? This being said, the 
intentional and selective character of civil society assistance is still problematic for several 
reasons.  
If civil society assistance is selective, there is a high risk that donors support only fragments 
of civil society and not a pluralistic spectrum of a variety of organizations. This can have far-
reaching consequences, as the provision of resources, contacts, information and know-how 
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strengthens the capability of selected groups, whereas others are left with little access to 
finances, training and know-how. It has been argued that in particular in the early stage of 
civil society development this imbalance determines the further development of associational 
life. Organizations that are the first to receive aid after political change gain a head start that 
can hardly be outrun by others.69 By these means, civil society assistance alters domestic 
power structures and is thus highly political in nature. In his study on civil society assistance 
in development countries Windfuhr comes to the conclusion:  
“In countries whose civil society is weak, external intervention influences the 
direction of the development and composition of civil society. The weaker civil society 
is, the higher the risk that new conflicts arise because certain groups and interests are 
selectively supported and privileged.” (Windfuhr 1999: 1, own translation).  
Furthermore, the focus of donors on institutions and leading NGO activists often weakens 
rather than strengthens ties within civil society. The selectivity of donors that equips some 
with resources, know-how and abundant contacts and leaves others with nothing frequently 
creates envy and resentment as well as fierce competition among NGOs. The competition for 
scarce resources, as well as the fact that it is more rewarding for activists to establish a new 
organization than to work for an existing organization instead hinders the development of ties 
of cooperation and trust among NGOs that constitute a vibrant civil society (see chapter 2). 
Moreover, project-specific support nurtures opportunistic behavior of recipients. In view of the 
scarce financial resources available, only NGOs that flexibly adapt to altering donors’ wants 
guarantee their financial existence. In the worst case, civil society assistance translates into 
nothing more than outsourcing development agencies that implement assistance projects 
from the donor to the recipient side. Such organizations fail to address their local 
constituencies. Furthermore, such organizations feel no need to address local demands, as 
they rely on foreign and not domestic actors in ensuring material well-being, reputation and 
political bargaining power. Analysts of civil society assistance thus critically put forward that 
recipients of external assistance are often detached from the local population. Some even 
point to a gap between the people and recipient organizations, i.e. the ones that pretend to 
represent society (Chandler 2004).  
Additionally, one has to raise the question of sustainability. Doubts can be raised whether the 
selected NGOs are able to sustain themselves after Western assistance comes to an end, 
especially if they do not correspond with local needs. The evaluation of US-funded NGO 
support programs critically states:  
69 Here both Wedel (1998) and Petrescu (2000) for Poland and Romania respectively, come to the 
conculsion that organizations which received developmental funds briefly after the fall of communism 
continue to have a decisive impact on the development of an NGO sector.  
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“When there is heavy emphasis on demonstrating a policy change or other large 
impact, inevitably there will be pressure to assist high-profile national 
organizations...The problem of working with national groups is that they tend already to 
be well funded by foreign donors and share the priorities of the foreign donor 
community. These organizations may depend on foreign funding for their survival and 
find it difficult to build an authentic constituent base of local support. Ironically, the 
emphasis on impact and results may push donors toward supporting organizations that 
are not sustainable in the long run” (USAID 1999: 20).  
Finally, interest-driven civil society projects undermine the credibility of donors and arouse  
suspicions of external manipulation. As already stated, civil society assistance is always 
political in nature and directly intervenes into the internal affairs of a country by empowering 
one actor’s group over another. As a result, civil society assistance may be perceived as a 
subtle form of political intervention from outside and rejected as an illegitimate interference in 
the internal affairs of a country. In consequence, the main recipients of aid are perceived as 
intruders and puppets of Western influence.  
Bearing these problems in mind, the question arises whether an intentional and purposive 
intervention into the internal affairs of a country, even if it is classified as assistance, is at all 
capable of fostering civil society development? Is it not the case that the two problems 
inherent to civil society assistance, its selectivity and illegitimacy, render any attempt to 
nurture civil society development from the outside impossible? Are the critics of civil society 
assistance right who suggest that due to its intentional and selective character civil society 
assistance results in a mere supplementary structural feature of civil society - in westernized 
and highly professional NGOs with little domestic support? 
This study aims to reveal that the anticipated failure is not a necessity. Not all analysts see 
civil society assistance critically. On the contrary, some even stress the advantage of civil 
society assistance in comparison to other forms of democracy assistance that target  state 
institutions. Carothers sees civil society assistance as “one step further” that has the capacity 
of turning “democratic forms into democratic substance” (Carothers 1999a: 337). Quigley 
(1997: 106) stresses the ability of non-state actors and private foundations that function 
“outside of state-to-state relations”. According to him, their capacity to disburse resources 
more quickly and adapt programs more easily than public funders will have a positive effect 
on democratization. Moreover, donors are increasingly aware of the shortcomings of their 
selective approach and adapt their strategies to recipient needs. The emphasis on single 
organizations and institutions is supplemented by activities that aim to nurture ties inside 
society, i.e. between different NGOs but also between NGOs and local administration and the 
wider society. We thus face the paradox that the critical studies on civil society assistance 
cited above are opposed by several studies on civil society assistance that demonstrate that 
foreign aid played a major role in nurturing the rise of NGO activity in Central and Eastern 
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Europe and that capacity-building measures had an immense effect on the individual and 
personal level.70 Donors also face the puzzle that their programs, projects and measures 
bear fruits in one country and have little impact in another. Civil society assistance, albeit 
instrumental and selective by character as we have now seen, thus may result in domestic 
changes that trigger civil society development. The question is not so much  if but rather 
when, under which conditions, and in what contexts external assistance contributes to the 
development of civil society. The purpose of the following chapter is to approach these 
questions from a theoretical standpoint.  
 
70 See e.g. McMahon (2004: 255pp), Ekiert / Kubik (2000), Carothers (1996a: 95pp). 
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4 Theoretical Framework: Civil Society Assistance as 
Externally Driven Intentional Institutional Transfer  
The key question of this study is whether the originally Western concept of civil society can 
be transferred to other domestic settings. Is it at all feasible to stimulate, nurture and 
strengthen civil society from abroad? Is civil society not inevitably an indigenous product, 
enshrined in the historical and cultural roots of a nation? The question is thus how far can 
civil society “travel”. And if it can travel, how far does the fact that travel expenses are paid by 
external actors inhibit the chances of traveling? In brief, is a transfer of civil society feasible, 
and if yes, under what conditions and with what outcomes?  
The following chapter theoretically approaches these questions and concerns. As pointed out 
in chapter 3, civil society assistance is understood as an externally driven intentional attempt 
to transfer a certain image, i.e. civil society, from one place to another. Civil society 
assistance thus refers to a transfer of formal and informal structures, namely civil society 
organizations on the one hand and civil values and norms on the other hand, that have 
proven valuable in the ‘Western’ world. The chapter starts with an overview of two basic 
approaches to civil society assistance that provide divergent answers to the question to what 
extent is an intentional transfer of civil society feasible. Following a more detailed description 
of a sociological understanding of institutions, I subsequently highlight the basic problems 
and dilemmas inherent to external efforts to assist civil society. Finally, conditions facilitating 
intentional transfer from without will be identified.  
4.1 Two Distinct Approaches to Civil Society Assistance  
In the few theoretical discussions of civil society assistance two distinct approaches to the 
questions above can be identified. The first is based on neo-liberal thinking and puts actors 
and their choices in the center of analysis. The second, however, follows a sociological line of 
thought and places greater emphasis on structures and cultures.71 According to the former 
approach, civil society assistance is seen as a promising device for promoting and stabilizing 
democratization processes. This assessment is based on the conviction that external actors 
71 For a description of the two basic lines of thought see: Scharpf (1997: 20pp), Jacoby (2000: 
3pp), Offe (1995: 201pp), Hall/Taylor (1996). Hall/Taylor label the two lines of thought the “calculus” 
and the “cultural” approach to human action. Based on the relationship between actors and structures, 
the definition of institutions and the explanation of change they distinguish among “three new 
institutionalisms”: “historical institutionalism”, “rational choice institutionalism”, and “sociological 
institutionalism” whereas “historical institutionalism” stands somewhat between the other two as it 
draws on the “calculus” and the “cultural” approach in an eclectic manner.  
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transfer missing links into transforming societies. In this perspective, external assistance and 
aid possess at least the potential to provide a valuable contribution to democratization. The 
sociological approach, in contrast, views civil society assistance as a donor driven and donor 
dominated transaction that either risks rejection or is followed by recipient opportunism and is 
in either case bound to fail. The two distinct approaches have also been labeled with the self-
explaining terms of engineering versus gardening. The former stresses the point that 
institution building is regarded as a manageable enterprise, whereas the latter points to the 
importance of grown structures and the longevity of institutions.  
Following a neo-liberal perspective, aid and assistance have been understood as a 
transmission belt that transplants missing links, in this case civil society into domestic 
contexts (Wedel 1998: 8). In this view, democratic change may be pictured as the 
reconstruction of an old house that is brought down and rebuilt on the same spot. Some of 
the old parts of the house that still function and live up to the expectations of the architect 
may be used again, but most of them are rebuilt differently, modernized and brought in line 
with a blueprint sketched out on the drawing table. Whether reconstruction will be a success, 
in the sense that it results in a stable and functional house, is foremost dependent on the 
skills of the architect, on good planning and on the quality of the blueprint. Democratic 
change is thus nothing more than a question of design. Institutional design determines the 
effectiveness and performance of institutions and since it is assumed that democracy 
consolidates when based on institutions capable to fulfill their major tasks, design 
subsequently is a decisive element in the successful completion of political change. As 
designs are usually copies (Offe 1995), democratization translates into nothing more than 
institutional modeling. Neo-liberal approaches to democratization thus regard the transfer of 
institutions, concepts or ideas as an effective mechanism for setting up proper institutions 
(Jacoby 2000: 3). If we return to our picture of the democratic house, civil society is seen as 
an important building block guaranteeing the stability of the new house. Today’s designers 
emphasize functions of civil society that stabilize and supplement political institutions. 
Emphasis is given to the conflict resolution capacities of civil society and intermediary 
structures. Moreover, civil society organizations are taken as more efficient than state bodies 
in performing services.72 Along these lines, the establishment of a plurality of associations 
and non-governmental organizations, as civil society is largely understood, will automatically 
be followed by a stable and consolidated democracy. The major question of concern is thus 
not whether a transfer is feasible, but how it is best done. The “question of strategy” 
(Carothers 1997) stands in the forefront, hence the question “how to devise effective 
72 The various democratic virtues of civil society are outlined in greater detail in chapter 2.1. 
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strategies to support a wide variety of democratization processes” (Santiso 2001: 1). It thus 
hardly comes as surprise that various studies on civil society assistance mainly provide an 
analysis of donors, their strategies, projects and programs.73 Although the donor perspective 
is an important step in any analysis of political or economic assistance, the sole focus on 
projects and programs reduces assistance merely to the business of right strategies and best 
practices. Recipient interests and contexts are widely ignored.  
By contrast, sociological or cultural approaches to civil society assistance stress the 
importance of domestic contexts and recipient responses. From this perspective, external 
assistance is regarded as a doomed effort that in the best case produces paper results or 
risks rejection and in the worst case results in nationalist backlashes and democratic reverse 
waves. Following a sociological interpretation, democratization is subject to path-
dependency. Institutions are not rebuilt after a tabula rasa. Instead rules and norms are 
internalized by the people that live and act under them. Actors and their choices are seen as 
a unit of analysis with little significance as human action is highly influenced and determined 
by institutions. The approach proceeds from the assumption that “behavior is not fully 
strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview” (Hall/Taylor 1996: 955). Institutions thus 
do not only provide necessary information and determine actors’ expectations about policy 
outcomes and the actions of others, they also provide moral templates and culturally defined 
“scripts” that do not only structure actions but also define the internal beliefs, cognitive maps 
and subsequently the preferences of actors (ibid, Scharpf 1997: 21). As a result, institutional 
change cannot be made by scratch following a previously created design. Institutions are 
instead resistent to change and when change occurs, it is a long process with an uncertain 
outcome. Hence, civil society is an indigenous product that does not only rely on formal 
institutions and associations but depends as well on a certain civic ethos or Sittlichkeit. 
Tolerance and trust that transcend beyond the circle of family and friends are inevitable 
values of civil society that make democracy endure in complex societies.74 A culture based 
on such values cannot be transplanted from the outside, rather is the result of a long 
historical and cultural development. A sociological approach to civil society assistance thus 
conceives neither the concept of civil society assistance, nor the strategy of donors, nor the 
project management as decisive factors determining the effect of external assistance. How 
the assistance is perceived, accepted and adapted by the recipients is mainly decisive. 
Recipient responses determine the implementation and thus the actual outcome, in contrast 
to the output, of the assistance granted:  
73 Examples of studies that largely focus on donors, in particular US-American donors, and on 
donor strategies are: Carothers (e.g. 1997, 1999a), Crawford (1996), Diamond (1997), Glenn (1999), 
Guilhot (2003), Hansen (1996), Jenkins (2001), Quigley (1997), Santiso (2001). 
 85
                                                
”However powerful external signals and levers may be, it is where and how they are 
received internally that proves decisive“ (Pravda 2001: 15).  
From this standpoint, external assistance to civil society remains without a lasting impact and 
results in the establishment of ’DONGOs’ (donor driven NGOs), Quangos’ (quasi-NGOs) or 
“GONGOs” (government organized NGOs). In other words, the supported NGOs are not 
independent but solely function as puppets either of donors or of the recipient state. Civil 
society assistance merely supports “some favored cliques” (Wedel 1998), who strive for the 
pursuit of their own wealth instead of the common good, and who orientate their actions 
towards donor promises instead of their constituencies’ needs. What evolves is nothing more 
than a supplementary stratum of Western oriented NGOs detached from society and 
domestic worries. As a consequence, civil society assistance breeds recipient opportunism 
and hypocrisy. The lofty goals of donors are followed by meager results (Quigley 2000). On 
top of that, civil society assistance may also result in negative effects. The privileged status of 
the beneficiaries of aid evokes envy. Main recipients may be regarded as “bridgeheads of 
alien influence” (Abele / Offe 2002). The external activities are not always welcomed as 
needed assistance rather as an unwanted intrusion into their internal affairs. National 
backlashes are the likely consequence.  
This study will follow neither the first nor the second line of argument as both reveal certain 
shortcomings that minimize their usefulness as an analytical framework for this study. The 
neo-liberal approach with its emphasis on the functions of a template on the one hand and 
the value of these functions for recipients on the other is inappropriate for grasping the 
peculiar character of different domestic responses to external pressures. The main question 
of concern of this line of thought is whether concepts and institutions are “fit” for transfer 
(Rose 1993: 98)75 and thus why they travel, and not to what extent and with what outcomes. 
The focus is placed exclusively on the externally driven transfer taking place in a kind of 
‘institutional modeling’. Such accounts are thus restricted to an analysis of the export side of 
the transfer, leaving half of the picture aside. Divergent responses to seemingly similar 
pressures and varying outcomes are, however, the major puzzle for anyone interested in civil 
 
74 See in detail on the concept of civil society: chapter 2. 
75 Rose (1993) stresses the point that lesson drawing is not about the uniform spread of programs; 
it is about finding programs that can transfer. The transferability of a program is grounded in elements 
connected to the program and elements connected to the country (e.g. lacking resources) adopting it. 
Basically his argument follows the logic that due to dissimilarities of two settings certain conditions 
have to apply so that the program can be effective. However, he gives no satisfying classification as to 
how many dissimilarities prevent the transfer and how much similarity is necessary. Cases are also 
rejected when programs do not transfer despite similarities in context or transfer despite lacking 
effectiveness.  
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society assistance. Neo-liberal accounts of civil society assistance are for all these reasons 
not capable of explaining the complex and interactive processes of international pressures 
and domestic responses. 
Moreover, empirical studies demonstrate that the actors involved in a transfer process are 
not guided by strategic calculations. In his study on policy transfer between the US and 
Britain, Wolman (1992) points out that the search for information about different political 
programs is not carried out in a structured and efficient way but takes place quite arbitrary 
(ibid: 31). The absence of an assessment of the effects of the program in the country of origin 
and the lacking awareness of the different conditions in the borrowing country prove that the 
effectiveness of the borrowed policy is not important for the borrowers (ibid: 35). The reason 
for the transfer lies in the fact that foreign concepts seem to be more easily accepted at 
home. In his study on the motives of states to utilize foreign experience Bennett (1991: 33) 
comes to similar conclusions. He names three different motives beside the search for 
effectiveness: (1) domestic actors use foreign evidence for reasons of agenda-setting; (2) to 
mollify political pressure; (3) to legitimate conclusions already reached. Radaelli (1997) also 
points to the need for legitimate decisions as the main explanatory variable in his study on 
the promotion of policy transfer in the EU by EU institutions. Finally, as shown above, 
approaches that ignore the cultural basis of civil society, underlying social norms and cultural 
values, fail to live up to the normative concept of civil society (see chapter 2.2).  
For all these reasons a sociological approach to civil society assistance seems more apt to 
identify varying domestic outcomes of civil society assistance. The dissertation thus draws on 
a sociological understanding of institutions and on the importance given to recipient contexts. 
One must note, however, that a sociological approach to civil society assistance that primarily 
draws on rigid structures and cultures, but leaves no room for change renders any analysis 
of civil society assistance a pointless enterprise. The dissertation thus aims to identify 
conditions of change and challenges the hypothesis that external efforts to assist civil society 
development are bound to fail.  
In line with actor-centered institutionalism this study stresses the role of actors and identifies 
more precisely the conditions under which change occurs. In other words, what 
circumstances and conditions facilitate the transfer of civil society? What makes it possible 
for civil society to travel? These questions are approached in the following steps. First, I 
describe the sociological understanding of institutions as well as the relationship between 
actors and structures as understood in sociological neo-institutionalism in greater detail, as 
the analytical framework developed in the remainder of this chapter draws on the basic 
assumptions of a sociological understanding of institutions. Secondly, implications for civil 
society assistance will be derived and the problems inherent in the transfer of concepts, 
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ideas and institutions from one place to another identified. Finally, I identify conditions that 
facilitate intentional transfer from abroad. In doing so, great emphasis will be placed on 
actors acting within institutional settings and on the possibility of learning. 
4.2 A Sociological Understanding of Institutions 
This study follows a sociological understanding of institutions that stresses the ‘dual nature’ 
of institutions (Offe 1995).76 From this standpoint, institutions are more than a simple 
instrument established in order to serve certain functions, to cope with special problems and 
to extract the resources needed to accomplish stated objectives. Institutions evolve not only 
in order to create the most efficient structure to perform certain tasks, but also generate 
norms and principles about what ought to be done, what is to be regarded as normal and 
what behavior can be expected from others acting under the same institution. In other words, 
besides the formal regulations and rules ensuring effectiveness, institutions embody the 
normative principles of those who live in or under them (Offe 1995: 299). Through this, 
‘socializing function’ institutions coordinate action, guide behavior and create purposes for 
action. Such norms are often not fixed in writing but are informal practices and common 
knowledge, which are lived and re-lived and slowly generated through habitual action and 
recognition. They incorporate on the one hand a normative basis from which the institution 
derives its legitimacy and on the other hand provide the institution’s members with shared 
cognitive and normative orientations. Institutions thus consist of two components (Offe 1995): 
a formal feature unveiled in formal structures based on written rules and specialized roles, 
and an informal feature based on common practice, daily routines and a shared 
understanding. In result, the continuing existence of institutions further depends on their 
ability to perform two functions: to achieve internal socialization and external effectiveness.  
The advantage of the outlined ‘second nature’ is obvious: it establishes order and provides 
orientation without an abundance of written regulations and rules. Moreover, by providing 
normative orientations, institutions generate support and loyalty as well as a sense of 
belonging. In doing so, they socialize and integrate their members. The inherent problematic 
is, however, also not difficult to depict. This self-enforcement of rules and routines results in 
rigidity and resistance to change. Institutions tend to be stable and persistent to change. This 
is due to a simple mechanism: Actors react to novelties while using old routines and adapting 
them to the new situation or better adapting the situation to the routines (March/Olson 1989: 
34). Even after a radical change, longstanding norms and habits persist. The institutionalized 
76 The following is mainly based on: Eisen (1996), Goodin (1996), Hall/Taylor (1996), March/Olson 
(1989), Offe (1995 / 2000b).  
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rules and norms are internalized by the members of the institutions. As a result, institutions 
are ‘given’ in the sense that they are neither questioned nor aware. Institutions regulate 
action in a way the actors are unaware of. Hence, they also regulate the action that attempts 
to foster institutional change. In the words of March/Olson (1989): action follows the “logic of 
appropriateness” (March/Olson 1989). Action is not determined by hierarchical preferences 
of actors that pursue their own interests. Rather, actors chose actions that are most 
appropriate with regard to the situation they are in and the position or role they hold inside 
the institution (ibid.: 23). Action is constrained by institutions, rules, the membership, position 
and role of the individual in question. Hence, preferences of agents are determined by 
institutions, existing rules, and norms, as actors seek to achieve some kind of cognitive 
consistency and a reinforcement of already existing belief systems. According to the 
sociological understanding of the term, institutions are thus conceptualized in broad terms as 
the definition encompasses not only formal and written rules and regulations, but particularly 
stresses the informal rules, norms, and cultural standards that are inevitable parts of 
institutions.  
 
4.3 Institutional Transfer – Doing What Cannot Be Done?  
So what does this imply for the externally driven transfer of structures and norms, in this 
case, civil society assistance? Firstly, an actor who attempts to transfer institutions faces the 
same problem as one aiming to re-design institutions: The problem of making a habit of new 
things, of rationally creating the irrational, of doing what can not be done.  
Institutions derive the support and loyalty of their members and their legitimacy from tradition, 
habits, convention, normative theories, or “animating ideas” (Goodin 1996: 26, Offe 1996: 
215). The agency once involved in establishing institutions has long been forgotten. 
Legitimacy is derived from the fact that ‘something has always been like that’ or that 
‘something is proved to be good like that’ and out of the fact that it is not man-made but 
stands above agency. An attached agency, in contrast, leads to the suspicion of particular 
individual interests, manipulation, enrichment or imperfection. According to classical political 
theory, this dilemma between agency and institutions is overcome by pointing to “unmoved 
movers”, “unruled rulers” or a non-institutionalized designer of institutions from whose 
decisions institutions emerge. Examples are Machiavelli’s Prince, Rousseau’s legislator or 
the charismatic leader by Weber (Offe 2000b). The argument is that if a founder is involved, 
at least he or she is legitimate due to an apparent superiority and outstanding capacities and 
because s/he strives for the common good and not for his/her own personal interest. A 
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further example of this dilemma is founding legends which often are built around the origin of 
institutions.  
The traditional and “naturelike” (Offe 1995: 207) character of institutions has far reaching 
consequences for civil society assistance. An institutional template coming from abroad, 
which is also being transplanted by an external agent, who follows his own interests can 
seriously inhibit the legitimacy of the institution and is likely to lead to outright rejection. Civil 
society assistance, like any political assistance aimed at transforming the political structure of 
a society, consequently always risks being perceived as illegitimate. This even more so, as 
civil society assistance is always interest-driven and selective, as pointed out in chapter 
three. For all these reasons, people doubt that external donors have altruistic motives and 
fear external manipulation. As a result they may refuse external assistance and advice.  
Besides the problem of legitimacy actors involved in institutional transfer encounter a second 
dilemma. One has to note that transfer targets at a change in the two dimensions of 
institutions: the formal and the informal dimension; the hardware and the software 
component of institutions. The informal dimension of institutions, the underlying traditions, 
cognitive scripts or normative theories are, however, not easily altered in an intentional 
manner. In the words of Claus Offe (1995: 202):  
“Institutions … inculcate duties and generate outcomes. In order to generate the 
outcomes, they must rely on cognitive and moral resources which in their turn, 
however, are not to be created by administrative fiat. “There is no administrative 
production of meaning” (Habermas 1975, p. 70…). Consequently, whoever wishes to 
advocate, design, construct change, or criticize institutions will have to bear in mind this 
dualism and the inherent limits of potential control over meaning.”  
One must thus remain alert of the fact that the formal rules of institutions are more easily 
transferred than the underlying principles, norms and rules. In many cases the transfer is 
therefore limited to the “hardware” or formal side of institutions: organizational patterns, 
formal rules and technical devices are provided. Such a partial transfer lacks, however, the 
underlying principles that determine actors’ expectations and behavior. The likely outcomes 
are therefore not effective institutions that operate in the same manner as in their place of 
origin. In his study on the screening process of the EU in CEE, Jacoby comes to the 
conclusion, that the transfer of Western-style institutions is a process that often produces 
unintended and unforeseeable effects (Jacoby 1998). Jacoby demonstrates that the EU 
screening process which monitors the adoption of the aquis communitaire by the EU 
accession states largely leads to increased organizational complexity and does not improve 
institutional functioning. Institutional transfer in this case thus only adds a supplemental layer 
of institutional complexity to preexisting practices. The major effect, at least in the eyes of the 
recipients, is not an increase in effectiveness, but a gain in international credibility.  
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An even more pessimistic scenario proceeds from the contention that transferred structures 
might well be incompatible with persistent normative and cognitive standards of former 
institutional settings. In this case, grown routines and informal structures will prevent easy 
adaptation to exogenous pressures. In the worst case, the rejection of the new structures will 
be the likely consequence. Such was the fear of many German analysts working on 
institutional transfer from West to East Germany after unification. It was widely assumed that 
the formal structures – the hardware of institutions – could be transferred, whereas the 
embeddedness of those formal structures into the socio-cultural environment which is 
indispensable for the proper functioning of institutions – the software so to speak – cannot be 
transferred and is a fixed variable (Eisen (1996: 7). The different socio-cultural basis in 
Eastern Germany invokes the risk of rejection (see e.g. Offe 1994: 46). Institutional transfer 
is thus always institutional hybridization and results in “formal institutions with informal 
practices” (Olson 1999).  
The inevitable consequence this contemplation suggests is that the transfer of institutional 
patterns is a very uncertain and risky enterprise. The endeavors to transplant certain 
structures, procedures, rules, regulations and norms into different settings is bound to fail 
due to the rigidity of institutions on the one hand, and the illegitimacy of externally driven 
reform on the other. Activities of external actors aiming to transform and reform domestic 
structures that follow an externally operating institutional template, risk rejection and failure 
or will lead to ‘supplementary social stratums’ disconnected to society or other political or 
social institutions. A sociological understanding of institutions thus confirms our suspicion that 
civl society assistance is more likely to transfer the structural features of civil society, i.e. the 
NGO sector, while external actors inevitably fail to install a cultural dimension of civil society. 
Moreover the “civilizational incompetence” of CEE citizens will prevent the adaptation of 
necessary moral qualities and behavioral patterns that make a vibrant civil society (see 
chapter 2). In result, the organizations supported from abroad are not embedded in the 
domestic political and social structure, not aligned with their original constituencies and are 
perceived by the domestic population as ‘bridgeheads of alien influence’. In the words of 
Claus Offe: 
“… the civic ‘spirit’ or ‘mental software’ that is needed to drive the hardware of the 
new institutions is less easily influenced by external interventions (than democratic 
institutions and economic resources)…. The rise of a robust ‘civil society’ cannot be 
initiated from the outside” (Offe 2000a: 96). 
Thus, if the contention holds true, should the author accept the fact that institutional transfer 
as well as civil society assistance is doomed to fail and abstain from a fruitless and 
redundant empirical analysis? Surely not. The aim of this study is to challenge this 
hypothesis. It does not intend to demonstrate that transfer is an easy enterprise resulting in 
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easily achieved success stories. Not at all - too many studies prove that transfer is a difficult 
process facing many drawbacks and obstacles. However, the study aims to challenge the 
hypothesis that transfer is inevitably bound to fail. It therefore aims to demonstrate that 
transfer is feasible if certain conditions apply.  
To accomplish the task of identifying conditions for transfer the project faces the problem of 
incorporating external and internal factors into the analysis. On the one hand, the external 
‘push’, i.e. the externally generated coercion and/or incentives aiming to transfer the missing 
‘civil’ link to new democracies needs to be conceptualized. On the other hand, the question 
arises how this foreign transplant is perceived, accepted, adopted, internally adapted or 
maybe rejected. Civil society assistance will therefore be understood neither as an intrusion 
from outside nor as emulation from within, but rather as an import and an export business 
that can only be understood by taking the donor as well as the recipient side into account. 
Moreover, although it is acknowledged that actors do not always follow strategic calculations 
but are more often than not guided by a search for legitimate and appropriate solutions, it is 
still necessary to stress the importance of choice, political processes, the interaction of 
actors, and learning processes. Please allow me to elaborate.  
4.4 Coercive Imposition versus Slavish Imitation: Conditions of 
Successful Gardening  
The contention of sociological institutionalism that underlying informal rules and culturally-
specific practices provide not only points of reference how to behave best, but also affect the 
very identities, self-images and preferences of actors has one major drawback. Sociological 
institutionalism easily explains why institutions continue to exist. It also offers strong 
explanations why reform efforts are no easy undertakings and also points to the major 
obstacles to democratic consolidation and explains why new democracies often consolidate 
with ‘defects’. However, although sociological institutionalism produces elegant accounts of 
failures of institutional reform, the focus on legacies, cultural practices and cognitive maps 
leaves little room for successfully conducted institutional transformations. Sociological 
institutionalism hardly investigates in causes of institutional change and thus provides only 
limited insight into the conditions that facilitate the transfer of structures and norms. For a 
study interested in the outcomes of institutional transfer it is, however, necessary to identify 
more precisely the conditions under which change in formal as well as in informal rules takes 
place. Furthermore, major focus needs to be given to institutional change occurring as a 
consequence of intentional and externally driven transfer. 
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For this purpose, greater emphasis has to be placed on political processes, actors, their 
interactions and choices on the one hand, and on the possibility of learning and cognitive 
change on the other hand. To avoid the pitfalls of an exclusively structural focus on 
institutions, Jacoby (2000:4) points out that institutional contexts are not to be taken as fixed 
and static. Reflecting on the institutional transfer from West to East Germany, Eisen (1996) 
comes to a similar conclusion and calls for a dynamic model of institutionalism. He stresses 
the point that in contrast to the pessimistic academic anticipations the institutional structures 
of the West did consolidate in the East, albeit with unforeseen outcomes. Eisen concludes 
that the institutional ‘software’ is not a fixed variable put rather open to change due to 
processes of institutional learning and adaptation (ibid: 8). In contrast to Jacoby who stresses 
the importance of political struggle, actors and policies, Eisen refers to the possibility of 
cognitive change or cognitive convergence as a result of learning processes that are 
triggered by a clash between - in his wording - the cultural (software) and the structural 
(hardware) dimension of institutions and that are facilitated and carried by certain ‘key 
actors’. The analytical framework guiding this study will draw on both insights. While actors, 
their orientations, capabilities and interactions stand in the center of analysis in the spirit of 
actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf/Mayntz 1995), special attention is further called to 
the question when and how actors learn and to the question when learning results in political 
and institutional change.  
In doing so, it is decisive for the purpose of this study to place special emphasis on 
interactions between external and internal actors. In other words, one needs to focus on the 
international as well as on the domestic side of the transfer. Not only is it important to 
determine how and to what extend external actors may intervene in domestic processes, on 
top of that, the analysis has to highlight how external pressures are perceived, accepted and 
adopted internally. In the remainder of this chapter I will draw up an analytical framework 
capable of achieving this goal. The argumentation is inspired by the concept of actor-
centered institutionalism developed by Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz (1995). Additionally, 
I will draw on approaches of learning and ideas that have gained prominence in international 
relations theory in order to cope with the peculiarities inherent to a study focusing on 
transactions between international and domestic actors. 77  
77 See for an overview of the literature on the role of ideas and learning in international relations: 
Schaber/Ulbert (1994), Keohane/ Goldstein (eds.) (1993), Haas (1992).  
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4.4.1 Actors and Interactions 
In order to identify the conditions that make institutional transfer work, we must remain alert 
to the fact that institutions are man-made, or to be more specific, institutions are the result of 
the social interactions of a plurality of actors. In the words of Claus Offe (1995: 212): 
“... social order can be re-negotiated by the agents who are institutionally provided 
with the license and mandate to do so”.  
Change as a consequence of actor choices, their interactions and decisions is subsequently 
feasible. This remains true despite the fact that institutional change and reform is hampered 
because formal and especially informal rules, including social norms, conventions and 
expectations, determine actors’ preferences and orientations and thus directly influence 
actors’ behavior and “structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose” 
(Scharpf 1997: 38). This being said, policy outcomes are still not determined by institutional 
rules under which relevant actors act, rather by the actors, their orientations and capabilities, 
actor constellations and modes of transaction (ibid: 43pp).  
“In our framework … the concept of the ”institutional setting“ does not have the 
status of a theoretically defined set of variables that could be systematized and 
operationalized to serve as explanatory factors in empirical research. Rather, we use it 
as a shorthand term to describe the most important influences on those factors that in 
fact drive our explanations – namely, actors with their orientations and capabilities, 
actor constellations, and modes of interaction” (ibid: 39). 
Such a framework thus puts actors into the center of analysis without proceeding from 
rational choice assumptions and without neglecting the importance of institutional settings. 
What is put forward is an interactive approach that stresses the interdependent nature of 
actors and structures, in which actors are taken as the starting point of analysis. 
Notwithstanding that the interactions among intentional actors are regarded as decisive, the 
point is stressed that interactions are structured by the characteristic of the institutional 
settings within which they occur (Scharpf 1997: 1).78  
According to actor-centered institutionalism, institutional settings function as a framework for 
action that structures the set of feasible strategies open to an actor by increasing the 
attractiveness of one particular strategy in comparison to another, and thus by decreasing the 
78 At this point a caveat is in order. Mayntz/Scharpf developed an analytical framework capable of 
explaining policy outcomes that are the result of actors interacting in given institutional settings. 
Institutional settings are thus initially taken as fixed variables. The question arises, to what extent 
actor-centered institutionalism is thus able to explain institutional change. However, the very fact that 
actor constellations and interactions are conceived as independent variables, which are not 
determined by institutional settings allows for institutional change coming as a result of a change in 
actor constellations, actor capabilities or actor orientations. For this exact reason, the framework 
provides valuable insights for the objective of this study. 
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set of feasible strategic options to an institutionally defined subset. The final choice of 
strategy lies, however, in the responsibility and cognizance of the actors involved. In contrast 
to rational choice arguments, it is not assumed that actors have fixed preferences and are 
guided by a sole focus on their self interest. Rather, the orientations of actors, i.e. their 
perceptions and preferences, are structured by formal and informal rules and norms. 
Moreover, the preferences of composite actors are the result of institutional rules that 
constitute them as well as special cultural rules and expectations (ibid: 41).  
Actors determine policy outcomes and thus political decisions that may alter institutional 
rules. However, individual actors are rarely the sole bearers of responsibility for decision 
making. More often than not, political outcomes and especially institutional reform programs 
are the result of the interactions of a variety of actors. If this is so, then policy outcomes that 
determine institutional rules cannot be comprehended as the strategic result of the 
preferences of one – or the strongest – actor. Rather, they are the unpredictable outcome of 
an interchange of various actors orientations as well as their capabilities and resulting action 
resources.  
“…it is unlikely that any actor that is capable of unified action … will be able to 
determine policy outcomes according to the actor’s own perceptions and preferences 
and through the use of the actor’s own capabilities. What is determinative, rather is the 
constellation among the plurality of actors that are involved in policy interactions” (ibid: 
44). 
The constellation of actors thereby refers to the players involved, their strategic options, the 
outcomes associated with strategy combinations, and the preferences of the players over 
these outcomes (ibid).  
This point is even more salient if one is aware of the fact that the interaction between actors 
does not only determine the policy outcome but also impacts on the orientations, i.e. the 
perceptions and preferences, and subsequently the strategic choices of the actors involved 
in the political game. Actors are aware of the importance of interaction. In other words, they 
realize that a desired outcome is not only dependent on their action alone, but the final 
product of various individual actors. As a result, they aim to anticipate the actions and 
choices of others and take the anticipated strategies of other actors into account while 
determining their own strategy. The anticipation of the expected choices of others thus affects 
their own strategic choices. Consequently, actor preferences may change in accordance with 
available strategic options identified by an assessment of other players’ strategies and 
choices, their capabilities and the own capabilities in relation to others. In other words, actors’ 
orientations are not only determined by their basic self-interest, their normative role 
orientations and their identity but also by “relational orientations” that take shape in the 
interaction with others (Scharpf 1997: 84).  
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In sum, policy outcomes and institutional change are the result of actors and their 
interactions. Actors and their interactions are, however, influenced by institutional rules and 
regulations. The capabilities of actors depend on institutional rules such as rules granting 
veto rights. Actor’s orientations are shaped by institutionally defined roles as well as social 
norms and culturally defined cognitive maps. The interaction of actors is usually also 
structured by institutional rules and different “institutional modes”.79  
4.4.2 Two Modes of External Influence: Empowerment and Learning 
What does this imply for the purpose of this study? Leaving the possibility aside that 
externally driven institutional transfer targets the policy environment or even the institutional 
setting in which actor interactions take place; one can primarily derive two ways by which 
change as a consequence of externally driven transfer may occur. External actors may firstly 
alter the capabilities of domestic actors, i.e. “all action resources that allow an actor to 
influence an outcome in certain respects and to a certain degree” (Scharpf 1997: 43). 
Secondly, external actors may impact upon the orientations, thus the perceptions and 
preferences, of domestic actors. 
Empowerment 
In the first case, external actors may intervene into domestic settings by strengthening one 
group of actor over others. In such a case, international assistance results in an increase in 
relative power resources and a high political status of domestic recipients of aid compared to 
their domestic opponents. The ways by which such an empowerment of certain domestic 
actor groups may take place are manifold (see chapt. 3.4.). The provision of financial and 
material resources is the most obvious means to support a given group. Money, but also 
technical equipment that is not at the disposal of major opponents can translate into decisive 
action resources. The recipient organization is – in the sense of the word – better equipped 
to master its tasks. Moreover, the financial benefits granted also maintain the material 
existence of the recipient and thus help the organization to survive; a fact which is especially 
important in authoritarian regimes. The provision of material goods may have an immense 
impact as shown by the example of the Serbian opposition which managed – thanks to the 
up-to-date computers donated to them - to count the votes of the presidential election much 
faster than the regime incumbents could. 
79 Institutional modes are determined by the rules according to which the interaction takes place. 
Scharpf (1997: 46pp) differentiates between four different modes of interaction depending on the 
institutional rules regulating their use: “unilateral action”, “negotiated agreement”, “majority vote”, 
“hierarchical vote”.  
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Secondly, external actors may expand the capabilities of domestic actors by the provision of 
information, training and know-how especially if the information is not available to major 
opponents and can thus translate into a decisive advantage in the political struggle. Taking 
part in capacity-building measures, will probably increase the recipient’s professionalism due 
to the knowledge, training, information and expertise they have received. This, in turn, may 
enable him or her to act more rapidly, self-assuredly and effectively than opponents, 
including those with incumbency resources. Finally, international connections can help to 
protect recipient organizations from government repression or – in new democracies – 
increase the recipient’s standing vis-à-vis its own government. Depending on the reputation 
of the external actor and on whether the expertise of the donor is trusted and respected in a 
given field, domestic actors may indeed gain legitimacy through international contacts. For 
example, a rather small NGO representing women’s rights in the Czech Republic is invited to 
regular committee meetings at the Ministry of Social Affairs. The NGO owes this special 
standard less to its actual lobbying power than to its connection to several international 
donors and to the interest of the government in sending positive signals to the European 
Union and European governments (interview Linau). What is decisive, however, is the 
esteem the external actor enjoys in the domestic setting. In Poland international contacts to 
US organizations may increase the standing of a civil society organization more than 
contacts to German or Russian organizations due to the high esteem of Americans in the 
country as compared to its large neighbors in East and West. The credibility, reputation and 
trustworthiness of the donor are thus at least as decisive as the content of the transfer when 
it comes to increasing action resources of chosen domestic partners. For all these reasons 
the assistance of external actors may translate into an increase of action resources of 
supported domestic actors. As a result, the external interference and support may lead - if 
not already the case - to an inclusion of the empowered domestic actor into the circle of 
decision makers. A further result of external support is a change in strategic options available 
to relevant actors. If the capabilities of one relevant actor increase, all players, including the 
actor in question, will alter their expectations of what strategies are available and of what the 
likely outcome of the political game will be. Subsequently, the range of available strategic 
options may alter as will the strategies they choose.  
From a theoretical point of view, the first method with which external actors may influence 
domestic outcomes is relatively unproblematic. It is obvious that action resources are critical 
to any explanation of policy outcomes since, in their absence “even the most enlightened 
perceptions and preferences will fail to make a practical difference” (Scharpf 1997: 51). 
Similarly, it is obvious that a transfer of resources, information and know-how increases the 
capability of domestic actors to exert political influence. The second option, the possibility 
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that external actors impinge upon domestic processes by altering actor orientations, is 
however less apparent and palatable and requires a more extensive explanation, though. 
Learning 
As already pointed out, sociological institutionalism proceeds from the contention that actors’ 
orientations are not primarily and solely determined by rational self-interests but are subject 
to the socially institutionalized environment of actors. Moreover, actor orientations are not 
only shaped by social norms but are further affected by culturally defined cognitive maps 
which form the worldview of actors. If this is so, then actor’s perceptions and preferences 
tend to be relatively stable as a result of the unconscious character of cognitive mappings 
and rigid worldviews. This notion explains the continuity of institutions, especially if they are 
ineffective and are confronted with external adaptation pressures. On the other hand, it is 
oblivious to the ability of actors to learn and thus ignores the major driving force behind 
institutional change. Although actor orientations tend to be relatively stable, this study 
stresses the point that they are no fixed variables but may be altered through learning and 
socialization.  
For the purpose of this study, the question thus has to be: how do citizens and activists of 
civil society organizations learn to take on their respective roles to create a vibrant civil 
society? How do they learn to participate in politics, trust their fellow citizens, tolerate and 
respect the actions and opinions of their political opponents, have trust in the liability of public 
institutions and rules, stand up for their rights and, in particular, how can they be convinced 
that they are not powerless subjects, rather self-reliant citizens that are able to initiate 
political change? Making activists of civil society organizations learn, however, is not enough. 
Those learning processes must also find their way in wider domestic settings. We thus have 
to additionally ask how to trigger learning processes of political decision-makers. How do 
politicians learn to accept participatory regulations that augment elections, to perceive civil 
society organizations not as illegitimate competitors, but as important intermediaries that 
channel public opinion and legitimate decisions, and when do they take actors of civil society 
as partners from whose participation decision-making profits? And finally the major question 
of concern is to what extent are external actors able to trigger such learning processes? And 
if they are, how do they do it? 
In order to come close to an answer to the above questions, the dissertation will draw on the 
insights of learning theories developed to explain changes in international relations and 
foreign policy. In this regard, the work of Peter Haas on epistemic communities is of 
relevance. It proceeds from the assumption that learning and ideas, i.e. knowledge, values, 
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and strategic concepts, account for changes in state behavior in foreign policy and in 
patterns of international cooperation.  
“We argue that control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of 
power and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of 
behavior and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination” 
(Haas 1992: 2p).  
Ideas are thereby formulated and diffused by means of “epistemic communities”. Epistemic 
communities are (transnational) networks of knowledge-based experts which despite 
perhaps consisting of professionals from various backgrounds (1) share a set of normative 
and principled beliefs, (2) share causal beliefs; (3) share notions of validity, and (4) have a 
common policy enterprise (ibid: 33). The argument goes that international policy coordination 
today is characterized by an increasing complexity and uncertainty which requires special 
expertise, information and advice. Transnational expert-networks hence become salient not 
only for the formulation of new ideas but also for translating ideas and information into 
policies. The basic assumption behind the argument is that groups of experts share a 
common understanding and methodologies which make it possible to ‘construct reality’ 
despite different cultural and national backgrounds. Furthermore, experts are esteemed by 
decision-makers and their societies as legitimate carriers of knowledge. Based on the same 
assumption of the salience of a shared understanding in (relatively) small transnational 
groups, Kathryn Sikkink (1993) introduced the concept of ‘principled issue-networks’:  
”These networks differ from other forms of transnational relations, such as epistemic 
communities or transnationally organized interests groups, in that they are driven 
primarily by shared values or principled ideas – ideas about what is right and wrong – 
rather than shared causal ideas or instrumental goals” (ibid: 412).  
Her own example is networks of human rights issues which influenced state behavior in Latin 
America.  
Learning processes are thus facilitated by the core consensus of a common professional 
background in the case of epistemic communities or a shared principle as in the case put 
forward by Sikkink.80  
We can thus conclude that a second mode of intervention by which donors may impact upon 
recipient organizations, is to trigger learning processes among recipients by engaging in 
transnational networks and partnerships. Such networks necessitate a common goal, task or 
“shared principle” as well as a certain continuity and form.   
80 See also Keck/Sikking (1998).  
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4.4.3 Conditions of ‘Successful’ Transfer 
A common understanding, shared principles and values or another kind of “core consensus” 
in small networks are thus the main factors driving processes of cognitive convergence and 
cognitive change across national borders. Transnational networks, we can conclude, that are 
based on a “core consensus” constitute a promising mechanism when it comes to triggering 
a proper understanding and an “appropriate spirit” among activists of civil society. If this holds 
true, then the type of interaction on which donor and recipient relations are based will 
determine whether learning and a subsequent change of domestic actor’s perceptions and 
preferences will occur. If donors and recipients engage in transnational networks that are 
based on a “core consensus”, be it a common goal, principle, problem, a shared cultural, 
political or professional background or historical affinity, civil society assistance is more likely 
to lead to lasting results. However, if such a core consensus is missing, or if recipients have 
doubts about the genuineness of the motives of donors, distrust the donor or if the donor is 
not credible, the transfer is likely to fail. 
A change in the orientations of domestic actors does not suffice as explanatory factor of 
institutional change, though. Coming back to the arguments of the actor-centered 
institutionalism, one has to accept that a further condition is necessary. New ideas and policy 
solutions but also newly established norms and contentions have to find their way into wider 
domestic settings. Haas refers to the well-known assertion that ‘knowledge is power’, and 
takes the legitimacy enjoyed by the experts as a guarantee that new ideas will find their way 
into domestic settings. Experts thus enjoy a “cultural authority” to introduce innovative ideas 
(DiMaggio / Powell 1991 cit. in Hall/Taylor 1996: 965p). However, as Risse-Kappen (1994) 
points out, “ideas do not float freely”. Rather, domestic settings select some ideas but not 
others. I therefore emphasize the already stated contention that no matter how elaborated 
and inspiring new ideas and orientations may be, if they are not based on action resources 
and political influence they will exert little impact. We thus have to come back to actor 
constellations and modes of interactions that determine the interactions of domestic decision-
makers. Not only are recipients of assistance in need of action resources in order to 
implement new ideas and convictions, new ideas must also be in the range of appropriate 
policy options of other actors. Again in this regard existing domestic institutional settings are 
decisive.   
To sum it up, external actors have two ways of impacting upon domestic transformation 
processes. While the first option focuses on a change in actor constellations, the second may 
result in institutional change due to an alteration of actors’ orientations. The availability of 
action resources to the ‘learners’, the attractiveness of the new orientations and subsequent 
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strategies and policy solutions to other players of the game, will determine whether new 
orientations find their way into domestic settings.  
One can state a further point in conclusion. The type of transaction through which transfer 
takes place and the relationship between external and domestic actors is more decisive than 
both the strategy of external agents and the content of the transfer. Whether transfer works 
depends neither on the effectiveness and performance of the transferred structure nor on the 
strategy applied by the external donor with regards to how best to conduct civil society 
assistance. Rather, it is decisive who transfers, for what reasons and through what kind of 
interactions. This is in line with the findings of Wedel (1998) in her study on Western aid to 
Eastern Europe. She arrives at the conclusion that how aid happens determines success or 
failure. Donor-recipient relationship are decisive, but are complicated by a lack of 
understanding on the side of donors and by legacies of communist rules, such as a distrust 
of foreigners, powers of old elites, as well as the persistence of existing relationships and 
mentalities among the recipients (Wedel 1998: 6). For these very reasons transnational 
relations between non-governmental actors are more likely to lead to lasting results than the 
civil society assistance of governmental agencies. The superiority of non-governmental to 
governmental assistance is firstly grounded in the fact that private actors are perceived as 
being more trustworthy and credible than state actors. Secondly, as shown, transnational 
advocacy networks and coalitions as well as epistemic communities result in cognitive 
convergence and cognitive change and thus impact upon the cultural dimension that is of 
utmost importance for a vibrant civil society.  
4.5 Conclusion: Working Hypothesis, Key Claims and 
Implications for Research 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, it intended to theoretically elaborate on the 
question driving the subsequent analysis: is it feasible to establish and support civil society 
from the outside? Second, based on theoretical accounts the aim was to develop an 
analytical framework capable of guiding empirical research.  
Applying two major lines of social science thought, two distinct answers to the key question 
of this work - does civil society assistance contribute positively to political transformation 
processes - could be identified. Neo-liberal accounts emphasize that civil society assistance 
can be a valuable mechanism to support civil society and subsequently to stabilize 
democratization processes. This assessment proceeds from the conviction that civil society 
fulfills important functions that make democracy flourish. The major question of research is 
consequently not whether it can be done. The question is how it is done. Civil society 
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assistance is perceived as a manageable enterprise. If this is so, then the outcome of 
assistance solely depends on the skills of the manager, i.e. the donor, as well as the 
elaborateness of underlying concepts and on the proficiency of project management. The 
outcome of civil society is thus a mere question of donor strategy and design.  
If a sociological approach to civil society assistance is applied, the answer to our question 
looks thoroughly different, though. As made clear in chapter two, civil society is more than a 
collection of various non-state organizations. In addition, the term civil society refers to 
certain values and norms, to a ‘civic ethos’ or Sittlichkeit without which the democratic 
functions ascribed to civil society cannot bear fruit. However, such a civic ethos is the result 
of a long historical and cultural development and as such not open to strategic planning. Civil 
society assistance is consequently bound to fail due to the fact that culturally and historically 
formed values and norms cannot be transferred from one place to another. Applying insights 
from sociological institutionalism that stress the dual nature of institutions two main problems 
inherent to civil society assistance understood as externally driven intentional transfer have 
been identified. First, civil society assistance risks being perceived as an illegitimate 
interference in internal affairs and as such will be rejected by recipients. Second, as formal 
rules – or in other words the hardware of institutions – are more easily transferred than 
underlying theories of use and cognitive scripts, continuing cognitive codes of conduct and 
standards of behavior will prevent formal structures from taking root. Transfer will therefore 
result in nothing more than in a supplementary stratum on existing practices. Coming back to 
civil society, the previous arguments suggest the hypothesis that civil society assistance will 
nurture recipient opportunism and hypocrisy and solely results in a supplementary stratum 
consisting of DONGOs (donor-driven NGOs) or GONGOs (governmental driven NGOs) that 
are not embedded in the domestic socio-political environment and may also be perceived by 
the domestic population as intruders and externally controlled puppets (see also chapter 
2.5.).  
This study follows neither the first nor the second line of thought. Neo-liberal approaches are 
rejected as inappropriate for the purpose of this study for three reasons. Firstly, they fail to 
account for divergent domestic responses to civil society assistance. Second, various studies 
on ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy borrowing’ demonstrate that institutional transfer is hardly 
driven by rational reasoning and a search for effectiveness, but more often than not follows 
the search for appropriate and legitimate solutions and structures. Finally, approaches that 
stress the rationality of an actor’s choices and the performance of institutions and concepts 
provide a too limited concept of civil society that is incapable of living up to the normative 
ideal inherent to the concept of civil society (see chapter 2.2.1). For these reasons the 
dissertation will be based on sociological and cultural explanations of human action and of 
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the interactions between actors and structures. The above mentioned hypothesis of 
sociologically inspired neo-institutionalism that civil society assistance is bound to fail and will 
lead to rejection or to nothing more than supplementary stratums, is challenged though. An 
overemphasis on structures and legacies overlooks the possibility of learning and change. 
Moreover, it is regarded as a fruitless approach for transformation countries searching for 
solutions to pressing problems as it leaves transformation societies with no other answer 
than: “get a history” (Pridham 1994).  
In the spirit of actor-centered institutionalism developed by Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz 
the overemphasis on domestic structures and cultures is replaced by a focus on actors and 
interactions. Emphasis is placed on the point that institutions are the result of social 
interaction. Although actors, their capabilities, orientations and interactions are affected by 
institutional settings, those do not determine but only structure actors’ choices and strategic 
options. Consequently, some leeway for action is plausible. Such a framework leaves room 
for actor choices that may result in institutional and cultural change, and also acknowledges 
the possibility and importance of cognitive change, thus learning. For the purpose of this 
study with its focus on the international as well as the domestic side of the transfer of civil 
society, it is necessary to incorporate external and internal actors and their interactions into 
the analysis.  
Based on the assumptions of actor-centered institutionalism two basic modes of intervention 
available to external actors have been identified and labeled as “empowerment” and 
“learning”. First, external actors may concentrate on the capabilities of domestic actors and 
the endeavors of external actors may alter domestic actor constellations, while providing 
resources, information and know-how to certain groups of actors. A change in political 
outcomes is the likely consequence. Secondly, the cooperation with external actors may 
impact upon the orientations of a given actor group and trigger processes of learning and 
cognitive change. Transnational networks that are based on a core consensus of shared 
principles or common professional backgrounds have been pinpointed as forms of cognitive 
convergence. While empowerment is more likely to affect the structural dimension of civil 
society, learning processes and the alteration of actor orientations are more likely to affect 
the cultural dimension of civil society (see chapter 2.2).  
Based on the preceding argumentation, the following working hypothesis will be drawn up for 
the study: 
Civil society assistance may impact upon political and social transformation by two distinct 
mechanisms: (1) it raises the capabilities of civil society actors thus empowering those 
groups, (2) it alters the orientations of domestic actors by triggering learning processes. 
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Donors may empower civil society organizations and strengthen their standing in relation to 
the government. Additionally they trigger learning via the provision of information, legal and 
political advice, as well as technical know-how. Moreover, donors may increase the 
legitimacy and standing of civil society actors. This support may be of great value especially 
in repressed societies. Ekiert / Kubik (1998: 18pp) explain, for example, that the Solidarity 
opposition movement in Poland in the 1980s tremendously benefited from Western 
assistance in various ways. The rich and diverse Western contacts of the Solidarity 
movement did not only provide much needed foreign material assistance (according to 
Ekiert/Kubik (1998: 19) the CIA alone spent about eight million dollars in 1982-83 on 
assisting Solidarity) More importantly, the affiliation with several international organizations 
made it clear “that the domestic legality and the international legitimacy were separate”. 
According to Ekiert / Kubik (ibid), gestures of international recognition had “… tremendous, 
though intangible, effect on boosting the movement’s moral and staying power”. In addition, 
Western contacts facilitated the spread of ideas among Polish intellectuals thus “contributing 
to the vibrancy of the underground cultural and political disputes”.  
After transition civil society organizations may equally benefit from external assistance. 
Donors may act as important political, social or legal experts in given policy fields, and offer 
expertise civil society organizations would not be able to obtain otherwise. Especially in 
Eastern and Central Europe there are abundant examples of how Western advice facilitated 
the establishment and reform of institutional structures. The German association of counties 
“Der deutsche Landkreistag” for example successfully assisted regional activists in Poland to 
found an association of councils and to press for a territorial restructuring of the country 
(Interview v. Hausen).  
Moreover, it has been argued that donors can act as independent and objective monitors and 
moderators and trigger participatory processes. In her assessment of the activities of the 
Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank in support of non-governmental 
organizations, Coston (1998) demonstrates that donors can encourage cooperation and 
understanding between domestic groups. According to Coston, the learning and dialogue 
forums conducted by EDI, i.e., training seminars, conferences and study tours for 
representatives of NGOs and government that support policy reform, contributed to a 
cooperative relationship between civil society organizations and government representatives 
in various policy fields such as water management or decentralization of education.  
These examples suggest that external assistance can make a difference. However, it is not 
clear when and how this happens. The attempt to initiate certain processes does not 
automatically translate into success. It might well lead to learning processes and to a change 
in the system but it might also fail to do so. 
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The arguments put forward in this chapter revealed that the impact of external assistance to 
civil society depends on two conditions, whereby the first is international, the second 
domestic in character. First, the type of interaction between the donor and recipient is 
decisive. Depending on the perceptions on both sides and depending on the existence of a 
“core consensus” between the donor and recipient, transfer is more likely to lead to lasting 
results. Donor-recipient interactions are thus crucial. Neither the elaborateness of the donor 
strategy nor the effectiveness of the transferred image is the main factor that decides on 
failure or success. Secondly, whether new ideas, norms and behaviors find their way into 
wider domestic settings depends on relevant actor constellations in the domestic realm. The 
availability of action resources on the side of the ‘learners’ is as important as the 
attractiveness of the new orientations and subsequent strategies and policy solutions to other 
players of the game.  
As a result, the working hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: 
Civil society assistance can contribute to the development of civil society and thus permits 
the concept of civil society to travel. Whether the transfer is stuck in a supplementary stratum 
of donor driven NGOs detached from society or whether it results in a vibrant civil society 
depends, however, on the type of transaction between donor and recipient on the one hand, 
and on domestic actor constellations and interactions on the other hand.  
As stated in the introduction to this section, besides the aim of theoretically approaching the 
key question, a further objective of this chapter was to develop an analytical framework 
capable of guiding empirical research. So what implications for empirical research can be 
drawn?  
First and foremost, one can conclude that major emphasis has to be placed on the actors 
involved in civil society assistance on both sides; on the donor as well as on the recipient 
side. The study needs to identify major donors and recipients, their objectives, interests, and 
strategies, as well as the underlying concepts guiding their actions. Secondly, the study will 
highlight the interactions between donors and recipients. Are they based on trust and a 
common understanding and resemble a partnership among equals or are they perceived as 
an asymmetric exchange between a superior donor and a dependent recipient? Thirdly, 
recipient contexts and domestic settings are of utmost importance. Domestic actor 
constellations and interactions that are of relevance for this study will be examined. These 
are, on the one hand, interactions between recipients of assistance and other civil society 
organizations. Does the better equipment and access to financial resources of recipients 
generate envy and distrust among organizations that do not possess these privileges? Or are 
recipient organizations able to act as carriers of civil society and succeed in transporting their 
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new ideas and values into wider domestic settings? On the other hand, the study will focus 
upon the interactions between recipients and domestic political decision-makers. As pointed 
out above (chapter 2.2.3), decision-making processes that aim to change the legal regulatory 
framework of non-governmental organizations are of special relevance in this regard. 
However, instead of contributing one more study comparing donors and their strategies, the 
study strives to focus on the outcome of civil society assistance, i.e. on recipients and their 
achievements rather than on the output of civil society assistance, i.e. on conferences, 
seminars and training conducted by donor organizations.  
The following chapter will present the methodology guiding the empirical research in greater 
detail.  
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5 Methodology  
The following section describes the methodology applied in order to systematically answer 
the research question above. Before I delve into the details and peculiarities of empirical 
research, it is necessary to illustrate the ultimate purpose the empirical analysis serves in the 
context of this research. Empirically and analytically inspired scientists draw conclusions by 
applying two distinct models of research: Either scholars value theoretically derived 
generalizations and use empirical analysis merely in order to test theoretically generated 
hypothesis, thus they apply the classical hypothetico-deductive model of research, or they 
utilize the variety of observable phenomena in social reality as a means of stimulating 
theoretical generalizations, i.e. they apply an analytical inductive approach to theory 
development. Although both methods are regarded as equally capable of bringing about 
worthwhile findings, this analysis utilizes empirical analysis in the former and not in the latter 
way. Instead of inducing theoretical generalizations from observable facts, the purpose is to 
show that the model theoretically derived above illustrates social reality in a useful manner. 
This will be done by conducting a comparative examination of two cases.  
Having said this, the research to be conducted needs to be carefully defined in order to arrive 
at valid conclusions. This chapter dwells on four distinct methodological questions that 
require clarification. First, the chapter investigates the peculiarities of comparative research 
in the social sciences. Second, it exposes the rationale behind the selection of the two 
country cases under investigation. It will be shown that the cases are selected in a manner 
that allows us to hold one possible alternative explanation – the geo-strategic location of the 
target country – constant, whereas another alternative explanation – the cultural and historic 
disposition of civil society – may be rejected by applying a “most-different systems” design 
(Przeworsk / Teune 1970). Third, one needs to address the question what exactly is 
observed. How can we identify observable indicators that are capable of determining the 
effects of civil society assistance and the “success” of civil society projects? What are the 
units of analysis, i.e. which donor and recipient organizations are the major objects under 
examination? And finally, the question arises what quantitative and qualitative means of 
measurement are employed in order to collect reliable information.  
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5.1 The Comparative Method and the Small N - Many Variables 
Problem  
Although research may well follow other purposes81, the ideal in social science is to draw 
generalizable conclusions from the cases under investigation and thus to “produce lawlike 
generalizations with empirical validity” (Scharpf 1997: 19). In practice, though, it is difficult to 
make causal inferences in the social sciences. One major problematic inherent to social 
research lies in the magnitude of possible alternative explanations to observable outcomes. 
Why should the development of a vibrant civil society, the establishment of numerous and 
pluralistic organizations and institutions of civil society, civic activity and mechanisms of 
participatory rule be the result of international assistance and not the consequence of an 
existing cultural basis, historically grown “social capital” (Putnam 1993), or simply the result 
of political liberalization and the granting of equal political rights and civil freedoms? 
Moreover, if a change in civic attitudes and institutions can be observed, how can this be 
attributed to bottom-up strategies to assist civil society in face of a variety of other powerful 
international factors as e.g. the prospect of EU membership? Alternative explanations are 
hard to rule out.  
One possible method of “discovering empirical relationships among variables” is the 
comparative method (Lijphart 1971: 683).82 The comparative method draws largely on John 
Stuart Mill’s presentation of canons of experimental inquiry in A System of Logic: 
Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843) that provides several research strategies that allow for 
generalizations in social science. Of particular relevance for comparative analysis are two of 
Mill’s strategies: the “method of agreement” and the “indirect method of difference” (Ragin 
1987: 36). In simple terms, the basic logic behind the two methods is to discard alternative 
explanations by comparing the differences and similarities among cases. While the “method 
of agreement” aims to single out alternative explanations by identifying the one and only 
causal factor that all observed cases depicting the outcome under investigation have in 
common, the “indirect method of difference” highlights cases that neither reveal the cause 
nor the effect and thus rejects competing explanations through paired comparisons (ibid: 
36pp). The major task for scientists is thus to find cases that ideally agree in only one of the 
possible explanatory variables. 
81 Other purposes are e.g. portraying correlations; determining typologies, providing descriptive 
case studies or historical research. See e.g. Beyme (1988: 52), King et al (1994).  
82 For the comparative method, see e.g.: Ragin (1987), Beyme (1988), Collier (1991); Przeworski / 
Teune (1970). 
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The comparative method, however, is plagued by the problem that we usually encounter 
various possible explanatory variables, but only a limited number of cases for research 
(Lijphart 1971: 685). This predicament has become known as the small N, many variables 
problem. It is thus often not feasible to reject all alternative explanations by comparing 
differences and similarities for the simple fact that not enough cases can be found and that 
the number of possible causes augments the number of observable cases.83 This point is 
easily illustrated by the concrete case under investigation. The subsequent research 
encounters only a limited number of countries that undergo political transformation 
processes, that further receive significant Western aid to civil society, and whose 
investigation also does not exceed the resources available for this analysis. A selection of 
cases is thus inevitable and, as King et al (1994: 139) point out, in a comparative study faced 
with the small N, many variables problem, “selection must be done in an intentional fashion, 
consistent with our research objectives and strategy”. The usual advice of experienced 
scholars on how to best select cases capable of minimizing the many variables, small 
numbers problem, and deriving generalizable results are as follows: (1) increase the number 
of cases as much as possible; (2) reduce the property space of the analysis, i.e. combine two 
or more variables that express an essentially similar underlying characteristic into a single 
variable; and (3) focus the comparative analysis on “comparable” cases, i.e. cases that are 
similar in a large number of important characteristics which one wants to treat as constants, 
but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each 
other (Lijphart 1971: 686p). While pointing to comparable cases Lijphart refers to what has 
been labeled a “most similar systems” design, at that time described as “the currently 
predominant view among social scientists” (Przeworski / Teune 1970: 32). The “most-similar 
systems design” focuses on cases that are as similar as possible in a wide range of 
variables, which differ, however, concerning the outcome under investigation and the key 
variable. Such a design controls for possible explanatory factors, as those are held constant, 
i.e. they are similar in the analyzed cases. The differences among the cases are thus left as 
possible causes for the phenomenon that is to be explained. To this extent, the method 
follows the logic of Mill’s method of agreement that explains a constant outcome by another 
constant cause.  
Przeworski / Teune (1970: 37p) state in criticism to the ”most similar systems” design:  
83 King et al (1994: 119) point out that a determinate research design requires at least one more 
observation than inferences. Applying the example of successful joint collaboration between countries 
in building a high-technology weapons system, they come to the conclusion that: “With seven causal 
variables and only three observations, the research design cannot determine which of the hypotheses, 
if any, is correct” (ibid: 120). The small N, many variables problem thus hampers causal inference.   
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“When the observed systems share characteristics X1, X2, …, Xk, the variations of 
the dependent variable Y (…) are associated with the variable Xk+1 (according to the 
hypothesis) or the alternative variables Xk+2, …, Xn (alternative hypothesis)….. The 
original hypothesis is (thus) confirmed, although alternative hypotheses are not 
rejected.”  
They criticize this design for two reasons. Firstly, they point out that the findings resulting 
from a “most-similar systems” design are only valid for cases that share the characteristics 
common to the selected “most similar” cases. Surely enough, the design follows the logic 
that the findings can be tested and confirmed in other, different, cases and thus aims to 
remove the controlled variables one-by-one. Yet, as Teune / Przeworski point out, if the 
findings are not confirmed, “… we are back where we started” (ibid: 38). Secondly, and more 
important for their subsequent conclusion, with a “most similar systems” design experimental 
variables cannot be singled out. Przeworski / Teune stress the point that no systems are so 
similar that they diverge only in one factor. Other characteristics in which the two (or more) 
cases under investigation differ (or further characteristics the scholar is not aware of) may 
account for the observed outcomes. In other words, the dependent phenomenon is 
“overdetermined” (ibid: 34). The “most similar systems” research design thus strengthens the 
confidence in the explanatory power of a hypothesis but only to a certain degree. If the 
resulting findings cannot be confirmed in cases diverging in one or more factors held 
constant by the “most similar systems” design, a relationship has been determined that 
seems dependent on another unknown variable.  
For these reasons Przeworski / Teune propose another design that focuses not on “most-
similar” but on “most-different” systems. The “most different systems design” aims to trace 
similar outcomes in a set of cases as diverse as possible. The underlying logic is that 
systemic explanations can be rejected if similar processes of change can be identified. 
Rather than positively identifying relevant systemic factors, the “most different systems” 
design thus “centers on eliminating irrelevant systemic factors” (ibid: 35). The point is that if a 
certain outcome is observed in very different cases, the factors in which the cases differ 
cannot be responsible for the observed outcome.  
Although Przeworski / Teune present the two designs in opposition to each other, it has been 
argued that the two strategies may be fruitfully combined. Collier (1991: 17) proposes a 
strategy that starts with a sample of cases that are roughly matched along a number of 
variables, controlling for their influence. As a result though, the differences between the 
cases are highlighted. In the same manner, my work will also take a middle position and 
partly “control” for alternative explanations by keeping them constant and partly reject 
alternative explanations through a most-dissimilar systems design. In other words, the 
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dissertation will first follow the advice of Lijphart and focus on comparable cases and 
afterwards pursue Przeworski / Teune’s strategy and highlight differences.  
5.2 The Selection of Cases 
The comparable set of cases for this study are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
which are located close to the European Union, have recently joined the European Union, 
and that all received civil society assistance from the West in the period between 1990-2000. 
Of course, we also witness transformation processes enhanced by Western donors including 
civil society assistance further to the East. However, those countries are so dissimilar 
regarding geo-strategic as well as cultural and historic conditions that a comparison would 
only have limited significance. Demonstrating that civil society in Poland is more stable and 
vibrant than that in Belarus hardly comes as a surprise. The stabilizing influence of the 
prospects of EU membership, which requires stable democratic institutions guaranteeing 
civic participation and free association on the one hand, and the cultural and historical traits 
ranking from early experiences with associative forms to an encompassing dissident 
movement on the other hand, are both strong explanatory factors that account for these 
differences. In the face of such obvious explanations, the large Western attention civil society 
organizations received in Poland that far exceeded the assistance granted to civil society 
organizations in Belarus will be regarded as a rather minor causal factor. The selection of 
cases is thus based on a design that is partly most similar and partly most different in order 
to deal with two prominent alternative explanations: the stabilizing influence of the European 
Union (EU) on the one hand, and pre-existing cultural and historical strands of civil society on 
the other hand. Whereas the first alternative explanation is held constant, the second is 
chosen in a way that it is most dissimilar.  
For these reasons, the dissertation project focuses on civil society assistance in Poland and 
Slovakia. Being geographically close to the EU, the two countries Poland and Slovakia have 
been chosen because it is believed that the prospect of EU membership is an important 
factor, which should be held constant. The interest of the dissertation is not so much to 
assess the impact of possible EU membership – requiring vibrant civil societies and 
democratic conditions (Copenhagen Criteria) – on civil society in democratizing countries, 
but rather to analyze the mechanisms and outcome of civil society assistance in the form of 
financial and technical assistance directly granted to domestic actors. As the multilateral 
framework of transnational civil society activities is relatively similar in Poland and Slovakia 
due to a geographic closeness to the EU, its impact will be held constant. However, among 
the countries geographically close to the EU, Poland and Slovakia are the most dissimilar. As 
the largest country in CEE, Poland is culturally homogenous and has a firm national identity 
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and no major ethical or cultural cleavages. Slovakia, in contrast, is a small and ethnically 
heterogeneous country, characterized by late independence and a late and feeble national 
awakening. Poland is the country in the former communist block with the most encompassing 
dissident movement and a forerunner with regard to democratic reforms with no major 
drawbacks on its way to becoming a consolidated democracy. The Slovak lands, on the other 
hand, showed only weak traces of dissident culture during communism and were governed 
by a repressive communism system that left little room for experiments with liberalization. 
Furthermore, Slovakia faced an authoritarian reverse wave between 1994 and 1998.84 One 
has to note, however, that both countries belong to the most Catholic countries in Europe 
and that both were at least partly part of the Habsburg Empire. Nonetheless, a comparison of 
both countries is capable of revealing the effects of foreign assistance in two different 
domestic settings that are additionally shaped by thoroughly different cultural and historical 
developments structuring civil society development. The project consequently aims to 
examine the extent to which two countries with quite different legacies shaping the revival of 
civil society reacted differently to civil society assistance. 
Before I go on to outline how the processes of change in the two countries under 
investigation will be traced, a caveat is in order as to what the chosen design implies for the 
comparability of the resulting findings. In other words, if causality between civil society 
assistance and civil society development can be demonstrated in the two cases under 
investigation by methods described below, to what extent can the empirical findings claim 
validity beyond the two cases? As we learned from the discussion of the work of Przeworski / 
Teune, a most-similar system design cannot reject alternative explanations. Consequently, 
the resulting findings are only valid in cases that depict the same characteristics than the 
cases examined. For this study this implies that the findings on the impact of transnational 
influences on civil society are only valid for cases that depict multilateral and bilateral 
pressures impacting on the domestic system in a way similar to the EU integration process. 
In other words, the findings on the impact of transnational civil society assistance are only 
valid in countries exposed to similar international adaptation and integration pressures.  
84 For a detailed analysis of the cultural preconditions of civil society in Poland and Slovakia see 
chapter 7.1. and chapter 8.1. respectively.  
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If we want to test to what extent the findings are valid beyond the range of countries facing a 
similar international environment, additional investigation, e.g. in the former Soviet Union, is 
necessary.85 However, this conclusion does not hold for the other alternative variable: 
cultural and historical preconditions of civil society. If an impact of civil society assistance on 
civil society development is demonstrated for both cases under investigation, i.e. for cases 
that are most different concerning their cultural and historical legacies, the “cultural 
approach” that stresses the importance of institutional legacies, informal rules and culturally 
defined cognitive scripts can be rej
5.3 What to Observe 
The aim of this section is to identify general questions to be asked in each case in order to 
allow for a “structured, focused comparison”, i.e. a comparison that focuses only on a specific 
aspect of a case, here civil society development, and that employs general questions to 
guide the data collection and analysis (George 1979: 61p).86 In other words, the following will 
clarify what should be observed in each case. Additionally, the section specifies the objects of 
research. It reveals what type of recipient and donor organizations and actors will be 
investigated. 
5.3.1 Leading Research Questions  
The analytical framework and the derived working hypothesis outlined above suggest four 
major questions each case study should clarify: (1) What is to be transferred, or what is the 
content of civil society assistance? (2) What is the outcome of the assistance granted? (3) 
Does the outcome positively contribute to civil society development in the sense of the 
85 In this regard the author will settle for what King et al view as an “indeterminate research 
design“ that is only to a limited extent capable of producing generalizations. A determinate research 
design capable of producing lawlike results is thus sacrificed for a more detailed insight into the unique 
particularities of civil society assistance in a smaller range of cases. In order to justify this “small N” 
selection I want to point to Satori’s suggestion that concepts that are applied to a broader range of 
cases can lead to conceptual “overstretch”. In other words, large N comparisons capable of causal 
inference deal more often than not with rather uninteresting research questions (cit. in Collier 1991: 
14). Or in the words of Charles Tilly: “… with the multiplication of cases and the standardization of 
categories for comparison the theoretical return declines more rapidly than the empirical return rises” 
(1984: 144). 
86 The method of structured, focused comparison has been developed by George (1979) in order 
to combine contributions from historians and political scientists for the purpose of developing policy-
relevant theory that is grounded in systematic examination of historical experience. George stresses 
the need to collect information in a systemized way along theoretically identified general questions in 
order to be able to compare cases in a systemized fashion. A special focus on deviant cases then 
allows for the cumulative development of theory (George 1979). The method builds the basis of what 
George and McKeown (1985) then call the congruence method (cit. in King et al 1994: 45). 
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concept of civil society outlined in chapter 2? And finally (4) is a “successful” transfer 
contingent on the applied donor strategy or on the interaction between donor and recipient or 
on the domestic setting characterized by domestic actors and their interactions? In other 
words, can we identify facilitating factors on which a positive outcome of civil society 
assistance depends?  
The most troubling questions are without doubt the determination of the “outcome” of civil 
society assistance and, by the same token, the question how to measure “successful” 
transfer. The typical answer to the question how to define success is to determine whether 
stated objectives of the proponents of transfer have been achieved or not (Jacoby 2000: 11). 
Related to this work, one can thus state that if the major goals of donors engaging in civil 
society assistance are realized one can speak of ‘success stories’. However, as also Jacoby 
observed for his study on the transfer of institutions in post-war Germany and after German 
unification “since the actors provide no clear and stable standards against which to measure 
outcomes, analysis cannot center on the question of success” (ibid). By the same token, as 
has been shown in chapters 3.3. and 3.4., donors that engage in civil society assistance 
provide only limited accounts of their goals and aspirations. Donors usually define their goals 
rather vaguely and often quite unrealistically and point more to the functions civil society is 
assumed to deliver than to observable and clear indicators (Quigley 2000).87 As a result, 
donor objectives cannot serve as points of reference. Moreover, an analysis that exclusively 
focuses on realized goals of donors is incapable of detecting unforeseen side - effects of the 
assistance granted. Those may, however, be more valuable for recipients and more capable 
of triggering domestic changes than the originally intended goals (Carothers 1996: 96). In 
response to this problematic, Jacoby avoids focusing on “success” and thus avoids 
struggling with the troublesome question what “success” might be. Instead he concentrates 
on the “performance and persistence of transferred institutions” (Jacoby 2000: 11). 
Performance refers to the benefits to the proponents of transfer, but also includes unintended 
consequences and outcomes. Persistence covers the rooting of institutions, their 
reproduction over time and the ways they gain legitimacy in the new society. Moreover, he 
regards effectiveness as decisive. It occurs,  
“…when the transferred institution acquires a legal framework, when it performs in 
the new society in ways broadly consistent with the aims (promoting efficiency or 
justice) that led to the transfer attempt, and when it persists by being reproduced over 
time….”  
87 One simply needs to remember how representatives of German political foundations refer to the 
democratization of Poland as “after we did this” or to the changes in Slovakia as “their biggest succes”’ 
to understand this point (interview with the author).   
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In short, his measure of institutional transfer encompasses the outcomes of “legality, 
performance, and persistence” (ibid).  
What does this method suggest for the subsequent analysis? Civil society assistance needs 
to be evaluated by assessing the performance, persistence and effectiveness of transferred 
structures. We thus need to clarify what structures are transferred by civil society assistance. 
Chapter 3.4.1. points out that donors more often than not are referring to NGOs if they talk of 
civil society. Civil society assistance is thus largely restricted to the support and assistance to 
local NGOs. We may thus conclude that the transferred structures of civil society assistance, 
are nothing more than supported non-governmental organizations, i.e. major beneficiaries of 
assistance.  
Assessing civil society assistance thus translates into an assessment of major beneficiaries 
of aid. Who are they? What have their main activities and achievements been? Do they 
manage to sustain themselves once assistance comes to an end? In brief, the research 
needs to focus on recipients not on donors. Evaluating donor strategies, projects and 
activities is a task identified by many as a major goal of research88. However, it accounts for 
nothing more than an assessment of the output rather than the outcome of assistance. The 
outcome of assistance is, in contrast, eminent in recipient organizations and especially in 
their activities and achievements. Moreover, a focus on recipients and their activities allows 
us to comprise the unintended outcomes and consequences of civil society assistance.  
Incorporating the suggestions of Jacoby into this analysis and drawing on the findings of the 
previous chapters, the general questions guiding the two case studies thus will be:  
1. Who are the major beneficiaries of civil society assistance? Are “main recipients” 
identifiable?  
This question targets the content of transfer as well as the selectivity of external assistance 
to civil society (see chapter 3.4.1). Has civil society assistance been distributed equally over 
the population at large and over the various organizations in existence? Or did the external 
assistance favor a small segment of society and focus primarily on “some favored cliques” as 
has been critically put forward by some observers (Wedel 1998). And if this is the case, how 
can these cliques be characterized?  
Main recipients are thereby defined as NGOs that 
• are frequently supported by Western funds, that 
• receive assistance from at least three of the donor organizations under investigation, and 
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• whose budget relies to at least 30% on foreign sources. 
2. Do civil society organizations that received assistance still exist, and are they able 
to sustain themselves?  
This question refers to the sustainability of organizations after external allocations come to an 
end. 
3. To what extent are major beneficiaries of external assistance rooted in society?  
The question is, whether major recipients of assistance are perceived by the domestic 
population and by the political elite as legitimate in the sense that they act and perform for 
the good of the people and the nation or whether they are perceived as “bridgeheads of 
foreign influence”. This question focuses on the legitimacy of the recipient organization. It 
allows us to clarify whether recipient organizations that greatly rely on foreign funds and that 
are internationally well connected are embedded in society or whether they are closer to 
Western organizations than to the people of their country. 
4. Do major recipients of assistance perform and persist in a way that corresponds 
with the identified characteristics of civil society?  
Do main recipients provide important services to other civil society organizations that help 
raise the quantity and plurality of civil society organizations? Do they facilitate the 
establishment of networks and horizontal ties among civil society organizations? Do they 
represent the interests of non-governmental organizations toward government? Do they raise 
public awareness of democratic rules and procedures and stipulate civic participation, and do 
they fulfill a watchdog function? In brief, do major recipients of civil society assistance fulfill 
the democratic functions attributed to civil society, and thus act as carriers of civil society? 
In this regard, the analysis will examine the effectiveness of recipients in strengthening the 
two dimensions of civil society identified in chapter two: the structure of civil society 
embodied by the quantity and plurality of existing organizations, and the cultural dimension of 
civil society, portrayed on the one hand by the horizontal relationships among different 
groups of civil society, and on the other hand in the horizontal relationship with the state. The 
subsequent analysis thus aims to assess to what extent recipients live up to the normative 
ideal of civil society outlined in chapter two. This will be done firstly by focusing on the 
services main NGOs provide to local NGOs thus contributing to NGO development. 
 
88 See e.g. Carothers (1997), Crawford (1996), Robinson (1996). 
 116
Secondly, the case studies will focus on examples of common action (e.g. campaigns) and 
on processes to establish an appropriate NGO legislation. While the former depits the type of 
relationship among NGOs, the latter illuminates the relations between NGOs and state 
authorities (see chapter 2.2.3, table 2, p. 44).  
5. How benefit recipients from external assistance? 
Finally, the analysis will inquire to what extent civil society organizations in Poland and 
Slovakia benefit from external assistance in fulfilling their various tasks and in acting as 
carriers of civil society? 
Recipient benefits in this regard may come in three different forms of assistance (see also 
chapter 4.4.2):  
• material benefits, i.e. financial resources but also other “hard products” such as technical 
equipment;  
• knowledge, i.e. the provision of information, techniques, concepts, models and ideas of 
technical and instrumental know-how; 
• moral support i.e. international contacts, expressions of international solidarity and 
international recognition.  
All three forms of assistance may translate into domestic bargaining power: Financial 
resources may raise the capabilities of recipients; knowledge and ideas may trigger learning 
providing the recipient with a wider range of strategic options; moral support may increase 
the internal integrity (belief in stated principles and goals) and the external standing 
(reputation in population, political acceptance) of recipient organizations. Whether this will be 
the case depends, however, on the given actor constellations in a domestic setting and on 
recipient perceptions (see chapter 4.4.1). In other words, the question is less what kinds of 
”goods“ have been transferred by the donors and more on whether the recipients valued the 
transferred merits. 
Whereas the first two questions that focus on main recipients and their sustainability or 
“persistence” refer to the output of assistance granted, the questions on recipient’s legitimacy 
and on recipient’s effectiveness as carriers of civil society are inevitable in order to uncover 
the actual domestic outcome of civil society assistance. Only a focus upon the rooting of 
recipient organizations in society and a clarification of the consistency of recipient’s 
achievements and performance with the normative ideal underlying the concept of civil 
society allows us to reveal the effect of external assistance that will always be a combined 
result of external activities and domestic responses. Even if determining the outcome of civil 
society assistance is the most troubling task the case studies face, it is not the end of the 
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story. The analysis additionally needs to clarify which conditions facilitate a “successful 
transfer” in the above sense of the word. The question thus is whether recipients’ 
achievements can be plausibly attributed to donor programs and projects, to donor 
strategies, to the type of interaction between donor and recipients or to the attractiveness of 
transferred formal and informal structures to key domestic actors. The last research question 
aimed at determining the benefits of assistance for recipients therefore aims to illuminate 
whether the observed outcome is actually a result contingent on donors’ actions. In other 
words, it clarifies whether the outcome is a result of accident or skill.   
The research questions will structure the analysis of the output and outcome of civil society 
assistance in the two case studies (see chapter 7.4. and 8.4. respectively).  
5.3.2 Objects of Research 
Summarizing the contemplation above it can be stated that recipients not donors are the 
major objects of this research. A comparative analysis of donors is not the purpose of the 
case studies, rather the aim is to analyze how recipients respond to civil society assistance in 
different contexts. Rather than focusing on a small number of donors and comparing their 
strategies, which is the prevalent practice in studies focusing on civil society assistance,89 
this analysis will center on a small number of recipients, so-called “main recipients” that may 
be and often are, supported by a wide range of different donor organizations. Having said 
this, we still cannot neglect the donor side. Firstly, pinpointing donor programs and activities 
is inevitable in order to determine to what recipients actually react. Secondly, the 
identification of “main recipients” is hardly possible without an analysis of donor programs 
and projects. Only an analysis of project lists will reveal which organizations heavily benefited 
from foreign funds.  
A descriptive approach to donors, their programs and projects is thus necessary. Therefore 
the study aims to draw a broad picture of civil society assistance in both countries. It goes 
without saying that such an approach impedes a detailed analysis of each donor. It would 
exceed the scope of this work to focus in detail on every donor active in civil society 
assistance in both countries. In order to solve this dilemma, the analysis concentrates on four 
major donors that have been of special importance in the region and also serve as illustrative 
examples of different types of donors and donor practices. The chosen examples are the 
European Union as the largest supranational actor, the United States as the largest non-
European national donor, and Germany as the largest European national donor active in 
89 See e.g. Crawford (1996), Robinson (1996), Quigley (1997), Diamond (1997).  
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CEE. Finally, the Soros foundation provides an example of private commitment. In the same 
manner, in this study it is not possible to cover every single project that benefited non-
governmental organizations in one way or another. More often than not, projects in a variety 
of issue areas, be it environmental protection, decentralization or support to small and mid-
sized enterprises (SMEs), are carried out by respective non-state actors such as 
environmental NGOs, foundations devoted to the goal of local democracy or economic think 
tanks. For a variety of reasons that have been outlined above (chapter 3.2.) donors are keen 
on relying on these actors while pursuing other purposes than civil society development. 
Sure enough, the mere fact that donors finance non-state actors to implement their projects 
builds up the capacity and institutional strength of the organization in question. In such cases 
civil society development is, however, not the stated objective of the donor but a (welcome) 
byproduct. Donors thus often support NGOs indirectly. Although the author is well aware of 
the effect this donor practice may have on civil society, it is impossible to investigate in a 
systematic fashion in such projects. Instead, only programs and projects are covered that are 
explicitly designed by donors with the goal of supporting civil society. In consequence, the 
study focuses automatically on projects that aim to support what has been called ’the Third 
Sector‘ (chapter 2.1.6.), as a summary of the major programs focusing on civil society 
assistance again proves that donors refer to NGOs when mentioning civil society (see also 
chapter 3.4.1. on this point).  
On the side of recipients, the research concentrates on ‘infrastructural organizations’ that aim 
to strengthen civil society by providing necessary infrastructure and support. The main 
reason for this lies first in the heavy emphasis placed on those organizations by donors. As 
will be shown (see chapters 7.4.1. and 8.4.1), infrastructural organizations are among the 
main beneficiaries of external assistance and are thus to be seen as “main recipients”. 
Secondly, the number of these major receivers of assistance is surprisingly small and thus 
does not exceed the scope of this analysis. And finally, infrastructural organizations are 
regarded as fruitful units of analysis as donors consider those organizations to be important 
catalysts of civil society development. The assistance to “infrastructural NGOs” is grounded 
in the belief that the services those organizations provide, ranking from lobbying the 
government to informing NGOs about funding possibilities to the provision of training, are the 
missing blocks needed for civil society development. These organizations are thus taken as 
intermediaries between donors and NGOs on the ground, and are regarded as multipliers of 
assistance.  
Having outlined the major research questions and objects of research, one limitation is in 
place. A focus on recipients, their sustainability, legitimacy, activities and achievements may 
translate into a focus on success stories that neglect failures. The present study analyses the 
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output and outcome of civil society assistance, as can be observed in a particular timeframe, 
namely ten years after the start of foreign assistance. This approach implies that failures in 
assistance that happened at an earlier period in time are no longer observable. This research 
does not deal with wasted funds, examples of corruption, or ineffective donor activities. A 
critical assessment of donor strategies is the price to be paid for determining the effects of 
assistance in single domestic contexts.  
5.4 Measurement Technique 
Now that I have clarified the key questions that will guide the subsequent analysis and 
determined the main units of analysis, the question arises how I will measure recipients’ 
benefits, their sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness. The study will rely on different 
sources of information: available opinion polls, surveys on the NGO sector in Poland and 
Slovakia, in particular a survey on donor-recipient relationships conducted among Polish and 
Slovak NGOs, materials of donors and recipient organizations, expert interviews and 
secondary literature.  
The case studies rely heavily on qualitative methods of measurement. However, this does 
not imply that quantitative methods of measurement are neglected. In line with the 
recommendation of King et al (1994: 44) ”when we are able to find valid quantitative 
measures of what we want to know, we should use them“, the study draws on statistical 
material when available. For example, surveys on Polish NGOs conducted by the Polish non-
profit organization KLON/JAWOR in 1993, 1994/1995 and 1997 with the support of the Phare 
Civic Dialogue Program (BORDO 1998A) were a avaluable source. Moreover, the database 
of KLON/JAWOR on NGOs in Poland was an important source. This database, which has 
been in existence since 1990, covers app. 20,000 NGOs operating in Poland. Further 
important data on Polish and the Slovak non-profit organizations is provided by the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (see Anheier/Salamon 1999). This project 
investigates the non-profit sector in 22 countries in comparative perspective.  
Moreover, the study highly benefits from a survey conducted among Polish and Slovak 
NGOs in the context of a research project that focused on “democracy promotion and 
protection in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa” (DPP).90 The 
90 The project was a combined effort of Professor Claus Offe at the Humboldt-University, Berlin 
and Professor Philippe C. Schmitter at the European University Institute in Florence and their 
respective research staff conducted in 1999-2002. It was inspired by the question whether 
“democratization from without” was at all feasible and aimed to clarify the actual outcome of external 
involvement in processes of democratization. A part of the project focused on external activities to 
support civil society assistance.  
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survey in which 72 Polish and 93 Slovak non-governmental organizations participated and 
which took place in 2002/03 inquires into characteristics of NGOs in Poland and in their 
relationships with foreign donors. The survey covers three main areas:  
• description of NGOs: location, year of foundation, number of employees, area of activity, 
level of activity, type of activity, budget (questions 1-9 in appendix 8, table 26),  
• self-assessment of NGOs role and situation in country: relationship with other actors, 
importance of NGOs, main problems of NGOs (question 10-12 in ibid), 
• relationship with foreign actors / donors: main donors, number of annually funded 
projects, benefits of cooperation, assessment of cooperation, main problems of 
cooperation) (questions 13-17 in ibid). 
The main results and a brief interpretation thereof as well as methodological remarks are to 
be found in appendix 8. Throughout this analysis, the author will refer to this survey as “DPP 
survey”.  
However, collecting quantitative data is only partly suitable to shed light on the key questions 
the case studies should answer. The specification of recipients’ benefits, their continuing 
existence and the degree to which recipients are accepted by the population are variables 
that are publicly available. It will be more difficult, however, to depict the effectiveness of 
specific recipient organizations in acting as carriers of civil society, especially as regards 
what has been called the “cultural dimension” of civil society. This is even more so, if the 
period under investigation is rather short at least in terms of cultural change. A horizontal 
relationship inside civil society that is based on tolerance and trust and that is capable of 
resolving major conflicts in society is as difficult to pinpoint as a change in the vertical 
relationship between civil society organizations and the state. These indicators are not easily 
open to empirical analysis. What is needed instead is a focus on unique processes and 
careful interpretation. One needs to invest in interpretative qualitative case studies, in short 
narratives that allow us to trace complex processes and produce “understanding via 
richness, texture, and detail” (McDonald 1996: 10 cit. in Bates et al 1998: 10). 
As a result, the case studies will only partly rely on quantifiable indicators and in addition 
focus on the role recipients played in relevant decision-making processes, namely in 
legislative processes and public campaigns. The ability of recipients to act in concert as well 
as the feelings toward the state and the degree to which civil society organizations rely on 
external assistance, resources and advice is most evident in unique processes that have 
been identified as relevant for civil society development. These are in the first place public 
campaigns that demonstrate the ability and confidence of civil society activists to raise their 
voice and to strife for increasing citizen participation, and secondly, lobbying processes that 
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aim to enhance the legislative environment under which civil society organizations act. 
Unfortunately the author does not possess the resources and capacity, and in particular 
language skills, to engage in what Clifford Geertz (1973) calls “thick description”. The 
analysis therefore makes use of the extensive secondary literature on civil society 
development in Poland and Slovakia and studies focusing on NGO campaigns and civil 
society achievements in both countries. In addition, materials of donors and recipients proved 
to be valuable sources of information on donor and recipients’ strategies, objectives, 
underlying concepts and activities. And last but not least, the study relies heavily on 
qualitative expert interviews conducted by the author in both countries under investigation. In 
order to get a broad as possible picture, experts have been chosen from four different 
groups: (1) representatives of donor organizations in the home country (if possible) and 
especially in the recipient country; (2) representatives of recipient organizations; (3) local 
scholars working on civil society in their country; (4) politicians and representatives of NGOs 
in the country under investigation (see list of interview partners in appendix 9). A snowballing 
process has thereby identified valuable interview partners, i.e., all interview partners have 
been asked whether they can indicate further persons that may be of value for the research.  
Before I analyze civil society assistance in Poland and Slovakia while applying the 
methodology outlined above, a brief description of the major donors under investigation will 
be given. As all four donors chosen as representative examples for this study are active in 
both countries they often have the same programs in both countries. For this reason, a 
summary of the major activities of our four donors in Central and Eastern Europe will serve to 
introduce the two case studies.  
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6 Donors in Focus: Major Donors and Donor - Recipient 
Interactions 
It is the aim of the following chapter to briefly portray civil society assistance in CEE by 
describing major donors, and their civil society programs. In doing so, the chapter focuses on 
four exemplary donors for reasons given above (see section 5.3.2): The European Union, the 
United States, Germany and the network of Soros foundations. The first part of the chapter 
gives a descriptive overview of these four donors. Emphasis is placed on the programs and 
strategies of major donors to assist the democratic transformation of the CEE states in 
general and the activities to support civil society in particular. In a second step, the chapter 
additionally outlines the main types of donor-recipient relations and sketches the various 
networks and links between donors and recipients that channel civil society assistance.  
6.1 Major Donors of Civil Society Assistance in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
6.1.1 Civil Society Assistance as Part of an Integration Strategy – The 
European Union and its Phare Program 
The most salient supranational actor involved in CEE is doubtlessly the EU. According to 
Pridham (1999) the EU applies a strategy of “dual conditionality” in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The first conditionality refers to the practice of the EU to attach membership in the 
EU to certain criteria, outlined at the summit in Copenhagen in 1993. From the early 1990s 
the European Union regards integration as the major strategy to achieve stability in the CEE 
states (Frantz 2000: 220). At the summit in Copenhagen, the EU worked out a catalogue of 
criteria that subsequently function as a “timetable to integration”, and gives the states 
seeking memberships a clear idea what they must do to their goal of accession. According to 
the Copenhagen criteria, the accession states have to meet three major conditions:  
1. Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the 
protection of minorities,  
2. The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,  
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3. The ability to meet the obligations of membership (adoption of the acquis 
communautaire) including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union (see e.g. Frantz 2000: 230).91  
The first part of the “dual conditionality” thus underlines that integration requires not only 
economic but also democratic stability and thus aims to ensure the political motivation of the 
states seeking membership to democratically transform the political system. The second part 
of the “dual conditionality” refers to the practice to directly grant technical and financial 
assistance to the CEE states and is thus more important for this study. The EU does not 
leave the accession aspirants alone on their path towards membership but provides 
assistance via the Phare program. While the initial idea behind Phare was mere economic 
assistance to the newly emerging democracies, the program steadily evolved as a pre-
accession instrument that aimed to keep the CEE states on a continual transformation path. 
Originally Phare was implemented in 1989 as a form of economic aid to Poland and Hungary 
(as indicated by the full name “Poland Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the 
Economy”) with the goal of supporting economic reforms and enhancing the private sector. It 
focused on measures in the area of agriculture, environment, restructuring of the economy, 
human resources (education and training), and other technical assistance. In the first year, 
the largest part of the funds (up to 50%) was dedicated to the restructuring of the economy.92 
However, the program steadily expanded in terms of geography, content and objectives.93 In 
the early years the program was truly demand-driven, i.e. the major share was subject to 
national programs negotiated between the recipient government and the Commission. Only 
up to 15% of the funds went into so-called ‘horizontal programs’, i.e., programs designed and 
administered by the Commission.94 In 1993 after the Copenhagen summit new guidelines 
have been elaborated for the years 1993 - 1997. Afterwards, Phare incorporated a more 
performance oriented approach, as well as a more explicit conditionality.  
91 For the criteria of membership outlined in Copenhagen and for the mechanisms installed by the 
European Union in order to monitor and assess the progresses of the accession states: see Bursis / 
Ochmann (1996).  
92 See: Europäische Kommission (1990).  
93 By the year 2000, PHARE included the 10 accession countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary) and three non-
candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYROM). For an overview of the history of 
the program see: Europäische Kommission (2000).   
94 Horizontal programs are complementary programs that supplement the national programs. In 
contrast to the national programs, horizontal programs are not subject to negotiations between the EU 
and the respective recipient government. Examples are: the ‘regional cooperation’ program, 
‘multidisciplinary measures’, the PHARE Information Action, the PHARE Democracy Programme 
(1992), or the Partnership and Institution Building Program (1993). 
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Furthermore new European Agreement activities – focusing on European integration 
including institution building and administrative measures – were implemented. Infrastructural 
measures were also integrated to a large extent into the program decreasing the emphasis 
on economic restructuring. In 1997 the Phare Program was fully restructured into a pre-
accession instrument. Phare is no longer demand-driven but accession-driven. The different 
measures should follow the priorities listed in the relevant Accession Partnerships.95 Now 
30% of the funds are attributed to institution building and 70% are left to investments. The 
major objectives are to focus on certain crucial needs for accession (institution building, 
technical assistance in the areas of adopting the acquis, public administration, advancement 
of economic and social coherence) and to train the candidate countries to manage the 
community funds, which will be available after accession.96 
I now turn to the question how the Phare program supported civil society in CEE. In the first 
years Phare did not include projects with a special focus on democracy and civil society. In 
1991 it was simply stated that the Phare assistance contained a general commitment to 
recognize the value of non-governmental organizations while implementing Phare projects 
(European Commission 1991: 19). In some Phare sector programs, e.g. concerning SMEs, 
the environment, social and employment policy, key importance was given to the support of 
intermediary bodies. In other sector programs such as the local government support 
programs NGOs were increasingly chosen as responsible for implementing Phare programs 
(ibid.). In particular, in the context of Phare regional development programs, substantial 
activities have been undertaken by NGOs. For example in Poland the majority of projects in 
this area were implemented by non-state actors (European Commission 1997a: 53). Besides 
this indirect way of supporting actors of civil society, two further channels of assistance can 
be identified: (1) via special, so called “horizontal” programs, and (2) via the national 
programs.  
95 In 1997, the “Accession Partnerships” was introduced by the Commission in order to streamline 
the pre-accession support. In contrast to the “Association Agreements” that previously regulated the 
relationship between the EU and the Candidate States (see Jacobson 1997: 8), the “Accession 
Partnerships” provide a clearly defined program to prepare for membership, involving commitments by 
the applicants to particular priorities and a calendar for carrying them out. The implementation of the 
“Accession partnerships” is steadily monitored. By connecting the PHARE funds to the “Accession 
Partnerships”, conditionality has been strengthened. PHARE funds can thus be restrained if the state 
in question fails to pursue a reform path agreed upon (for information on the accession partnerships 
consult the website of the European Commission:  
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ac_part_10_99/intro/index.htm). 
96 For this reason after 2000 two new programs are introduced which supplement PHARE: 
SAPARD: a program focusing on agriculture and the development of rural areas (precursor to the EU 
agricultural funds); ISPA: focusing on transport, environment and infrastructure (precursor to cohesion 
funds). PHARE funds are allocated to economic and social coherence with a regional and training 
focus. In this sense PHARE functions as the precursor to the structural funds.  
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In 1992 a special Phare (and Tacis) Democracy Program was launched on initiative of the 
European Parliament in order to “counter the fact that Western attention and assistance has 
been focused largely on the creation of market economies in the CEEC” (European 
Commission 1997b: 2). The program aimed to support the establishment of political and civil 
institutions crucial for the achievement of political consensus and stability. Between 1992 and 
1997 the program financed democratic initiatives worth of 56 Million ECU. The program 
supported three different types of projects:  
1. ad hoc projects, designed and administered by the European Commission to meet a 
specific need (10% of the budget); 
2. macro-projects up to 200,000 € which involve partnerships between NGOs in East and 
West (biannual competitions); only NGOs eligible; managed by European Human Rights 
Foundation since 1993 (70% of budget); 
3. micro-projects up to 10,000 € approved in target countries; only NGOs eligible, managed 
by EU delegations that often delegated the task to local organizations (e.g. Cooperation 
Fund in Poland, Civil Society Development Foundation in Slovakia) (20 % of budget). 
Although the Democracy Program was not exclusively designed as a civil society program, in 
practice its major objective was the support of actors of civil society, namely of NGOs. This is 
mainly the case because only NGOs were eligible to apply to the major share (90%) of the 
projects funded.97 Moreover, the evaluation of the Phare Democracy program conducted in 
1997 revealed that the major share of the realized projects fell into the category 
“development of NGOs” (46%), followed by the categories “awareness raising and education” 
(15%), “media” (19%), and “human rights” (10%) (European Commission 1997b: 35pp).98 
The Phare Democracy Program is, however, not the only program that has been designed in 
order to support civil society, NGOs and local structures. Other multi-country programs, 
namely the Phare NGO and LIEN program starting in 1992 and 1993 respectively and the 
Phare Partnership Program starting in 1992 provide support for civil society development 
(European Commission 1998b: 31). Here NGO and LIEN are “social” programs targeting 
specifically at NGOs, and supporting activities to promote integration of disadvantaged 
groups (unemployed, homeless, handicapped people, etc.) in the population.  
97 See European Commission (1997b). For micro- and macro-projects only NGOs are eligible. Ad-
hoc projects were mainly conducted by (Western) NGOs.  
98 The democracy programme supported projects in eight areas of activity: (1) Parliamentary 
practice and procedures, (2) Transparency of public administration and public management; (3) 
Development of NGOs and representative structures; (4) Independent, pluralistic and responsible 
media; (5) Awareness building and civic education; (6) Promoting and monitoring human rights; (7) 
Civilian monitoring of security structures; (8) minority rights, equal opportunities and non-discrimination 
(European Commission 1997b: 4).  
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Socially active NGOs were the main beneficiaries of the 40 million ECU earmarked for LIEN 
(1993-1997) (ibid). The Phare Partnership program (41 Million ECU between 1993-1997) in 
contrast, focused primarily on support for local economic development, cooperation between 
the private sector, local government and civil society and aimed to trigger transnational 
European networks. NGOs, independent organizations and institutes were the main 
beneficiaries of the Partnership Program.  
Moreover, civil society assistance is a frequent part of the national programs negotiated 
between the recipient governments and the Commission. In most of the CEE countries civil 
society development programs have been established that are subject to the Phare national 
program (as was the case for example in Bulgaria in 1996, the Civil Dialogue Program has 
fulfilled the same function in Poland since 1992 already). The objectives of Phare’s civil 
society programs are “to strengthen the capacity of leading institutions and to assist them in 
expanding the range of their activities, increasing their self-reliance and enhancing their 
participation in society and their support of NGOs” (European Commission 1997a: 53). In 
brief, the programs focus on some leading NGOs who aim to advance civil society 
development. The funds are mainly distributed by specially founded quasi-independent funds 
such as e.g. the Cooperation Fund in Poland, or the Civil Society Development Foundations 
in Slovakia, Bulgaria or Romania.  
In sum, one can distinguish between three different channels through which actors and 
organizations of civil society benefited from Phare money. Firstly, NGOs benefited indirectly 
from the assistance provided as they frequently implemented Phare projects in a variety of 
areas ranking from environment to decentralization. Secondly, certain horizontal programs, 
such as democracy, LIEN or the partnership program mainly focused on NGOs. Thirdly, 
some recipient states chose civil society development as one field of assistance of their 
national programs. These various distribution channels make it difficult to estimate how many 
funds went to the benefit of civil society. The evaluation of the Phare Partnership Program 
estimates that between 1992 and 1997 Phare programs in favor of civil society development 
(Democracy, Lien, Partnership, Civil Society Development Program) account for 157.7 million 
ECU in the years 1991-1991. This translates to 2% of the total Phare budget.  
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Table  3 Phare Programs in Favor of Civil Society Development 1991- 1997(MECU) 
Program 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total % 
Partnership  10  11 10 10 41 26.0 
Democracy 5 20 20 20 22 20 56 35.5 
NGO/LIEN  5 5 10 10 10 40 24.4 
Civil Society Dev. 4  6.2 0.5 2 8 20.7 13.2 
TOTAL 9 25 21.2 1.5 33 38 157.7 100 
Source: European Commission (1998b: 31). 
 
6.1.2 Forerunners in the Promotion of Democracy: United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED)  
The USA can be viewed as a forerunner in the support to democratization. As early as 1983 
the Reagan administration established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a 
quasi-independent foundation with the explicit purpose of promoting and assisting 
democracy abroad. It has an independent bipartisan board of directors, but receives 
congressional funding (Diamond 1997: 315pp). However, while the early years of democracy 
promotion were highly influenced by bipolarity and the cold war, the new emphasis on the 
promotion of democracy as a goal in itself instead of an ideological weapon has evolved 
slowly since the middle of the 1980s. According to Carothers (1999a: 49) democracy 
promotion became a full-fledged, integral part of US foreign policy at the beginning of the 
1990 in response to the new challenges in the East.  
The new emphasis on foreign policy is portrayed by the announcement of the “Democratic 
Initiative” of the United States Agency for International Development in late 1990. While since 
its creation in 1961, the agency previously focused mainly on social and economic 
development, in 1990 the agency established the promotion of democracy as one of its 
central objectives (ibid). This reads in the Strategic Plan for 1997 as follows:  
“Broad based participation and democratic processes are integral elements of 
sustainable development: they encourage individuals and societies to take 
responsibility for their own progress, ensure the protection of human rights and foster 
informed civic participation…. To achieve the broad goals of democracy, USAID 
supports programs that strengthen democratic practices and institutions, and ensure 
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the full participation of women and other groups lacking full access to the political 
system…” (USAID Strategic Plan 1997 cit. on website).  
With this reorientation from a development policy that mainly focused upon economic 
development to one that emphasizes the importance of political restructuring, USAID was 
among the first development agencies to take this turn. From 1991 - 1999 only the 
expenditures for democracy projects from USAID increased nearly by four and went up from 
165.2 Million US$ to 637 million US$ (Carothers 1999a: 49). USAID breaks down the 
strategic goal of “democratic transition” into five distinct areas: Rule of law; public 
administration; independent media; political and social process including electoral assistance 
and trade union assistance; and non-government organization development. In line with 
these objectives, the assistance also granted to CEE countries aims to support economic as 
well as political transformation. The US assistance to CEE countries is based on the Support 
For East European Democracy, or SEED Act, fashioned by the U.S. Congress in 1989 
already. At that time, the Congress authorized $1 billion for Central and Eastern European 
assistance. The law was seen as setting the foundations for a new Marshall Plan designed to 
revitalize post-Cold War Europe and aimed to provide for assistance to promote democracy 
and economic reforms throughout Central and Eastern Europe.99 
With regard to American civil society assistance, one has to note that in the early 1990s NGO 
development only played a minor role in overall democracy assistance. According to 
Carothers (1999: 59), American donors regarded civil society assistance simply as an “initial 
dose” that would soon roll back for the benefit of top-down programs. Major emphasis was 
instead placed on electoral assistance and institution building. However, this does not imply 
that civic initiatives and NGOs did not receive assistance. As Petrescu points out for the case 
of Romania, assistance to civil society came in fast and without bureaucratic hurdles. Most 
grants were made directly by the National Endowment of Democracy or by their grantee 
“Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe” (IDEE).  
“These first small grants had a decisive impact. They helped establish the credibility 
of a few organizations, set them up as institutions and formed a group of “traditional 
recipients” of grants” (Petrescu 2000: 219).  
However, the emphasis in the first years was on civic education, namely on voter education 
and thus indirectly served the purpose of setting up democratic elections. If other forms of 
civic initiatives were supported, the assistance was often the result of personal contacts of 
aid officers in the field and thus followed a trial and error strategy and not a thoroughly 
elaborated programmatic approach.  
99 See the USAID website on its activities in CEE and Eurasia: 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/index.html. See also appendix 2, table 5. 
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However, in 1995 USAID stressed the importance of NGO development as an integral part of 
democracy assistance and firstly institutionalized an NGO support program: the “Democracy 
Network Project” (DemNet). DemNet aimed to strengthen public policy oriented NGOs and 
was concurrently implemented in the countries of CEE. Other NGO support programs farther 
East followed suit. What all NGO support programs had in common was that they provided 
small grants to chosen NGOs, emphasized the importance of a transparent grant making 
procedure, integrated training and technical assistance and used one American NGO per 
country in an intermediary implementation role. In each country the objectives of the grant 
schemes and the focus points varied depending on local needs and the agenda of the 
intermediary American NGO (that mostly opened an office with local staff in the respective 
country).100 DemNet also included regional components that aimed to strengthen cross-
border linkages. Moreover, a regional project in which the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law (ICNL) operated as an intermediary body concentrated on the NGO legal 
environment in the region. DemNet lasted three years and ended in most of the CEE states 
in 1998. USAID also made progress in conceptual terms. In 1996 it presented a study on 
strategic approaches for donor-supported civic advocacy programs that provided the ground 
for a programmatic strategy focusing upon advocacy groups (USAID 1996).  
The quasi-independent National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is also active in the 
region. Its activities proved especially decisive at the beginning of transition due to its 
unbureaucratic and fast assistance. The NED identifies its mandate as: 
“…. promoting U.S. non-governmental participation in democratic institution building 
abroad… (including) strengthening democratic electoral processes in cooperation with 
indigenous democratic forces, fostering cooperation with those abroad dedicated to the 
cultural values, institutions and organizations of democratic pluralism; and encouraging 
the establishment and growth of democratic development in a manner consistent both 
with the broad concerns of U.S. national interests and with specific requirements of 
democratic groups in other countries” (NED, 1997 cit. in: Glenn 1999: 6). 
The NED relies on four traditional “core” grantees or satellite organizations that receive two-
thirds of its annual program funding. Two of these grantees are the two party institutes: the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI). The other two, the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) and the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) are affiliated with the U.S. labor federation and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce respectively. Due to this arrangement it comes as no surprise 
that the NED is mainly active in the areas political party assistance, trade union assistance, 
and assistance to associations and institutes aiming to support private enterprises. Although 
100 For more on the USAID NGO support programs, their similarities, differences, failures and 
achievements: see USAID ( 1999).  
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it has its own budget, the NED occasionally acts as an intermediary for projects funded by 
USAID if the projects fall within its area of expertise. 
6.1.3 The Enlargement of European Networks – The German Transform-
Program and the German Political Foundations 
In Germany concerns about “good governance” and “democracy promotion” increasingly also 
were incorporated into foreign and development policy. However, the new democratic face of 
development policy only gained prominence in the second part of the 1990s and thus at a 
later point than in other European countries.101  
Unlike the USA, Germany chose not to operate exclusively via its traditional development 
agencies102, but launched a special program for the assistance of transformation states in 
response to the distinct character of the transformation processes in Eastern Europe: the 
Transform-Program. Established in 1993, the program integrated various single measures by 
the German government that had been assisting the transformation processes in CEE since 
the end of the Cold War.103 By the end of 1997 1.6 bill. DM have been spent in 11 
countries.104 The Transform-Program provides technical assistance, mainly focusing on 
economic reform. The major part of the financial resources is devoted to fostering the 
business sector (46%), followed by education and training (12%) and the advancement of the 
financial sector (9%). Further areas of assistance are governmental and legal assistance in 
economic and European matters (8%), agriculture (7%), research (7%), the development of 
101 While in 1997 the development ministry carefully stressed the importance of political conditions 
for the success of development measures and raised the question whether “good governance is a 
precondition or outcome of developing aid” (BMZ aktuell Nr. 076/Feb.97), in 1998 five criteria (human 
rights, citizenship participation, rule of law, social market economy, development-oriented policy) were 
identified and made conditional for aid (BMZ aktuell Nr. 090/April 1998). In this sense, aid either has to 
open up the room for reform discussions in the case of autocratic regimes – in brief promote 
democracy – or support and assist the reform process in the case of transition countries – in brief, 
protect democracy (ibid). 
102 Usually the German ministry of development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung – BMZ) relies on two core organization for the implementation of its 
political objectives: These are for technical assistance the Gesellschaft für technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (Society for Technical Assistance) and for financial assistance the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (Bank for Reconstruction).  
103 The program includes assistance measures of various ministries and is coordinated by a 
consortium of the ministry of development, the foreign ministry and the ministry of economy, with the 
managerial support of the KfW (see BMWi 1998: pp. 23). The projects are conducted by organizations 
such as the GTZ, NGOs, associations, administrative bodies or, to a lesser degree, consultants. 
104 The countries involved are: Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia (Byelorus), Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and since 1998 Slovenia. For the Czech Republic and 
Estonia, the aid program will end by the end of 1998 due to their good economic performance. In 
Poland and Hungary the aid will be reduced. Bulgaria was part of the program until 1998. From 1999 
onwards Bulgaria has been  classified as a developing country and as such part of the developing aid 
policy of the ministry of development (BMZ). In this way technical and financial assistance can be 
given for a longer period of time (BMWi 1998: 22).  
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an effective administrative system (5%), and assistance in the area of labor and social policy 
(4%) (figures from 1998, see appendix 2, tables 1+2). The aim of the program is to establish 
the structural preconditions necessary for the establishment of democracy and a social 
market economy (BuWi 1998: 24). Since 1998 the program has stated that the facilitation of 
the integration of the candidate states into EU is a further major objective. The strategy of the 
program can be characterized as demand-driven, reactive and top-down. The program is 
designed to meet the different needs of the countries. Therefore country-specific programs 
are developed in cooperation with the respective countries (ibid: 21). Letting the business 
sector aside, the strategy follows a top-down approach as it concentrates on major 
institutions such as governmental agencies or the judiciary. This approach is based on the 
assumption that certain structural conditions are a prerequisite for economic (and political) 
development. Examples for this approach are several projects training civil servants, 
especially with respect to EU enlargement; and legal assistance concerning economic and 
European law. 
German civil society assistance is mainly left to the German political foundations. The work of 
the political foundations in the Federal Republic goes back to 1947 when Social-Democratic 
politicians re-established the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES). Other political groups in 
Germany soon followed this example: The Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) representing 
the Christian Democrats was established in 1956, the liberal Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation 
(FNS) in 1958 and the Bavarian Christian Social Union founded the Hans-Seidel-Foundation 
(HSS) in 1967. In the meantime the Green party and the PDS also have created political 
foundations: the Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) and the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation.  
The German political foundations have a somewhat complicated status. On the one hand, 
they are formally independent, decide on their own strategy and budget, and are very eager 
to maintain this independence. On the other hand, they are financed exclusively by the state, 
i.e. by the ministry of development and foreign ministry with regard to their international 
activities. Moreover, they are also affiliated with their respective political parties despite being 
formally independent.  
Mainly devoted to civic and political education - a task which the founders of the new German 
after-war democracy considered to be extremely important - the political foundations have 
been pursuing this goal since 1957 at the international level as well.105 Since then they have 
105 The German political foundations are therefore often regarded as the real forerunners of 
democracy assistance long before the promotion of democracy found its way in official foreign policy 
documents. They became especially prominent for the role they played in the Spanish and Portuguese 
democratization processes. See for the work of the German political foundations in Spain: Powell 
(1996: 306f). 
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become a constant cooperation partner of the German government in the area of 
development and foreign policy. This cooperation follows guidelines that were already 
established in 1973 (BMZ 1973). According to those guidelines, the activities of the 
foundation:  
1. have to follow the structural-political approach of the BMZ and aim to foster long-term 
structures and conditions for development and – along the same lines – democracy 
(1973: 63). The German government emphasizes a structural approach and aims to 
establish long-term structures and institutions necessary for stable democracy and 
development. Main areas of interest are civic education and institution building.  
2. The foundation activities are limited in the following respects: First, measures with a 
negative effect on the bilateral relations between Germany and the recipient country are 
not funded. Second, the foundations are not allowed to take sides in internal conflicts 
(ibid: 69).  
In this sense the activities of the foundations conform with – or at least do not contradict 
German foreign policy. The German political foundations thus act as “unofficial” German 
representatives.106 The special status of the political foundations is also eminent in the way 
they are financed. The foundations are mainly state-financed. Contrary to other NGOs they 
are only partly project-financed but also have a fixed quota at their disposal that is distributed 
between the foundations according to a special key.107 This system allows the foundations to 
react quickly and independently to new developments in the recipient country and to satisfy 
new demand without having to master bureaucratic obstacles and follow long bureaucratic 
procedures. In the field offices, in particular, the foundations and their representatives enjoy 
therefore great freedom of action. 
One should not forget, however, that the foundations are not so much in line with the 
government, rather with the different parties. The foundations are independent and – 
according to the German constitutional court – “obey the necessary distance to the 
106 The conformity of the foundations’ objectives with official foreign policy is evident in such stated 
goals such as: “presenting Germany’s role in the world”; “advancing European integration’”or “the 
improvement of Czech – German relationship”. Moreover, the political foundations often aim to spread 
German ‘achievements’ such as the social market-economy (KAS 1996: 11).  
107 The KAS and FES receive 32.5% of the resources available, while the HSS and FNS receive 
12.5% and the HBS only 10% of the resources (BMZ 1995:3; interview). The HBS was only included in 
this financing method in 1996. From then on, its share grew over the years at the expense of the other 
small foundations FNS and HSS. This process will come to an end in the year 2000 when all three 
small foundations will receive 11.66 % of the resources. This key will be changed again after the year 
2000 when a PDS-oriented foundation will receive project-related financial resources In 1999 the PDS 
foundation will receive 4 Million DM from the interior ministry for institutional support. From the year 
2000 onwards it will be included in the finance splitting between the foundations in similar fashion as 
the HBS with steadily growing percentage. 
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respective parties” (BVerfg 1986:1, own translation). Nonetheless, close cooperation and 
personal contacts exist among foundations and their respective parties. Furthermore, the 
foundations and the parties are connected by the same political viewpoints and ideology. 
More than being ‘German representatives’ the foundations are therefore representatives of a 
special political spectrum and aim to transport certain key values, a fact that automatically 
translates into partial sponsorship. In other countries such as the US this practice is regarded 
as inadequate to nurture democracy. Faced with such critique, the foundations and the BMZ 
point to the fact that all foundations are active in the different countries and therefore 
ultimately offer political advice to the whole political spectrum.  
As regards the special status of the German political foundations, their long tradition and 
experience in the area of civic and political education and in developing states, it is hardly 
surprising that political foundations have been the main actors of German democracy and 
civil society assistance in CEE. Between 1989 and 1994 the political foundations received a 
government allocation of 135 million DM in support of their activities in CEE. This 
corresponds to 0.09% of all official German aid given to the region (145 billion DM).  
The goal of the political foundations in CEE can be described as fostering democracy and 
market economy by supporting and creating structural and civic conditions necessary for a 
stable democracy (BMZ 1995: 6pp). The promotion of democracy is, however, not the only 
objective of the political foundations. As already mentioned, foreign policy goals are also on 
the agenda as well as goals resulting from their political background such as ‘support of 
Christian-democratic values, principles and institutions (KAS 1996:11) or to foster social 
dialogue (FES: homepage). Furthermore the foundations strive for a social market-economy, 
decentralization and federal structures and local self-government.  
In new recipient countries like in Central and Eastern Europe, the German foundations seek 
to establish a network of contacts with the political elite in order to exercise long-term 
influence. This implies cooperation with the respective parties in the transition country that 
are close to their own background. Although the political foundations do not conduct direct 
party assistance through direct funding because German law forbids this, they do support 
their sister-parties indirectly by providing technical and organizational advice and a network 
of international contacts. The aim of the foundations is to establish one strong sister party 
that is able to play a decisive role in the political process. 
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 In this sense attempts are often made to unite similar parties and e.g. bring together several 
social democratic parties.108  
In order to achieve these goals the foundations follow a strategy that can be described as 
moderately demand-driven and elite-focused with a heavy reliance on and freedom of action 
of the field offices.109 Moreover, despite being politically partisan, the foundations comply with 
the strict rule not to polarize and not to get involved in internal conflicts of their partners, in 
line with the ‘intervention proscription’ outlined in the guidelines for the cooperation with the 
BMZ. In this sense, the foundations perceive themselves as a ‘neutral instance’ (KAS) or 
‘institution without interest’ (FES) that ‘provides platform for dialogue’, aims to initiate public 
debate, and puts political issues on the agenda (Interview Weber). The programs are often 
designed quite vaguely with a time frame of several years. The KAS coordinates only one 
project per country, which states rather broad goals such as ‘decentralization’, ‘social market 
economy’ or ‘rule of law’. The FES has several projects per country but those are also ‘catch 
all projects’ - able to integrate different measures  such as ‘social cooperation’ or ‘economic 
and social policy’. By these means, it is possible for the foundations to react quickly to new 
political issues and demands. This open and relatively unbureaucratic form of financing is 
symbolic of the institutionalized cooperation between the ministry and the foundations as well 
as the independence of the foundations.  
The foundation’s strategy differs as to whether to follow a ‘partner-principal’ or to 
conceptualize ‘regime-measures’. The KAS opts for the former, while the FES for the later 
option. ‘Partner-principal’ implies that the work focuses on a limited number of long-term 
partners that are bound to the foundation by a partner contract. The main purpose is 
institution building. The partners receive financial support and implement measures on their 
own with the advice of the KAS. This strategy has the advantage that the organizational and 
personnel expenditures can be kept to a minimum. However, the approach heavily relies on 
the respective partner and the cooperation with the partner. A further problem is the question 
of sustainability. As the KAS is not supposed to create dependencies, the question whether 
sustainability can be achieved is decisive for a new partnership. Due to the limited resources 
108 For example, such attempts at combining forces have been successful in Bulgaria where the 
representative of the FNS was able to persuade four liberal parties to integrate into one party 
(interview Thebaud). However, similar attempts undertaken by the FES in Bulgaria at a conference 
failed.  
109 All foundations run field offices in Central and Eastern Europe depending on their financial 
resources. The ‘small’ foundations, namely the FNS, HBS and HSS, can only afford one office in the 
region. HBS has its office in Prague, the FNS in Budapest. The heads of the offices enjoy a great 
leeway of action. They design and conceptualize the different measures, search for and identify 
partners and keep contact to the respective sister-party. Consequently, the work of the foundations 
and the activities taken heavily depend on the single person on site. 
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of the partners such sustainability is, however, hard to achieve. ‘Regime-measures’, in 
contrast, are single measures conceptualized and implemented by the FES in cooperation 
with different, changing partner organizations. This strategy allows them to concentrate on 
different topics rather than partners. Regime-measures are especially useful in the uncertain 
transition phase in which the identification of adequate partners is difficult. Yet, in the area of 
trade union support the strategy of the FES is close to the ‘partner principal’ of institution 
building.  
The main partners of the political foundations are usually universities, research institutes, 
associations, NGOs, trade unions or foundations. As parties cannot be funded, party-oriented 
organizations such as party foundations or educational centers are often supported. Unlike 
American donors, the European Union, or the Soros foundations, the German political 
foundations do not run grant schemes that follow specific guidelines and operate with 
tenders. They instead operate on the basis of informal requests as in the case with the FES 
or with long-term partner-contracts as in the case with the KAS.  
Although the political foundations are similar in many respects, there are also important 
differences. These are highlighted in a brief portrait of each political foundation active in CEE 
(see appendix 1).  
6.1.4 Private Actors – Efforts “From Below” 
In the following I briefly highlight the variety of private actors involved in CEE, before 
concentrating on the major private donor active in CEE: the Soros foundations.  
The Variety of Private Actors  
One of the major particularities of civil society assistance to Central and Eastern Europe is 
the variety and magnitude of private commitment. This is even more so, as a majority of 
private actors operating in CEE are active for the first time in their history in the international 
scene (Quigley 1997). Moreover, the variety of private actors involved is also unique. One 
can identify three basic groups: Among the active organizations are international NGOs that 
operate on a global scale, such as amnesty international or transparency international. The 
latter in particular conducted several projects aiming to assist democratization and the 
development of civil society in CEE. Moreover, international NGOs engage in global 
networks that also embrace CEE NGOs. Secondly, several philanthropic foundations aim to 
support civil society in the region. Those foundations are inspired by humanistic ideals often 
combined with the wish to support former motherlands. The majority of them are US-based 
(examples are the Ford Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund, Open Society Institute), but European Foundations are also active – mainly 
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represented by the European Foundation Center (EFC). The magnitude of such private 
commitment, as compared with the activities of quasi-national commitments, is illustrated by 
the following comparison: Between 1989 - 1994 the German political foundations spent a 
total of 53.2 million US$ in the Visegrad countries. In contrast, the foundations of George 
Soros alone spent the amount of 62 million US$ in the same period and area, not even 
including the support of the foundation and academic activities of the Central European 
University (CEU). US state-funded foundations (NED, German Marshall Fund) lay far behind 
such figures with 28.3 million US$ (Quigley 1997: 122). Finally, national interest groups, 
associations and NGOs of donor countries are active in CEE and in partnerships with their 
CEE counterparts. In contrast to the first two types of actors that may be categorized as 
manifestations of an increasing internationalization, the activities of this group are to be seen 
in a European context and can be categorized as the expansion of European networks. The 
organizations either attempt to establish transnational coalitions with future allies in an 
enlarged Europe or minimize the anticipated risks of  enlargement. Moreover, the respective 
governments often nurture such partnerships in their attempt to facilitate the European 
integration of CEE by enlarging existing European transnational networks (as demonstrated 
by the case of Germany above). For example, the German Landkreistag (association of 
regional districts) assisted associations active in decentralization in Poland in order to press 
through a territorial reform that introduces a district level. The territorial reform carried out in 
1999 created a new territorial level in Poland that only has one counterpart in the EU – the 
German districts. Thus, by advancing the territorial reform in Poland, the German districts 
gained an ally in the European Council of Regions (interview v. Hausen). Other examples of 
associations which established transnational bonds are the German Paritätischer 
Wohlfahrtsverband, which is active in supporting non-partisan social welfare NGOs in 
Poland. Trade unions mainly support their counterparts in CEE to prevent social dumping in 
neighboring countries. What all those activities have in common is that they work less with 
grants and financial support but rely more on the transfer of know-how and technical 
assistance. Moreover, international assistance is not a core activity of the respective 
organizations but a minor additional task only carried out in CEE.  
Unfortunately it augments the scope of this study to portray the variety of private commitment 
in CEE in the area of civil society assistance. Instead, the author restricts herself to covering 
the activities of the major private donor active in CEE: the network of the Open Society Fund, 
sponsored by George Soros.  
Building Open Societies – The Open Society Institute and the Soros Foundation 
Network 
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The network of Soros foundations has been the most far-reaching and significant private 
commitment in CEE. Inspired by the writings of Karl Popper, the US financier George Soros 
established his first foundation, the Open Society Fund in New York in 1979 with the aim of 
advancing an open society based not only on democracy and the market economy but also 
on tolerance, the rule of law, historical truth, a thriving civil society and respect for 
minorities.110 The first Soros foundation in Central and Eastern Europe was established in 
1984 in Hungary. The Soviet Union followed in 1987, Poland in 1988. During most of the 
1990s, the Soros foundations network developed in nearly all post-communist states and 
increasingly expanded in other world regions, such as Africa, Asia and the Americas. Today 
the network of the foundations of the Hungarian émigré includes 29 national and 4 regional 
foundations and covers more than 50 countries all over the world, and according to the 
presentation on their website: “…lays the foundation for a truly global alliance for open 
society”.  
The Soros foundation’s network in CEE includes the national Soros foundations and the 
Open Society Institute (OSI) in Budapest. The Soros foundations operate largely 
autonomously. The priorities and specific activities of each Soros foundation are determined 
by a local board of directors and staff in consultation with George Soros and OSI boards and 
advisors. As result, and in contrast to other donors operating in the region, the Soros network 
explicitly makes use of domestic human resources and local expertise. The nation-based 
approach of the foundation is further stressed by the fact that all national foundations operate 
as locally registered non-governmental organizations. Moreover, many foundations seek to 
attract funding from sources other than the Open Society Institute and are thus donors and 
recipients (or intermediary) at the same time. The Open Society Institute in Budapest 
provides administrative, financial, and technical assistance to the Soros foundations and also 
operates independent programs and initiatives, which address specific issues on a regional 
basis. Again the majority of the employed staff is from the region. As for their areas of activity, 
the Soros network focuses on efforts in civil society, education, media, public health, and 
human and women’s rights as well as social, legal, and economic reform. Since the end of 
the 1990s the Soros foundations have also been assisting the CEE countries that are 
candidates for EU membership in preparing for accession. In doing so, the foundations focus 
on membership criteria that are also central to the network’s mission such as the protection 
of the rights of Roma and other minorities, criminal justice reform, the reduction of corruption 
and strengthening civil society participation in policymaking. Several foundations also support 
110 See for the history and activities of the Network of Soros foundations and the Open Society 
Institute in Budapest: Diamond (1997) and their homepage: www.soros.org. 
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programs to inform leaders about EU policies and to educate the public about the impact of 
European integration (Soros foundation network 2000: 16).  
The activities and expenditures of the Soros foundation network grew significantly from 1994 
(300 million US$) to the peak years of 1998 (574.7 million US$) and 1999 (560 million US$). 
In 2000 the expenditures were slightly reduced to 494 million US$ and are planned to remain 
at that level for the previous years (ibid: 9). Thereby approximately half of the expenditures 
are spent in favor of the national foundations. In 2000, the national foundations in the CEE 
accession states spent 58.6 million US$ together.111 The majority of funds have been 
devoted to grant making to non-governmental organizations. Other activities include training 
and educational measures.  
Additionally, the Soros network supports “the most influential institution of higher learning in 
the post-Communist world” (Pridham 1994: 17), the Central European University located in 
Warsaw and Budapest. Between its founding in 1990 and 2002 nearly 5000 students from 
over 40 different countries graduated from the CEU. As a result, the CEU contributed not only 
to the advancement of higher education in the region while “bringing together students and 
faculty from a diverse regional and international base in an open and liberal academic 
setting” and “preparing its graduates to serve as the region's next generation of leaders and 
scholars” (CEU website), but it created a tight network of individuals and built the human 
resources from which the national foundations can profit.  
6.2 The Network of Donor-Recipient Relationships  
Knowing the major actors, the question arises how they relate to each other? Can we identify 
‘national tribes’, i.e. governmental and non-governmental actors from the same country who 
cooperate in their endeavors to support civil society beyond their borders? Or are the donor-
recipient relationships determined by a strict distinction between state and non-state actors 
leaving civil society assistance exclusively to non-governmental donors, invoking the vision of 
charitable bonds or brother activists inside a “global civil society”? Are there steady bonds 
between donors and “their” recipients, or are the transactions between donors and recipients 
in constant flux?  
It will be evident in the following that civil society assistance is shaped by complex networks 
between several, legally different actors. These networks often follow national lines. Thus, 
111 Own calculation based on the expenditures of the Soros foundation in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia given in the Soros 
Foundation Network Annual Report 2000. 
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governmental agencies mainly rely on national NGOs, foundations or consultancies to run 
their programs. Nonetheless, horizontal ties between organizations active in common issue-
areas are constant practice. Especially if informal networks are included which serve mainly 
informative and consultative purposes, the various connections cut across national as well as 
legal lines. Thus a group of governmental and non-governmental actors with different 
national backgrounds, including donor and recipient organizations may be the major driving 
force behind a domestic campaign to strengthen the NGO sector.  
In order to unfold the various relations between donors and recipients, it is useful to look at 
the practice of aid distribution of the four donors under investigation.  
As already mentioned, civil society assistance in Germany is to a large extent left to the 
German political foundations. Additionally, the Transform Program provides funds that benefit 
NGOs and democratic stability. Recently, the German embassies have been giving direct 
grants to domestic recipients in certain countries. This is taking place, for example, with funds 
from the Stability Pact in the Balkan region. The support programs are administered by 
respective ministries, mainly the BMZ and the foreign ministry (Stability Pact) and their 
aligned organizations.112 In certain issue areas specialized organizations have been founded 
to implement assistance to CEE.113 Additionally, existing associations and NGOs may directly 
apply for project money at different ministries. This brief summary demonstrates that the 
assistance market in Germany is highly determined by public administration and state-
aligned institutes or agencies and by non-profit seeking non-governmental actors. Profit 
seeking consultancies do exist, but they are more the exception than the rule.  
A quite different picture is found in the US. In contrast to German ministries, USAID 
delegates the management of its programs mainly to private and partly to non-profit sectors. 
The distribution of US civil society assistance funds is thus characterized by a high 
permeability between the private and the public sector. Most projects handled by USAID 
112 In the case of the BMZ these are the Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and 
the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), in the case of the foreign ministry e.g. the Institut für 
Auslandsbeziehungen or Inwent (formerly Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft). 
113 Examples include the ”Stiftung für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und berufliche Qualifizierung“ 
(SEQUA), an organization established in 1991 with the aim of mobilizing the know-how and 
commitments of economic organizations and firms in the area of international assistance. SEQUA is 
closely aligned with the German chambers of commerce and administers e.g. several projects 
supporting chambers of commerce  and SMEs in CEE (see www.sequa.de). Another example is the 
“Deutsche Stiftung für internationale rechtliche Zusammenarbeit e.V.“ (German Foundation for 
International Legal Cooperation) (IRZ) that “supports partner states in reforming their legal system and 
their judiciary” on behalf of the German government. The IRZ foundation was established in 1992 as a 
non-profit making association on the initiative of the then Federal Minister Klaus Kinkel. According to 
their website, in previous years the work of the foundation was largely promoted within the framework 
of the Transform program. The major share of funding now comes from the budget of the Federal 
Ministry of Justice (www.irz.de). 
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including civil society projects are contracted out to external, private and profit-seeking firms. 
These are commonly well-established development consultancy firms such as Chemonics, 
Management Systems International, Creative Associates International, KPMG or Barents 
Group. The firm that wins the contract then assembles a consortium of specialized sub-sub-
contractors including institutes, non-profit organizations and smaller consultancies (see 
Guilhot 2003). In the field of civil society assistance, in which the sums are often smaller and 
might not be that attractive for large companies, specialized non-for-profit organizations often 
fulfill the role of the sub-contractor.114 One can conclude that the logic behind the program 
management of USAID follows the logic of a market marked by oligopoly, and thus highly 
differs from the above illustrated example of the public-dominated German practice.  
The EU’s distributive practice may be characterized as a mixture of the two. Parts of the 
Phare program with relevance to civil society assistance are administered by the 
commission. In these cases, which mainly concern cross-country partnerships, i.e. projects, 
which involve at least two civil society organizations from different countries and horizontal 
programs, recipients apply directly in Brussels. However, the recipients often disapprove of 
this approach due to long and bureaucratic procedures. According to an additional 
distribution practice, funds are administered by the delegations of the Commission in the 
respective target countries. They in turn may rely on further sub-contractors. For example, in 
Poland, the Cooperation Fund fulfills this function. Finally, the Commission often relies on 
specialized NGOs or consultancies often located in Brussels to administer programs, e.g. the 
European Human Rights Council (EHRC) which administers the macro-grant projects of the 
Phare and Tacis Democracy Program.  
Private organizations are known for having the most direct chain between donors and 
recipients. The Soros foundations directly administer their programs. Hence, they give 
grants, but do not conduct projects themselves. However, the various national foundations 
may also act as sub-grantees of other donors. Due to their acknowledged regional and 
national expertise, they are attractive intermediaries that may distribute German, European 
or American funds. The different distribution channels are illustrated in table 4 (next page).115 
114 e.g. the Academy for Educational Development that implemented the DemNet program in 
Poland  (see chapter 7.3, and appendix 5, portray 10). 
115 Note that the graph mainly serves illustrative purposes.   
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Table  4  Donor-Recipient Relationships (by Direction of Money Flows). 
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Based on the outlined distribution practice of four donors we can make the following 
observations on donor-recipient relationships in civil society assistance. First, civil society 
assistance in CEE is marked by a variety of actors involved: governmental and quasi-
governmental agencies on the one hand, non-for-profit and for-profit non-governmental 
organizations on the other. As a result, civil society assistance is administered by different 
links between the public sector and the private sector in the donor country. On the one hand, 
there is a free market and flexible business conditions, on the other hand stable political-
administrative arrangements between governmental and non-governmental agencies within 
national borders determine the paths of assistance (see Guilhot 2003). Second, one has to 
acknowledge the fact that a clear-cut distinction between those who give, those who 
administer, those who implement and those who receive is difficult to detect. Although there 
is a general tendency for governmental agencies to shape the framework of assistance and 
provide the funds, while NGOs implement the project in the field, several organizations may 
be sometimes the donor, sometimes the recipient or both at the same time. This leads us to 
the third observation: the frequent use of sub-grantees and -contractors or even sub-sub-
grantees. In particular with regard to governmental agencies, the project administration is 
more often than not delegated to either profit-seeking firms or to non-for-profit oriented 
organizations depending on the linkage between the public and the private sector common in 
the donor country. Fourth, “national tribes” can be identified, but they are blurred the closer 
one gets to the recipient side of the chain. Whereas contracts from the American SEED-
Program went to US-firms or NGOs and exclusively German organizations applied for 
Transform-projects, some consultancies operate on an European if not global scale and 
administer temporally bilateral projects, World Bank or Phare projects. Moreover, 
international NGOs specializing in civil society assistance act as intermediaries of 
governmental, EU and private funds. And certain highly professional operating recipient 
organizations apply everywhere. Finally and closely related to the previous point, there is a 
pronounced tendency to choose local organizations to implement civil society projects. As a 
result, certain organizations in recipient countries re-distribute funds and act as 
intermediaries between foreign donors and domestic recipients and as professional ‘brokers 
of aid’.  
We can conclude that civil society assistance in CEE is shaped by a variety of different 
actors with various and overlapping relations. In international relations literature this complex 
picture of various relations of state and non-state actors has been described as a multi-level 
relationship (especially in order to comprehend processes of European politics). Although 
this model allows for alignments between state and non-state, sub-national and 
supranational level it sill preserves the impression of being vertical. However, it was 
demonstrated that various relations cut across national borders. The metaphor of a network 
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seems more useful to describe the various relations and links between the different donors 
and recipients. This point becomes especially apparent if working relationships, private 
contacts, and informal networks serving informative and consultative purposes are included. 
Not just one network evolves but several networks, which are also interlinked and overlap. 
There are the national policy-networks of development ministries, agencies, democracy 
promotion foundations and important consultants that design and conceptualize policies and 
programs. There are international networks between certain kinds of donors such as the 
‘democracy foundations’, quasi-governmental foundations whose major aim is to support civil 
society and democracy abroad. There are certain issue area networks such as human right 
networks. And in the recipient countries there are networks between donors – often called 
‘donor forums’116 What evolves is a network of various communities with different, more or 
less institutionalized links.  
116 ‚Donor forums‘, i.e. regular and more or less institutionalized meetings between various donor 
organizations with the aim of exchanging information and coordinate action, can be found e.g. in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In Poland an attempt to establish a similar body failed. The principle 
behind the establishment of such forums or organizations is to coordinate donor activities in order to 
prevent double-funding of single projects and in order to be more effective. In Slovakia the previously 
informal donor forum was registered as a civic association last year. The donor forums can thus be 
comprehended as the result of a learning process on side of the donors.  
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7 Analyzing Civil Society Assistance in Poland  
The subsequent chapter investigates civil society assistance to Poland. What donors have 
been involved? What strategies have been pursued? What has been the output of civil 
society assistance and, more importantly, did these outputs facilitate the re-emergence of 
civil society in Poland after the end of authoritarian rule? In other words, may one plausibly 
attribute the state of civil society in Poland roughly ten years after transition to external 
assistance? Or are the various external support measures and programs nothing more than 
a footnote to a historically determined path shaped by existing or non-existing cultural 
preconditions rooted in the communist past and in the experience with the Solidarity 
opposition movement? The theoretical framework of this work pointed to two divergent 
hypothetical answers to these questions, whereby both are grounded in the assumption that 
past experiences and domestic settings matter. Following the line of thought of sociological 
institutionalism one comes to the conclusion that civil society assistance is doomed to fail 
and results at best in a supplementary stratum of donor-driven NGOs detached from society. 
The argumentation inspired by actor-centered institutionalism, however, comes to a different 
result. civil society assistance may indeed facilitate the development of civil society via the 
mechanisms of empowerment and learning. The provision of resources raises the 
capabilities of civil society actors in achieving political outcomes. More importantly, 
transnational networks facilitate learning and the spread of ideas. civil society assistance 
may thus effect the orientations’ of domestic actors, teaching them to trust their fellow 
citizens, to tolerate and respect the opinions of their political opponents, to place trust in the 
liability of public institutions and rules and to perceive themselves as agents of political 
change. The objective of this chapter is to determine which of our two hypothetical answers 
hold true in the Polish case.  
To answer this tricky question the chapter takes the following steps: First, it investigates the 
“near past” and identifies the cultural legacies underpinning civil society development in 
Poland. Cultural legacies are not regarded here as major driving forces determining the 
development of civil society. Using the words of Scharpf, historical experiences are instead 
regarded as “a shorthand term to describe the most important influences on those factors 
that in fact drive our explanations – namely, actors with their orientations and capabilities, 
actor constellations, and modes of interaction” (Scharpf 1997: 39). Moreover, past 
experiences and cultural legacies as a major alternative explanation for the development of 
civil society need to be explicated in greater detail. Secondly, an illustration of the state of 
civil society roughly ten years after transition will be given. In doing so the research applies 
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the distinction between the “structural” and the “cultural” dimension of civil society and makes 
use of the indicators put forward in chapter 2.2.3.117 The third section then gives an overview 
of the history of civil society assistance to Poland throughout the 1990s. It will be clear that 
civil society assistance to Poland came in sequences, in which three different time periods 
can be distinguished with varying strategies and emphasis. Finally the chapter focuses on 
the output and outcome of external assistance to civil society. As outlined in the methodology 
of this work (chapter 5.3.2), special emphasis will be placed on major recipients, especially 
so-called infrastructural NGOs, and their sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness in 
advancing the structural and the cultural dimension of civil society. The role of these “main 
recipients” in advancing a relationship between civil society and the state, in acting as 
intermediaries of assistance and in building networks and horizontal links among various civil 
society groups is of particular importance (see chapter 2). The study thus aims to clarify the 
extent to which civil society assistance supported non-governmental organizations that acted 
as carriers of civil society. However, the analysis does not stop here. The relationship 
between donors and recipients also requires clarification. Thus, the investigation assesses 
the extent to which major recipients benefited from external assistance by placing special 
emphasis on the two modes of influence outlined above: empowerment and learning (see 
chapter 4.4.2). A summary of the major findings is subject of the fifth section.  
117 The identified indicators are: (1) number of NGOs and associations, (2) thematic distribution of 
NGOs, (3) regional distribution of NGOs, (4) civic participation and volunteerism, (5) relationship 
between civil society and state, (6) horizontal relationships between NGOs. 
 146
                                                
7.1 The Domestic Context - Historical and Cultural Legacies  
The following is based on the conviction that the re-emergence of civil society in Poland after 
1989 must be viewed in a historical context.  
“The collective memory of bygone days… has significantly affected the existing 
basic codes of national-political culture via the uninterrupted reinterpretation of 
historical facts” (Kurczewska 1995: 38).  
The author restrains from giving a minute and chronological account of civil society 
development in different periods of Polish history.118 Instead, the section draws attention to 
the legacies of the near past relevant to civil society development.119 The guiding question is 
to what extent have cultural legacies from previous events hindered or facilitated the 
development of civil society. The legacies of the communist regime evident in all post-
communist countries have been summarized above (see chapter 2.3.). For this reason, the 
following will mainly focus on the Polish liberalization experiences and on the “legacies” of 
the oppositional movement Solidarity. 
7.1.1 Solidarity and the Legacies of a “Successful” Opposition  
It is no exaggeration to state that Poland is the one country in CEE where liberalization 
experiences were the most far-reaching and profound. Poland is the only case in CEE where 
a strong oppositional movement existed, the trade union Solidarity. It therefore would be 
misleading to take the characteristics of communist states outlined in chapter 2.3. as the only 
118 For historical accounts of civil society including the “distant past”, see: Leś et al (2000: 2-12); 
Szücs (1988); Kurczewska (1995). 
119 Disagreement exists over the question whether the “distant past”, i.e. experiences with non-
governmental forms of self-organization and interest representation before the onset of communist 
rule, facilitates the upspring of civil society in countries such as Poland in contrast to the countries 
farther East such as Ukraine or Russia (Klein 2001: 41). Some authors point to the century-long 
existence of federations and especially charity based organizations in Poland (Leś et al 2000), or 
stress the importance of the noble democracy of the 18th century, the experience of the two partitions 
and the traditions of Polish national culture based on the ideas of social solidarity, egalitarianism and 
social emancipation (Kurczewska 1995: 44pp). Others, in contrast, argue that previous states of civil 
society have been demolished under communism: “Crucially, the Soviet-type revolution destroyed the 
civil societies that were coming into being after the Second World War. Before the communist take-
overs these countries were at best semi-developed … but they were not the homogenized, simple 
polities that they became as a result of the Stalinist revolution. The countries of the region had 
embarked on their own, often rather fitful roads toward modernity, which recognized the existence of 
the market and the move toward greater complexity. These processes were cut short and all 
subsequent development took place under the aegis of the state“ (Schöpflin 1993: 226). It is, however, 
not the purpose of this work to resolve this dispute. Being well aware of the fact that civil society 
development in Poland pursues a rather different pathway after 1990 than civil society development in 
countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus, the author concentrates for reasons of simplicity and 
lack of space on the “near past”, i.e. the period of communist rule, and only occasionally will draw 
attention to more distant historical legacies. 
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factor pre-conditioning the cultural basis of civil society. The following thus briefly portrays 
liberalization tendencies and oppositional activities in Poland throughout the communist 
period. Secondly, the section discusses the extent to which the history of civic initiatives 
independent from the state nurtured an ethical life and civic values, thus facilitating the 
emergence of civil society once authoritarian rule came to end. 
Liberalization tendencies and the rise of Solidarity  
Throughout the communist period spheres of social life existed that were outside the control 
of the communist state. One of such “circles of freedom” that resisted the centralization 
tendencies was agriculture, large parts of which remained in private hands in Poland. As a 
result, farmers presented a relatively autonomous interest group that was further represented 
in the form of a political satellite party (Pelczynski 1988). More important from the point of 
view of the opposition, however, were different partly legal, partly illegal citizens’ initiatives 
that enjoyed sometimes more, sometimes less freedom of maneuver. One can differentiate 
between individual and disconnected single oppositional initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the establishment of the infrastructure of an “alternative” society in the 1970s, the short 
interlude of “publicity” during the legalization of the Solidarity movement in 1981/1982, the 
subsequent underground activities, and a short but lively liberalization period in 1987/88, 
which led to the rise of several different organizations.  
Throughout this period, the Catholic Church proved to be the most important guarantor of 
self-organized social activities in communist Poland. It ensured the existence of civic 
organizations on the one hand, and protected illegal protest movements on the other.120 In 
1956 the Polish state granted the Catholic Church among other things the right to maintain its 
own organizations. As a result, the Catholic Church functioned as a protector of the 
oppositional movement and permitted the establishment of “permitted, but limited” citizens’ 
initiatives (Matynia 2001: 920). These initiatives included organizations critical of the official 
state ideology such as e.g. the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia, parts of the Polish 
scouting organizations and partly the student cultural movement, academic associations and 
independent journals. Leading intellectuals were also affiliated with the Catholic Church and 
made use of the relative freedom of church near associations in order to spread critical ideas 
and thoughts (Michnick 1990: 186).  
While using the openings in the system, these initiatives thus laid the ground for further 
oppositional citizen activities beginning in the 1970s that have been labeled the realm of the 
120 In various cases, e.g. at the time of the student protests at Warsaw University in 1968, the 
Catholic church openly sided with the protesters and subscribed to the demands of citizens and 
human rights principles (see Fehr 1996: 72p). 
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“unofficial” and “forbidden” (Matynia 2001: 922). It was the aim of the “unofficial” to create an 
alternative to the system, an informal sector or second society (see Fehr 1996: 61pp) as 
conceptualized in the writings of intellectual leaders such as Kolakowski (1970) or Adam 
Michnik (1976). This alternative was based on a moral concept of society as the sphere of 
citizens living in “truth” and “dignity”. Values inside society were contrasted with the 
ambiguities of the Communist regime thus praising the former and de-legitimizing the latter. 
The moral concept referred to human rights, to the identity as humans and the inviolability of 
human dignity (Tatur 1989: 221p). As pointed out in Michnik’s essay “the new evolutionism”, 
the aim was to achieve an evolutionary extension of civic rights. The way toward this goal 
was to “be constantly and incessantly visible in public life” rather than to act in hiding, and to 
“formulate alternative programs” (Michnik 1985 cit. in Matynia 2001: 921). The strikes at the 
Gdansk shipyards in December 1970 and strikes in Ursus and Radom in June 1976 finally 
resulted in the establishment of the “Workers Defense Committee” (KOR) in 1976, whose 
foundation marked an alliance of intellectuals and workers. After further nation-wide strikes in 
1980s the trade union Solidarity was founded by Lech Walęsa in Gdansk. Additionally, 
several other forbidden civic organizations as well as a vibrant zamisdat underground 
publication sprang up. What evolved was an “infrastructure of organizations that facilitated 
political group interaction” (Fehr 1996: 107, own translation).  
Finally, the oppositional trade union Solidarity and the regime reached an agreement that 
legalized the union in August 1980s. Moreover, the regime recognized Solidarity as 
representative of society, thus giving up its claim to best represent the interest of the people 
(Morawski 1992: 99). The subsequent 16 months marked a period of lively citizen’s activities 
under the banner of Solidarity that filled the “social vacuum” (Matynia 2001: 927). Besides 
the workers’ committees, these initiatives included debating societies (e.g. DiP (Experience 
and Future)), expert councils, a “workers university”, human rights organizations, 
independent journals and even a center for social studies conducting among others opinion 
surveys (OBS) (Fehr 1996:88pp).121 Preserving the name of a union, the movement united 
several different initiatives concerned not only with labor issues but also with culture, 
education, publication, and with the advancement of a “self-administrated republic”. This 
concept fully developed in summer 1981 partly in response to the delaying tactics of the 
government. It marked a programmatic shift away from previous doctrine of the “anti-political” 
trade union and the “self-limiting revolution” that was until then seen as a warrant for stability 
and autonomy (Tatur 1989: 125pp). The concept stressed the importance of active citizens, 
121 The author refrains from a detailed description of the story of Solidarność and instead points to 
the numerous excellent studies on the foundation and history of the movement: e.g. Staniszkis (1984), 
Tatur (1989), Thaa (1996: 255-271), Fehr (1996: 88-111), Matynia (2001), Carpenter (1999), 
Pelczynski (1988).  
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and proclaimed the self-administration of society, i.e. the (re-)establishment of classical 
institutions of public life, resulting in a “reformation from below” and the construction of a 
social infrastructure “from below”.122  
The period of “publicity” and legalization of citizens’ activities came to an abrupt end with the 
establishment of martial law in 1982. The subsequent years were marked by underground 
activities kept alive by informal groups and social networks. Particularly important in this 
underground period were the survival of the independent publication activities and the circle 
of politically active intellectuals that nurtured a language of pragmatism and mediation and 
slowly worked toward a political dialogue with the authorities (Fehr 1996: 98pp).  
With Perestroika and Glasnost, liberalization also advanced in Poland. Although single 
liberalization measures were already taken in the middle of the 1980s,123 the years 
1987/1988 are usually regarded as the liberalization period in Poland (see e.g. Staniszkis 
1991: 7; Fehr 1996: 111). In these years, several civic initiatives such as political clubs, 
economic student societies, or local environmental initiatives sprang up.124 The numerous 
organizations and clubs operated under the heading of Solidarity, shared the moral concepts 
of the oppositional movement, and were partly inspired by 1980/81. However, it has been 
convincingly argued that they had an independent organizational structure and developed a 
distinct style of action and discourse (Fehr 1996: 153).  
The legacies of Solidarity 
The question now is the extent to which the history of civic initiatives independent from the 
state nurtured an “ethical life” or civic culture of tolerance and trust that has been identified as 
inevitable for civil society development. It often has been argued (see e.g. Morawski 1992, 
Ekiert/Kubik 1998) that Solidarity was a nascent civil society. Several factors support this 
argument: The size of the movement that embraced one fourth of the Polish population, the 
evolving infrastructure of organizations, independent circles, and publishing houses that filled 
the “social vacuum” between private life and nation; the moral concept of civil society as well 
122 After the strategies of “revolution from below” and “reformation from above” failed in 1956 and 
1968, “reformation from below” based on an “anti-political” movement seemed to be the last available 
option. For the oppositional strategy of solidarity and the moral concept underpinning it see: Klein 
(2001: 38pp); Ogrodzinski (1995), Thaa (1996: 163pp), Fehr (1996:78pp). 
123 Examples of liberalization measures before 1987 include the legalization of local braches of the 
Polish Ecological Club (PEC) as early as 1983, the foundations act of 1984 or the amnesty act for 
political prisoners in 1985. The legalization of parts of the PEC allowed not only the development of a 
state-critical and effective environmental movement (still strong in Poland today), but  the local 
ecological clubs also functioned as a training facility of independently minded activists that supported 
underground “Solidarity” and often took local political posts after 1989 (Ekiert / Kubik 1998: 20). The 
legalization of foundations facilitated the transfer of Western financial aid to Polish oppositional 
groups, usually under the auspices of the church. 
124 See Fehr (1996: 111-154) for a detailed description and classification of these initiatives.  
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as a cultivated culture of communication and discourse on which the movement was based; 
and finally the aim to build a “self-administered republic from below” that resulted in a 
“politicization of professional competences” in different issue areas (Tatur 1989: 179 own 
translation). 
Nonetheless, the role of Solidarity in bringing about civil society has been highly disputed. 
Carpenter (1999) points out that Solidarity embraced civil society to a lesser extent than it 
drew on a strong sense of national consciousness moving it closer to a national movement 
than to civil society. The monolithic character of the movement, the tendency to suppress 
internal opposition (Carpenter 1999: 333), the “politics of unity” that referred to fundamental 
attitudes including neo-traditionalist, if not nationalist tendencies (Staniszkis 1991: 221), and 
the “fundamental heritage” (Thaa 1996: 260pp) are labeled as legacies of the Solidarity 
movement that counteract the development of civil society based on conflicting and diverging 
interests. Besides the moral concept of civil society based on civic values of society, the 
movement equally referred to and was transported by national and religious symbols. A 
romantic image of Solidarity was upheld, which equalized the movement with the unity of the 
Polish people. As a result Solidarity was based on a strong feeling of identity and unity in a 
“community of faith”, and on a strong sense of fraternity, mutual obligation and the common 
good (Carpenter 1999: 338). This strong feeling of identity maintained the unity of the 
movement, and was thus preserved as an important guarantor of its strength and power. 
However, although the monolithic character of the movement and the “myth of solidarity” 
ensured unity of the movement, mobilized the masses and was thus important to bring down 
the ruling regime, it has been identified as a major obstacle for the development of civil 
society and democracy. This is mainly for two reasons:  
Firstly, the “myth of solidarity” and the strong idealized feelings of a “community of faith” 
easily resulted in disillusionment and an “agony of myth” (Szacki 1991: 721). The romantic 
feeling of unity, the moral-cultural group identity and a “fundamental mentality” were 
especially evident in the masses of union members (Tatur 1989: 177). This “symbolic 
radicalization of the masses” highly contrasted with an increasingly pragmatic stance of the 
oppositional elite that continuously worked at the end of the 1980s toward a settlement with 
the communist regime (ibid). The new and old elites were united in their fear of mass 
protests.  
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Staniszkis makes the point that this new pact that aimed at the demobilization of the masses 
alienated the electorate from their leaders.125 Moreover, the “identity crisis” inside Solidarity 
that brought divergent viewpoints to the fore and triggered the split inside the movement 
further disillusioned the masses that strongly believed in a united front (Staniszkis 1991: 
215). Especially the “war at the top” evolving between the political leaders at the beginning of 
the 1990s had this effect. The outcome is a surprising and unanticipated passivity evident in 
Poland after the first elections, a phenomenon Staniszkis (1991: 221) compared with “a new 
social vacuum”.  
Secondly, the idealized image of society on which Solidarity was based cemented the deep 
state-society divide. The image of a community of the “better” standing in sharp contrast to 
politics and the state as a realm of corruption and illegitimacy resulted in distrust and 
disguise of politics and the state. Additionally, the corporate character of the movement 
prevented a differentiation of interests despite the variety of divergent sub-groups that united 
under the roof of Solidarity: …”Illegal civil society … was diversified but also strongly unified 
by a common umbrella (the myth of solidarity)” (Ekiert/Kubik 1998: 20). The result was an 
administrative structure outside of and paralleling the state.126 Elzbieta Matynia (2001: 928p) 
points out that what developed was  
“… a highly mobilized polity that shadowed the state, creating its own authorities, 
experts, and domains of competence. …. Solidarity did not work against the regime in 
most cases, but rather in spite of the regime, or simply aside from the regime.”  
Even the whole movement can be taken as a substitute for the state: Carpenter (1999: 341) 
makes the point: ”Solidarity in effect took on the Party’s function of having a monopoly on 
public representation.“  
125 It is worthwhile to note that Staniszkis assessment of the form the transition took, thus what has 
been called the “mode of transition” (Karl/Schmitter 1995) is rather different than the assessment of 
others. Karl and Schmitter (1995) regard a pacted transition as a promising start for democratization 
and pose the hypothesis that a pact will support the consolidation of democracy. It is not the time and 
place here to delve deeper into the question what “legacies” are to be expected by the mode of 
transition. However, one may risk the suggestion that a pacted transition contributes to the stabilization 
of new political institutions, but may amper the emergence of civil society. This is due to two factors. 
Firstly, a pacted transition may be followed by “a new social vacuum” (Stanizkis 1991) as a result of 
the disillusionment of the mass population, as was the case in Poland. Secondly, a pact leads to the 
“decapitation of the oppositional elites by success” and thus demobilizes the emergent civil society of 
the liberalization phase for the simple reason that it deprives civil society of its leaders (Bernhard 
1996: 323). This effect may be short-term, which was the case in Poland, because Solidarity members 
of the middle ranks and people activated by solidarity ‘s civic committees quickly filled the gaps.  
126 It is worthwhile to note that the paralleling of state structures in Poland already had its roots in 
the time of partitions: “…. during the partitions the society demonstrated that it was capable of 
enduring for more than one hundred years without its own state, thanks to unity of culture, religion, 
and language. As a consequence, informal institutions ensured the continuity of the social bond. This 
made it possible in the 1970s to articulate the notion of a “substitute society”, a self-organizing society 
that was supposed to take over the functions of the state” (Staniszkis 1991: 182). 
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7.1.2 Summary: Preconditions of Civil Society in Poland 
So what conclusion is to be drawn from the legacies of the communist regime, and the 
oppositional movement? It has been argued above (chapter 2) that civil society needs to be 
enshrined in a civic culture and certain values of tolerance and trust. This culture is, however, 
not the one of a community of faith inspired by a common public good or a corporatist ideal, 
for which each individual is willing to sacrifice him or herself. Rather it is a culture of a society 
of “modular men” (Gellner 1995) with different interests and desires who tolerate and trust 
their (unknown) fellow citizens thus respecting their different interests. Tolerance in the other 
becomes possible as each member of society trusts the other to equally comply with the 
same set of rules. This is the very “clue” that allows for compromise, conflict-resolution and a 
peaceful co-existence. Civil society is thus pluralistic and is based on Sittlichkeit or an 
“ethical life” and relies on institutional rules provided by the state. In this sense the legacies 
determining post-communism in Poland - the passivity, the distrust in others, and the 
negative image of the state - are all heritages that severely weaken the prospects for a re-
emergence of civil society (see chapter 2.3.).  
Moreover, although the oppositional movement drew on an enlightened concept of civil 
society and triggered values of solidarity and trust, Solidarity did not automatically provide a 
fertile ground for civil society development. Rather it preserved an image of civil society that 
is not compatible with a liberal concept of civil society based on the recognition of divergent 
interests. Civil society was seen as a “community of equals” whereby equals are not 
understood as citizens holding equal rights but as a collective of people with equal economic 
status, viewpoints and religious and national feelings. Secondly, civil society is not perceived 
as a sphere holding a symbiotic relationship with the state, rather as a sphere ‘without’ the 
state, paralleling state structures. In addition, the moral image on which the movement was 
based preserved an image of civil society as the realm of the “equal” and “benevolent” that 
contrasts with the concept of civil society as a sphere of contesting and competing interests. 
This moral image of civil society cements the state-society divide and the deep distrust of 
both the state and anything ‘political’ and quickly triggered disillusionment and alienation 
once the movement split. 
Nevertheless, Solidarity did make a change. The mobilization taking place on a mass scale, 
especially in 1981/82 broke through the passivity and incapability to mobilize prevalent in 
communist societies - An experience that was preserved in society’s memory. Marcin Krol 
made the point:  
“The effects of solidarity are not only that there had been the time (of legality), but 
the results of it, that is the participation of a large number of people in public life and the 
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development of a political consciousness of these people” (Marcin Krol cit in. Fehr 
1996: 120 own translation). 
It has been rightly stated that the developing infrastructure of divergent social groups and 
initiatives were united under the roof of Solidarity. The same holds true for the conceptual 
approaches of different professional groups to create a “self-administrating republic”. 
However, concepts and ideas have been developed in various issue areas, be it 
environment, regional and local democracy, education or culture. Furthermore, distinctive 
organizations and networks striving for the fulfillment of these ideas developed that assumed 
the role of intermediary organizations filling the “social vacuum” (Fehr 1996: 114). The variety 
of organizations in existence thus contributed to the differentiation of the public sphere and 
laid the ground for differentiated social representation (ibid: 154). Moreover, a substantial 
basis of political, local and professional leaders and activists has been formed who were able 
and willing to build up civil society after 1989. These are cultural, institutional, and in 
particular personnel assets other post-communist societies did not possess and from which 
civil society in Poland could profit.  
The following section will demonstrate the extent to which the cultural legacies outlined 
above shape the development of civil society after transition.  
7.2 Ten Years After – The Reemerging Civil Society in Poland 
I now turn to an assessment of the development of civil society in Poland in the period of 
roughly 13 years after transition. The analysis follows the indicators of the structural and the 
cultural dimension identified in chapter two. The section thus firstly portrays the pluralism and 
inclusiveness of civil society by focusing upon the mere number of non-governmental 
organizations, the composition and regional dispersion of associational life.127 Secondly, the 
section aims to focus upon the cultural dimension of civil society by focusing on three 
indicators: (1) the willingness of citizens to participate in civic initiatives; (2) the relationship 
between state authorities and people active in civil society organizations; and (3) the 
relationship among civil society organizations. It will be evident in the following that in the 
period of investigation civil society advanced on the structural and the cultural dimension. 
However, the legacy of a state-society divide as well as distrust towards federations and 
umbrella organizations can still be felt.  
127 The analysis greatly profits from three independent studies on NGOs in Poland: The Klon/Jawor 
surveys, the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, and the DPP survey (see chapter 
5.4.). 
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7.2.1 Quantity of Non-Governmental Organizations  
After the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, Poland experienced a fast and steady 
increase in non-governmental organizations, while the years between 1989 and 1993 
marked a “rebirth period” with the most dynamic growth (Leś et al 2000: 21). Leś et al (2000: 
12) estimate that there were approximately 50,300 active NGOs in Poland in 1997 and 
assume that 85% of the registered organizations are actually active. Based on a comparison 
of different sources, Klon/Jawor come up with a more pessimistic estimation. They risk the 
statement that at the end of 1994 about 18,500 foundations and associations were actively 
operating in Poland in contrast to 48,000 officially registered organization (BORDO 1998: 
54).128 The vast majority of the organizations (about 85%) have been founded after 1989 
(ibid). Many organizations that had been active in the communist period ceased to exist. 
Others “depoliticized”, thus reformed their programs and structures or returned to the 
programs maintained before the communist centralization.129 A comparative survey 
conducted by Johns Hopkins University assesses the size of non-profit non-governmental 
activity in terms of employment rather than actual numbers. According to their findings, the 
Polish nonprofit sector accounts for 1 % of non-agricultural paid labor and is thus about the 
same size than other non-profit sectors in CEE. For comparison, the equivalent average of 
Western Europe is 7% (Leś et al 1999: 331). 
128 The difference in the figures is partly due to differing report years and partly to different 
definitions applied. Leś et al employ an encompassing understanding of “nonprofits” including any type 
of associations and foundations, including voluntary fire brigades, plus labor unions, professional, 
business and employers’ organizations, church-based social institutions and political parties in line 
with the definition of the Johns Hopkins nonprofit project. In contrast Klon/Jawor focuses mainly on the 
legal form of associations and foundations and consequently neither on trade unions, professional 
organizations and unions of employers nor on political parties or church-based nonprofit organizations, 
as they are all three subject to other legal regulations. The difference in numbers already points out 
the unclear legal situation of non-governmental organizations that are subject to various legal 
regulations and registration procedures. A fact that impedes statistical inquiry (see Leś et al 2000: 
13pp). 
129 Examples of such organizations that reformed their statute are: the association of Polish 
Lawyers, the Polish Historical Society, the Polish Sociological Society (Kurczewska / Bojar 1995: 166). 
One should note here that several organizations existed throughout the communist period. Examples 
for organizations that were established before 1945 are: the Polish Women’s League, the Union of 
Polish State Artists, Children’s Friends Society or the Polish Red Cross (see e.g. Bordo 1998: 27). 
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7.2.2 Composition 
If one looks at the composition of associational life in Poland, two different pictures emerge 
depending on whether one takes number of organizations or employment as indicators. As 
measured by absolute numbers, most organizations in Poland in 1996/97, i.e. 51%, are 
dedicated to the provision of social services and see their primary field of activity in health 
care and social assistance. Activities related to education, family, children and youth, arts and 
culture, local and regional development, sports and recreation, environmental protection and 
human rights are further important areas of activity (BORDO 1998: 60).130 If non-
governmental activity is measured on the basis of paid employment, the relationship looks 
much different though. Like other post-communist countries the percentage of paid 
employment in Poland is assumingly the highest in organizations involved with sports and 
recreation activities, followed by education (18%) and social service provision (12%) (Central 
European average) (Anheier/Salamon 1999: 18). Anheier/Salamon (ibid) attribute the 
surprising importance of sports and recreation in the associational life of Central European 
countries, which stands in stark contrast to other world regions, to the heavy subsidization of 
such associations during the Communist era. These findings are even more interesting if the 
different areas of activity are compared with Western Europe. Whereas the three areas (1) 
unions and professional associations; (2) sports / recreation; and (3) environment/advocacy 
are more developed (in terms of paid labor) in Central than in Western Europe, the areas of 
social services, health, and education are underdeveloped in comparison to Western 
Europe.131 These figures point clearly to the old and new faces of non-state activities in CEE 
countries.  
130 One has to note that these findings of the Klon/Jawor survey correspond with the results of the 
DPP survey.  According to the DPP survey conducted in 2002/03 the largest share of NGOs is active 
in the area of social services (30%), followed by youth, culture and education (24%), decentralization / 
regional development (17%), and economic development (10%). The differences in percentage are 
due to the fact that in the Klon/Jawor survey more than one answer could be given (see appendix 8).  
131 This fact is most evident in the following numbers: one paid employee in labor unions or 
professional associations in Western Europe opposes 3.7 salaried staff in similar organizations in 
Central Europe. In recreation and sport the ratio is 1:3.5 and in environment and advocacy 1:2. In 
contrast 1 paid employee in organizations dedicated to social service provision in Central Europe 
equals 2.3 employees in Western Europe, one employed in the health protection in Central Europe 
faces 2.8 colleagues in Western Europe, and the ratio in education is still 1:1.6 (own calculation based 
on Anheier/Salamon 1999: 18).  
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On the one hand, we have a rather limited number of financially powerful organizations, 
namely sports clubs, trade unions and other social organizations that were already active 
during Communism and fall back on the assets accumulated during communist times.132 On 
the other hand, we observe a large number of newly created organizations, in Poland namely 
in the area of social service provision, but also in areas such as decentralization and 
regionalization. This majority of associations in quantitative terms, however, does not have 
salaried staff positions but largely rely on volunteers (BORDO 1998: 64). A further interesting 
result of the findings above is the oversized environment / advocacy sector. The surprisingly 
high number of paid staff in environmental and advocacy organizations, both institutional 
forms of “new social movements” that are usually not equipped with exceeding financial 
resources in Western Europe, points to the “new” features of nongovernmental activity in 
post-communist Europe. The NGO sector is not only determined by a small number of 
powerful organizations that already existed under Communism, but additionally by a small 
number of organizations, which are at least well financed and whose objectives lie in areas 
such as environmental protection, human and minority rights, development or women issues. 
These organizations who count themselves as belonging to the “Third Sector” or “the 
movement of non-governmental organizations” (Gliński 1998: 31) hold intense contacts to the 
West, are influenced by ideas and concepts previously developed in the “new social 
movements” of the West, employ mainly young people (Gliński 1998: 31), and are financially 
supported by Western sources. In line with these findings Kurczewska / Bojar (1995: 166pp) 
differentiate between organizations that adopt models, values and organizational forms that 
are rather new in the Polish society and that often refer to Western models and ideas, and 
organizations that revert to models and tradition from pre-war times. The first category 
includes ecological movements, feminist organization and advocacy organizations but also 
quickly growing private foundations such as the Foundation for the Development of 
Democracy in Poland, the Foundation for the Development of Local Communities, or the 
Cultural foundation, organizations dedicated to international and European issues, and 
moreover economic associations inspired by the possibilities of private ownership and the 
market. The other category includes organizations that existed before the war and that have 
been resurrected133 or social initiatives and organizations that refer to organizational and 
132 One has to note that the figures above refer to a country sample which Poland was not part of. 
However, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the findings equally hold true for Poland. Gliński 
points out that NGOs established during the communist period in Poland have not only a tremendous 
property at their disposal but further benefit from “access paths” to public funds, mainly in the form of 
personal and informal contacts (Gliński 1999: 12). On the other hand, “new stances” of non-
governmental activities in Poland are well-established and equipped. For more on the well-established 
environmental movement in Poland see: Gliński (1999: 20).   
133 Examples include: the Polonia, Jagiellonie, Union of Catholic Youth, League of Polish Women. 
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cultural traditions that date back to the time of the partitions134, or Polish divisions of 
international associations135 (ibid: 167).  
7.2.3 Regional Distribution 
As concerns the regional dispersion of nongovernmental organizations, the Klon/Jawor 
survey on NGOs in Poland in 1997 still noted that the activities of NGOs mainly focus upon 
large urban areas - usually former voivodship centers. The largest share of NGOs in 1997 
was located in Warsaw (29.5%), followed by Krakow (6.7%), Gdansk (5.8%) and Katowice 
(5.7%) (BORDO 1998: 57p). Moreover, NGOs existed only in 54% of all gminy, the lowest 
level of the territorial organization of Poland (Chimiak 2000: 466). However, in recent years a 
shift to the regional and local level is observable. Especially, the territorial reform of 1999 that 
enhanced the process of territorial decentralization in Poland and included a county level is 
assumed to provide a possible impetus for NGO development (Kuti 1999: 54, Leś et al 2000: 
22). The Klon / Jawor survey on NGOs of the year 2000 thus notes a lower territorial 
concentration than in 1997: in 2000 the number of NGOs registered in Warsaw sank to 
20%.136  
7.2.4 Civic Participation and Volunteerism 
If one turns to the cultural dimension of civil society one must first note that civil participation 
in Poland is still relatively low, but rising. According to Gliński (1999: 9), civil participation in 
Poland measured by membership in non-governmental organizations, increased from 5.5% 
of the population in 1990 to 13.7% in 1995 and 16% in 1997. Despite these optimistic figures, 
evidence suggests that organizational membership is exceptionally low in Poland in 
comparison with other post-communist countries (Howard 2003: 58). One further has to 
stress the point that passivity and a disbelief in the ability of NGOs persist in the Polish 
population. According to opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology 
Polish Academy of Science (IfiS PAN) in 1992, 1995 and 1999, more than 50% of the 
respondents each time declared that no existing civic organization represented their interests 
and roughly the same percentage wanted new organizations to emerge, which 51% (1995) 
are in turn willing to join (Leś et al 2000: 21, Gliński 1999: 9). Gliński concludes that there is a 
134 Examples include: Society of the Friends of the Małopolska Land, Wielkopolan Society, Friends 
of the Mazowiecki Land, Unions of Silesians, Kaszuby Peoples, People of Podhale. 
135 Examples include: Lions Club, Red Cross Club, Rotary Club, Zonta , Soroptmist, YMCA. 
136 Quoted from the working document of the fifth meeting of the EU-Poland Joint Consultative 
Committee, Warsaw, May 13th-14th 2002 on “NGO Sector in Poland and its Role in the Process of 
Accession into the European Union”. 
www.esc.eu.int/pages/Enlarg/ccm/pologne/meeting5_13_05_02/di_ces47_2002_di_en_original_.pdf 
 158
substantial potential for civil activity in Poland, yet he has to admit that citizens do not place 
trust in the effectiveness of citizen’s activities. Over 76% of Poles claim that socially active 
people can achieve little or nothing (CBOS 1998 cit in: Gliński 1999: 10). Paternalism and a 
lack of faith in participatory mechanisms thus continue to be a disease of post-communist 
Poland. A further indicator for civic participation is the willingness of citizens to support NGOs 
as volunteers. Especially in Poland where the situation of NGOs is marked by a lack of 
financial resources, volunteerism is an important factor for many NGOs to sustain their 
activities (Wygnanski 1997: 94, Leś et al 2000: 17)). According to Leś et al (1999: 328), 16% 
of the adult population contributes time to non-governmental organizations. This figure is 
relatively low if compared with the “world” average of volunteerism derived from 22 countries 
that equals 28% (Anheier/Salamon 1999: 10). Moreover, volunteerism in Poland is also 
slightly lower than in other Central European countries (ibid: 329). One has to note, however, 
that the picture looks different if religious institutions are included. In this case 25% of the 
adult population volunteers (ibid: 328). This fact demonstrates that the lack of volunteerism, 
which has been identified as one major obstacle to NGO development (Regulska 1999: 63), 
does not equally apply to all NGOs. In particular non-governmental organization that already 
existed under communism, usually referred to as “social organizations” in Poland, have 
difficulties in recruiting volunteers (ibid). Since “volunteerism” had been imposed on the 
people from above during Communist times, the willingness to contribute to these 
organizations sank to a low. People are more willing to contribute to small and newly 
established organizations especially in charity. In the year 2000 87% of NGOs reported that 
they utilize the services of volunteers (Klon/Jawor data cit. in USAID 2001: 121). 
7.2.5 Relationship between Non-Governmental Organizations and State 
Authorities 
With regard to the relationship between non-governmental organizations and state 
authorities, one can note that a distorted relationship between civil society and the state is 
still apparent in Poland. This problematic relationship is grounded in attitudes and convictions 
prevailing in civil society organizations as much as in an ambiguous state policy and a 
lacking political will of the governing elite. 
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 Leś et al (2000: 19) make the point that the strong awareness of a social identity that is 
separate and independent from the state and grounded in the experiences with Solidarity and 
further cultivated by the disillusionment with the Solidarity elite that “changed sides” is still 
alive among civil society activists.137 One could argue that middle rank Solidarity leaders 
preserved the “myth of Solidarity” and the moral concept on which Solidarity has been based 
inside organizations of civil society.138 However, as Piotr Gliński points out, the young 
generation that has been influenced little by the experience of Solidarity also sees political 
elites and politics in a decisively negative light: ”The stereotype of rejecting politics as 
something dirty and immoral is still rife” (Gliński 1998: 33). Gliński thus sees the hypothesis 
of A. Rychard confirmed that “… Polish social life is very specifically removed from the field 
of politics” (cit. in ibid). The distrust of politicians and political parties has also been revealed 
by the DPP survey on NGOs in Poland. The majority of NGOs (79%) report that they have no 
relations with political parties. Moreover, the largest share of them (70%, 55% of total) does 
not regard such relations as important. The ones that hold contacts to political parties largely 
assess them as less important (33% of the ones with contact, 14% of total) (see appendix 8, 
table 26, question 10). On top of that, the question on major problems of NGOs reveals the 
big frustration with the government among Polish NGOs. 71% of Polish NGOs judge lacking 
governmental support as very problematic. The lack of governmental support thus ranks as 
the second pressing problem of Polish NGOs directly behind the lack of financial sources. A 
deficient cooperation among NGOs and state authorities is further regarded as a point of 
concern (see ibid, question 12).  
Whereas activists of civil society seem to regard politics as dirty and the state as superfluous, 
state authorities and political elites in contrast consider organizations of civil society to be 
unwelcome and unnecessary competitors. A political will by the political elites to stimulate 
civil society development is as much lacking as an understanding for the purpose of 
intermediary organizations. 
137 This judgment has been confirmed by interviews conducted by the author. The disillusionment 
with politics as much as with the new political elites is also due to the fact that many civil society 
organizations were founded by people that had been active in the civic committees of Solidarność. 
These committees whose major purpose was to mobilize voters for the first election were dissolved by 
Walęsa after this aim had been achieved. This practice cause tremendous frustration among people 
involved. One could argue that a split occurred between the Solidarity activists that dedicated their 
time to civil society organizations and those that went into politics whereby the latter have been 
perceived by the former as “giving up their ideals”.   
138 The preservation of the moral myth of Solidarność inside civil society organizations is evident in 
statements such as the following : “In a difficult situation of the country’s transformation, we represent 
environments and places, where the meaning of human life is regained” (Statement of the Regional 
Forum of Non-governmental Organizations in Poznań April 1995 cit. in Asocjacje 
www.ml.com.pl/asocjacje/217.htm). 
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“Generally speaking the Polish political class does not understand the importance of 
the non-governmental sector in the new democratic states; it tries to control it and is 
not interested in its development, although there are some exceptions, mainly amongst 
the politicians of the Freedom Union” (Gliński 1998: 39).  
Rather than stimulating and deliberately constructing intermediary organizations and non-
governmental service providers through the provision of incentives, specific opportunity 
structures, or a suitable infrastructure, state policies are ambiguous and often destructive to 
civil society development.139 Formal structures ensuring communication with NGO 
representatives exist, but they are not supported by a coherent and clear state policy. In June 
1993 the Bureau for the Cooperation with Non-governmental Organizations was along with 
the Ministry of Employment and Social Policy. Having just started its operations it was 
already closed in January 1994 subsequent to a change in government.140 In 1997 a 
plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister to Co-operation with NGOs, Minister Zbigniew Wozniak, 
was brought into office. In 1998 he appointed a working group consisting of leaders of NGOs, 
representatives of the government and experts that aimed to prepare the principles of reform 
and met for the first and only time in May 1998.141 The position of plenipotentiary of the 
Prime Minister was, however, again closed in March 1999. Several ministries, including the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Policy, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources, 
and Forestry put the question of NGO development on their organizational agenda. However, 
with the exception of the Ministry of Environment protection that had been involved in regular 
and growingly intense working contacts and informational exchange with environmental 
NGOs since 1991, most ministerial activities in this area remain poor and are restricted to the 
drafting of purposive statements and ineffectual meetings (Gliński 1999: 19). In sum, the 
various formal structures created with the stated aim to establish institutionalized forms of 
cooperation and consultation between civil society organizations and state authorities hardly 
fulfilled their purpose. Throughout the years no constructive and coherent state policy to 
support civil society organizations existed. As a result, progress in legislative issues 
concerning NGO operations has long been postponed, leaving the legal framework that 
regulated the operations of nongovernmental organizations throughout the 1990s as 
ambiguous, inaccurate and insufficient.142 In the words of Zbigniew Lasocik, a Polish NGO 
activist:  
139 See e.g. Regulska (1998: 45), Leś et al (1999: 333), Lasocik (2000).  
140 See Asocjacje: Polish NGO Review – History of the Third Sector 1989-1999. 
wwww.ml.com.pl/asocjacje/215.htm. 
141 See Asocjacje www.ml.com.pl/asocjacje/2191.htm and /2192.htm.  
142 see e.g. Lasocik (2000), Regulska (1999: 67), Regulska (1998: 45), Gliński (1999: 8), 
Wygnanski (2000), Leś et al (1999: 333). 
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“It must be noted that the Polish legal system fails to fully implement the 
constitutional principle of freedom of association. Numerous lacunae can be found in 
our provisional regulations: some fundamental definitions are lacking; some solutions 
negate the principle of impartiality of the registering bodies; and freedom of association 
is unjustly limited through some faulty solutions“ (Lasocik 2000: 6). 
Gliński (1999: 18) thus jumps to the conclusion that state authorities continue to treat civil 
society organizations according to customs and procedures inherited from the socialist times. 
More often than not, informal and personal are more important than institutionalized and 
legalized principles and rules. In this way, clientelism and corruption is common practice 
especially on the local level.  
Despite everything stated above, one nonetheless has to note that changes in attitude are 
visible and that progresses in diminishing the state-society divide is in sight. Firstly, despite 
the incoherent governmental policy on NGOs and regardless of the repeatedly changing 
administrative structures in charge of NGOs there has been an on-going, although 
sometimes conflictual, communication process between government and NGOs. Secondly, in 
2003 an agreement has been reached on new legislation regulating the relationship between 
civil society organizations and state authorities. Finally, one should add that the legislative 
process was marked by an ongoing although often interrupted process of consultation 
between representatives of civil society organizations and the government through which 
NGO activists were included in the decision making process (see in detail chapter 7.4). 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that the relationship between NGOs and state authorities 
is improving especially on the local level. Although it is still true that only 1/3 of NGO received 
local authority funding in 1996 (Gliński 1999: 23) and that the cooperation between local 
authorities and NGOs is especially low in the field of social services,143 signs are visible in 
recent years that a constructive relationship between local authorities and NGOs is 
developing (Regulska 1998: 64). As the studies conducted by Klon/Jawor indicate, NGOs 
label local authorities as their prime cooperation partner and this cooperation has been 
consolidated over the years of the survey and is increasingly perceived as important 
(BORDO 1998: 49).144 Additionally, triggered by operations of so-called “NGO support 
centers” and “infrastructural NGOs” (see chapter 7.4.), several local co-operations programs 
have been introduced as e.g. in Gdynia and in Gdańsk in 1995 (Gliński 1999: 22).  
143 This is evident in the following figures: In 1999 only 8% of all counties (powiats) contracted 
social services out to NGOs while another 12 % offered grants (Leś et al 2000: 22). 
144 This fact has also been confirmed by the DPP survey (see appendix 8, table 26, question 10). 
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7.2.6 Relationships Among NGOs and Inside Civil Society 
The remaining question of this section points to the relationships prevalent inside civil 
society, i.e. relationships between various civil society organizations. The image of “one 
sector” to which activists of certain advocacy NGOs like to refer obliterates the fact that civil 
society consists of a variety of different organizations with divergent interests. As outlined 
above, in Poland NGOs are active in various issue areas, be it labor issues, social services, 
health, education, culture, decentralization, environment or human rights. One can note that 
no evidence points to exclusionary animosities between the various groups that result in the 
preservation rather than a “cross-cutting” of cleavages within society. Nonetheless, I want to 
highlight two points referring to relationships among civil society groups. Firstly, in Poland 
distrust toward umbrella organizations and federations aiming to join forces of NGOs is 
observable (see e.g. Wejcman 1999). This distrust is largely attributable to the “negative 
associational freedom” described above (see chapter 2.3.). Umbrella organizations remind 
NGO activists too much of communist times (see in greater detail chapter 7.4.). Secondly, 
tensions inside civil society do not run along the lines of divergent interests, such as the 
interests of labor and capital, but additionally are apparent between what has been called 
above the “old” and the “new” stances of civil society organizations. Although transmission 
belt organizations of the former regime adapted to the new democratic system and truly 
reformed themselves (Bernhard 1996: 324), newly established organizations with a Western 
outlook often distrust those organizations. Such is the case for example between the two 
main federations of trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ. Although both have similar interests 
as representatives of workers, and notwithstanding the fact that branches of both already 
cooperate on company level, political cooperation was unthinkable for a long time.  
7.2.7 Summary  
To conclude, ten years after transition a re-emerging civil society is visible in Poland. Some 
even call the NGO sector in Poland the “most robust in Central and Eastern Europe” (USAID 
2001: 126). Numerous civil society organizations sprang up in a variety of issue areas, thus 
constituting a substantial and vibrant sector of NGO activity. Having said this, civil society in 
Poland still suffers from cultural legacies inherited from the communist past. The sector is 
characterized by “old” and “new” organizations, whereby the “old” features of the NGO sector 
in Poland have money and informal networks to administrative personnel, whereas the “new” 
strand has the youth, volunteers and Western support. Organizational membership and 
volunteerism is still low due to prevalent passivity and a lack of faith in participatory 
mechanisms. Civil society activists regard politics and politicians as something dirty; 
politicians in contrast regard NGOs as unnecessary competitors. A coherent state policy that 
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aims to stimulate civic participation and self-organization has long been lacking. In this 
regard, the legacy of a state-society divide lives on. In addition, ties inside civil society are 
largely based on informal and personal contacts. 
Having said all this, one still must mention that there is a visible advancement of civil society 
on the structural as well as on the cultural dimension. Statistical material depicts that not only 
the numbers of organizations but also civic participation and voluntarism are rising over the 
years. In addition, a small but very active circle of individuals and organizations exist, which 
see their purpose in the advancement of “the Third Sector”. Moreover, the year-long battle 
between activists of NGOs and governmental representatives ended with a final agreement 
on new legislation in 2003 that is regarded by both sides as favorable to civil society 
development. Additionally, on the local level signs of an evolving cooperation between local 
authorities and NGOs are also visible. The question now is: to what extent are these positive 
changes in the structural and in the cultural dimension of civil society attributable to Western 
assistance and support? In a first step to answer this question, I now summarize Western 
support to civil society in Poland in the 1990s.  
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7.3 The External Push – Forms and Types of Civil Society 
Assistance in Poland  
As already stated, it is not the purpose of the case studies to compare donors, their activities 
and strategies. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of civil society assistance in Poland, 
understood in line with most donors as assistance to “Third Sector” NGOs (see chap. 4.5)145 
is indispensable. Based on the proceeding account of the programs and projects of major 
donors (chap. 6) and the strategies and concepts applied (chap. 4), this section aims to 
illustrate the external assistance to Polish civil society in the period under investigation.146 
What kind and quantity of assistance has been donated, to whom, when and how? The 
chapter will approach this question by providing a chronological account of civil society 
assistance. It will be argued that civil society assistance came in sequences, in which roughly 
three time periods can be distinguished: the initial period of assistance from 1989 to 1993, a 
period of intensive support from 1994 to 1998, and a period of donor withdrawal starting at 
the end of the 1990s. In each period the chapter focuses on the aim, type and strategy of 
Western assistance. Before this is done, however, civil society assistance is approached in 
quantitative terms. 
145 The equation of civil society assistance with NGO assistance is also evident in the Polish case: 
The evaluation of the NGO support program of the Stefan Batory Foundation points out: “…(the 
foundation’s) understanding of ‘civil society’ includes an institutional concept of the civic sphere…. The 
Foundation turns its strategic look towards civic activities that have already obtained an institutional 
form.” (Open Society Institute 2000: 10). The basic objective of the Phare Civic Dialogue Program was 
to “provide support for civil society by means of help for NGOs that are recognized to be the 
manifestation of civic activity and the inevitable part of any modern democratic society” (Mendza-
Drozd 2000: 31). 
146 In line with the account given in chapter six, the following is based on an analysis of the 
activities of some chosen large donors: the EU, USA, Germany, and the Stefan Batory Foundation 
(founded by George Soros).   
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7.3.1 The Quantity of Civil Society Assistance – A Minor Financial Item  
One has to note that Poland was by far the principal beneficiary of Western attention among 
the CEE countries. The head start in democratization, the prominence of the Solidarity 
movement, and not least the large immigrant populations abroad translated into huge public 
and private Western commitments (Wedel 1998: 205, Quigley 1997: 46).147 
However, if the available data is explored in greater detail one realizes quickly that the major 
share of aid went to economic restructuring, privatization and to infrastructural measures 
(see appendix 2). Civil society assistance is a minor financial item that makes up for less 
than 2% of the overall assistance granted.148 Moreover, if one focuses only upon support in 
favor of democracy, what has been called “democracy promotion and protection” (DPP), it is 
evident that donors did place less emphasis on civil society assistance in Poland than in 
other CEE countries. In Poland civil society assistance makes up for 23% of the funds 
available for the support of democracy. This is a substantial share. However, one has to note 
that the share is lower than in other CEE countries. On average, civil society received 30% of 
funds available for the support of democratization in CEE countries. In Slovakia, even 42% of 
the DPP means went to civil society assistance (see table 7). In Poland, in contrast, 
emphasis was placed on institution building (such as administrative reform, decentralization 
measures) with 49% of the means available for DPP. Also per capita Poland received less 
support to civil society than the CEE average. 1.9 Euros were spent for civil society 
assistance per Polish inhabitant. In contrast, 3.5 Euros per capita went for the support of civil 
society on the CEE average. In institution building the ratio is only 4 to 4.8 (ibid).  
147 This favored status is illustrated in the following numbers: Nearly half of all the commitments 
provided by the Group of Twenty-Four Industrialized Countries between 1990-1993 (16.871.7 million 
ECUs), and 45.2% i.e. 2346.8 million ECUs from the IMF went to Poland (Quigley 1997: 47). From 
1990 to 1998 Poland received 1732 million ECUs, that is 25% of all PHARE money assigned to 14 
country programs (European Commission 1998a: 92). The USA also assisted Poland with more 
financial aid than any other CEE country. Until 1996 Poland benefited from 34% of the finances 
earmarked for the SEED program. Until the year 2000 USAID spent a total of US$ 960.5 million in 
Poland via its SEED program (USAID 2000a). By contrast, the German involvement in Poland is rather 
modest. Until 1997 Poland received 11.3% of the German Transform money which translates in 181 
million DM (BMWi 1998: 23). The German political foundations spent a further 45 million until 1994 
(Quigley 1997: 124). To sum it up, especially in the first half of the 1990s Poland received more 
Western assistance than any other country. An estimated 10% of the aid consisted of grants (Wedel 
1998: 29). 
148 For example, USAID spent 1.3% of its total allocations on direct aid to NGOs (see appendix 5, 
table 11). Phare remained with an estimated 1.7% to civil society assistance below the average share 
of 2% of total Phare allocations (see appendix 3, table 6, and the European Commission 1998b: 31).  
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Table  5 Cvil Society Assistance in Relation to other Forms of DPP in Poland, Slovakia 
and CEE Average, 1990 – 2000 



























281.6 26% 3.0 80.5 25% 2.1 26.4 20% 4.9 
Institution 
Building 
451.7 41% 4.8 155.5 49% 4.0 46.9 35% 8.7 
Political 
Process 
39.6 4% 0.4 8.9 3% 0.2 4.7 3% 0.9 
TOTAL 1102.8  11.6 317.7 29%*** 8.2 133.3 12% 
*** 
24.7 
Source: Own calculations based on the database of international DPP activities conducted by 
the joint research project “Democracy Promotion and Protection in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa of the Humboldt University and the European 
University Institute.149  
*** Share of all DPP expenditures in the six CEE countries under investigation. 
                                                
149 The research project collected data on support to democratization from 17 donor countries, the 
UN, the EU and private foundations in the years 1990-1998, and is thus the most comprehensive 
databank on donor support to democratization up to date. The collected data have been classified into 
three broad categories: (1) Civil Society Strengthening (incl. assistance to democracy advocacy 
groups, human rights advocacy groups, trade unions and business associations, women’s 
organizations, organizations representing ethnic minorities, generic support for non-governmental 
organizations, media); (2) Institution Building (incl. assistance to legal and judiciary institutions, local 
governments, (public administration, legislative bodies); (3) Political Process (electoral assistance, 
political party assistance). The category “Democracy Promotion General” refers to projects or 
programs that could not clearly be put into the above categories.  In CEE the project covered the 
following countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  The data 
includes projects from the following donors: (1) nation states, such as Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA, (with Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland as minor contributors); (2) international organizations 
such as the European Union and several agencies of the United Nations System such as UNDP, ILO 
and UNESCO; and (3) political foundations such as the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), and the 
publicly funded and privately managed American National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The only 
“private” donor to contribute enough to be included in our database is the Open Society (Soros) 
Foundation – which does not exclude occasional efforts by others such as the Ford Foundation, the 
Rockefeller Fund, the MacArthur Foundation, etc (see Gbikpi 2002). 
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7.3.2 The Marriot Brigades and Some Favored Cliques: The Years 1990-
1993 
If one aims to investigate into the first years of Western assistance to Poland after regime 
change, one is well advised to risk a glimpse at the preceding decade. Unlike most other 
CEE countries, the story of Western aid to Polish civil society or non-state actors did not start 
in 1989 but long before. In the 1970s and 1980s personal contacts and ties had been 
established between Polish dissidents and the West, which Western donors were glad to use 
when they came to the country in 1989/90. In this way, civil society assistance to Poland in 
the period 1990-1993 was at least in part shaped by previous experiences.  
According to Ekiert and Kubik (1998: 18) Polish dissidents have had intense and various 
contacts with the West that became “massive” in comparison with other CEE countries 
especially at the end of the 1980s. The links to Western social scientists and journalists 
allowed Polish intellectuals to publish in the West. This helped to raise Western awareness of 
the Polish situation. Much needed financial assistance followed on the spot. Especially after 
the introduction of martial law, the foreign outposts of Solidarity, i.e. its Brussels office and 
the Committee in Support of Solidarity in New York ensured a continuous inflow of financial 
and material resources assisting the de-legalized movement. This assistance came from 
private and non-governmental sources such as trade unions, social and political 
organizations or Polish émigré organizations but also from governmental sources, especially 
from the USA (Ekiert / Kubik 1998: 19). This head-start not only in democratization but also in 
assistance provided Poland with a great advantage. Personal contacts were already in place 
on which the massive inflow of aid coming in 1989/90 could rely.  
These contacts were of special importance in the first years after transition. The Western 
willingness to assist the democratization process was enormous and financial aid came in 
fast and on a grand scale. However, little knowledge existed on how and whom to support. 
Like most others, donor agencies were largely taken by surprise by the end of the Cold War, 
which made assistance to democratization in CEE possible. Neither concepts nor strategies 
existed that helped to face the new challenge. Moreover, Western agencies had no relevant 
experience, as experience with developing aid in the Third World was not applicable. Donors 
that previously conducted democracy assistance, e. g. the German political foundations, also 
found their experience in Latin America and Southern Europe unsuitable for the Polish and in 
general the post-communist cases. Whereas in former cases structures and organizations 
had been largely in place, finding suitable partner organizations proved a major problem in 
Poland (see appendix 6). “Bridgeheads” who identified worthwhile ways to invest in Polish 
democracy were consequently much needed (Wedel 1998: 5). Polish emigrants and Poles 
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associated with the Solidarity movement played that role. Besides relying on individuals and 
on former contacts, donors focused upon the organizations largely opposed to the former 
regime: trade unions and universities. Or they concentrated on specific issues they regarded 
as important hoping that the provided publications, conferences or training would be of some 
use for the recipients. In brief, trial and error substituted a comprehensive strategy. And as 
Poland was the first CEE country to which donors moved, Poland was both a testing ground 
and learning field. Mistakes were inevitable and mistakes were made. For example, USAID 
relied in the initial period largely on short-term advisers. However, as USAID admits on its 
website:  
“The predominant emphasis on providing U.S. short-term advisors, rather than on 
the creation of sustainable institutions, weakened the longer-term impact of some 
programs.”150 
The consultants that resided in the only Western-style hotel available, the Marriot Hotel, 
became quickly known among Polish recipients as “the Marriot Brigades”. The lack of local 
knowledge and sensitivity for the Polish situation and especially the obvious gap between the 
well-suited Westerners residing in the luxurious hotel and the living conditions of the Polish 
people provoked envy and frustration more than it provided needed advice (interview 
Stanowski).  
One has to note that civil society assistance was not the major focus of Western assistance 
in the initial period. Chief emphasis was placed upon the economic transformation and on the 
reform of political institutions on the national level (see e.g. USAID 2000a: 4; Europäische 
Kommission (European Commission) 1990: 5).151 
The donors’ lack of enthusiasm for supporting NGOs however does not imply that assistance 
had not been available for civil society and civic initiatives that sprang up. One has to note, 
though, that the initial support benefited only a few organizations, namely trade unions, the 
media, scientific institutions or individual scholars. US donors in particular continued their 
support of Solidarity of previous years.  
150 Cit. from the homepage of the USAID mission to Europe, Decade of USAID assistance, 
http://www.usaid.gov/pl/decadeof.htm. 
151 The primary emphasis of donors on the economy and on national political institutions has been 
highly criticized. Regulska (1998) argues that the lack or delay of foreign assistance worked against 
civic initiatives and NGOs: “..the delayed focus on local initiatives and NGOs put them structurally in a 
disadvantaged position to negotiate space within the local community development process. Citizen’s 
initiatives and NGOS have often found themselves marginalized and in confrontation with a growing 
small business sector … and with restructured local governments that are gaining stability..” (Regulska 
1998: 44p). This assessment cannot be confirmed by the author in her interviews with Polish 
recipients. 
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The NSZZ Solidarity was one of the principal recipients of grants to non-state actors from 
both USAID and NED (see tables 11 and 13 in appendix 5). For example the NED, who also 
administered the majority of SEED funds in 1990-1991, invested 60% of its funds in trade 
union development in 1990, mainly supporting NSZZ Solidarity, and spent another 20% on 
support to Solidarity’ citizen committees, in line with the US focus upon electoral assistance. 
Only 9% of the funds went to support of civic initiatives and “the Third Sector” (see appendix 
5, table 15). The two largest German political foundations concentrated on political elites, and 
on potential “multipliers”, namely scholars and journalists. They worked together with 
universities, research institutes and in the case of the FES with trade unions. The initial 
activities aimed at the transfer of information to general topics such as social market 
economy, democracy and pluralism. Moreover, the German political foundations 
concentrated on specific issue areas such as decentralization in the case of the KAS and 
regional development and trade union development in the case of the FES (see appendix 6, 
portray 12). The Stefan Batory foundation placed an initial emphasis on the support of 
science, research, education, and the media (see appendix 4, table 10+portray 8).  
However, support to civic initiatives, associations and NGOs was available and steadily 
increased starting from 1991/92. In 1991 the NED already awarded 34% of its funds for third 
-sector development (see appendix 5, table 15). Also USAID invested a substantial amount 
(7.2 million US$) between 1989 and 1994 for overall support to NGO development (USAID 
2000a: 77). In 1992 the Phare “civic-dialogue” program was launched with the major 
objective to “provide support for civic society by means of help for NGOs that are recognized 
to be the manifestation of civic activity and the inevitable part of any modern democratic 
society” (Mendza-Drozd 2000: 31). Financial aid in the form of grants, information, and legal 
services and training programs for NGOs were the three major activities carried out by the 
civic dialogue program (ibid). Here it is important to note that the dialogue program was less 
donor-driven than recipient-driven. It evolved out of a series of meetings labeled “the role of 
NGOs in a civil society” at the ministers’ council’s office.152 It was thus the Polish government 
that initiated the NGO support program as part of the Phare national program. Moreover, it 
was also the Polish side that looked into the administration of the program. The Cooperation 
Fund, a state treasury foundation established for the implementation of various aid programs 
for Poland in 1990, was in charge of the program – (see appendix 3, portray 6). Between 
1992 and 1994 3 million Euros were earmarked for the civic dialogue program, benefiting 
302 NGOs with 1.3 mio Euros (ibid: 29). Also the German political foundations and especially 
152 See Asocjacje – the Polish NGO Review, Find out about the Third Sector in Poland, History  
1991: www.ml.com.pl/asocjacje/213.htm  
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the Stefan Batory Foundation provided important initial support for the establishment of 
various NGOs.  
In sum, money was available in the first years after transition in particular and donors were 
willing to spend it. However, it was the well-known personalities of the Solidarity movement 
that easily gained access to Western resources. Contacts established before the regime 
change as well as bridgeheads that identified valuable “investment opportunities” for donors 
were decisive. Moreover, in particular governmental donors opted for large-scale funding 
providing a few organizations with excessive means, training and advice and largely 
neglecting small and local initiatives.153 As a result, the assistance mainly benefited “some 
favored cliques” (Wedel 1998).154 As will be shown (chapter 7.4.), the beneficiaries of 
assistance in this early stage were not only still in existence but also became important and 
well-known organizations in their respective fields by the end of the 1990s. One can thus 
conclude that notwithstanding trial and error and a likely waste of resources, the massive 
inflow of foreign assistance in this initial period provided an important impetus for institution 
building and supported several NGOs that subsequently contributed to the development of a 
NGO sector and the advancement of civil society.  
7.3.3 From Macro to Micro – The Donor Learning Curve: The Years 1994 - 
1998  
Civil society assistance gained momentum in 1994/95. Not only did civil society assistance 
expand in quantitative terms, but a shift from capital-based NGOs with well-known founders 
to small and local initiatives is also visible. Along with that, donors moved from “institution-
building” to “capacity-building” applying a more fine-tuned strategic approach (see chapt. 
3.4.).  
153 For example the large-scale USAID project supporting Polish NGOs in 1989-1994 equipped 
with 7.25 million US$ was largely spent for the re-establishment of the Polish YMCA providing funding 
for youth leadership to address problems of social, environmental and economic concerns (USAID 
2000a: 77 and 106). 
154 Examples of organizations enjoying this status are first and foremost the trade union NSZZ 
Solidarność. Another example is the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (FSLD), an 
organization whose major aim is to advance the territorial decentralization and local democracy in 
Poland. FSLD was a major grantee of USAID and Phare and also received assistance from all other 
donors. Another example is the Warsaw Journalism Center that had been established with USAID 
funding, or several think tanks or associations active in the economic field.  Finally, the “Institute for 
Democracy in Eastern Europe” (IDEE), the successor of the US based “Solidarity in exile” served as a 
bridge of US-American funds to Poland (see appendix 7, table 23, see also chapter 7.4.1.). 
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The funds available for civil society increased, specific programs were implemented, and the 
focus shifted from “macro to micro”155, substituting large-scale funding with small grant 
schemes. For example, between 1992 and 1998 the Cooperation Fund awarded between 
1992-1998 2.4 million Euros in 1028 grants via the Phare micro-grant schemes dedicated to 
NGO development (Civic Dialogue Program, Lien Program, Democracy Program) (see 
appendix 3, portray 6). USAID set up the Democracy Network Program (DemNet) in 1995 
with the aim of strengthening the NGO sector. Administered by an American NGO, the 
Academy for Educational Development, and equipped with a local office and local staff, 
DemNet developed and supported public policy-oriented NGOs in Poland through grants, 
training and technical assistance. In a period of three years the program distributed 1.8 Mio 
US$ to 67 NGOs for 91 projects (appendix 5, portray 10). The Stefan Batory Foundation also 
shifted its focus from education and research to NGO support. Whereas in 1992 the two 
largest shares of funds were spent in the area of science and culture with 25% and 24% of 
the budget respectively, by 1995 28% of the grant budget and thus the largest share have 
been allocated for support for NGOs. Moreover, NGOs were recipients of most of the grants 
awarded by other Foundation programs. As a result, 66% of beneficiaries were NGOs in 
1999 absorbing 77% of the total grants awarded by the Foundation (appendix 4). The 
German political foundations continued their support, but with a slight thematic shift. 
Emphasis was placed less on education and research and shifted to organizations with a 
European perspective from 1995 onwards.  
The increasing use of micro-grants ensured that smaller, less professional, and local NGOs 
also gained access to foreign funds.156 The evaluation of the Phare Democracy Program 
jumps to the conclusion:  
“… (micro-projects) have much more of a direct impact in supporting civic education 
and civic activity and in mobilising people (in Poland). The small grants enable faster 
development of NGOs which are process-oriented and membership-based” (European 
Commission 1997c: 104). 
In addition, the target of assistance broadened, although most donors continued to focus 
primarily on public policy-oriented NGOs, on NGOs active in civic education, and on activities 
of NGOs that contribute to the promotion of a pluralistic and democratic society (DemNet, the 
Phare Democracy Program, German political foundations). In contrast, the Stefan Batory 
foundation and the Phare Civic Dialogue Program had only limited restrictions concerning the 
155 “We were moving from macro to micro” that is how USAID Mission Director Donald Pressley 
described the USAID activities in civil society assistance after its arrival in 1993. Quoted in USAID 
(2000a: 28). 
156 To give an example: The Cooperation fund awarded grants in almost all of Polish voivodships 
(regions) in 1996/97. NGOs in Warsaw received 27% of the awarded grants, and over 70% of the 
awarded grants went to regional centers and local areas (see appendix 3, table 9). 
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thematic scope of supported NGO activities, although they placed special emphasis on 
activities aiming to support the NGO sector. The Batory Foundation stated broadly that it 
assisted NGOs that “are involved in the social, cultural and economic transformation 
processes” (Stefan Batory Foundation 1997: 3). The Civic Dialogue Program had no 
restrictions as to its thematic scope. Although a significant aspect was that the organizations 
cooperated with other organizations and self-governments and acquired new skills (Mendza-
Drozd 2000: 35). The DemNet program also gave up its initial focus on public policy oriented 
NGOs and shifted to local grassroots and to NGOs addressing specific topical issues or 
social problems. The program operators realized that by focusing primarily on capital-based 
NGOs active in the diffuse field of “democracy promotion”, NGOs might be built up that are 
“sophisticated and skillful at courting the Western donor community while not responding well 
to their local constituents’ needs” (USAID 1999: 12).  
Yet NGO assistance did not only gain in quantitative terms by covering a wider range of 
NGOs including the local level and focusing on thematic oriented NGOs as well, civil society 
assistance also profited with regard to the strategies and types of assistance. Donors 
became increasingly aware of the importance of indigenous processes and local 
knowledge.157 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) put the lesson learned 
as follows:  
”...reform must result from an indigenous, transparent, participatory process. 
International organizations … help catalyze the process, by bringing important 
stakeholder together and providing technical assistance and comparative 
analysis…(but) in order for an.. reform process to succeed, indigenous institutions and 
individuals must assume ownership of activities” (USAID 1999: B1). 
Training and capacity building became an important aspect of the NGO support programs. 
Thus the times of the “Marriot brigades” had passed. Instead of relying on foreign experts 
donors chose to refer to local expertise or to get involved in “train the trainer” projects that 
aimed to pass technical know-how onto Polish professional trainers. For example the Phare 
Civic Dialogue Program provided training and information services in order to enhance the 
professional standards of NGOs. In the period 1996/97 altogether 4258 NGO representatives 
had been trained in a range of subjects including management, fundraising, public relations, 
strategic development and the role of NGOs in a changing society (Cooperation Fund 1998: 
29pp). Moreover, donors increasingly relied on domestic NGOs in order to implement their 
projects. 
157 This point holds not only for civil society assistance but for assistance in general. USAID, for 
example, underwent a process of decentralization and regionalization transferring its operations from 
Washington to Poland in 1993-1995. This process went hand in hand with an increasing use of Polish 
consultants and organizations as implementers of USAID funded projects (USAID 2000a).  
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 For example, the DemNet team restricted from conducting an informational and outreach 
campaign on their own to help NGOs apply for DemNet grants. Instead they relied on a 
network of support centers, later known as SPLOT, to do so and trained the SPLOT staff in 
order to achieve this goal. The aim was not only to pass on information but also to strengthen 
local support centers (appendix 5, portray 10).  
Capacity building was further understood as “network building” between NGOs and between 
NGOs and local authorities. Moreover, the installment of an “infrastructure” of the NGO 
sector has been of special importance. This infrastructure consisted of “leading institutions”, 
that are local NGO support centers and a NGO representative, supported by a favorable 
legal environment. All specific NGO support programs (Civic Dialogue, Batory Foundation, 
DemNet) worked towards that goal (see chapter 7.4.).  
In sum, donors applied a more fine-tuned approach starting in 1994. The emphasis was 
shifted to micro-grants that also benefited small and local NGOs. Moreover, a wider range of 
NGOs received assistance. Along with that, donors increasingly relied on domestic 
organizations and local know-how in conducting their programs. The EU as well as USAID 
used local staff in order to manage their NGO support programs. Domestic organizations 
were also used in order to implement projects. Finally emphasis shifted from institution 
building to capacity building. Not only intensive training, but also the building of networks and 
a favorable environment for non-governmental activities became the major concern.  
7.3.4 Withdrawal of Donors and the Europeanization of Assistance: The 
End of the 1990s  
The end of the 1990s marked a further turning point in the history of Western assistance to 
civil society in Poland: Western donors were increasingly withdrawing from the scene. USAID 
ended its commitment in the year 2000 and US-based philanthropic foundations such as the 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation or the Ford Foundation that have been very active in the 
field of NGO development are shifting their focus further East. The support of the German 
political foundations continues. However, their resources are too limited to broadly support 
civil society. They instead focus upon specific issue areas such as activities related to 
European integration. The Phare Civic Dialogue program was closed at the end of 1998, 
Phare democracy, Phare Lien and Phare Partnership followed shortly after.  
Donors aim to smooth out the consequences of their withdrawal. Thereby US-American and 
European donors apply two different strategies. USAID thoroughly worked on its exit strategy 
by starting initiatives in anticipation of its departure from Poland already in 1996. In the area 
of NGO assistance the USAID exit strategy consisted of two main pillars. Firstly, major 
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emphasis was placed on ensuring the long-term sustainability of Polish NGOs. The initiatives 
and priority areas of DemNet have to be seen in this light. DemNet’s activities aim to raise 
the professionalism and public opinion on NGOs and to trigger local funding for NGOs by 
establishing “community foundations” (see appendix 5, portray 10). Professionalism, 
philanthropy and local support in contrast to state funding are thus seen as the best ways to 
ensure NGO sustainability. Secondly, USAID frequently leaves “successor organizations” 
behind that have been established by local staff of the USAID projects.158 In the case of 
DemNet the Academy for the Development of Philanthropy established in 1998 aimed to 
continue DemNet’s efforts to promote long-term sustainability of NGOs.  
In contrast to the USA, the European Union continues its support, not under the banner of 
“democracy assistance” though. Instead the EU incorporates the candidate countries into the 
common European support structure of the cohesion and structural funds. As a result the 
specific Phare NGO support programs end in 1998.159 Starting in the year 2000 Poland, like 
other EU candidate countries, is eligible for the EU’s internal support programs and the 
structural funds. NGOs are thus eligible to various support programs in the area of education 
(e.g. Leonardo, Socrates), Justice (e.g. Daphne), Research & Development, Equal 
Opportunities for Women, Health or Human Rights (see Open Society Institute 2001).160 
Moreover, in 2000 the EU launched the new program ACCESS with a budget of 20 million 
Euros for the ten accession candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe (total 
allocation for grants in Poland is 5.58 million €). ACCESS aims to support the development of 
Civil Society in these countries and replaces the Phare Lien, Democracy and Partnership 
program.  
158 Examples of such “successor” organizations are the European Institute for Democracy (evolving 
out of the USAID political party building program), or FIRMA 2000 (successor of Business Support 
Program).  
159 In 1999 Polish NGOs could still apply to some Phare projects. However, in line with the 
streamlining of Phare as a primarily pre-accession instrument, support was exclusively assigned to 
activities with a European focus. For example, Polish NGOs that engaged in joint projects with their 
local governments could apply for financial support within the Pro-European Initiatives Project (Phare 
1997) for activities related to the promotion of European integration (Mendza-Drozd 2000: 33). 
160 Whether NGOs can apply for these funds depends, however, on their government. The Polish 
state has to contribute partly to respective programs which they are not willing to do in all fields. As a 
result, NGO activist are eager to participate in the discussions preceding the EU integrations. The 
question is the subject of several working groups between NGO representatives and representatives 
of respective governments.    
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According to the European Commission “Access will support initiatives and strengthen the 
operational capacity of non-governmental and non-profit organizations through co-financing 
grants for projects of relevance to acquis implementation and to certain social need priorities” 
(cit. from http://www.access.atomnet.pl/html/guide.html) .161  
The Stefan Batory Foundation as a “local donor” seeks to ease the shift from foreign to 
domestic and European funding. To do so, it expanded its institutional grant scheme as a 
substitute for foreign funding: 
 ”The IGP (institutional grant program) fills a temporary foreign funding void. Two-
three years ago institutional grants defined as support for “statutory activities” would be 
sought from a variety of foreign donors; this diversity has decreased considerably. The 
Helsinki Foundation for human rights with grants in 1996 and 1997, matched from the 
Ford Foundation, is a perfect example: In the past, it had secure funding from foreign 
donors; only one year later, these foreign donors are leaving” (Stefan Batory 
Foundation 2000: 11). 
Moreover, the Stefan Batory Foundation supported the establishment of a Polish NGO Office 
in Brussels in 2001 to improve the communication between Poland’s NGO community, 
European NGOs and EU officials, and to ensure a better preparation of Polish NGOs for the 
membership in the EU.162  
To conclude, the section has investigated in civil society assistance in Poland over time. It 
became clear that the importance donors place on civil society has changed over the years. 
In other words, civil society assistance came in sequences. Roughly three different periods 
have been distinguished: In the years 1989/90 to 1993, donors concentrated more on 
political institutions on the national level and on political elites than on civil society. However, 
this does not mean that civil society did not receive any assistance. On the contrary, 
important financial means were available that laid the ground for non-governmental 
161 Doubts have been raised, however, whether ACCESS is suited to replace the Phare civic 
dialogue, democracy and LIEN programs. Firstly, ACCESS is “accession-driven”, i.e. its aim is to 
facilitate the adoption of the aquis communautaire in the respective countries. Along the same lines, 
the range of eligible projects is limited to certain key areas. In Poland those are environmental 
protection, socio-economic development especially the promotion of worker’s rights and social 
dialogue, and activities in the social sector (ibid). Moreover, ACCESS firstly provides macro-grants 
only. Small grant schemes similar to the previous programs that operated with micro-grants between 
3000 and 10,000 Euros were only established in 2001. Macro-grants, however, exceed by far the 
capacity of the majority of small NGOs in Poland.  
162 See: http://www.eu.ngo.pl. Since 2001 the Polish NGO Office in Brussels has been fulfilling the 
following tasks: (1) distributing information on issues important to European network NGOs and civil 
dialogue at the EU level, back to Poland for wide and rapid dissemination through Poland’s NGO 
website (www.ngo.pl) and the media; (2) bringing Poland’s Third Sector closer to the decision makers 
and participants of the European civil dialogue in the run-up to EU enlargement through provision of 
news and data; (3) bringing Poland’s NGOs into the discussions on social and political issues 
important to European network NGOs and the future development of the European Union; and (4) 
assisting in bringing Poland’s NGOs into contact with similar organizations in the 15 member states, 
as well as providing resources to host Polish interns and visitors in Brussels. 
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organizations to start their operations. However, the aid benefited mainly “some favored 
cliques” (Wedel 1998) and was often directed by contacts already established in previous 
years. Like this, organizations came into existence that shaped the subsequent development 
of civil society. Civil society assistance gained prominence in the middle of the 1990s, 
starting around 1994/95. This new emphasis did not only translate into more available funds, 
but also in the provision of a more fine-tuned and appropriate technical assistance and in a 
broadening of the range of recipients. Donors aimed to build up the capacity of NGOs. This 
implied on the one hand an advancement of professional standards and organizational 
knowledge; on the other hand, donors stressed the importance of networks, thus a 
cooperative relationship among NGOs and local authorities, and aimed to build a favorable 
“infrastructure” of the NGO sector. Finally, at the end of the 1990s we were witness to a 
withdrawal of mainly American donors which posed a major challenge to Polish NGOs. As 
illustrated above (chapter 7.2), the NGO sector in Poland is quite developed in comparison to 
the situation in 1990. However, it is far from being consolidated. The question thus is whether 
Polish NGOs manage to shift from US funds to European or domestic sources. Issues such 
as sustainability, governmental support, cooperation with local authorities and advancement 
of philanthropy rank high on the agenda of NGO activists. It is left to the next section to clarify 
the extent to which recipients of foreign assistance succeed in settling these issues.  
7.4 The Output and Outcome of Assistance – Recipients in 
Focus 
Whereas the aim of the previous section was to highlight donor activities throughout the 
1990s in Poland, the subsequent section aims to give a tentative assessment of the output 
and the outcome of the described endeavors, and thus shifts the attention from donors to 
recipients. Questions arise as to the extent to which the described efforts of donors have 
reached their aim to strengthen civil society in Poland. Did Western civil society assistance 
contribute to an increase in the quantity and plurality of organizations, and did it succeed in 
transplanting a respective cultural basis of civil society that is evident in the vertical 
relationship with government, and in horizontal relationships between NGOs (see chapter 
2.2.3.)?  
This question is even more salient with respect to the two problems of civil society 
assistance: the problem of selectivity and legitimacy. It has been pointed out that the 
selectivity of donors may not translate into a variety of non-governmental organizations and a 
classical civil society, rather a distorted and structural image of civil society evolves marked 
by a few organizations that serve donor rather than domestic needs and remain 
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disconnected to society. If this is the case, civil society assistance supports nothing more 
than a “supplementary stratum” of highly professional NGOs that will vanish once donors 
funding ends. 
This section aims to clarify whether this has been the case in Poland. In order to approach 
this question, the analysis concentrates on major beneficiaries of assistance or “main 
recipients” in line with the argumentation outlined in the methodology of this work (chapter 
5.3). The analysis thereby follows the leading research questions identified in chapter 5.3.1. 
First, what type of organizations gained Western attention? Second, are such “main 
recipients” sustainable in the long run? Third, are they embedded in local structures and 
perceived as legitimate domestic actors or as puppets of Western agencies, intruders and 
“bridgeheads of alien influence”? Fourth, are they the often-cited “multiplicators” that 
contribute to an advancement of civil society on the structural and the cultural dimension? 
And fifth, to what extent does external assistance support main recipients in fulfilling their role 
as carriers of civil society? A key question of the research is whether the outcomes of main 
recipients are owed to the peculiarities of domestic settings or whether the cooperation and 
transactions with external actors were decisive in bringing about the described results. In 
other words, to what extent did civil society assistance alter the capabilities and orientations 
of civil society actors and impacted upon social and political change by means of 
empowerment and learning?  
 
7.4.1 Types of Main Recipients 
It has been pointed out that external assistance tends to be selective in the distribution of 
civil society assistance and favors only a few organizations (see chapter 3.5.). Evidence 
suggests that this is also the case in Poland. According to the Klon/Jawor survey from 1997, 
with 17.6% of all resources available to Polish NGOs foreign funding is the second largest 
sources of financing for the nongovernmental sector in Poland in 1997 (BORDO 1998: 70). 
However, only 16% of all NGOs benefited from this important source (BORDO 1998: 67). 
Western civil society assistance thus benefits only a small segment of civil society in Poland. 
The question arises what segment of civil society has been supported and whether types of 
“typical” recipients can be identified? 
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Based on the observations of the author in Poland, three different types of “typical” recipients 
have been identified that have been labeled “democracy promoters”; “infrastructural 
organizations”, and “thematic organizations”. The organizations differ according to their 
statutory objective, their activities, and their relationship with donors.163 
Democracy Promoters:  
Donors rely on domestic NGOs as implementers of their democracy and civil society 
development projects (see chapter 3). Instead of conducting civic education, awareness- 
raising, or anti-corruption projects themselves, they sponsor a domestic NGO to do so. In this 
way, organizations are established whose only objective is the promotion of democracy and 
civil society. Examples include organizations such as “The Institute for Democracy in Eastern 
Europe” (IDEE), The Foundation for the Education of Democracy (Fundacja Edukacja dla 
Demokracji – FED), or the “Civil Society Development Foundation” (CSDF). Despite different 
backgrounds all three organizations are rather similar in terms of objective, areas of activity 
and origin.164  
The “democracy promoters” see their main objective in the promotion of democracy and civil 
society. IDEE “is committed to the development of a civic society and the enlivening of 
contacts between people actively working in non-governmental organizations …” 
(www.idee.ngo.pl). CSDF “works to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of citizen-
based initiatives in Poland and other countries of CEE” (free.ngo.pl/csdf/English.htm). Also 
FED names “the promotion of ideas about democracy and the free market economy” as its 
major objective (www.edudemo.org.pl).  
Additionally, the approach to the promotion of democracy and civil society is similar. Civic 
education and training of NGO leaders are the main area of activity. The provision of 
consultation, technical assistance and information to NGOs, or the organization of internships 
163 The following typology is based on the field research of the author in Poland. The sample 
includes examples of large recipient organizations that sometimes even directly evolved from donor 
programs and that are still visible in the Polish civil society sector today. The “main recipients” of each 
group have in common that they received assistance from at least three of the main donors covered 
by this study, i.e. the EU, American donor organizations (NED; USAID), the Stefan Batory foundation, 
and the two largest German political foundations. Additionally, the chosen NGOs are frequently 
supported by Western funds, and their budget relies to at least 30% on foreign sources (see chapter 
5.3.1). The selection was based on a systematic analysis of available project lists of the four donor 
organizations (see appendix 7) and was the result of a “snowballing process” (see in detail chapter 
5.4). Emphasis was placed here on “infrastructural NGOs” for reasons given above (see chapter 
5.3.2). As a result, one has to note that the described organizations provide no exhaustive list of “main 
recipients” but are only typical examples.  
164 The following is based on information given on the respective websites of each organization, on 
personal interviews, and on annual reports and other materials: FED (1999), IDEE (1999), CSDF 
(1997), CSDF (1999), CSDF (2000).  
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and study trips are further undertakings. CSDF thereby mainly focuses on services to NGOs 
(e.g. strategic planning processes, evaluations, trainings). FED and IDEE have a wider target 
group. FED originally provided civic education to schoolteachers, but soon included NGO 
leaders, local government members and students. IDEE founded a network between like-
minded organizations in CEE, the “Centers of Pluralism”. Both also manage projects 
supporting local press development in Poland and other countries, work with school councils 
and youth groups or organize internships and study trips for councilors of Ukraine to Poland 
(IDEE 1999: 13).  
Finally, the establishment of all three is interwoven with Western based organizations. IDEE 
is the branch of the Washington based Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, the 
successor of the exile representative of Solidarity, the “Committee in Support of Solidarity” in 
New York. FED is the outgrowth of a joint program, created by Polish and American teachers 
in 1982 as a response to the introduction of martial law in Poland that became one of the first 
grantees of the NED in 1990. Workshops in union skills organized since 1990 by trainers 
from the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) led to the creation of a team of Polish 
volunteer trainers, which then began conducting independent training courses based on the 
AFT model. Finally the Polish team established its own organizations, the FED. CSDF 
evolved out of a two-year “train the trainer” program for indigenous NGOs trainers initiated in 
Poland and Hungary in 1994. The program titled “Civil Society Development Program” was 
launched in response to a report prepared for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund on Civil Society 
Assistance in CEE that recommended the creation of indigenous teams of trainers and 
consultations (Siegel / Yancey 1992).165 The program was funded by a group of mainly 
private, US-American donors.166 
Infrastructural organizations 
Infrastructural organizations may be labeled the “second generation” of recipients. They differ 
from the previous group in that they focus less on education and more on structures. 
Moreover, they compliment the provision of services with a political perspective. The aim is to 
build an “infrastructure” for civil society organizations including not only the provision of 
165 For more information see the website of Dan Siegel and Jenny Yancey who were the founding 
Co-Directors of the Civil Society Development Program: www.newvisionsprd.org/index.html 
166 Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Stefan Batory Foundation, Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, 
Open Society Institute, Partners for International Education and Training, Phare Civic Dialogue 
Program, Phare Democracy Program, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Trust for Mutual Understanding, 
Winston Foundation for World Peace. 
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services, information and know how, but also a constructive political environment for NGOs 
including respective laws and representative structures. 167  
The most important of these infrastructural organizations in Poland are: 
• “Associations for the Forum of Non-Governmental Initiatives” (Forum Inicjatyw 
Pozarzadowych) (FIP); an NGO founded in 1996 by individual members. FIP regards 
itself as an advocate for NGOs.  
• The KLON/ JAWOR association transformed into an independent NGO in 2000 as an 
offspring of a database on NGOs in Poland of same denominator created in 1990 (then 
run by the “Regardless of Bad Weather Foundation). It provides free information on 
NGO- relevant issues with the aim of developing civil society.  
• The “Support Office for the Movement of Self-Help Initiatives” (BORIS) founded in 1992 
and “The Network of Information and Support” (SPLOT) (1995), the so called “NGO 
support centers” that support NGOs active in social welfare with the provision of training, 
information and know-how.  
• The “Working Community of Associations of Social NGOs in Poland” (WRZOS) founded 
in 2000; an umbrella organization of seven regional associations of NGOs working on 
social welfare in Poland. All in all, WRZOS represents a growing number of 280 
organizations.   
• The “Academy for the Development of Philanthropy in Poland” (Academy) founded in 
1998, a NGO that aims to advance funding possibilities for NGOs via the establishment 
of community foundations.  
Regarding their major objective and mission, the “infrastructural organizations” do not differ 
much from the “democracy promoters”. The main mission is to promote the development of 
civil society as stated with different wording in each statute.168  
167 The following is based on information given on the respective websites of each organizations, in 
personal interviews, in Wejcman (1999) and in annual reports and other materials: BORIS (2001), 
BORIS (2000), FIP (2000), FIP (1999).  
168 The organizations aim to “support broadly understood civic activity” (BORIS); “to promote the 
participation of NGOs in creating the civil society” (FIP);  “to strengthen the civil society and encourage 
citizen participation in solving social problems at local community level” (WROSZ), or to “support the 
development of civil society through rendering help to associations, foundations, support groups and 
other civil initiatives” (SPLOT).  
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However, the activities and approaches to civil society development are slightly different than 
the “democracy promoters”. On the one hand, the activities aim to support NGOs via the 
provision of services.169 On the other hand, activities aim to build an “infrastructure” for 
NGOs. Such an infrastructure embraces networks and institutionalized forms of cooperation 
among NGOs, but also a respective legal framework as well as cooperative relationships 
between NGOs and state authorities. In order to ensure such an “infrastructure”, the 
organizations engage in network building among NGOs (BORIS, FIP), lobby for legislative 
reform (FIP, representatives of KLON, BORIS, Academy), or lobby central government on 
behalf of social NGOs (WROSZ). They aim to install an NGO representative (FIP, WROSZ) 
and domestic funding possibilities for NGOs (Academy). 
One must note that the described organizations have their roots in social initiatives 
surrounding the Solidarity civic committees and are further manifestations of a strong charity 
tradition in Poland (Wejcman 1999: 19). Nonetheless, all organizations hold intensive 
contacts with Western donors, benefit from technical and financial assistance, and also 
embrace Western models and ideas. One may say that the organizations are inspired rather 
than driven by the different foreign models and templates. BORIS was founded in 1992 with 
the aim of coordinating the self-help initiatives movement. From the very beginning BORIS 
has been cooperating with the Deutsch-Polnische Verständigung e.V. (Association for 
German-Polish Understanding) sponsored by the German Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband 
(German welfare association). BORIS acted as the Polish partner of the Deutsch-Polnische 
Verständigung assisting the implementation of various training and internship activities for 
Polish social workers (program “training and twinning”) (Balon 1999: 6). Moreover, BORIS 
received start- up funding from USAID and was supported by Phare civic dialogue (appendix 
7, table 19, 23). The network SPLOT previously known under the heading ”Open Society 
Network“ received financial and technical assistance from Phare civic dialogue, the DemNet 
project of USAID, and the Batory foundation. It consists of previously established regional 
centers of social initiatives (the first one was founded already in 1989 as the “Council to 
coordinate self-help” at the regional office of the NSZZ Solidarity in Poznań).170 Western 
assistance aimed at enhancing the services of SPLOT for its members including information 
provision, standards of training etc.  
169 BORIS and the different organizations of the network SPLOT (of which BORIS is part of) 
engage in training activities, the organization of conferences, but also in consultancy. KLON/JAWOR 
compiles reports on the NGO sector in Poland and provides relevant information for NGOs via a 
special Internet platform (www.ngo.pl). WROSZ also provides services in the form of information and 
know-how to its members. FIP, too, emanates information relevant for NGOs (funding possibilities, 
conferences, legislative alterations etc.). 
170 See Asocjacje “the association supporting social initiatives” Review on the Third Sector in 
Poland; http://www.ml.com.pl/asocjacje/index-e.htm. 
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The process leading to the national representation of social NGOs WROSZ, i.e. the process 
of building regionally organized umbrella organizations and federations is modeled on the 
German system of “freie Wohlfahrtverbände” and has been accompanied and supported by 
the association Deutsch-Polnische Verständigung e.V. and regional branches of the German 
association “der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband”. The first regional association of this kind 
called WROS was founded in 1995 in Wrocław after a study visit of Polish social workers in 
Germany. From the beginning the organization received assistance from its partner 
organizations in Germany, while the major share of assistance was coming in the form of 
training and advice and less in the form of material goods and direct financial support 
(Drogoś 1999). FIP was founded in 1996 after the first national forum of Non-governmental 
initiatives was held in Warsaw in September 1996. It was founded by individual members 
including among others employees of the Civic Dialogue Program, of BORIS, and of the 
Foundation for Poland (Polish representative of the Fondation de France) (Cooperation Fund 
1998: 23; FIP 2000). Local representatives of donor organizations were thus founding 
members of FIP. Moreover, FIP can name most Western donors as their sponsors. The 
Academy is finally a direct offspring of a donor program. The Academy continues the efforts 
of the USAID DemNet project aiming to promote local philanthropy (see appendix 5, portray 
10). The local staff and their know-how have still been ensuring that the Academy remains 
embedded in local structures. The director Pawel Łukasiak is the former president of BORIS 
and well known in the NGO community. The Academy’s endeavors are joint ventures with 
FIP and the Batory Foundation. Moreover, it received some further funding from USAID. This 
little summary depicts that the described organizations hold frequent personal and informal 
contacts. What evolves is an informal network of recipients and locally active donors.  
Thematic Organizations 
Although they have a certain preference in this respective, donors do not only sponsor 
advocacy NGOs or NGOs that regard the promotion of democracy and civil society as their 
main statutory goal. NGOs with specific thematic objectives are also “main recipients” that 
benefit from donor funding. One has to note, however, that some topics receive more 
Western attention than others. A fact revealed by the survey of KLON /JAWOR (see table 6). 
According to this survey, NGOs active in the area of “state, law, politics”, “human rights”, 
“education” the “mass media”, “family/children/youth”, “religion”, “social issues”, 
“decentralization”, and “environment” relied more frequently on foreign resources than the 
average of NGOs in Poland. 
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Table  6 NGOs Relying Partially on Foreign Funds by Core Area of Activity in Poland 1994 
Area of activity Declared as core activity in 
1994 in % 
% of organizations using 
foreign funds 
Total of NGOs  16 
State, law, politics 3.8 28 
Human rights 6.3 24 
Education 40.9 20 
Mass media 7.3 19 




Social assistance 29.6 17 
Health 21.4 17 
Regional Development 16.7 16 
Ecology 23.6 16 
Science 11.2 14 
Rural areas / 
decentralization 
3.6 13 
Economy 10 13 
Hobby 7.4 11 
Sports 13.5 11 
Arts, culture 29.4 11 
Construction 2.5 11 
Professional groups 6.4 8 
Communication 2 7 
Public safety  1.5 6 
Source: Survey of Klon/Jawor 1994 published in BORDO 1998: 44, 32 
Note: More than one answer is possible 
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Examples for such thematically oriented “main recipients” are the “Helsinki Foundation of 
Human Rights” (HFHR), “The Foundation in Support for Local Democracy” (FSLD) but also 
various think tanks such as the “Institute for Public Affairs” (ISP, Instytut Spraw Publicznych) 
or the “Institute for International Relations” (CIM).171 
The named organizations are active in different issue areas and strive for different 
objectives.172  
One has to note that the mentioned organizations are rather different with regard to statutory 
objectives and major activities. Nevertheless, three combining characteristics can be 
highlighted. First, the briefly described organizations did profit from an early start and early 
Western support. By the year 2000 they are well-known and reputable organizations with a 
substantial budget and a high number of paid staff that shape the development of their 
specific thematic fields.173 Second, all of the organizations are affiliated with prominent 
personalities from politics and (social) science with international contacts and reputation.174 
This fact facilitated the access to financial resources at least as much as the specific 
thematic orientation. And finally, one has to note that all of the covered organizations have 
strands in the Solidarity movement and evolve out of domestic concerns. The Helsinki 
Committee in Poland that founded HFHR in 1989 was established during the period of 
martial law in 1982. It was an underground organization, which aimed to inform the 
international community on the situation in Poland by publishing Human Rights reports and 
smuggling them to the West (HFHR 2000: 24, interview Danuta Przywara). FSLD was 
171 The following is based on interviews by the author, on respective websites (www.hfhrpol.waw.pl; 
www.csm.org.pl; www.isp.org.pl,  and the following material: FSLD (1999); FSLD (1997); HFHR 
(2000). 
172 The Helsinki Foundation was founded in 1989 as an independent institute for education and 
research in human rights. The HFHR engages in legislative monitoring in the area of respect of human 
rights in Poland and other countries of CEE. The Foundation in Support for Local Democracy aims to 
advance local self-government in Poland. It implements its mission primarily though training and 
educational programs via a network of 15 Regional Training Centers, a College of Local Government 
and Administration and three Higher Education Schools of Public Administration. Besides the provision 
of training, consulting and technical assistance to local governments, the FSLD supported the state 
system reform introducing the powiat level in 1999. The Institute of Public Affairs as well as its offshoot 
the Center for International Relations are think- tanks in the area of public politics and international 
relations launched in 1995. They evolved out of a program of the Batory foundation (see appendix 4, 
table 10). 
173 For example the FSLD budget in 1999 was 5.1 mio Euro (www.fundersonline.org). In 1999 
FSLD employed 186 people (FSLD 2000: 44). 
174 The Helsinki committee in Poland that acts as the Program Board of the HFHR consists mainly 
of professors and known figures of the Solidarity movement (Jacek Kurczewski, Zbigniew Holda, Ewa 
Letowska (also advisory board of IPA), Janusz Grzelak, Marek Nowicki, Teresa Bogucka, Stefan 
Starczewski …). The advisory council of IPA consist for example of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (former 
Prime Minister), Bronisław Geremek (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Tadeusz Mazowiecki (former 
Prime Minister). CIM has been founded by Janusz Reiter (former Minister of Foreign Affairs). FSLD is 
headed by Prof. Jerzy Regulski (also advisory board of IPA).  
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created in 1989 by a group of members of the Civic Committee led by Professor Regulski 
(FSLD 1997: 8). The group tied up to the Solidarity principle of “self-administration”. Although 
this principle was primarily connected to workers committees, a small group of experts inside 
the Solidarity movement connected the idea with the self-government of local and regional 
levels (see e.g. Baldersheim/Illner 1996, Benzler 1993). The think-tanks ISP and CIM are not 
only connected with well-known personalities but are also connected to a strong tradition of 
social sciences in Poland. A further example – that has not been covered here – are the 
strong environmental NGOs that on the one hand received massive Western support, but on 
the other hand can be traced back to environmentally oriented sub-groups operating under 
the broad roof of the Solidarity movement (see Glinski 1999; REC 1997: 55pp). We thus 
must conclude that these “main recipients” are rather recipient than donor-driven. It holds 
true that some topics are more supported by donor organizations than others. But this fact is 
as much due to donor preferences as to domestic concerns.The major differences among the 
three types of main recipients are summarized in the following table:  
Table  7 Types of Main Recipients 










Civil Society and 
“Third Sector” 
• Service provision 
(information, know- how, 
finances to NGOs) 
• Lobbying for respective 
legal framework 
• Integrative measures 
(network building, 







• Service provision (training, 
research) 
• Awareness raising 
• Lobbying 




7.4.2 Sustainability of Main Recipients 
It was made clear above that the three groups of recipients evolved as well-established and 
highly professional organizations over the years with the help of external assistance. The 
question remains, however, whether they will be able to ensure their sustainability once 
international donors withdraw from Poland. The question of sustainability seems to be of 
special importance concerning “democracy promoters” and “infrastructural organizations”. 
What can be the tasks of “democracy promoters“ once donors decide that a country is 
“democratic” and that end the funding of civil society assistance activities has come? Along 
the same lines, how can “infrastructural organizations” make their living, once the 
“infrastructure” of NGOs is in place and their mission is thus fulfilled? It will be made clear in 
the following that in Poland the main recipients typologized above managed to sustain 
themselves in the period of donor withdrawal. However, they did so while pursuing different 
strategies. 
The organizations labeled above as “democracy promoters” succeeded in ensuring their 
sustainability by continuing their efforts in other countries and regions. They shift their 
geographic focus in line with donor attention. All three organizations described above (IDEE, 
FED, CSDF) increasingly conduct (Western funded) projects in countries such as Ukraine, 
Byelorussia or Kosovo. In 1999 IDEE even managed a “Democracy support program” in 
Cuba. One may argue that with the support to “democracy promoters”, external civil society 
assistance transferred development-aid organizations. In other words, donors transferred 
their own images and created templates of themselves, which lack the finances and the 
governmental funding or the philanthropic support of their role models though. 
The sustainability of “infrastructural organizations” is guaranteed at least in the short-run. 
This is largely due to the Batory Foundation that continues and intensifies its support to 
NGOs in Poland and thus aims to facilitate the withdrawal of mainly American donors. 
Moreover, the highly professional and well-connected “infrastructural organizations” are in a 
favored position to make the shift to European funding. FIP for example manages several 
projects appointed by the delegation of the EU Commission in Poland. The Stefan Batory 
Foundation that sponsors a representation of Polish NGOs in Brussels further facilitates the 
shift to European funds. Moreover, the socially oriented organizations such as BORIS, 
WROSZ or SPLOT can partially draw on indigenous support and continue their relationships 
with German welfare associations. Finally, the organizations do possess contacts to 
governmental and administrative bodies. Whether they manage to succeed in receiving 
domestic funding is to be seen in the future. Nevertheless the limitation of funds is felt. This is 
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e.g. evident in the move of organizations such as FIP, WROSZ, KLON/JAWOR (and others 
such as Humanitarian Action, Polish Foundation) in a joint “NGO center” in Warsaw.  
As far as domestic funding possibilities for Polish NGOs are concerned, one can state that 
with the support of foreign aid, a number of domestic donors in form of foundations and 
support centers evolved that support NGOs. These are, e.g. above called “thematic 
organizations” such as the Children and Youth Foundation that provides grants to NGOs 
engaging in social projects. Moreover, the work of the Academy seems to take fruit. The 
Academy assisted the establishment of 13 local philanthropic organizations in Poland by 
2001, including five equipped with their own capital endowment. This point is confirmed by 
the following insights from the DPP survey on NGOs in Poland and Slovakia conducted in 
2002 and 03 (see appendix 8). Asked about their main donors, 24% of the participating 
Polish NGOs name a domestic foundation or fund as one of their main donors (e.g. Polish 
Children and Youth Foundation, Pastwowy Fundusz Rehabilitacji). Additionally, 5% draw on 
funds of the Academy in Support of Local Philanthropy; and 20% name the Stefan Batory 
Foundation as one major donor. 42% draw only on domestic sources (including 
governmental support) and a further 37% depend on a mix of foreign and domestic sources. 
Only 12% mention exclusively foreign donors as their main donors (including Batory 
Foundation) (ibid: question 13, 13a).  
In sum, contrary to doubts that have been raised concerning the ability of “main recipients” to 
sustain themselves, once donor commitments came to an end, the organizations under 
investigation managed to guarantee their existence. However the strategies that ensured 
sustainability are different. “Democracy promoters” use their expertise in democracy 
assistance in order to conduct their projects in other countries further to the East now. 
“Infrastructural NGOs” succeeded in shifting to European and local funding. And “thematic 
organizations” managed to turn their favored stand due to early and massive external 
support into a comparative edge. As a result, they are reputable and well-known 
organizations with relatively easy access to domestic (and foreign) sources.  
Moreover, a large share of Polish non-governmental organizations benefit at least indirectly 
via the work of “main recipients” from Western funding. In this way, the provision of material 
resources and institution building greatly benefits Polish civil society (see chapter 7.4.4. 
below).  
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7.4.3 Legitimacy of Main Recipients  
So far the analysis has focused on major characteristics of main recipients and tackled the 
question of sustainability. The proceeding section jumped to the conclusion that main 
recipients succeeded in maintaining sustainability. Main recipients can therefore be classified 
as an output of civil society assistance. The following will go one step further and aim to 
tackle the question of legitimacy. Are organizations with international contacts that draw on 
foreign resources to a great extent accepted as legitimate domestic actors?  
As regards the acceptance of “main recipients” in Polish society, one must first note that in 
Poland (as in most CEE countries) Western contacts are assessed as something positive 
rather than negative. Instead of undermining the credibility of recipients, Western assistance 
thus raises the self-esteem and results in reputation and standing. This point is confirmed by 
the DPP survey conducted in 2002. A vast majority of Polish NGOs (93%) assesses 
international contacts as very important (appendix 8, table 26, question 10). Thereby it makes 
no difference whether the questioned NGO has international contacts or not.175 In other 
words, also non-recipients see international contacts as something positive and not as 
something illegitimate. Therefore one cannot confirm that main recipients are perceived as 
“bridgeheads of alien influence”. Most NGOs further agree that one can profit from the 
reputation of the donor organization (75%) (ibid: question 12). However, the questioned 
NGOs largely agree that donors prefer a few highly professional NGOs; 51% agree that this 
is partially the case; 14% agree that this is the case with all donors (ibid: question 17). One 
could argue that envy is more of a problem than the rejection of recipients as westernized 
intruders. NGOs have further no negative image in public opinion. In the DPP survey the 
majority of NGOs (52%) report that a negative public opinion of NGOs is no problem of 
NGOs in Poland (ibid: question 12).  
7.4.4 Main Recipients as Carriers of Civil Society?  
The following tackles the question whether “main recipients” contribute with their activities to 
an advancement of civil society on the structural and the cultural dimension. In other words, 
can we attribute the positive changes in civil society development identified in chapter 7.2. to 
the activities of main recipients?  
175 Approximately half of the questioned NGOs hold international contacts, half did not. Both groups 
equally assessed international contacts as very important. It is important to note that the survey 
covered a substantial share of local NGOs. 44% of the questioned NGOs are located in cities with less 
than 100.000 inhabitants. Only 19% are located in the capital. 
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Did main recipients strengthen non-governmental structures in Poland, help to overcome the 
deep state society divide, and advance the relationships among civil society organizations? 
To answer these questions, the section focuses on three different areas of activity: service 
provision to small and local NGOs, lobbying for legal reform and the installment of a NGO 
representative. Emphasis is largely placed upon “infrastructural NGOs” for reasons given 
above (chapter 5.3.2.).  
Service Provision 
The first indicator of the effectiveness of main recipients in advancing the structural and 
cultural dimension of civil society is their role as service providers to NGOs. Did main 
recipients contribute to the organizational capacity of small and local NGOs by the provision 
of services, techniques, know-how and financial resources? It will be argued in the following 
that this has been the case. Organizations that benefited from foreign support more often 
than not acted in one form or another as “intermediaries” in the sense that they passed on 
the gained benefits in the form of information, training and advice, but also in the form of 
finances. With regard to the provision of information, in particular, there are many examples, 
KLON published a series of issue-oriented directories176 as well as a “Know your Rights” 
series of brochures covering topics related to social services and legal rights. Moreover, 
KLON enabled NGOs to gain access to the Internet and set up an e-mail account on their 
NGO Internet server (www.ngo.pl). The use of modern communicative technology further 
facilitates the access to important information such as funding possibilities, training 
opportunities and legal issues. SPLOT also collects and disseminates information relevant to 
NGOs. It published e.g. a guidebook to American organizations offering grants in CEE as 
well as a brochure on selected national public funds accessible to NGOs. Moreover they 
have altogether six bulletins that inform about the work of NGOs in Poland. Secondly, “main 
recipients” contribute to the organizational capacity of NGOs and other organizations via the 
provision of training. Primarily ”democracy promoters” are active in this field, but the “support 
centers” also train NGO leaders and activists in such a wide range of issues like “strategic 
planning of long-term activities”, “effective self-evaluation”, or “how to establish ties with the 
public administration and local government” (BORIS).  
To sum it up, a broad range of NGOs increased their professionalism or in the language of 
donors “they build up capacity” thanks to the services provided by main recipients. In this 
manner, the intermediary role of main recipients reduced the problem of selectivity inherent in 
176 These included among others: A directory on NGOs working in the field of disabilities (1997), a 
catalog of non-governmental environmental initiatives in Poland (1998), directory on organizations 
working for the advancement of rural areas and agriculture (1998). 
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civil society assistance. One has to note, however, that the training provided is often 
thematically restricted. Management techniques, questions of how to guarantee sustainability 
and how to raise funds stand in the forefront. The major focus is thus often placed on 
strengthening the organizational capacity of NGOs regardless of their thematic objective.  
Legislative Reform 
Besides the provision of services, infrastructural NGOs have been very active in striving for 
legislative reform concerning NGO law and in campaigning for NGOs rights. In Poland non-
governmental organizations either take the legal form of an association according to the 
associations act of 1989 (amended in 1990, 1996 and 1998) or the legal form of a foundation 
according to the foundation act of 1984 (amended in 1991).177 Although it is undisputable that 
the two laws on associations and foundations grant the freedom of association and permit 
NGOs to exist, Third Sector activists have been criticizing for over ten years that the acts do 
not sufficiently regulate the rights and duties of NGOs, and thus do not provide a framework 
that stimulates the emergence of a thriving civil sector. Critics point to a lack of definitions, a 
confusing legal situation due to a co-existence of old and new regulations, restrictive 
interpretations of the laws by the courts, time-consuming registration processes for 
foundations together with unclear tax regulations and restrictions concerning the economic 
activity of associations and foundations in particular (conducted with the purpose to dedicate 
the income to public benefit objectives).178 NGO activists were especially frustrated with the 
unclear tax situation, and the obstacles to contracting out public services to NGOs.  
The dissatisfaction with the unclear tax regulation reached its peak when the Foundation for 
Polish Science was charged with overdue corporate income tax. The foundation invested its 
177 See for a discussion of the different acts regulating non-governmental organizations in Poland 
Lasocik (2000); Wygnansiki (2000), various contributions in the International Journal for Non-for profit 
law (IJNL). 
178 Critics point out that instead of a coherent legal framework a patchwork of new and old 
regulations is in existence that applies to different organizations. Besides the two fundamental 
regulations on associations and foundations a number of legal acts are still in effect which apply to 
“social organizations” (Lasocik 2000: 9), a term that referred to quasi-voluntary organizations during 
communism.  Moreover, some organizations have special regulations such as the Law on the Polish 
Red Cross, The Law on the Polish Allotments Union, or the Law on the Polish Hunting Union (Leś et al 
2000: 16).  Sports clubs are subject to the law on Physical Culture of 1996 (ibid: 14). The legal 
situation is consequently “somewhat complex and confusing” (IJNL 1998, Iss.1). A further problem is 
the lacking definition of foundations. Associations have been defined in the law as a “voluntary, self-
managed and permanent union with non-profit aims (which)... defines its own aims, programs and 
structure (and) ... bases its activity on unpaid work of its members“ (Lasocik 2000: 8p). The foundation 
act, however, fails to give a clear definition of foundations but only stipulates that the major features of 
foundations include legal personality, a non-profit-making purpose, and a declaration of aims stated in 
the founding act (Leś et al 2000: 14). In consequence of this unclear legal situation, foundations 
engaging in business operations have often been treated as companies although they dedicated their 
income for common benefit purposes (see for a critical assessment of the legal situation in Poland e.g. 
Lasocik (2000), Regulska (1999: 45); Gliński (1999:8); Wygnanski (2000); Leś et al (1999:333).  
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funds in treasury bills determined to use the realized gains for its core activity – the support 
of science. According to the Polish Corporate Income Tax Act, Article 17, this objective enjoys 
a tax-exempt status. Nevertheless the charge was confirmed in court (Wygnanski 2000). In 
response, the infrastructural NGOs described above launched a nation-wide campaign. They 
critically declared that “Polish law and the interpretation thereof treats foundations as if they 
were for-profit companies, ignoring the very fact that foundations can only register as such if 
its existence is deemed (by the state) to be of paramount social importance” (Lasocik 2000: 
15), and that economic activities are in accordance with the law if the attained income is 
spend on core activities and/or public benefit activities (see also Wygnanski 2000). The case 
has been brought to the Supreme Court of Poland.  
The legal framework was further criticized for insufficiently regulating the cooperation 
between public authorities and NGOs, thus hindering the realization of public tasks by NGOs 
as contractors of public authorities (IJNL 1998, Iss.1). Although the Budgetary Law from 1999 
on the Public Finance Act admitted the possibility that public authorities subcontract the 
provision of public services, there has been a serious battle between NGO activists and 
regional accounting chambers on how to interpret the law, a battle that ended in 1999 with 
the modification of the law by the Sejm in favor of nongovernmental organizations. The 
modified law enforces the transparency of public financing and aims at a broad access to 
public funds. (Lasocik 2000: 34, Gliński 1999: 19, 21).  
For all these reasons, NGO activists, many of which are working for the organizations under 
investigation, have been fighting for years for a new law that eradicates the above mentioned 
restrictions. Until 1998 it was attempted to strengthen the legal security of NGOs with a 
“Public Utility Act”. Since then there has been an ongoing discussion on a “Public Benefits 
Activity Law” also called “Law on the Cooperation between Public Administration and NGOs” 
designed to regulate the cooperation between NGOs and government. It took six years and 
intensive debate between NGO activists and governmental representatives until the Sejm 
finally adopted the law in April 2003.  
The new law regulates a variety of issues relevant for NGOs. Firstly, it defines the criteria for 
a new type of organization – the “public benefit organization”. NGOs that acquire this new 
status receive certain privileges, primarily tax benefits. This procedure ensures that not the 
legal form decides upon tax privileges of NGOs, rather the question whether the 
organization’s objectives and tasks contribute to the public benefit and whether they are non-
profit seeking. A council consisting of representatives from government and NGOs will decide 
upon the public benefit status of applying NGOs. Secondly, the law installs clear mechanisms 
of contracting and subsidizing the realization of public tasks by NGOs and thus regulates the 
cooperation between NGOs and government. Thirdly, the law increases the possibility for 
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NGOs to engage in economic activities that remain tax-exempt. NGOs now have the 
possibility to invest their financial assets tax-free and to charge fees for the provision of 
services. The law thus enables NGOs to raise financial resources spent on statutory 
activities. Moreover, the law introduces the 1% law that has long been established in other 
CEE countries (as e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria and Czech Republic and Slovakia) and that 
provides the possibility of transferring 1% of the personal income tax to public benefit 
organizations. And finally, the law regulates voluntary work (ICNL 2003).179 Although it is to 
be seen how the law will operate in practice, the law is expected to provide an impetus for 
NGO development, not least because it provides new funding opportunities and aims to 
ensure that more NGOs gain access to public funds. 180 
The final agreement on the new legislation can be classified as a “success” for the 
infrastructural organizations under investigation but also of their aligned donors. 
Representatives of these organizations, mainly from FIP but also from other organizations, 
have been part of the legislative drafting group, and leading figures in the campaign following 
the court decision charging the Foundation for Polish Science with overdue corporate income 
tax.  
The failed attempt to install a “NGO representative”  
Further activities of “infrastructural NGOs” (supported by their donors) aim to develop 
horizontal relationships and networks among NGOs and to integrate the NGO sector. 
However, whereas there are several examples of regionally or thematically structured loose 
networks,181 attempts to install a nation-wide “NGO representative” in order to gain greater 
bargaining power against the government continuously failed. Efforts in this direction started 
already in 1991 with the establishment of the Forum of Polish Foundations, an initiative of the 
Stefan Batory foundation, the European Foundation Center, the Foundation for Poland and 
others. Since associations could become members, it was hoped that the foundation could 
act as an “umbrella organization” of Polish foundations and associations. However, the 
foundation could not live up to these expectations (Asocjacje 1991: 2; Stefan Batory 
179 See ICNL 2003. For the ongoing discussion preceding the adoption of the law, see: Gliński 
(1999: 8pp), Lasocik (2000: 11p). 
180 One has to note, however, that it is too early to jump to a concluding assessment of the effects 
of the new legislation. Anheier/Salamon (1999: 34) make the point that the legal framework is not the 
only factor that determines the relationship between civil society and the state. Referring to other CEE 
countries that were much faster in coming to terms with the legislative issue of NGOs they indicate: 
“Indeed, in many ways, the new legal frameworks emerging in the region appear to be superior to 
those in the West…. Nevertheless public attitudes still lag behind this legal development and the 
public at large seems disillusioned with the promise of the sector.” 
181 BORIS for example initiated a coalition of about 20 Warsaw based NGOs (GRIN Initiative group 
of Warsaw Pro Bono Organizations) with the aim of developing and coordinaing cooperation among 
the members and with local administration. The aim is to strengthen contacts among NGOs.  
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Foundation 1997: xiv). A second attempt was made in 1996 with the initiative of the first 
National Forum of Non-governmental Initiatives (in Polish: Ogólnopolskie Forum Inicjatyw 
Pozarządowych - FIP), a congregation and fair of 800 NGOs in Warsaw that has been 
inspired by similar fairs taking place regularly in France (Cooperation Fund 1998: 23). The 
aim was to promote the activities of NGOs but also to nurture cooperation among NGOs. The 
organizers of the fair stirred a discussion on the installment of a “NGO representation”. 
However, the participating NGOs did not see the need for the formation of an umbrella 
organization. Furthermore a deep skepticism towards umbrella organizations and any 
attempt to “organize from above” that is rooted in communist times prevented any form of 
institutionalized representation (Wejcman 1999: 24). Instead of a membership-based 
umbrella organization, the members of the organizational Committee of the fair thus 
established the “Association for the Forum of Non-governmental Initiatives” (FIP), a non-profit 
and apolitical organization with the objective of further supporting national NGO meetings, 
and to act as an advocacy organization of NGOs, substituting a non-existing “NGO 
representative”. 
The Working Community of Associations of Social NGO’s (WRZOS), a national 
representation of 12 regional centers of socially active local NGOs founded in 2000, is a 
further attempt to install an umbrella organization, but not as a representative of NGOs, 
rather as a federation of thematically oriented organizations active in the social field. 
Whereas FIP is a typical advocacy NGO without a membership base, WRZOS emulates the 
German model of territorially organized “Dachverbände” (umbrella organizations) and 
receives various supports from regional branches of the German Paritätischer 
Wohlfahrtsverband.  
7.4.5 Recipient Benefits – Did Civil Society Assistance Make a 
Difference? 
The question arises to what extent recipients benefited from civil society assistance. Did 
donors assist main recipients in assuming their roles and fulfilling their tasks? The section will 
focus on three main benefits according to three different types of assistance that have been 
granted (see chapter 5.3.1.): (1) finances; (2) knowledge, i.e. the provision of information, 
training, techniques and know-how; and (3) moral support.  
Financial Support 
A large majority of NGOs in Poland highly benefited from financial support granted by 
external donors. In the DPP survey, 58% of the participating NGOs report that they received 
institutional grants, while 64% profited from project grants. In both cases more than 90% of 
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the beneficiaries regarded this kind of support as very important (see appendix 8, table 26, 
question 15). This data suggests that without external support a large part of Polish NGOs 
could not have carried out a wide range of their activities. Furthermore, external financial 
support guaranteed the existence of several Polish NGOs. This holds especially true for main 
recipients, as the following examples demonstrate. The Batory foundation used its 
institutional grants to increase the number of support centers in Poland. Moreover, the Batory 
foundation expanded its institutional grants to cushion the withdrawal of foreign funds from 
Poland. Particularly main recipients benefited from this expansion (see appendix 4, portray 
8). While striving for legislative reform, the community of Polish NGO activists received 
backing and support from foreign donors throughout the political process. As already noted 
(chapter 7.4.1.), this support came firstly in the form of finances, enabling the organizations 
to sustain their activities. 
One has to note, however, that donor preferences did not always correspond with local 
needs. The following observation of the Cooperation fund suggests that the vast majority of 
Polish NGOs in need of financial assistance did not always fit donor requirements:  
The contests organized within the framework of the (Phare) Democracy Programme 
had considerably fewer applicants than the contests organized by the Civic Dialogue 
Programme and LIEN…. Such situation was on one hand the outcome of very stringent 
substantive requirements that the applying organizations were to fulfill, and on the 
other hand, it was caused by the fact that the number of organizations focused on 
democratic activities, no matter how broad that notion might be was notably limited….. 
It is worth noticing that the applications submitted to the contests organized by Phare 
Democracy Programme were generally very well prepared and the projects 
implemented with in the budget of that programme were at the highest professional 
level (Cooperation Fund 1998: 11). 
With their narrow focus on democracy building projects, donors seem to forget that 
organizations of civil society have various purposes among which awareness rising and civic 
education is only one.  
Capacity Building 
However, financial support is only one facet of foreign assistance. The transfer of knowledge, 
concepts and techniques as well as the provision of expertise and advice is another.  
The support centers and other main recipients profited from the training they received from 
donor organizations. The Civic Dialogue Program was among the first to pay much attention 
to the development of regional NGO support centers in order to ensure long term support for 
NGOs especially at the regional and community level (see table 10). DemNet trained the 
existing centers in management techniques and relied on the centers as intermediaries 
passing on information on DemNet grants and assisting local NGOs in applying for funding. 
Additionally, donors relied on the described organizations as intermediaries enabling them to 
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reach small and local NGOs. For example, BORIS assisted German welfare organizations in 
organizing regional conferences on social welfare issues in Poland. Through this cooperation 
between international donors and domestic intermediaries and “multipliers”, a large majority 
of Polish NGOs did receive support in the form of training and expertise and highly benefited 
from it, as confirmed by the DPP survey. When questioned why foreign cooperation has been 
or would have been important, the majority of replying NGOs reported that they received 
benefits from international organizations in the form of expertise/consultancy (60%), and 
training / workshops (54%). Again more than 90% of the NGOs acknowledge these benefits 
as very important (appendix 8, question 15). 
The value of externally granted expertise is demonstrated by the process of legislative reform 
in NGO law described above (chapter 7.4.). In their negotiations with governmental 
representatives NGO activists could draw on free expertise ordered by several donor 
organizations. The USAID funded International Center for Non-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
accompanied the legislative process, assisted the NGO representatives in developing draft 
laws, and continuously provided professional legal expertise on the various proposals. The 
Phare Civic Dialogue Program appointed an expert group to analyze the current legal status 
of NGOs. Moreover, the team of three legal experts prepared a study draft of the legal act on 
non-profit organizations after extensive consultation with the NGO sector (Cooperation Fund 
1998: 28; IJNL 1998). The result was the first draft of the “Law on the Cooperation between 
Public Administration and NGOs” finally adopted in April 2003.  
One should further note that expertise and know-how often came as unintended side-
products of cooperation with international organizations in the form of Western models that 
provided impetus and stirred emulation. The short history of the Polish NGO sector is full of 
such examples. The idea for the National Forum of Non-governmental Initiatives, an annual 
fair aimed at the development of cooperation and promotion of the activities of NGOs first 
held in September 1996 in Warsaw, originally came from France (Cooperation Fund 1998: 
23). An important facet of the new “law on the Cooperation between Public Administration 
and NGOs” adopted in April 2003, namely the installment of legal councils that decide on a 
public benefit status of NGOs, follows a Scottish model. The foundation of the NGO 
“WROSZ” a national representation of 12 regional centers of socially active local NGOs that 
has enterred in a transnational partnership with the German Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband, 
Berlin Brandenburg, resembles the model of federation of social service oriented NGOs 
usually found in Germany.  
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Moral Support 
Besides the well-known benefits of foreign assistance coming in the form of “institution 
building” and “capacity building”, one should not neglect hardly visible and often unintended 
“side-products” such as moral support or a higher reputation and standing of the recipient. 
Ekiert / Kubik (1998:19) point out that “moral support” was of utmost importance for the 
Solidarity underground movement in the 1980s. Gestures such as the donation of the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Lech Walęsa in 1983 or the fact that Solidarity was formally affiliated and thus 
already recognized by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World 
Confederation of Labor in 1986 increased the movement’s confidence and standing and 
helped to make the distinction between “illegal” and “legitimate”. Western support thus 
contributed to the oppositional strategy to undermine the credibility of the regime and to 
break up the monopoly of the leading ideology on determining the truth (see also Klein 2001: 
37). Moreover, the support was important for individuals. In the words of Danuta Przywara 
from the Helsinki Foundation: “This moral support showed that we are important and that we 
should go on.” In the transition period Western backing also contributed to instead of 
damaging the reputation of their cooperation partners, as Western support demonstrated 
expertise, which was often lacking in the organizations themselves. In the words of Regulski, 
the president of FSDL regarding assistance from the USAID: “You can’t underestimate the 
psychological character of USAID’s support. It was crucial at the time to our success. People 
were afraid; we had no experience but we had someone assisting us” (USAID 2000a: 32).  
In the survey on NGOs of 2002 most NGOs also still agree that one can profit from the 
reputation of the donor organization (75%) (appendix 8, question 12). Additionally, the 
majority of NGOs (58%) see the foreign donor as a partner that strives for the same goals, a 
fact that is highly valued (87%). A further unintended consequence that is highly valued by 
recipient organizations is the provision of “networks and contacts”. 77% of the participating 
NGOs report that the cooperation with Western donors is important for them as it provides 
networks and contacts. Nearly all of the questioned NGOs (99%) regard this form of support 
as very important (ibid).  
The evaluation of the Phare Democracy Program points to another benefit:  
“The major overall impact of PTDP (Phare Tacis Democracy Programme) in Poland 
was a political one. Its pure existence on such a range and scale gave real credibility to 
the NGO sector as such… (projects) initiated by EU meant a clear sign to Polish 
decision-makers that the NGO sector cannot be ignored if Poland wants to join the EU” 
(European Commission 1997c: 102).  
In other words, the in financial terms rather modest support of the Phare Democracy program 
benefited Polish NGOs mainly by means of increasing the visibility and acceptance of NGOs. 
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In negotiations with a government that strives to enter the EU, international cooperation 
translates into political bargaining power. 
We can thus conclude that Polish civil society benefited from Western support in many ways. 
Moreover, the Polish organizations are aware of this fact and appreciate the support they 
received.  
7.4.6 Summary 
Chapter three points to the problem of donor selectivity that may undermine the credibility of 
donors. It became clear above that in the Polish case donors did prefer some type of 
organizations to others and thus supported only a small segment of civil society. 
Furthermore, the externally supported NGOs are not representative of the NGO sector in 
Poland at large. Instead some thematic issues are more supported than others. Especially 
NGOs declaring their core activity to lie in the area of “state, law, and policy” or “human 
rights” over-proportionally profit from foreign funds.182 This fact confirms that foreign donors 
do select recipients and prefer so-called “advocacy”, “watch-dog” or “public policy oriented” 
NGOs that comply with Western standards. Three main types of “main recipients” have been 
identified: (1) “democracy promoters” which, similar to their foreign role models, aim to 
support democracy and conduct civic education projects; (2) “infrastructural NGOs” that 
strive to install a favorable infrastructure for NGO activities including a legal framework, 
networks and representative bodies of NGOs and funding opportunities; (3) thematically 
oriented NGOs, mainly working in the field of human resources, education, the media, 
children and youth. These organizations received massive donor support from the very 
beginning often thanks to well-known leaders.  
This section aimed to tackle the question whether the organizations donors regard as 
building blocks of democracy and civil society really act as carriers of civil society. In other 
words, does donor funding translate into a variety of non-governmental organizations and a 
pluralistic civil society or rather in a distorted image of civil society marked by a few 
organizations that serve donor rather than domestic needs and remain disconnected from 
society?  
In the Polish case, one can note that despite donor selectivity main recipients are embedded 
in domestic settings. Main recipients succeeded in ensuring their sustainability. “Democracy 
182 28% of NGOs active in the area “state, law, politics” declare that they frequently draw on foreign 
sources, more than NGOs active in other thematic fields. The second biggest “receivers” are human 
rights NGOs. 24% of these draw frequently on foreign sources (average: 16%) (BORDO 1998: 44). 
See also table 6.   
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Promoters” implemented civil society assistance projects in other countries and regions. 
Infrastructural NGOs managed to shift to European and domestic sources of funding. And 
most thematic organizations developed thanks to the early and massive support for well-
situated and reputable domestic actors with access to domestic and European funding. In 
none of the cases did Western contacts and funding undermine the legitimacy of recipients. 
On the contrary, Western contacts more often than not boost the reputation of the domestic 
organization. Main recipients additionally act in one form or another as “intermediaries” in the 
sense that they pass on the gained benefits in the form of grants, but also training or advice. 
Examples include organizations such as the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy that 
trains a high amount of local administrative staff via its regional branches, the Children and 
Youth Foundation that provides grants to NGOs engaging in social projects, or the 
community foundations established with the help of the Academy of Philanthropy. What 
evolved with the support of foreign aid is a number of domestic donors in form of foundations 
and support centers that continue to support local NGOs. This way a larger share of civil 
society organizations benefited at least indirectly from Western funding. Foreign funding thus 
fuelled the rise of non-governmental organizations in Poland portrayed in chapter 7.2. By 
these means foreign support and main recipients contributed to the structural dimension of 
civil society in Poland. Civil society assistance has been less successful in advancing the 
cultural dimension of civil society. The animosity between politicians and NGOs mirroring the 
state-society divide evident in Poland and the lacking willingness of the Polish people to 
participate in civil activities continue to be problems of civil society development. 
Nonetheless, changes in the cultural dimension are visible. Main recipients aimed for better 
cooperation among NGOs. Various activities such as the regional and national NGO 
meetings or regional networks of cooperation work in this direction. The attempts to install a 
nation-wide umbrella organization or representative for the NGO sector for the sake of 
effective lobbying, however, largely failed due to a prevailing distrust towards umbrella 
organizations among Polish civil society organizations. Main recipients further learned to 
understand that the rise of civic activity is difficult without cooperative ties with state 
administration and a respective legal environment. Their aspirations for a respective legal 
framework for non-governmental initiatives in Poland that facilitates the cooperation among 
NGOs and state administration succeeded in 2003 with the passing of a new law. Whether 
the law will help to overcome the animosities between state administrations and NGOs is to 
be seen.  
We can thus conclude that “main recipients” in Poland are more than donor-driven NGOs but 
act as carriers of civil society. What is even more salient from the point of view of this study is 
that main recipients benefited from the assistance granted by their donors in bringing about 
the described achievements. Building the capacity of local NGOs, enhancing their knowledge 
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base and emanating information had often not been possible without their having been 
trained previously by donor organizations themselves and without Western financial support. 
The internationally granted expertise also proved an important tool in the legislative process 
and enhanced the bargaining power of the NGO representative in the drafting group on NGO 
legislation. The transfer of foreign models and ideas that provided impetus and inspiration 
was an additional unintended “by-product” of international cooperation and communication.  
7.5 Conclusion: Civil Society Assistance in Poland – A 
Success Story by Accident or Skill?  
The proceeding analysis aimed to answer one major question: Is it possible for externally 
granted assistance to civil society organizations to contribute positively to civil society 
development in Poland after transition from authoritarian rule in structural as well as cultural 
terms? The initial notion guiding this research has been that civil society development in 
Poland after transition was highly shaped by the historical legacies of previous years, but 
rather disconnected from the various Western endeavors to build up civil society. Moreover, 
the faults evident in civil society assistance, namely its selectivity and lacking legitimacy, are 
bound to result at best in nothing more than donor-driven NGOs detached from society that 
will wither away once donor funding comes to an end. Even if this initial hypothesis were not 
to be confirmed, doubts can still be raised that it was external assistance that shaped Polish 
civil society and not the past experiences with organized forms of civic activities and a nation-
wide oppositional movement that existed in Polish history. Thus, if the Polish case is a 
“success story” of donor organizations, it may well be a success by accident rather than skill. 
In order to answer these questions and to verify or falsify our initial hunch, the analysis faced 
a threefold task: firstly, to assess civil society and its cultural preconditions in Poland; 
secondly, to plausibly attribute the current state of civil society to Western assistance; and 
thirdly, to rule out other plausible explanations that ground civil society development in 
historical and cultural prepositions of civil society. 
Chapter 2.3.. portrayed the historic legacies of the communist rule that are widely regarded 
as an obstacle to the re-emergence of civil society even after liberalization legalizes the self-
organization of society. It has been shown that communist rule is obstructive for civil society 
to take root as it preserves an image of social homogeneity that inhibits interest 
differentiation and representation. The bad reputation of associations is a further stumbling 
block for organized civic activity. The communist patronage state that acts as a care-taker of 
the people results in passive citizens with extensive demands toward the state, and since the 
state largely failed to live up to the expectations it raised, it leads to a deep state-society 
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divide. For all these reasons, communist rule does not provide fertile ground for civil society, 
but instead is quite obstructive for the cultural basis so much needed for a lively civil society 
to develop. However, it has been argued that communist states are characterized by as 
many similarities as differences, and the differences in the Polish case emanating from the 
oppositional movement Solidarity, is not to be neglected. The experience with Solidarity 
taught the Polish people that civic action makes a difference and may result in change. 
Moreover, the aim of achieving an evolutionary extension of civic rights (Michnik) and the 
concept of a “self-administrated republic” resulted in independent circles of freedom and the 
construction of a social infrastructure of various political clubs and organizations “from 
below”. This resulted in the existence of various initiatives and concepts in different issue 
areas such as human rights, environment, or local self-administration. Along with that, a 
substantial basis of political, local and professional leaders and activists has been formed 
that were able and willing to build up civil society after 1989. Nevertheless, it would be 
misleading to assume that the experience of the Solidarity movement countermands the 
legacies of the communist past. On the contrary, it has been argued that it particularly 
deepened the state-society divide. The monolithic character of the movement that was based 
on the myth of a “community of faith” striving for the “common good” and standing and 
fighting against a corrupt state preserved the image of society as the place of the “better” and 
the state and politics as the place of “evil”. Moreover, once the movement came to power and 
the differences inside the movement came to the fore citizens reacted with disillusionment 
and passivity. The myth of solidarity translated into an “agony of myth” (Szacki 1991).  
Chapter 7.2. gave an assessment of the state of civil society in Poland roughly ten years 
after transition. It jumped to the conclusion that progress is visible on the structural as well as 
cultural dimension. The number of non-governmental organizations has been growing 
rapidly. Additionally, the organizations are active in a broad range of issue areas. 
Nevertheless it became clear that civil society development suffered from the legacies 
outlined above. Civic participation remained low and NGOs have first been largely restricted 
to urban centers. However, communication among the various civic organizations is evident, 
but the distrust toward institutionalized forms of cooperation is high and largely prevents the 
building of umbrella organizations. The state-society divide also has left its traces. Politicians 
continue to regard NGOs as unwelcome competitors, while civil society activists regard 
politicians as corrupt and politics as something dirty. This attitude has been evident in a 
lacking state policy, which triggers the self-organization of society and an unfavorable legal 
framework regulating non-governmental activities. However, throughout the period of 
investigation improvement was evident. In recent years, NGOs are increasingly springing up 
in regional and local areas. An agreement among government and NGO representatives on a 
new NGO law has finally been reached after a long struggle. And a process of integration of 
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single organizations active in the same issue areas is taking place, although the attempt to 
establish a membership-based representative of NGOs failed.  
The key question of this chapter has been whether the depicted positive changes in the 
structural and in the cultural dimension of civil society are attributable to Western assistance 
and support, or whether civil society assistance leads to donor-driven NGOs that fail to meet 
local demands. The analysis of the output and outcome of civil society assistance given in 
chapter 7.4 revealed that the hypothesis of a supplementary stratum could not be confirmed. 
Although civil society assistance to Poland was selective and mainly supported by only a few 
specific NGOs, i.e. so-called “democracy promoters”, “infrastructural NGOs” or thematic 
organizations run by well-known personalities, Western assistance is neither perceived as 
illegitimate, nor do the main recipients fail to ensure their sustainability. Additionally, major 
recipients acted as intermediaries that pass on the gained benefits and supported other non-
governmental organizations with the provision of training, know-how, information and access 
to funds. The struggle for favorable legal regulations, more cooperation between state 
administration and NGOs and among NGOs also benefited Polish NGOs at large. The 
section thus concluded that main recipients acted as carriers of civil society.  
More important from the point of view of this study is the fact that while bringing about the 
described achievements, main recipients highly benefited from international cooperation as 
demonstrated in chapter 7.4.5. These benefits came firstly as material assistance in the form 
of project or institutional grants. Due to the lack of domestic funding possibilities especially in 
the early 1990s, these funds were of utmost importance as they ensured the mere existence 
of non-governmental organizations in Poland. Recipients also highly valued and profited from 
so-called “soft products” of assistance that are activities of donors usually referred to as 
“capacity building”. The provision of training, information and know-how increased the 
professionalism of NGOs and raised their operational capacity. As a result, NGOs became 
better in gaining funding on the one hand. On the other hand, they became experts in their 
respective fields. More than anything else, this expertise increased their domestic reputation 
and their recognition by state authorities. This was even more so the case when domestic 
NGOs were backed internationally. Such was the case in the legislative process on a 
respective NGO law. The domestic authorities could not neglect the fact that legal reports 
presented by the NGO representative on the draft law of the government were firstly drafted 
by an international expert and secondly financed by the EU. These are politically powerful 
arguments in the negotiations with a government that wants to enter the EU. In other words, 
the international support as such directly translated into the increasing visibility and 
acceptance of the NGO sector and political bargaining power. Applying the language of 
actor-centered institutionalism, donors raised the capabilities of civil society actors, i.e., “all 
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action resources that allow an actor to influence an outcome in certain respects and to a 
certain degree” (Scharpf 1997: 43).  
However, it would be misleading to assume that these merits and benefits of civil society 
assistance to Polish NGOs have been the inevitable consequences of all donor activities. 
One must keep in mind that the effect of foreign assistance was facilitated by several factors.  
Firstly, one must remark that although all three types of main recipients highly benefited from 
foreign technical and financial assistance, none of them was fully donor-driven. For the 
“democracy promoters” donors have been a role model that stirs emulation. “Infrastructural 
NGOs” used external models as a ground for inspiration rather than copying. Organizations 
such as BORIS or SPLOT combine features of American small lobby groups and of 
European intermediary organizations. Thematically oriented recipients finally use external 
techniques, methods and financial resources in order to pursue their own agenda more 
effectively. From their standpoint, donors were mainly sponsors. In all three cases the 
recipient organizations are driven as much by indigenous concerns as by opportunities 
provided for by donors. Additionally, all three types are rooted in the Solidarity movement, 
and they often have been founded in response to domestic concerns.  
Secondly, foreign support was largely perceived as legitimate and acceptable assistance in 
Poland. Based on the strong belief that Poland would have been a democratic and wealthy 
country similar to its Western neighbors if it had not been for the Soviet occupation, Western 
assistance was demanded by the Polish people as a way to re-install normality. Aid was not 
regarded as a pittance, rather as assistance to which Poland is entitled. The credibility and 
esteem of the donor also played a role. American donors, in particular, are highly appreciated 
in Poland thanks to the massive support they had already granted during the 1980s. The civil 
society assistance of the European Union has to be seen in the light of the prospects for 
membership in the EU. The fact that Poland wants to enter the European Union provided 
important leverage not only for donors that aim to foster civil society development but also to 
NGO activists in the country who were not tired of reminding their governments of the 
importance of a lively civil society for EU accession. One may argue that thanks to European 
enlargement the adoption of a new NGO law came within the range of appropriate policy 
options to governmental representatives. 
Finally, one has to note that the focus on main recipients that are still active and visible in 
Polish civil society today deliberately neglects civil society assistance “failures”, be it recipient 
organizations that failed to ensure their sustainability or high-priced short-term consultants 
whose expertise proved useless. Chapter 7.3 pointed out that the history of civil society 
assistance to Poland was full of such failures. The early period in particular was marked by a 
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lack of strategy and a tremendous ignorance towards domestic contexts. Not until the middle 
of the 1990s did donors change their approach to civil society assistance in Poland and apply 
a more fine-tuned strategy. They became aware of the shortcomings of selecting a few 
recipients and increasingly provided small grants to a wider spectrum of NGOs active in a 
variety of thematic areas. Additionally, donors placed greater emphasis on “capacity building” 
with a focus on training, network building and a favorable regulatory environment for NGOs. 
Most importantly, donors learned that local knowledge and initiative was important to ensure 
success. They decentralized their support and increasingly relied on decentralized structures 
and local staff in carrying out civil society assistance. Most Phare NGO support programs 
were administered by the locally run Cooperation Fund. The NGO support program of USAID 
called “DemNet” also operated with local staff. And the Soros-funded Stefan Batory 
Foundation was run as a domestic foundation with domestic staff from its very beginning. 
The local administration of the programs ensured a close cooperation with domestic NGOs 
and their needs. This is even more so, as the NGO support programs and the infrastructural 
NGOs cultivated close personal links, which are demonstrated by the fact that staff of the 
former are often board members (or even founding members) of the latter or vice versa.183 
Instead of strictly divided “donors” and “recipients” we thus observe a group of Polish and 
international activists that work together in order to advance civil society. The result are 
transnational networks of civil society activists that are often held together by what one may 
call “local donors”, i.e. donor organizations with local offices that highly rely on local expertise 
and local staff. These “activist networks” acted as a source of impetus and inspiration and 
are characterized by close cooperation. Through this intensive cooperation donors had an 
impact on projects and activities of main recipients. In the same vein, recipients influenced 
grant schemes and donor strategies. Thus, learning processes took place on both sides. One 
may argue that the insight that civil society is more than a collection of NGOs but also 
requires a favorable environment, a regulative framework and horizontal ties among the 
various organizations and initiatives based on tolerance and trust was the result of a 
common learning process of donors and recipients starting in the middle of the 1990s  
We can thus conclude that external support positively assisted the re-emergence of civil 
society in Poland via the mechanisms of learning and empowerment. In this process the 
provision of material resources, training and know-how proved as important as the type of 
183 Some examples can illuminate this point. Kuba Wygnański is Board Member of BORIS, the 
Batory Foundation, FIP, Council member of CSDF, and head of KLON/JAWOR. The Project Director of 
DemNet Paweł Łukasiak who is now heading the Academy, is the former president of BORIS, now a 
Council member, and additionally a member of FIP. The Director of the Deutsch-Polnische 
Verständigung e.V., Krzysztof Balon, is a board member of BORIS. Further examples are: Paweł 
Jordan (president of BORIS, member of FIP); Zbigniew Wejcman (employee BORIS, board member of 
WROSZ) and others.  
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transactions between recipients and donors. Doubts may be raised, however, whether the 
Polish experience is applicable to other cases, as it was clear that without the various 
facilitating factors described above civil society assistance may have remained without much 
impact in the Polish case. So what conclusion is to be drawn? Is Poland a “success story” of 
the combined donor efforts to “build” civil society? Or is civil society assistance nothing more 
than a footnote to a process that followed a path dependent on past experiences and that 
was highly shaped by local actors socialized in the Solidarity movement? It has been pointed 
out that alternative explanations are hard to rule out by looking on single cases. For this 
reason, the following will briefly highlight civil society assistance in Slovakia - a country 
whose cultural preconditions are less favorable to civil society.  
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8 Analyzing Civil Society Assistance in Slovakia 
The following chapter focuses on the case of Slovakia. For the purpose of this study, 
Slovakia can be regarded as a divergent case, because the emergence of civil society in 
Slovakia is an unlikely phenomenon according to a sociological understanding of civil society 
as put forward above. History has not provided Slovakia with the cultural assets commonly 
regarded as favorable for civil society. The prospects for a vibrant civil society based on 
active citizens and moral qualities such as tolerance and trust are dim. The reasons lie in 
both the repressive nature of the previous regime and the identified legacy of communism 
(chap. 2.3.) as well as ins late independence and belated modernization. The times when 
Slovakia was a state are scarce; Slovakia was mostly under the influence of other states 
such as Bohemia, Hungary, or the Habsburg Empire. National elites that act as carriers of 
civil society did not exist. Instead the Slovak lands were characterized by a poor, peasant, 
and catholic population that believed in the merits of rural life and in the superiority of 
Hungarian nobility. The communist regime in Czechoslovakia maintained a repressive policy 
that left little room for public dissent and “circles of freedom” outside of state control. As a 
result, analysts describe the political culture of Slovakia as one shaped by state paternalism, 
an apathetic and passive citizenry, and “civic impotence” (Fialová 2002).  
Keeping this pessimistic analysis in mind, it is not that surprising that Slovakia was the only 
country of the Visegrad-Four to experience a democratic reverse wave of authoritarian rule 
between 1994 and 1998. With a short interlude in 1994, Slovakia was ruled by Prime Minister 
Vladimir Mečiar and his party “Movement for a Democratic Slovakia” (HZDS) between 1993 
and 1998. After the elections in 1994, the HZDS entered a coalition with the nationalistic 
“Slovak National Party” and the radical left-wing “Association of Workers of Slovakia”. The 
regime of Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar and his ruling nationalist-communist coalition was 
based on populist and nationalist rhetoric and on undemocratic means of suppressing the 
opposition. Events provoked by the government such as the illegal ousting of a Slovak 
parliamentarian in 1996, the refusal of the government to protect minority languages, 
attempts to control the media and to restrict the freedom of NGOs, and not least the 
harassment of the president’s son resulted in harsh international criticism and a poor 
international image of Slovakia.184  
184 For an account of recent developments in Slovakia, see: Wolchik (1997: 233p), Goldmann 
(1997: 148), Bútora / Bútorová (1999: 84pp), Mihalikova (2004), Human Rights Watch World Report 
1998 on Slovakia (www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki-21.htm). 
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Despite everything mentioned above Slovakia has a lively NGO-Sector, which is 
characterized by a high degree of organization and cooperation. One may even argue that it 
is due to the work of NGOs that the Mečiar government was succeeded in 1998 by the 
coalition under Mikulas Dzurinda, which facilitated the democratic and economic transition of 
the country and laid the path into the European Union. The NGO sector has created its own 
infrastructure including regional associations and national umbrella organizations, and a 
democratically elected body, the “Gremium for the Third Sector” (G3S), which advocates the 
interests of NGOs and coordinates joint actions of NGOs. The “Gremium” has been 
successful in mobilizing NGO support for large initiatives. In 1996, in response of the 
Government’s Bill on Foundations, the “Gremium” carried out a nationwide media campaign 
and mobilized NGOs to join the “SOS Third Sector Campaign” in order to prevent the law. 
The “OK ‘98” campaign before the parliamentary elections in 1998 proved to be more 
important from a political standpoint, Several activities and events organized by NGOs such 
as “get out the vote” concerts, cultural activities or discussion forums aimed to convince 
especially disillusioned young people to vote and to ensure free and fair elections. The high 
voter turnout at the 1998 elections (84%)185 is widely assumed to have benefited the 
democratic oppositional coalition of Miklas Dzurinda that finally succeeded in breaking 
Mečiar’s rule.186  
In both campaigns and especially before the elections in 1998 Slovak NGOs received 
massive Western support in financial as well as technical terms. Without this support one 
may doubt whether the NGOs would have ever had the means to conduct the campaigns 
and various activities briefly sketched out above. Moreover, the question of Euroatlantic 
integration came to play a key role in the election campaign. Both western politicians and 
domestic opposition leaders and NGOs continuously stressed the point that the Slovak prime 
minister himself was the major obstacle to Slovakia’s membership in EU and NATO and that 
Mečiar was the reason why Slovakia fell from being one of the most promising candidate 
185 At 84% the voter turnout was 9% higher than in the 1994 elections (Bútora/Bútorova 1999: 81). 
Furthermore, the percentage of first-time voters was raised from around 60% in 1994 to over 80% in 
1998. 70% of the first-time voters supported the opposition (Bútova /Bútorová 1999: 82, 88). 
186 One has to note that the oppositional coalition that was successful in the elections in 1998 was 
a right-left coalition itself consisting of moderate parties. The oppositional coalition consisted of four 
“electoral parties” two of which were coalitions themselves. The main party, the “Slovak Democratic 
Coalition” (SDK) was an alliance of five oppositional parties that aligned in 1997: the conservative 
“Christian Democratic Movement” (KDH), the liberal “Democratic Union” (DU), the conservative-liberal 
“Democratic Party” (DS), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), and the Party of Greens in 
Slovakia (SZS). The second strongest member of the oppositional coalition with 15% of the votes was  
the SDL, a part of the former communist party. The third strongest was the SMK, a coalition of three 
Hungarian parties. Finally SOP, a center-left party was part of the coalition against Mečiar (see e.g. 
Bútora /Bútorová 1999: 81p). The 10 parties have diverse political programs and ideological profiles. 
They were, however, united in their goal to beat Mečiar, to support Slovakia’s integration into EU and 
NATO, and to install democratic principles in the country.  
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countries to one with the weakest prospects of membership. In view of the high public 
support for Slovak membership in these organizations, the alignment of Slovak opposition 
leaders and NGOs with foreign actors was a valuable asset of the democratic opposition.187 
The key question of this chapter is to what extent did the NGO sector in Slovakia benefit from 
Western civil society assistance. Can we attribute the development of NGOs, the high 
organizational and technical capacity of NGOs as well as the tense cooperation among 
NGOs to external civil society assistance? Did Western involvement tip the internal power-
balance in Slovakia and thus contribute to the outcome of the 1998 elections? And if this is 
the case, are the elections a victory of civil society? Or did Western funds simply support and 
install a counter-elite, a non-governmental shadow government consisting of future politicians 
that “survived” under Western auspices in non-governmental organizations, but who leave 
their organizations without a mission, goal and human resources once they enter the new 
government? Or did external assistance support the rise of civil society in a country whose 
historic legacies left little hope for democracy and civil society? Did the West give Slovakia a 
“history”? 
In order to answer these questions the analysis proceeds in the following steps. The first 
section briefly outlines the communist and pre-communist legacies impacting upon civil 
society development. The second section portrays civil society in Slovakia after 1989 in 
structural and cultural terms. In doing so, focus will be placed on the Mečiar and the post-
Mečiar era. Thirdly, the chapter portrays the external assistance granted to non-
governmental organizations and civil society in Slovakia. Special emphasis will be placed on 
the quantity, the timing and the strategy of external civil society assistance. Subsequently, the 
chapter focuses on the recipients of assistance and investigates their sustainability, 
legitimacy and effectiveness in building civil society (see chapter 5.3.). It will be evident that 
Western assistance played a key role for NGOs in Slovakia. However, several conditions that 
ensured the beneficial character of external assistance will also be identified. The final 
section summarizes the major results and is guided by the question whether civil society 
assistance in Slovakia was nothing more than a subtle form of external intervention from 
below or a genuine effort to trigger civil society development.  
187 Especially public support for EU membership reached in Slovakia a constant high of over 70%. 
Public support for NATO membership is lower, however rising. Between 2000 and 2001 it ranged 
between 40 to 50% (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 1). 
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8.1 The Domestic Context - Historical and Cultural Legacies 
As pointed out in chapter two, civil society requires a “cultural basis” of civic attitudes and 
values shaped and formed in historic processes and by cultural legacies. The following thus 
focuses briefly on the communist and pre-communist history of the Slovak state in order to 
pinpoint the cultural foundations on which civil society in Slovakia is built. As the communist 
legacies hampering civil society development are already discussed thoroughly in chapter 
2.3., it is left to this section to pinpoint free spheres of societal life outside state control and 
dissident activities in the Czech and Slovak lands. Moreover, I will briefly point to Slovakia’s 
pre-communist history and political traditions in order to highlight a number of important 
factors specific to the Slovak case: the belated modernization of Slovakia, the 
interrelationship between Slovak, Hungarian as well as Czech culture, and the striking lack of 
a national history and consciousness. It will be clear that those who believe in historical 
explanations will be left with little hope with respect to the rise of civil society in Slovakia. 
Karen Buerkle makes the point that whenever the territory of Slovakia was democratic, i.e. as 
part of Czechoslovakia from 1918 until the rise of the Fascist Slovak state in 1939 and after 
the velvet revolution in 1989, democracy was brought to Slovakia as the result of events 
outside Slovakia’s borders. In neither case was democracy the result of the public 
involvement of a large part of the Slovak population. In both periods democracy came to 
Slovakia before it had a well-developed civil society (Buerkle 2002a: 1).  
8.1.1 Pre-Communist Legacies 
Slovakia’s history has been determined more than anything else by its lack of experience 
with independent statehood, an identity that formed in opposition to Hungarian and Czech 
supremacy, its belated modernization and lack of experience with associational life. All three 
factors are major legacies still impacting civil society today.  
For nearly 1000 years the territory of present-day Slovakia was part of the Hungarian 
Kingdom and known as Upper Hungary. The Hungarian supremacy only ended with the 
formation of Czechoslovakia in 1918. The Slovaks voluntarily joined the common state, but 
the cultural and social differences between the industrialized and urbanized Czech lands and 
the rural and peasant Slovaks quickly created resentment and “… fed the growth of Slovak 
nationalism, as many Slovaks felt that Hungarian rule had merely been exchanged for rule 
from Prague” (Wolchik: 1997: 199). Despite the fact that they could participate in liberal 
elections, Slovaks identified little with the political system. In 1939 they euphorically 
celebrated the creation of their own state, ignoring the fact that this first Slovak state was 
based on a fascist regime protected and controlled by Hitler Germany. Until the velvet 
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revolution of 1993 Slovakia thus hardly had any experience with independent statehood. 
Along with that, Slovakia had no experience with democratic rules and regulations.  
“Slovak citizens do not have the experience … of creating state institutions, 
administrating the state, or deciding about important political issues affecting their 
everyday life. This results in naiveté and a political illiteracy, or what is even worse, it 
leads to apathy and passivity … that is the ideal ground for authoritarianism” (Fialová 
2002b: 11).  
A further factor hampering civil society is a late national awakening that in turn was based on 
an ethno-centric and romantic image of the nation. Gellner (1995) convincingly argued, “the 
modular man is a nationalist”. From this view, the development of civil society necessitates 
national identity. However, in the Slovak case the evolution of national identity is 
overshadowed by the supremacy of Hungarian and Czech high culture. The multi-ethnic 
region of Upper Hungary was strongly dominated by the Hungarian culture. Members of the 
nobility of the region considered themselves as Hungarians regardless of their ethnic 
affiliation. The same holds true for educated Slovaks or even Slovak-speaking yeoman of the 
17th or 18th century whose predominant identity was Hungarian (Fialová 2002b: 1). In the 19th 
century a brief and feeble Slovak nationalist movement developed. It was, however, severely 
hampered by the absence of a historic precedent of land autonomy or statehood on the one 
hand and the supremacy of the Hungarian culture on the other hand. In their search for 
Slovak images and models, Slovak intellectuals had to turn to the rural, peasant, catholic and 
largely conservative population as the main carriers of the language and folklore of ethnic 
Slovaks. This even more so, as the national movement largely failed to win over the Slovak 
speaking urban population and Slovak yeoman who were highly influenced by Hungarianism. 
Slovak emancipation thus had to distinguish itself from Hungarianism and from Hungarian 
liberalism that significantly shaped Hungarian national emancipation in the 19th century. Pan-
Slavism was the only embracing ideal available. Fialová concludes that Slovak emancipation 
was thus largely based on conservative ideals, anti-liberal tendencies and an ethno-centric 
and largely romantic image of the nation (ibid: 4). This image was consolidated during the 
pre-war period when Slovaks aimed to preserve their newly gained cultural identity against 
“Czechoslovakism” a notion connected to multi-ethnic Bohemism that was largely perceived 
by Slovaks as purely “Czechism”. 
Finally the pre-communist history of the Slovak lands was marked by the lack of 
associational life. Unlike in Poland, where Polish non-governmental structures and 
associational life developed during the partitions in response to external intervention 
(Kurczewska 1995: 44pp), this was not the case in Slovakia. In her analysis of associational 
life in Slovakia, Buerkle points out that a feeble Slovak civil society developed only at the 
beginning of the 19th century. It was, however, largely determined by a Hungarian – German 
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middle class with only a few Slovak charitable associations and self-help societies inspired 
by a brief Slovak national movement. On the territory of present-day Slovakia self-organized 
activity remained far below the degree of associational life in other parts of the Habsburg 
Empire (Buerkle 2002b: 2p). In a society that was largely shaped by an underdeveloped 
middle class, a low percentage of Protestants and a large majority coming from a mostly 
poor, rural, peasant, catholic background where liberal values had never been introduced, 
the development of individualism and self-responsibility was associated with great 
difficulties.188 The chief exception was Bratislava, where during the 19th century and at the 
turn of the century a strong associational life developed that also was ethnically tolerant and 
of a mixed German –Magyar nature. Although associations sprang up during the first 
Czechoslovak Republic, Buerkle (ibid: 7) makes the point that the associations mainly 
formed along ethnical, religious or political lines and were hardly inspired by values such as 
tolerance and trust. Although some degree of pluralism developed in the cities, in the 
countryside non-state organized activity remained low and was restricted to fire brigades and 
agricultural based associations. There were not only fewer associations in Slovakia than in 
the Czech Lands during the Czechoslovak Republic, but they were also more geographically 
dispersed (Buerkle 2002a: 6p). The authoritarian regime ruling between 1939 and 1945 
marked a major decrease in civic activity. Many associations were dissolved, others 
controlled and redirected (ibid: 8).  
8.1.2 Communist Legacies 
Chapter 7.1.1 points to the various legacies of communist societies that are widely 
considered to obstruct civil society development and even to lead to “civilizational 
incompetence” (Sztompka 1993: 89). In particular, the image of social homogeneity and a 
resulting lack of interest differentiation and representation, a thoroughly discredited image of 
associations, citizens’ passivity tied with exceeding claims toward the state as a protector 
and care-taker, and a deep state-society divide have been identified as the major factors 
deterring civil society. This section argues that the legacies of communist rule have a more 
profound effect in Slovakia than in Poland. The repressive character of the Czechoslovak 
communist regime, the small oppositional circle, and the lacking popularity of the opposition 
in the Slovak lands are factors that inhibited the development of free spheres of civic activity 
as we saw in the Polish case (chapter 7.1.).  
188 The rural character of Slovakia is still evident today: The majority of towns in present Slovakia 
(87,3%) have less than 2000 residents, and about one third of the Slovak population lives in these 
municipalities (Mannová 1998: 12 cit. in: Fialová 2002c: 6).  
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In comparison with other socialist regimes in CEE such as Poland or Hungary, the 
communist regime in Czechoslovakia took a hard-line until its demise in 1989.189 The 
liberalization tendencies cumulating in the Prague spring in 1969 were crushed violently. The 
subsequent period of “normalization” was based on a policy of repression of public dissent 
that manifested itself in the party purges following 1968, the emergence of conservative party 
leaders, a harsh response to signatories of the “Charter 77”, and violent crackdowns on 
demonstrations at the end of the 1980s. The regime took an orthodox and dogmatic stance in 
economic terms as well. It was strongly against private farming, small-scale industry or small 
privatization, which was common in other CEE countries. 190  
Nonetheless, a small circle of dissidents existed despite the outright repression. Their 
activities were largely limited to petitions such as the Charter 77, a petition requesting the 
government to respect the Helsinki treaty on Human Rights it signed in 1975. The number of 
signatories remained below 2000, an indicator of the small number of open opponents 
(Glenn 2001: 48). The reasons for the small circle of dissidents lie mainly in the repressive 
nature of the regime, but also in its economic effectiveness. Czechoslovakia hardly faced an 
economic crisis: inflation was low, hard currency debt remained in an acceptable range and 
basic consumer goods were on hand. Nor did the population suffer from food shortage or the 
government face the burden of large Western debt (see e.g. Glenn 2001: 46). Unlike in 
Poland where the economic crisis of the 1970s severely damaged the legitimacy of the 
regime, the patronage state in Czechoslovakia seemed to keep its promises. Only at the end 
of the 1980s did stagnation prevail and economic analyses affirmed the need for radical 
economic reform, but did not catch the ear of the conservative ruling elite, though.191 Due to 
the repressive and conservative regime, the small circles of independent civic activity, and its 
economic performance, one may well argue that Czechoslovakia was one of the countries 
where ideology significantly influenced most spheres of social life (Fialová 2002c).  
This holds especially true for the Slovak lands. The small dissident circles described above 
hardly had any appeal in the Slovak part of the country. During the Prague Spring 
189 Linz/Stephan (1996: 316pp) classify Czechoslovakia as „frozen post-totalitarianism“ with a 
dogmatic Stalinism that endured intact after Stalin’s death. After the suppression of the Prague Spring 
and “the largest purge of Communist Party membership in the history of Eastern Europe” (ibid: 318) 
reform-minded Communists were few and quiet. Also Elster/Offe (1998: 42) point out that communist 
governments in CEE exercised their rule in different ways with Poland and Hungary as the most liberal 
regimes, Romania the most repressive regime and with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR 
ranking somewhere in between. 
190 For a more detailed description of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, see:Goldmann (1997: 
113pp), Glenn (2001: 45pp; 61pp). 
191 This was the case with the “Komarek report” by Valtr Komarek, director of the Forecasting 
Institute of the Academy of Sciences. The report called for a market-driven economy to prevent 
Czechoslovakia from sinking to the level of a Third World country by 2010 (see Goldman 1997: 119p). 
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liberalization tendencies were also largely dominated by Czechs (Mansfeldová 1998: 14).192 
In the communist period, the traditionally agricultural Slovak lands experienced a belated 
economic modernization based on heavy industry. This was additionally accompanied by 
social achievements. As a result, the communist regime quickly gained prominence:  
“This modernization of industrial type was marked by a period of social engineering; 
it was followed by social rights, applied before and separately from political rights, and 
it was broadly perceived as successful” … “Slovakia, as a more traditional society 
originally (after World War II) did not desire socialism; later it was intrigued by it 
because of its state paternalism, collectivism, closeness, egalitarianism, 
redistributiveness, authoritarianism, and anti-intellectualism (Krivý, Feglová, Balko 
1996: 40p cit. in Fialová 2002c: 5pp).  
Not until the end of the 1980s did Slovakia experience some oppositional tendencies and 
signs of civil society development. Whereas demonstrations in the Czech lands took place on 
the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion (on August 21st in 1988 and 1989) or on the 
anniversary of the suicide of Jan Palach (in January 1989), demonstrations in the Slovak part 
of the country were largely influenced by Catholicism. The first mass demonstration against 
the regime that took place in March 1988 was the “candle demonstration” on the feast day of 
Lord’s Annunciation in Bratislava. More than 10,000 people protested against the violation of 
the rights of believers (Glenn 2001: 228). In all of Czechoslovakia several smaller civic 
initiatives and organizations sprang up.193 However civic activity remained much stronger in 
the Czech in comparison to the Slovak lands (Mansfeldová 1998: 16). 
Unlike the “Civic Forum”, the Czech oppositional movement formed in the velvet revolution of 
November 1989, its Slovak counterpart “Public Against Violence” (Verejnost’ Proti Nasili; 
VPN) included not only anti-communists but also further reform communists and even 
communists holding top positions in the state apparatus (Samson 2001: 368). In this manner, 
the movement did not have the capacity to bring to power a democratic elite. Instead, one 
successor of the VPN, the ruling party of Vladimir Mečiar, the “Movement for a democratic 
Slovakia” (Hnuti za Demokraticke Slovensko, HZDS) consisted of former communists that 
quickly took on a nationalist and populist rhetoric (ibid). Vladimir Mečiar ruled the country 
from 1993-1998 with a nine-month interruption by the government of Jozef Moravčík in 1994. 
After the 1994 elections Mečiar’s HZDS entered a coalition with the far-right, nationalist 
“Slovak National Party” (SNS) and a populist leftist movement, the “Association of Workers of 
Slovakia” (ZRS). The nationalist-left wing coalition clearly showed authoritarian political 
192 Fialová (2002c: 14) points out: “… the events of 1968 were of Czech origin and the Slovak 
intelligentsia took only a small part in it. Even those Slovak personalities of 1968 who were on the top 
of the events (A. Dubček) were not regarded as Slovaks by the domestic or international public”. 
193 The major civic initiatives were: the democratic initiative, the independent peace movement, the 
peace club John Lennon, the movement for civic freedoms (HOS) and the club for social recreation 
(Mansfeldová 1998: 14, footnote 7). 
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tendencies, including “disrespect for the rule of law, favoritism, corruption, the intertwining of 
crime with politics and a confrontational nationalist policy” (Bútora / Bútorová 1999: 80). With 
its combination of populism and nationalism it appealed to the elderly and the rural 
population who largely feared economic and political reforms.  
8.1.3 Summary: Cultural Preconditions of Civil Society in Slovakia 
Due to the historic developments described above, the late independence, nominal 
democratic and associational experiences, the traditional and rural character of Slovak 
society, the lacking middle class and intelligentsia, and the belated modernization, most 
analysts describe the pre-conditions for civil society in Slovakia as rather unfavorable.194 
According to Fialová (2002c), political culture in Slovakia is characterized by a passive 
attitude towards the state and politics in general. The culture of self-help is poorly developed 
and strong dependency on the state has a long tradition. The Slovak emancipation, which 
focused on traditional rural life patterns and aimed to counterweight liberal Hungarianism 
resulted in anti-liberal attitudes and did not prove capable of breaking patterns of traditional 
collectivist life. Societal ties are not characterized by trust in Putman’s sense, nor can they be 
described as associative. Instead they remain collectivist and gemeinschaftlich. Distrust 
prevails and distrust in politics and politicians is particularly regarded as part of Slovak 
cultural heritage. Additionally, equalitarianism is highly valued among Slovak citizens. 
However, ‘equal’ is not understood in terms of ‘equal rights’ of equal citizens, but in economic 
terms. Social justice and social rights prevail over civil rights. In sum, Slovak history is 
marked by little experience with free civic activity. The goal of the next section is to determine 
the extent to which this history challenges the development of civil society in Slovakia after 
the demise of authoritarian rule.  
194 See e.g. Fialová (2002b and 2002c), Buerkle (2002a), Vašečka (2002a), Mihalikova (2004). 
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8.2 The belated Liberalization – The Rise of Civil Society in 
Slovakia 
The following section investigates civil society development in Slovakia throughout the 
1990s. The analysis is guided by indicators of the structural and cultural dimension of civil 
society identified in chapter two. It focuses on (1) the rise of NGOs in quantitative terms; (2) 
the main areas of organized civic activity outside state and market; (3) regional dispersion of 
associational life; (4) civic participation; (5) the relationship between state authorities and civil 
society organizations; and (6) the type of relationship between civil society organizations.195  
In doing so, the section will focus on three time periods: the period from the demise of 
communist rule until the partition of Czechoslovakia (1989-1992), Slovakia under Mečiar’s 
rule (1993-1998), and the period following the elections of 1998 (1998-2002). It will be 
demonstrated that despite the previously outlined cultural preconditions effecting civil society 
development and the authoritarian tendencies under Vladimir Mečiar’s rule civil society in 
Slovakia advanced on the structural and cultural dimension in the period under investigation. 
Moreover, instead of hampering civil society development, the period of repression triggered 
it.  
8.2.1 Quantity of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Focusing on the size of organized civic activity in Slovakia, it can be stated that – like in other 
Central European states – the number of non-governmental organizations has risen rapidly 
since the breakdown of communist rule in 1989. Whereas in 1992 7,000 NGOs were 
registered, the number cumulated to 17,844 registered non-governmental organizations by 
195 The analysis profits greatly from the following studies on NGOs in Slovakia: The first source is 
the annual “Global Report on the State of Society” of the Institute of Public Affairs in Bratislava which 
regularly contains a section on NGO development (Bútora et al 1997, 1998), (Mesežnikov et al 1999; 
2001). Secondly, the analysis draws on the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project 
conducted by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies. The project analyzes the 
nonprofit sector in 28 countries on a comparative basis (see Anheier/Salamon 1999). Thirdly, the 
analysis greatly profits from a SDI project on civil society in Slovakia (Vaśečka (ed.) 2002). The 
Service Center for the Third Sector, associatied with the Slovak Academic Information Agency (SAIA-
SCTS), a non-profit seeking NGO, also maintains a database on NGOs and publish directories of 
NGOs. One has to note, however, that the SAIA-SCTS database is not a complete list of NGOs active 
in Slovakia. The database only includes those organizations that chose to register with SAIA which 
may create a bias. The database thus tends to under-represent certain types of organizations such as 
sport and hobby clubs (see also Demeš 2001: 472). Unfortunately, alternative data from the Statistical 
Office is not available. At any rate, one can expect that the SAIA database only consist of active 
NGOs. Finally, this analysis draws on the findings of the DPP survey conducted among Polish and 
Slovak NGOs in 2002/03 (see appendix 8). The Slovak sample is based on the SAIA-SCTS database 
which implies that it may depict the same bias.  
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April 2000 (Demeś 2001: 471), including approximately 3,000 church organizations (ibid: 
483).196 According to the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, which 
measures the size of the nonprofit sector with economic indicators, the Slovak NGO sector in 
1996 is slightly less developed than its counterparts in the other Visegrad countries. With 
0.9% of total non-agricultural employment, Slovakia ranges below the CEE average of 1.1% 
of total employment (Poland 1%) (Woleková et al 1999: 360). However, if volunteers are 
included, the share increase to 1.2% - the same share as in Poland (Leś et al 1999: 328). 
Table 8 illustrates that the major rise of NGOs took place in the years 1990 and 1992-93, 
when the largest number of NGOs registered with the Interior Ministry.197 The DPP survey, 
which is based on the SAIA-SCTS database, indicates a second “wave” of NGO formations 
between 1993 and 1996. Only 20% of the surveyed NGOs report having been founded 
between 1989 and 1992. The largest share (44%) started to operate between 1993 and 
1996, a period Michal Vašečka refers to as the phase of “emancipation of civil society” which 
was followed in 1997 by a period of “(political) mobilization”.198  
 
 
196 One has to note, however, that not all registered non-governmental organizations are active and 
not all consider themselves as part of the “Third Sector”. Demeš (1999: 349) estimates in 1999 that of 
the then 13.6 thousand registered NGOs, 1300 to 2000 “take an active part in shaping the Third 
Sector identity”. 
197 Vašečka (2002a: 1) attributes the rise of NGOs in these years to the burgeoning demand for 
social and educational services and a natural response to the freedom of association that was not 
possible under the previous authoritarian regime. Note that the peak of registrations in 1997 is largely 
due to a new registration law from 1996 that required foundations to re-register. 
198 According to Vašečka (2002a: 2p) the development of civil society in Slovakia occurred in four 
chronological phases: (1) “diversification”, marking a period of rapid growth of NGOs starting in 
November 1989; (2) “consolidation”, starting in 1992/93 and marking an increasing professionalisation 
of the non-governmental sector; (3) “emancipation”, a period starting in 1994 with the incorporation of 
Mečiar’s rule and initiated by an uneasy cooperation with government; and finally (4) “(political) 
mobilization” of NGOs, which manifested itself in various campaigns starting in 1997, parallel to the 
deterioration of political and legislative conditions for NGOs. In Vašečka’s view, the professionalism of 
NGOs as well as their self-identity, coherence, and self-consciousness as a “community of involved 
people” rose over these various periods.  
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Source: own calculations based on Vašečka (2002a: 4) 
8.2.2 Composition 
If we turn to the composition of non-state, non-economic civic activity, the picture again looks 
different, when the analysis is based on absolute numbers or on paid employment (see 
similar observations in the Polish case, chap. 7.2.1). According to the DPP survey in 
Slovakia, most NGOs focus on issues concerning the youth, culture and education (32%; 
Poland: 24%), followed by social services (19%; Poland: 30%). Further important issues are 
ecology with 11% of NGOs (Poland 1%), and human rights issues (8%; Poland: 3%). 
Decentralization also ranks high on the agenda of Slovak NGOs (9% of NGOs are active in 
this area). However, this is much lower than in Poland (17%). Moreover, little attention is 
given to economic development (4%; Poland: 10%). 4% of NGOs aim to support the NGO 
sector and 15% regard it as a further important area of activity (Poland: 3% / 19%).199 
According to the Johns Hopkins data, the majority of non-profit seeking organizations (37%) 
focus on culture and recreation, just like in other CEE countries. Education comes seconds 
with 29% of paid employment, followed by professional organizations (including unions) 
(10%), and environment and advocacy (10%). Social services, health care and development 
rank low with 5%, 2%, and 1% of paid employment respectively (Woleková et al 1999: 361).  
                                                
199 See appendix 8, table 26. These findings roughly correspond with the SAIA-SCTS database 
according to which most NGOs in 2000 focused on helping children (32%) and education and science 
(28%). NGOs are also active in humanity and charity (16%), culture (10%), the environment (7%), 
human rights (5%) and community initiatives (2%) (Demeš 2001: 472). 
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These figures are particularly interesting in comparison with the CEE and the West European 
average. In the case of Poland, it has already been argued that the Johns Hopkins data 
reveal the old and the new faces of civic activities in CEE that organize outside the state and 
market (see chap. 7.2.1). In comparison with Western Europe, we witness in CEE on the one 
hand an oversized sector in the following areas: sports / recreation, professional 
organizations / unions, and environment/advocacy. On the other hand, the areas social 
services, health and education are markedly under-developed. These findings are even more 
striking in the Slovak case. Although the figures for recreation and professional organizations 
roughly correspond with the CEE average200, the share of paid employment in the field of 
environment/advocacy at 10% is higher in Slovakia than the CEE average (6%) and by far 
higher than in Western Europe (3%). The same holds true for private education (Slovakia: 
29%; CEE-average: 18%; Western Europe: 28%) (Anheier/Salamon 1999: 17). In the same 
vein, the field of social services and health care are distinctly underdeveloped, compared 
even to other CEE countries (ibid).  
The findings of the two studies suggest that the new face of organized non-state, nonprofit-
seeking civic activity in Slovakia is marked by highly professional organizations active in 
environmental protection and advocacy, private education, and a feeble but evolving social 
sector that lacks financial resources and paid labor. In contrast to Poland, like Slovakia a 
catholic country with a strong charity tradition, fewer organizations deliver social services and 
the ones who do possess fewer material means to employ labor. Woleková (1999: 363) 
attributes both the underdeveloped social service and health sector as well as the highly 
developed environment/advocacy sector to the peculiarities of the Mečiar regime. The small 
share of employment in health and social services “... very likely reflects the determination of 
the post-1989 governments to keep firm control over these two crucial welfare fields“. 
Hospitals remain state-owned. Moreover, private health care providers are legally defined as 
commercial organizations. Besides that, the state maintained social services established 
during communist times. The organizational strength of new initiatives in the area of 
education, advocacy, and environment are in her opinion a direct result of “the crucial role 
that civic organizations have played in the post communist development of this country“ (ibid: 
364). The authoritarian tendencies of the Mečiar government triggered opposition inside 
NGOs, and also pushed oppositional leaders into NGOs. The operational effectiveness and 
unity of NGOs and not least the Western attention and support they received is thus widely 
regarded as a result of Mečiar’s rule. I will come back to this point later.  
200 In the field of recreation work, 37% of paid employment in Slovakia and 35% by the CEE 
average. 10% of paid employers in Slovakia work in professional unions work, as compared to the 
CEE average 11% (Woleková 1999: 361). 
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8.2.3 Regional Distribution 
A further striking feature of the NGO sector in Slovakia is its unequal regional distribution. 
The majority of NGOs, namely 35%, are located in the capital Bratislava (SAIA-SCTS 
2000b). The urban centers Košice, Banská Bystrica and Prešov are further strongholds of 
NGO activity with 12%, 10% and 10% of NGOs respectively (ibid). The concentration of 
NGOs in urban centers is further visible if one focuses on the number of inhabitants per 
NGO. In Bratislava there are 716 inhabitants per NGO, Košice has only 2487 inhabitants per 
NGO. In Trencin, the city with least inhabitants per NGO, the ratio is 3547 to 1.201 The 
unequal regional distribution of NGOs corresponds with regional socioeconomic disparities 
between Eastern and Western Slovakia and urbanized and rural areas. In 2001 the share of 
GDP per capita in Eastern Slovakia equals 39% of the EU average (Slovak average: 49% of 
the EU GDP average). In contrast, the GDP per capita in Bratislava amounts to 99% of EU 
average. The unemployment in Bratislava reaches roughly 7% whereas it amounts to 26% in 
the rural areas (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 1).202  
8.2.4 Civic Participation and Volunteerism  
The next indicator I turn to is civic participation. Organisational membership in Slovakia is low 
as is the case in other CEE countries. According to the 1995-97 World Values Survey 
organizational membership in Slovakia reached 12,6% (Howard 2003:65p).203  According to 
a public opinion survey of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO, Inštitút pre verejné otázky) 
conducted in 1999, Slovakia experienced an increase in political mobilization in 1998, which 
manifested itself in a high voter turnout to parliamentary elections. Other forms of civic 
participation were in 1998 frequently used. 49% of respondents reported that they signed a 
petition at least once; 24% joined a group or organization pursuing their interest; 17% 
attended protest demonstrations (Bútorová / Gyárfášova / Velšic 1999: 151). Volunteerism 
continued to rise. According to the Volunteer Center of SAIA-SCTS, interest in volunteer work 
grew during 1997, and approximately 19% of the population was involved in some volunteer 
activity (Demeš 1999: 350). However, the optimistic expectations of large parts of the 
population towards the future quickly dwindled in view of political struggles and conflicts 
201 These findings correspond with the DPP survey: The largest share of Slovak NGOs covered by 
the survey are located in the capital (44%). Moreover, 48% report to mainly operate on the national 
level. A surprising share of 14% of NGOs sees the international level as their main field of operation 
(see appendix 8, table 26, question 8). 
202 It is worthwhile to note that the regional disparity of NGOs corresponds not only with socio-
economic disparities but also with voter orientation (see Krivý 1999: 65, see also section 8.2.5.). 
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within the ruling coalition and a growing unemployment rate.204 The ratio of dissatisfied 
people grew from 34% in January 1999 to 59% in March 2000 (Bútorová / Gyárfášova / 
Velšic 2001: 199). The disappointment of citizens with politics translated in less participation 
in public life. In 2002 the organizations ETP Slovakia and Ekopolis Foundation remarked “… 
the participation of citizens in NGO activities has dropped from 25 to 16% in the last five 
years” (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 2).  
8.2.5 Ties Between Non-Governmental Organizations and Within Civil 
Society 
The following section will demonstrate that the ties between Slovak NGOs are marked by 
cooperation and good working relations as well as by a striking degree of unity and cohesion. 
Many groups of NGOs joined coalitions or umbrella organizations.205 Moreover, the Third 
Sector in Slovakia is very well organized. This is firstly the result of the Stupava Conference, 
an annual gathering of NGOs. Seconldy, in Slovakia an effective body representing NGO 
interests exists called, “Gremium of the Third Sector” (G3S). This committee, which is 
regularly elected at the Stupava Conference, is widely accepted as the voice of NGOs in 
Slovakia. The following will briefly portray the Stupava Conferences and the G3S. Moreover, 
the questions will be raised as to the extent to which the strong cohesion among NGOs is 
likely to persist after the downfall of the “common enemy” Vladimir Mečiar and whether the 
NGO sector is more likely to unite the fragmented Slovak society or deepen existing 
cleavages.  
 
203 Thereby membership varies according to the type of organization: church or religious (29%), 
sports or recreational (22%), labor union (19%); political party (7%), professional (7%), charitable 
(5%), environmental (5%), educational/cultural or artistic (6%), other (13%). See Howard (2003:65p). 
204 For a detailed account of the internal problems of the coalition see: Mesežnikov (2001: 27pp). 
For an account of the economic situation of Slovakia after the 1998 elections see: Jakoby et al (2001).  
205 Examples are: the Slovak Humanity Council (SHR), an umbrella of charity NGOs that was the 
largest umbrella organization in Slovakia in 1995 with 115 members; the Slovak Catholic Charity 
(SKCH), an umbrella organization of Catholic charity NGOs; the Slovak Youth Council (RMS), an 
umbrella of NGOs focusing on children and youth; Tree of Life, the umbrella organization of 
environmental NGOs; the Slovak Association of Nature and Country Protectors (SZOPK), a further 
umbrella organization of environmental NGOs; and finally the Association of Civil Associations in 
Slovakia. 
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The Stupava Conference 
The Stupava Conference is an annual gathering of NGOs and their representatives. It is the 
largest annual meeting of NGOs in Slovakia. The first conference took place in 1991 in 
former Czechoslovakia. It was initiated by Slovak and foreign charity foundations whose aim 
was the advancement of civil society in Czechoslovakia (Charta 77 Foundation, Slovak 
Academic Information Agency (SAIA), Jan Hus Foundation Brno, European Cultural 
Foundation).206 After the split-up of the country, Slovak participants of the first conference 
created the “Gremium of the Stupava conference of Slovak NGOs” in March 1993 and 
founded the “Service Center for the Third Sector”, a subsection of SAIA, as a permanent 
organizer of the Stupava conferences (see chapter 8.4.1). The Stupava conference provides 
a platform of debate for main issues of concern for NGOs. It evaluates the development of 
the Third Sector and determines goals for the following year. Moreover, the Stupava 
conferences, which are open to all NGOs, democratically elect the so-called “Gremium of the 
Third Sector”, thus establishing an effective organ of NGOs. Since 1997 the Stupava 
conference is supplemented by regional gatherings of NGOs, which elect Regional Gremia of 
the Third Sector (RG3S). Table 9 provides an overview of the Stupava conferences from 
1991 to the year 2000. It is clear that the early conferences mainly focus on operational 
issues relevant for NGOs such as a respective NGO and tax law or questions of funding or 
volunteerism. This focus shifted in 1997 when the Stupava conference actively discussed the 
political role of NGOs and debated the participation of NGOs in political and pre-election 
activities. This debate resulted in an encompassing pre-election campaign of Slovak NGOs 
called “OK ‘98” that aimed to motivate especially the young to vote (see chapter 8.4.4). 
The Gremium of the Third Sector (G3S) 
The Gremium of the Third Sector was firstly elected at the second Stupava Conference in 
1994 as an organ representing different types of NGOs. Since then the annually elected 14-
16 members of the G3S represent the following areas of NGO activity: humanity and charity, 
environment, education, youth, culture, human rights and minority issues, and community 
initiatives. The G3S consists of volunteering representatives of NGOs. According to the SAIA 
webpage the G3S pursues the following tasks: (1) to develop partner relations with 
representatives of the state, local governments, the business sector and unions as well as 
206 One may note that the Stupava Conferences had a presuccessor. In August 1990 a conference 
on foundations and the volunteer sector in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic took place in 
Bratislava, which was attended by over 50 participants and foreign experts from the USA, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Australia, and Central and Eastern Europe. The Department of Education, Youth and 
Sport in the Slovak Republic, and the Faculty of Law of Comenius University organized the conference 
in co-operation with the Rockefeller Foundation. See: www.saia.sk/stupavska_konferencia/indexe.htm.  
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with international non-governmental organizations; (2) to defend and pursue the interests of 
NGOs, (3) to develop cooperation and solidarity within the Third Sector; and (4) to explain 
and publicize the task of the Third Sector at home and abroad.207 In fulfilling these tasks the 
G3S receives administrative support from SAIA-SCTS, which functions as the secretariat of 
the G3S. The G3S played a leading role in the negotiations about legislation concerning non-
governmental organizations with the government and acted as a coordinating body for the 
major campaigns of the NGO sector such as the SOS campaign and the election campaign 
“OK ‘98" (see below). The G3S further cooperates closely with various umbrella 
organizations and the Donor forum (Vašečka 2002c: 14). 
207 See: www.saia.sk/g3s/indexe.htm 
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Table  9 Topics and Participation on the Stupava Conferences 
No. Year Title, Location Major Topics Participants 
1 1991 “The Conference of 
Foundations in the 
Czechoslovak Federal 
Republic”, Stupava 
Available information on NGOs; tax 
and legislative conditions for NGOs 
24 participants from 
Slovakia, 34 from the 
Czech Republic, 20 
from abroad 
2 1994 “Present and Future 
Perspectives of the 
Third Sector in 
Slovakia, Stupava 
Legislative context; cooperation 
within the sector; transparency of 
public grant policy; professionalism 
of NGO activists; first election of a 
16 member G3S  
150 domestic 
participants, 20 foreign 
guests 
3 1995 “The Third Sector and 
the Civil Society”, 
Bratislava 
Role of NGOs in civil society; legal 
and tax context of NGOs 
250 domestic 
participants, 20 foreign 
guests 
4 1996 “The Third Sector - We 
Serve the Citizens”, 
Banská Bystrica 
Community initiatives; cross-sectoral 
cooperation; legal assistance; media 
and public relations; organization of 
independent pre-conferences of five 
sections; meeting of donors 
190 domestic, 20 
foreign participants 
5 1997 “The Third Sector – 
Actively Working for 
Democracy”, Košice 
Creation of a network of regional 
gremia; funding opportunities; 
“Donors’ Forum”; legislative issues; 
upcoming elections 
250 domestic, 30 
foreign participants 




Analysis of NGO activities in the 
civic campaign for free and fair 
elections „OK ‘98“. 
400 NGO 
representatives, plus 
politicians and foreign 
guests 




Modification of election of G3S; 
strengthening of regional gremia 
 
7 2000 “Let People 
Cooperate”, Poprad 
Cooperation between government 
and civil society; regional 
development; decentralization; 
Slovak EU integration; definition of 
the Third Sector; transparency; 
ethics within the Third Sector 
405 participants 
Source: Own summary based on: www.saia.sk/stupavska_konferencia/indexe.htm, Bútora / 
Demeš (1998: 4, 15p, 21), Demeš (2001: 488) 
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The common aim of the G3S elected in 1999 read as follows: 
“Our common aim is to build a civil society in Slovakia, a society of free and active 
citizens who do not wait but act for the public benefit. Our basic aim is to achieve an 
equal status of NGOs in providing of public-benefit services and activities for citizens 
and their equal access to public resources” (www.saia.sk/g3s/declaration.htm). 
Thanks to the G3S and the Stupava Conference, the Third Sector in Slovakia is marked by 
intense cooperation structures as well as strong unity and cohesion. One has to note, 
however, that this cohesion is largely the result of the confrontation with a repressive 
government. One may doubt whether the united front of NGOs will be maintained after the 
downfall of the “common enemy”, the Mečiar administration. As Pavol Demeš (1999: 355) 
points out:  
“Under the Mečiar government, the Third Sector developed for several years under 
state pressure, which considerably helped to increase its cohesion. In the future it will 
probably be more difficult to maintain the spirit of sector-wide cooperation, and a 
certain fragmentation and the creation of new types of groups can be expected”. 
It thus comes as no surprise that fragmentation tendencies are visible. Since 1997 regional 
G3S offices that exist in all of the seven Slovak regions have supplemented the G3S. Since 
then a process of decentralization took place which strengthens the increasingly active 
regional offices of the G3S. This process cumulated in 1999 in a modified format of the G3S. 
Like that, the regional gremia had been strengthend and the domination of capital based 
NGOs came to end (Demeš 1999: 355). Along with that, certain issue-oriented NGOs choose 
to create their own platform of debate. For example, in 1997 environmental groups created 
their own representative body known as Ekoforum (interview Koštálová). 
A process of fragmentation is, however, not necessarily negative for civil society 
development. On the contrary, the fragmentation of different organizations that represent 
different constituencies and interests has to be regarded as a way towards civil society based 
on plural interests and different wants. The question remains, however, to what extent are 
divergent interests capable of cooperating and/or applying civil conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. One can state that in Slovakia the fragmentation tendency is unlikely to hinder 
peaceful relationships among NGOs. This expectation is grounded in the fact that even the 
Mečiar-friendly “Union of Civic Associations and Foundations” attended the Stupava 
Conference in 1999 and that environmental NGOs who left the G3S, declared their interest in 
future cooperation. Moreover, NGOs that perceive themselves as part of the Third Sector 
hold cooperative and friendly contact to other non-state organizations. The G3S for example 
established cooperative ties with the “Confederation of Trade Unions” (KOZ) and the 
“Associations of Employers Unions and Associations” (AZZZ) already in 1996. Both 
organizations declared their support of NGOs in legislative and other issues. Several 
common conferences cemented cooperation and information exchange (Vaśečka 2002: 16p).  
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Having said this, one should bear in mind that the NGOs described above and the Third 
Sector may not fully represent the heterogeneous Slovak society. Slovakia is an ethnically 
divided state with a large Hungarian minority (10.7%) and a growing Roma and Sinti minority 
(2.5%).208 Furthermore, socio-economic disparities between Eastern and Western Slovakia 
and especially between urbanized and rural areas prevail.209 The differences in 
unemployment, GDP and real wages translate into different political attitudes and party 
affinity:  
“Support for democratic principles is not evenly distributed in the population … More 
advocates of democratic principles are among people with higher education, the young 
and middle-aged generations, members of the Hungarian ethnic minority, and residents 
of large cities. … These political cleavages have been visible during the whole period 
of Slovakia’s independence” (Bútorová / Gyárfášová / Velšic 2001: 216). 
The rural-urban divide further manifests itself in electoral results. Whereas the HZDS-SNS 
coalition was mainly supported in rural areas, the SDK, SDL and SOP have stronger roots in 
urban centers (Krivý 1999: 65).210 An exception to the rule is Southern Slovakia, which is 
predominantly rural. Nonetheless, the oppositional parties, namely the Hungarian SMK 
received broad support due to the predominantly Hungarian population. As shown above, the 
regional and urban-rural divide in Slovakia also manifests itself in the development of NGOs 
who are still predominant in urban areas.  
NGO leaders are aware of this problem and aim to address it. Pavol Demeš (2001: 490) 
comes to the conclusion:  
“Leaders of the Third Sector rightly feel that a lack of cooperation and excessive 
fragmentation within society may seriously hinder the development and modernization 
of Slovakia. It will be interesting to observe how representatives of the public sector 
react to this challenge, and whether NGOs will be able to communicate that message 
to the wider public”.  
208 Additionally several small minorities live in Slovakia: Czechs (1%), Ukrainian (0.3%), German 
(0.1%), Polish (0.1%). See: Goldman (1997: 117). 
209 A glance at the high regional disparity of unemployment figures and wages makes this point 
clear. By the end of 1999, exactly one half of Slovakia’s districts had an unemployment rate higher 
than 20% (average unemployment rate in 2000: 19,1%); in 10 districts, predominantly rural areas, it 
exceeded 30%. Similarly, there are clear regional disparities in wages with Bratislava and Košice as 
areas of high wages, and 12 districts, seven of which are in the eastern Prešov region, with average 
wages that are more than 25% below the overall average wage (Woleková / Radičová 2001: 369). 
210 One may note that this divide is not a recent phenomenon. Karen Buerkle (2002a: 6) 
demonstrates that the national-populist Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party that dominated the Slovak 
political scene in the 1930s and the HZDS of Vladimir Mečiar have drawn their strength from the same 
regions within Slovakia.  
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8.2.6 Relations Between Non-Governmental Organizations and State 
Authorities 
In Slovakia the relationship between civil society organizations and state authorities in the 
period of investigation depended highly on the government in office. Roughly three relevant 
time periods can be distinguished: 1990 – 1992, 1993 - 1998 and from 1998 through 2000. 
During the early years of the new Czechoslovak state (1989-1993) the relationship between 
NGOs and government in the Slovak lands were “promising” (Vašečka 2002a: 2). A number 
of NGOs sprang up that were largely characterized by amateurism and a lack of financial 
resources. The government of the Slovak federation slowly started to approach the issue of 
civil society and NGOs. Single ministries established cooperative bonds with NGOs and 
provided financial support (Woleková 1999: 367).  
Already after the elections of 1992 and even more so after the establishment of the 
nationalist-populist left-right coalition under Vladimir Mečiar in 1994, the feeble bonds of 
cooperation between NGOs and government authorities broke, and the relationship was 
marked by a growing tension. In the words of Michal Vaśečka (2002a: 1):  
“… almost all post-communist European governments were suspicious and 
distrustful of NGOS and were reluctant to support them. Still, in the Slovak case it 
became clear during the Mečiar years that the government and the non-governmental 
sector could not only not cooperate but they could hardly coexist…”. 
The fierce relationship was partly due to the fact that the NGO sector in Slovakia manifested 
itself as a major oppositional force during the Mečiar years. Mansfeldová (1998: 15) points 
out, that oppositional Slovak intellectuals drew back from the political scene into civil society. 
In face of lacking political opportunities, political opponents did not enter or found political 
parties, as was the case in other post-communist countries, but instead created non-
governmental organizations. This was compounded by the fact the HZDS government 
closely controlled state administration and scientific institutions, thus leaving intellectuals with 
few prospects to make their living. As a result, there was a mushrooming of private schools, 
foundations, independent institutes and associations after 1992 and especially in 1993 
(Fialová 2002c: 15).211 Fialová argues that in contrast to other Central-European post-
communist states, where the Intelligentsia played a major role in opposing the communist 
regime, intellectuals in Slovakia only took up that role after 1992/93. In previous years, 
Slovak intellectuals were hardly visible in the public scene and if so rather as part of Czech-
dominant dissident circles. Moreover, Slovak intellectuals gained little esteem among the 
211 For example, future prime minister Miklas Dzurinda founded with 9 other dissidents (four of 
which became ministers after 1998) the economic think tank MESA 10.  
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Slovak population with its belief in equalitarianism and its distrust towards any kind of elite 
(ibid: 13). Only with the establishment of several oppositional NGOs and the transformation 
of Slovak intellectuals into civil society leaders, the Slovak intelligentsia started to play a 
major role in the restructuring of the country. By these means, an oppositional movement 
formed in Slovakia under the label “Third Sector”.  
The Mečiar government answered the burgeoning oppositional stance of the NGO sector 
with containment, attacks and repression. The government denied the largely oppositional 
oriented NGOs any right to a say in a matter. 
“…the struggle by NGO leaders to gain the attention of policy makers has been 
particularly difficult since the Slovak elections in 1994 that resulted in the … coalition 
government headed by Prime Minister Mečiar” (Bútora / Demeš 1998: 2).  
The conflict came to a climax when the government passed three laws on NGOs which were 
highly criticized by leading NGOs: the law on foundations in 1996, the law on non-investment 
funds, i.e., charity organizations that do not have an endowment (1997), and the law on 
Nonprofit Organizations Providing Beneficial Public Services (1997). In particular the law on 
foundations, which required the re-registration of all existing foundations under conditions 
most foundations could not fulfill, was regarded as a major attack on the NGO sector. 
Leading NGOs launched in response a campaign called “Third Sector SOS Campaign”. The 
campaign, which involved intensive media coverage, aimed to inform the public about NGOs 
and the negative consequences of the law. Despite several lobbying activities the law 
nonetheless passed (see in greater detail chapter 8.4.4).  
The hostile attitude of the government was further visible in various attacks by governmental 
representatives and politicians towards single NGOs or the NGO sector. One parliamentarian 
declared  
“There is a burning need to introduce order into the non-transparent jungle of the 
10000 clubs, civil associations and foundations in Slovakia whose activities are in 
conflict with the interests of the citizens of this country” (Hofbauer 1995 cit. in Bútova / 
Demeš 1998: 9).  
Especially the international financial support to civil society organizations raised criticism of 
HZDS politicians as the following quote depicts:  
“... foundations represent the most generous flow of uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
finances of a controversial nature and unknown usage ... also for purposes discordant 
with state interests and the interests of our citizens … it seems that in the name of 
plurality, democracy and freedom has grown something (that is, NGOs) that has almost 
nothing in common with these noble concepts “ (cited in Vašečka 2002b: 6).  
A further attempt of the government to contain NGO activities comprised various activities 
that aimed to install a “parallel structure” of government-friendly NGOs. For example, at the 
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beginning of 1997 a new umbrella organization named “the Union of Civic Associations and 
Foundations” was founded. It was clearly an attempt of the government to install an 
alternative to the Gremium of the Third Sector and thus to undermine its legitimacy (Bútora / 
Demeš 1998: 19). The Union publicly condemned the pre-election campaign “OK ‘98”. 
However, the success of the “OK ‘98” campaign and the positive public opinion of NGOs in 
Slovakia demonstrate that this attempt largely failed (see chapter 8.4.4). Its chairman 
abandoned the Union of Civic Associations and Foundations at the beginning of 1999. 
Afterwards it showed its willingness to cooperate with the G3S and participated in the sixth 
Stupava conference (Demeš 1999: 356). However, in 2000 it reduced its activities (Demeš 
2001: 472). 
Relations between NGO and governmental representatives improved clearly after the 1998 
elections. The new government expressed its desire to “fully develop civil society” as the 
seventh main goal of its governmental program, and several ministries invited 
representatives of NGOs to join advisory bodies (Richterová 2000: 49).212 Prime Minister 
Mikláś Dzurinda met in 1999 with representatives of the G3S and offered partnership 
between government and NGOs. Several meetings between NGOs and parliamentarians 
organized by the Slovak Humanity Council (SHR) followed. The Environment Ministry 
created a liaison officer for relations with NGOs in 1999. A Cabinet Council for NGOs 
consisting of representatives of the state administration and NGOs was established with the 
aim of supporting NGOs. Moreover, state authorities started to contract out services to NGOs 
(Demeš 2001: 480), and governmental funding for NGOs rose from 864 million crowns in 
1999 to 978 million crowns in the year 2000 (ibid: 478).  
One has to note, however, that the cooperation with the government did not completely fulfill 
the expectations of NGOs that were convinced that they ensured the electoral victory of the 
government. NGO activists perceive the progress on NGO legislation as slow and 
unsatisfactory. The foundation law was reformed only in 2002. The required start-up 
endowment is perceived by parts of the NGO sector as far too high.  
212 For example, representatives of G3S and the Slovak Youth Council became members of the 
newly created Consultation Committee for European Integration of the Slovak Government’s 
Ministerial Council. The Environment Minister signed an agreement on co-operation with an 
environmental NGO and the Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Family appointed independent NGO 
representatives to the ministry’s grant-allocation commission. The Agriculture Minister assigned an 
NGO representative to the commission for the Rural Development Plan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
created an advisory group consisting of foreign affairs experts from NGOs. The Education Minister 
invited representatives of the Youth Council to the ministry’s grant-allocating commissions, and the 
Ministry of Justice included NGO representatives to the foundation law drafting commission (Vašečka 
2002a: 18p). 
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The Law on Non-Investment Funds adopted in 1997 will not be re-defined, and the public 
benefit status of NGOs is still not clearly defined (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 6). The limited public 
funds are criticized, as well as the non-transparent and unclear grant policies (Vašečka 
2002a: 12). Nonetheless, in comparison with the relationship between NGOs and the 
previous government, and even in comparison with other CEE countries, one can state that 
the government accepts NGOs in Slovakia as useful and welcome partners, whose voice is 
heard in policy making. As Katarína Koštálová from SAIA pointed out:  
“The government understands that a partnership between NGOs and the 
government is important. And this is already a big step forward” (interview with the 
author).  
The development of organized civic activity in Slovakia during 1994-1998 demonstrates how 
governmental repression may be answered by increasing cooperation and public 
involvement. The question arises, however, whether civic involvement continues once the 
threat of governmental interferences is lifted. Evidence suggest that the Third Sector in 
Slovakia was by the time of government change consolidated enough to continue its 
activities despite the fact that the major objective of a change in government has been 
achieved:  
“Intense Third Sector development and cooperation continued following 1998 
elections …, which proved false the notion that cooperation and solidarity in Slovakia’s 
Third Sector was a reaction to the previous administration’s aversion to the Third 
Sector” (Demeš 2001: 471). 
The various activities of NGOs in the area of NGO training, counseling and public 
awareness-raising continued. Along with that, Slovak NGOs sustained their public policy 
orientation and uphold their willingness to play a role in the political and social development 
of the country. Several new topics and objectives arose on the agenda. A major theme was 
the advancement of NGO law, but also other legislative initiatives in certain issue areas, such 
as social assistance, waste recycling, or the freedom of information, were put forward. 
Further issues at the beginning of the new millennium were decentralization and public 
administration reform, anti-corruption and transparency, minority problems especially 
Romany initiatives, and the integration of Slovakia into the European Union.213  
8.2.7 Summary: The Belated Rise of Civil Society in Slovakia  
Ten years after the demise of communist rule in the Slovak lands and seven years after 
independence civil society in Slovakia is visible, despite a pronounced lack of historical and 
cultural preconditions. Numerous associations and organizations sprang up that aim to 
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represent citizen’s interests and that provide social and other services. In addition to trade 
unions and sport clubs already in existence during communism, newly founded NGOs mainly 
focused on education, human rights, the environment, children and youth, and social 
services. The NGO sector is firstly characterized by relatively strong NGOs focusing on 
advocacy, the environment and human rights issues. Secondly, NGOs dominate in urban 
areas. Besides these “structural” features of civil society in Slovakia, progress is also visible 
in what has been called the “cultural dimension” of civil society. The relationship between 
NGOs is characterized by a strong cohesion and cooperation especially during the Mečiar 
years. The fragmentation of the sector along regional and issue-oriented cleavages, which 
started in 1998, is less the result of a growing animosity inside the sector but the outcome of 
NGOs representing various interests. In opposition to the Mečiar regime a small but highly 
active group of about 2000 NGOs developed that strives for an active citizenry, for public 
participation in political decision-making, and for the respect of civic and human rights and 
democratic principles. With campaigns such as the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” in 1996 
and the pre-election campaign “OK’ 98” in 1998 this active group of NGOs raised public 
awareness and succeeded in overcoming a prevailing political hopelessness mainly among 
the youth and oppositional voters. After the electoral victory of the opposition over the 
nationalist-populist left-right wing coalition of Vladimir Mečiar, NGOs continued to watch 
democratic principles, consulted and cooperated with the new government in various issue 
areas, and continued their approach of transparency and openness towards other social 
groups.  
The Slovak case provides an example how authoritarian tendencies in a political system, 
which allows for a rudimentary degree of free association and free speech at least, may 
result in the emergence of civil society. One may argue that between 1994 and 1998 Slovak 
civil society has been catching up with a development that started already in the 1970s in 
Poland. A dissident and oppositional movement evolved which Slovakia lacked during 
communist times. Moreover, a dichotomy between state and society evolved, which often 
proved to be an important element of liberalization and civil society development in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Unlike other CEE states, Slovakia did not experience this division in the 
past (Vašečka 2002a: 1; Fialová 2002c).214 Henceforth, Slovakia experienced a belated 
liberalization in the 1990s.  
 
213 See ETP/Ekopolis (2002: 7,11); Demeś (2001: 486). 
214  For the importance of a state-society divide as a precondition for democracy, see: Rustow 
(1970).  
 230
Having clarified the state of civil society roughly 10 years after transition, the question arises: 
what are the driving forces behind the rise of civil society in Slovakia described above? It was 
demonstrated that the authoritarian stand of the Mečiar regime that left enough room for 
dissident activities triggered opposition and contributed to the unity and cohesion among 
Slovak NGOs. But to what extent did external civil society assistance enable and shape the 
belated rise of civic activity in Slovakia? To answer this question the next section illustrates 
civil society assistance to Slovakia in the 1990s. This description is followed by an analysis of 
the output and the outcome of external assistance in the form of main recipients, their 
sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness as carriers of civil society.  
8.3 The External Push – Forms and Types of Civil Society 
Assistance in Slovakia 
The following portrays civil society assistance to Slovakia in the period under investigation. 
Unlike the illustration chosen in the Polish case, the following does not proceed in a 
chronological order. Instead the section first pinpoints main donors active in Slovakia and 
their interests. Secondly, the quantity and timing of assistance to civil society in Slovakia is 
assessed. Finally, the section highlights donor strategies. It will be evident that civil society in 
Slovakia resembles civil society assistance in Poland in many respects. However, some 
important differences can be identified: Civil society assistance in Slovakia started at a later 
point in time than in Poland, but was more massive in scale. The strategies of donors were 
more fine-tuned from the beginning, as they were shaped by learning experiences made in 
other cases. And finally, the assistance was more political in character, leaving little doubt 
that its major target was a change in political leadership and an integration of Slovakia into 
Western security structures.  
8.3.1 Main Donors and their Interests 
As in other countries of CEE, a multitude of state and non-state donors have been providing 
civil society assistance to Slovakia. The following will give a brief overview of the main 
donors of civil society assistance in Slovakia with a special emphasis on the four donors 
mentioned above. This section will end with a brief assessment of donors’ interests and aims.  
The most important private foundations in the country have been American philanthropic 
organizations such as the Open Society Foundation of George Soros, the Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers fund, and recently the Trust 
for a Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, a grant-giving organization funded by five 
American foundations that was established in 2000 with the aim of easing the withdrawal of 
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foreign funds in the region. Moreover, independent but state financed democracy promotion 
foundations were prominent, most importantly the US National Endowment for Democracy, 
the Co-operative Dutch Foundations for Central and Eastern Europe, the British Westminster 
Foundation, the Japanese Sasakawa Peace Foundation and Nippon Foundation, the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Additionally, Slovak NGOs 
turn to foreign governments for assistance. Various states established small grant schemes 
administered by their embassies. Prominent examples are the British “Know How Fund” that 
earmarked 2.9 million GBP for Slovak NGOs in 1999. The “MATRA KAP Project” of the Dutch 
Embassy gave 300.000 Dutch Guilders to Slovak NGOs in 1999 and the Canadian 
Embassy's “Canada Fund for Slovakia” distributed 80,000 Canadian Dollars to Slovak NGOs 
between April 1999 and March 2000 (Demeš 2001: 476). The four donors illustrated in this 
work have been active in Slovakia too, although their programs and projects are largely the 
same than in Poland with slight administrative differences due to local needs.  
European Union 
Similar to Poland, the Phare national program includes a program scheme supporting NGOs 
labeled “Civil Society Development Program” (CSD). This program together with the micro 
grants of Phare democracy, Phare Lien and Phare Partnership are administered by the 
independent non-governmental organization “Civil Society Development Foundation” 
(NPOA), specially founded in 1993 with the aim to administer the Phare CSD program and to 
support civil society development (see appendix 3, portray 7). NPOA is highly active in 
strengthening NGOs and the Third Sector. Following the major discussions on the Stupava 
Conference in 1997, NPOA included a democracy component in the CSD program. In 
consequence it was able to finance 50% of the projects supporting the pre-election campaign 
“OK ‘98”. Furthermore, NPOA is a founding member of the Donors’ Forum, an informal group 
of donor organizations that regularly meet with the aim of improving the effectiveness of 
assistance. They coordinate grant-giving, identify recipient needs and demands, exchange 
information on supported projects, and communicate with other donor organizations.  
United States Agency of International Development (USAID) 
USAID started its operation in former Czechoslovakia in 1990.215 Slovak NGOs benefited 
from USAID financing in various issue areas.216 Moreover, like in Poland the NGO support 
215 Between 1990 and 2000 $180 million in SEED Act financing has been provided with the aim of 
promoting and protecting democracy, facilitating political and social change, and assisting the shift to a 
market economy based on a strong private sector. In order to enhance democracy, USAID’ activities 
focused on the establishment of free and fair elections, party formation, local government and public 
administration, education, labor issues, regional development, rule of law, democratic pluralism and a 
vital NGO sector (see also appendix 2, table 5, and aooebdux 5, table 12). 
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program “DemNet Project” operated in Slovakia from 1996 to 1999. It has been implemented 
by the NGO “Foundation for a Civil Society”. To smoothen the process of donor withdrawal 
for NGOs, USAID launched a successor program called “Your Land” administered jointly by 
Ekopolis Foundation and ETP Slovakia.217  
National Endowment of Democracy (NED) 
The NED spent approximately 4.7 million US$ in direct project grants in Slovakia between 
1990 and 1999.218 If one focuses on the areas of NED assistance, a remarkable difference to 
the Polish case is visible. The largest share of grants was spent in favor of Third Sector 
development (25%), followed by electoral assistance (20%) and assistance to economic think 
tanks and economic assistance (12%). In comparison to Poland, support for trade unions 
ranks rather low with 9% of grants. However, comparatively great attention was dedicated to 
projects for civic education and awareness-raising as well as media assistance, which 
received 7% and 6% of grants respectively. Activities that directly aim to sustain democracy 
received a remarkable 8% of the funds available (see appendix 5, table 14). 
German Political Foundations 
The German political foundations started their operations in 1990 in the former 
Czechoslovakia with local offices in Prague. The FES additionally opened an office with local 
staff in Bratislava in 1992. Both foundations stated that the democratization of Slovakia is 
their major goal. Until 1998 this goal implied the unification of the opposition and a re-
democratization. After the electoral defeat of Vladimir Mečiar, the consolidation of democracy 
as well as integration in EU and NATO were major objectives (see appendix 6, portray 13).  
 
216 In several issue areas, projects have been implemented by NGOs, thus strengthening and 
stabilizing these NGOs. For example, the USAID local government project strengthened the 
“Association of Towns and Communities”, and founded the “Local Self-government Assistance Center” 
(USAID 2000b: 12p). Labor related projects implemented by the American Center for International 
Labor Solidarity largely provided institutional and technical assistance to the “Slovak Confederation of 
Trade Unions” (KOZ). The Rural Community Capacity Building Program included a small grant 
scheme to NGOs and led to the establishment of a new NGO called “VOKA” (Vidiecka organizácia pre 
komunitné aktivity) that continues the work in rural development (ibid: 15). Rule of law projects 
assisted the “Slovak Judges’ Association”, the “Slovak Lawyers’  Association” and were partly 
launched by “Transparency International Slovakia” and the “Integra Foundation” (ibid: 16). Finally, 
media assistance projects supported the “Slovak Syndicate of Journalists” and worked with “Memo 
‘98”, an organization specialized in media monitoring (ibid: 17). See also appendix 7, table 24. 
217 The “Your Land” program provides project grants to NGOs in the areas of advocacy, rural 
development, community development, women/minorities/tolerance, and anti-corruption. Your Land is 
an active member of the Donors’ Forum (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 3pp). 
218 Note that this sum includes 1.2 million US $ support to Czechoslovakia in the years 1990-1992. 
One also has to note that the financial involvement of the NED in Slovakia is higher due to regional 
and cross-country programs and projects. The sum above solely refers to the projects reported on the 
NED homepage. 
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Open Society Foundation (OSF) 
The Open Society foundation (OSF) was established in Bratislava by George Soros in 
November 1992 under the name ”Open Society Fund“.219 In line with other foundations 
founded by Soros, the main objective of the OSF is the creation of an open society. 
Educational activities comprise the core of OSF activities and receive approximately one 
fourth of the funds. Civil society assistance mainly includes the “Community Program” 
launched in 1996 that supports community foundations and funds. OSF additionally provides 
technical assistance to local organizations in cooperation with the organization Partners for 
Democratic Change. Finally, the “Development of Democracy Program”, supports initiatives 
that foster the cooperation and dialogue among NGOs and between NGOs and local 
administration and that contribute to the sustainability of NGOs. Despite recent initiatives to 
support civil society, one can state that the OSF in Slovakia does not have the political weight 
of the Stefan Batory foundation in Poland in this area. It largely remains a foundation focused 
on education and research and only recently took steps in advancing a civil society 
infrastructure (see appendix 4, portray 9).  
Interest of Donors 
The main interest of donors in civil society assistance becomes obvious in the following 
quote of the British ambassador to Slovakia:  
 “Organizations of the Third Sector are the replaceable guarantee of the supervision 
of decisions of the executive powers and the tyranny of the parliamentary majority, not 
only in Slovakia, but in all parliamentary democracies of the world. The British 
government is interested in assisting the Third Sector, not because you are wonderful 
people, but because we want to see Slovakia in NATO and the European Union” (Peter 
Harborne cit in: Bútova / Demeš 1998: 16).  
The same interest was expressed by a representative of the KAS explaining their support of 
the monthly economic newsletter of the think tank MESA 10.  
“... our major priority was not only the monthly economic newsletter, although we 
regard professional reports on the state of the economy as valuable and important. 
However, a further aim was to guarantee persons of the opposition a (material) 
existence and provide them with a way to make their living” (Reinhardt Stuth, interview 
with the author, own translation). 
We can conclude that until 1998 the common interest of donors in Slovakia was the 
democratization of Slovakia and the integration of Slovakia into NATO and the European 
Union. This interest translated into a more precise political goal: the electoral defeat of 
Vladimir Mečiar and his coalition and thus the election of the opposition. In consequence, 
219 The new name was adopted in 1996 after the foundation law required a re-registration of the 
foundation.  
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civil society assistance was a tool to build up and empower a counter-elite and subsequently 
to achieve regime change. And the electoral victory of the opposition in 1998 demonstrated 
that it was a successful tool. Nonetheless, most donors continued their assistance after this 
major goal was achieved, as will be shown in the next section.  
8.3.2  The Quantity and Timing of Assistance  
It has already been pointed out that the support to civil society in Slovakia received over-
proportionally more foreign attention than other states in Central and Eastern Europe 
(chapter 7.3.1.). Whereas in average foreign donors spent 30% of their DPP funds on civil 
society in CEE, this share is much higher in Slovakia with 42% of all DPP funds. The foreign 
attention and assistance Slovak civil society received is even more evident if one focuses on 
the sum per capita: between 1990 and 2000 donors spent 10.3 US $ per capita with the aim 
of supporting civil society (Poland: 1.9 US$) (see table 5, chapter 7.3.1). This special 
emphasis on civil society assistance in the Slovak case is also confirmed with regard to 
single donors. USAID for example spent a higher share of its SEED funds on the stabilization 
of democracy in Slovakia than in Poland (17% of the SEED funds earmarked for Slovakia in 
contrast to 8% of the Polish SEED funds). Additionally, 20% of US Democracy assistance 
was used in support of NGOs (in Poland: 16%) (see appendix 5, table 11+12).  
The question arises whether the great emphasis on civil society was equally high throughout 
the period under investigation. The political interest of donors pointed out in the previous 
section raises suspicions that donors were most supportive to civil society (and the 
opposition) in the period of Mečiar’s radical right-left coalition between 1994-1998 and shortly 
before the elections in 1998. In this case one could well argue that civil society assistance 
was nothing more than a subtle form of external intervention, and that it is the key intention of 
foreign involvement to “make decisions” rather than “rules” (Abele/Offe unpublished 
manuscript). In order to confirm or falsify this suspicion, the following will focus on the timing 
of donor support to civil society.  
International political assistance to Slovakia was in comparison to the Polish case rather low 
until 1993, partly as a result of the special status of the Slovak lands in former 
Czechoslovakia. According to Glenn (1999: 20) international assistance to Slovakia was “a 
fraction of the sum provided to the federation as a whole”. The majority of aid benefited 
Prague and the Czech lands. None of the donors had offices in Slovakia until after the 
breakup in 1993 (Glenn 1999: 24). Only USAID had opened its office in Bratislava by 
January 1992, a whole year before other donors settled in the Slovak Federation (USAID 
2000b: 5). The situation changed tremendously with the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993. 
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Afterwards donors were eager to equally benefit both new countries and not to raise doubt 
that one may be preferred (interview Mansfeldová). 
Nonetheless, civil society assistance only gained momentum in 1995. If one focuses on 
USAID annual contributions to Slovak NGOs the following tendency is visible: Until 1995 
USAID invested approximately 150,000 US$ per year in NGO development. Moreover, NGO 
development investments primarily benefited the civic movements Civic Forum and VPN 
(Verejnost’ Proti Nasili, Public Against Violence) and can therefore be regarded as a mixture 
between civil society and political party assistance. Not until in 1996 when the DemNet 
project was launched, did support for NGOs reach a high of nearly one million US$ per year. 
After DemNet came to end in 1999, USAID assistance to civil society remained higher than in 
the years 1990-1995. Until 2002 USAID benefited NGOs in the country with half a million 
US$ annually via its Your Land program.220  
With 1.2 million US $ NED assistance was the highest in 1990 when it fully administered the 
SEED sums in favor of democracy (Glenn 1999: 29, see appendix 5, table 16).221 Until 1996 
the funds steadily decreased, a trend that was also visible in Poland (see appendix 5, table 
15). In 1997, however, they increased again and reached a new high of 760 thousand US $. 
Moreover, from 1995 onwards all grants benefited exclusively NGOs active in different issue 
areas (Third Sector development, human rights, business), except for one grant to the trade 
union KOZ in 1998. In 1998 half of the funds were used for electoral assistance, however, 
unlike in other cases this does not imply party assistance but solely voter education, 
monitoring or surveys conducted by NGOs. Also in 1999 the majority of funds (64%) goes to 
NGO projects in various issue areas. Firstly, these figures demonstrate that the NED 
increased its commitment in 1997/1998 in preparation for the elections. Secondly, we can 
note that the NED predominantly focused on NGO development and civil society assistance 
in Slovakia, quite in contrast to its activities in other CEE countries where it largely focuses 
on political party, labor and business assistance.  
The EU Phare democracy micro-grants have been distributed rather equally over the years 
(appendix 3, table 7). The Civil Society Development Program, in contrast, is marked by a 
tremendous increase in financial resources in the year 1997. From 1993 when the program 
started to operate until 1996, it supported civil society with an average of 0.45 million ECU 
per year. In the years 1997 and 1998, however, 1.5 million ECU were earmarked for the 
same objective (see appendix 3, portray 7). Since 1999 Slovak NGOs have additionally had 
220 Own calculations based on USAID (2000b: 40p). 
221 According to Glenn this early commitment was mainly dedicated to electoral assistance (Glenn 
1999: 21pp). After the 1990 elections the assistance declined dramatically (ibid). As a result, we 
observe comparatively little funding in 1992. 
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the possibility of drawing on EU structural funds (Demeš 2001: 481). We thus witness a shift 
from horizontal programs to pre-accession funds similar to the Polish case.  
In summary, we can identify three periods of foreign assistance to civil society. Until 1995 
Slovak civil society only received little foreign attention, in particular with regard to 
governmental support. In contrast, Slovak civil society organizations immensely benefited 
from international financial support between 1995/96 and 1999. This peak is followed by a 
decrease and slow withdrawal of funds by 2002. Can we thus confirm our suspicion that civil 
society assistance in Slovakia was nothing more than political intervention with the sole goal 
of “making decisions”? Two observations contradict this argumentation. Firstly, one has to 
note that this “attention curve” corresponds with the sequencing of civil society assistance in 
the Polish case where no similar single event can be pointed out that donors aimed to 
influence. Civil society assistance simply did not become “en vogue” until the middle of the 
1990s. Secondly, although the intensive financial support diminished after 1999, donors did 
not withdraw from the scene after this objective has been achieved. On the contrary, donors 
were aware of the fact that democratic procedures in Slovakia required time and practice to 
consolidate and that the non-governmental organizations in existence were not able to 
sustain themselves. Foreign donors continued to support Slovak NGOs especially via the 
provision of grants. Support to civil society in this third period still remains on a higher level 
than in the first period and is longer than e.g. in the Polish case.222 The Phare CSD program 
for example launched a further round in 1999. USAID continued its support to NGOs after 
DemNet came to end with an additional program (Your Land Program). 
8.3.3 Strategy of Assistance 
As already pointed out in the previous section, civil society assistance to Slovakia did not 
start until the middle of the 1990s, and thus at a later point in time than e.g. in Poland. This 
later start largely prevented failures and mistakes. One may argue that civil society 
assistancein Slovakia benefited from the learning experience of donors in other countries as 
e.g. Poland. The following will briefly highlight the major strategies applied that partially 
correspond with civil society assistance to Poland in the second half of the 1990s.  
222 This observation holds not only true for the donors mainly covered by this study. The British 
Department for International Development (DFID) still supports Slovakia in 2002 with 3 million £ (1999: 
2.9 million £; 2000: 2.8 million £) (DFID 1999: 12). Moreover, the sums earmarked for NGO and civil 
society development increased in this period from 0.27 million £ in 1999 to 0.75 million £ in the year 
2002. A small grants scheme operating since 1995 further supports NGOs. In its country strategy 
review from 2000, the DFID names as one of its priorities for the coming year “We will initiate debate 
on NGO/Government partnership and seek ways of encouraging greater involvement of the Third 
Sector in policy planning, implementation and monitoring” (DFID 2000: 13). 
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In Slovakia donors generally dedicated great attention to assistance to civil society and thus 
responded to the situation in the country and to local needs. In this regard, the focus of 
democracy and civil society assistance was slightly different than the Polish case, as the 
example of USAID demonstrates. In Poland USAID’s emphasis on democracy assistance 
was largely placed on institution building. For example democratic governance and public 
administration projects received 22% of total DPP funds. In contrast, in Slovakia USAID took 
a more political approach with a higher focus on political and social processes. Democratic 
governance and public administration ranks low with only 0.4% of DPP funds. In contrast, 
NGO assistance (21%, Poland: 17%), assistance to political parties and elections (6%, 
Poland: 1%), media (6%, Poland: 3%) and rule of law (4%, Poland: 1%) received 
proportionally more assistance than their Polish counterparts (see appendix 5, table 11+12).  
Civil Society Assistance drew heavily on local intermediaries and local expertise. Most of the 
NGO support programs were implemented and administered by local organizations and with 
involvement of local staff. Examples are the Civil Society Development Foundation founded 
in 1993 with the aim to implement the Phare Civil Society Development Program, the 
Foundation for Civil Society in charge of the USAID funded DemNet program or the 
Ekopolis/ETP Slovakia foundations that implemented the USAID funded Your Land program. 
Other donors such as the FES run a local office with local staff. The positive effect of the use 
of intermediaries is an increase in flexibility and a quick responsiveness to local needs, as 
was the case in 1997 for example when NPOA adjusted the Phare CSD program in order to 
support democracy projects or in 1996 when NPOA installed legal counseling centers for 
NGOs to ease the effects of the foundation law (see above).  
Civil society assistance programs mostly involve small grant schemes. Several embassies 
run additional small grant schemes for NGOs (e.g. Great Britain, Canada, Denmark). The 
negative aspect of this development is that most large grant-giving foundations that play a 
vital role in the development of Slovak NGOs merely re-distribute funds from abroad. Local 
foundations with an endowment registered in Slovakia are rather rare (Demeš 2001: 475).  
As a consequence, the question of sustainability is high on the agenda of donors and 
recipients. Most NGO support programs involve “capacity building” measures to raise the 
professional standard of NGOs. Like in Poland, the establishment of community foundations 
that support local initiatives is a further objective. The community foundation of Banská 
Bystrica, for example, started to build an endowment in cooperation with foreign sponsors 
(OSF, USAID). One has to also note that some donors chose to stay in Slovakia longer than 
expected in order to ease the shift to local or EU structural funds (see above).  
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If one focuses on the thematic orientation of the support programs one can ascertain that 
most programs distributed their grants among thematically different NGOs. In case of the 
Phare CSD program for example, in the period 1992-1999 the majority of grants went to 
NGOs providing social services (23%), followed by volunteer development (16%), the 
environment (13%), health (12%), and education (11%). 9% of the grants were awarded to 
NGO projects aiming to promote democracy. However, if one focuses on the regional 
distribution of NGO grants, a major emphasis on NGOs in Bratislava is visible. Between 1997 
and 1998 the majority of grants (48%) benefited organizations located in the capital, followed 
by Košice (13%), Prešov (8%) and Banská Bystica (5%) (own calculations based on Demeš 
2001: 477). 
A further sign of donor learning experiences is the institutionalized cooperation among some 
donor organizations. In 1997 grant-giving organizations created an informal association 
called the Donors’ Forum with the aim of improving the support to Slovak NGOs and further 
enhancing the funding situation in Slovakia. Members include the OSF, the NPOA, the 
Ekopolis foundation and ETP Slovakia. While the founding members were mainly 
intermediaries re-distributing foreign funds, the trend is to increasingly involve local 
foundations and grant-giving organizations.  
In sum we can conclude that civil society assistance in Slovakia was more political, strategic 
and focused than in Poland. Moreover, it was more massive in quantitative terms at least if 
the sum per capita is concerned. All this is partly due to the late start of civil society 
assistance at a time when donors already learned their lesson in other CEE countries. The 
turn civil society assistance took in Slovakia is, however, also heavily influenced by the 
political situation in the country and by the anti-democratic setback in Slovakia under Mečiar. 
This political situation created both the local demand for foreign assistance for the opposition 
and the political interest of donors in supporting civil society. As a result, civil society 
assistance in Slovakia was carried by interests on both sides.  
8.4 The Output and Outcome of Civil Society Assistance in 
Slovakia – Recipients in Focus 
The following investigates the output and the outcome of civil society assistance in Slovakia 
by placing a special emphasis on recipients. In this regard, five questions are of major 
concern. First, what types of non-governmental organizations receive foreign attention? 
Second, are such “main recipients” self-sustainable in the long run? Third, do their 
constituencies and the population at large accept them as legitimate domestic actors? 
Fourth, do main recipients contribute to the advancement of civil society on the structural or 
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cultural dimension in Slovakia? In other words, can they be labeled “carriers of civil society”? 
And finally and most importantly, to what extent does foreign support assist main recipients in 
fulfilling their role as carriers of civil society (see for a detailed description of these questions: 
chapter 5.3.)?  
It has been pointed out that the selectivity and lacking legitimacy of foreign assistance may 
result in negative effects such as envy and resentments among NGOs or lead to the 
establishment of DONGOs (donor driven NGOs) that lack a domestic constituency and fail to 
sustain themselves once foreign funding comes to an end (see chapter 3). This problem is 
even more salient in the Slovak case where the massive inflow of aid ahead of the elections 
evokes suspicion of external intervention. Is such clearly interest-driven assistance that aims 
to “make decisions” rather than “rules” (Abele/Offe unpublished manuscript) suitable to 
transplant democratic and civic values and to trigger a civic culture based on tolerance and 
trust? Or is it not more likely to deepen already existing cleavages in society, such as the 
cleavage between the predominantly Mečiar-friendly rural population and the predominantly 
Western oriented urbanized areas (see chapter 8.2.4.)?  
The aim of this section is to clarify whether this has been the case in Slovakia. As in the 
previous case study, this will be done by concentrating on major beneficiaries of assistance, 
who are presented in the first sub-section. It will be evident that the typology of “main 
recipients” given above (chapter 7.4.1) is also applicable in the Slovak case. The section 
further tackles the questions of recipients’ sustainability, legitimacy, and effectiveness. 
Thereby, special attention is given to the benefits of foreign assistance in order to answer the 
key question of research: Did civil society assistance alter the capabilities and orientations of 
civil society actors and make an impact on social and political change by means of 
empowerment and learning?223  
223 The following is based on the field research of the author in Slovakia. The sample includes 
examples of large recipient organizations that sometimes even directly evolved from donor programs 
and that are still visible in the Slovak civil society sector today. What the “main recipients” of each 
group have in common is that they received assistance from at least three of the main donors covered 
by this study, i.e., the EU, American donor organizations (NED; USAID), the OSF, and the two largest 
German political foundations. Additionally, the chosen NGOs are frequently supported by Western 
funds and their budget relies on foreign sources to at least 30%. The selection was based on a 
systematic analysis of available material on donor programs and on available recipient lists (see 
appendix 7) and was the result of a “snowballing process”. One has to note that the described 
organizations provide no exhaustive list of “main recipients” but are only typical examples. Other 
examples could also be found.  
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8.4.1 Types of Main Recipients  
As in Poland, in Slovakia we also find NGOs that started their activity as implementers of 
international democracy and civil society development projects, or more specifically civic 
education projects. The creation of such “democracy promoters” is clearly influenced by 
international actors; their main statutory objective is the promotion of democracy and civil 
society.224 One can note, however, that democracy promoters in Slovakia quickly focused on 
the advancement of civil society and the “Third Sector”, thus shifting closer to the second 
group of NGOs, the “infrastructural” NGOs. An example of this type of recipients is the NGO 
“Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia” (PDCS).  
Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (PDCS) is a non-governmental, non-profit 
educational organization that works within an international network of likeminded 
organizations in 12 countries called Partners for Democratic Change.225 The mission of 
PDCS is “to help develop and promote culture of democracy, expand democratic approaches 
and mechanisms for dialogue and conflict prevention” (website). PDCS stemmed from an 
international educational program ”Partners for Democratic Change” which was created and 
developed in the USA, and which developed conflict management curricula within CEE 
universities. In Slovakia PDCS thus began as the Center for Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution as one of the projects at Comenius University in Bratislava in 1991. In 1994, 
following the decision of Partners for Democratic Change International, PDCS was founded 
as an independent NGO. PDCS offers training courses and consultations to various target 
groups - mainly to NGOs, but also to public administration institutions, social workers, or 
secondary school teachers. PDCS additionally offers conflict resolution alternatives and 
mediation.226  
So called “Infrastructural NGOs”, thus NGOs whose major objective is to support civil society 
and the NGO sector and who aim to install a favorable framework or “infrastructure” for 
NGOs, were established relatively early in Slovakia, although the focus on a respective 
infrastructure was no major objective from the beginning.  
224 For the distinction of three types of recipients see table 6, chapter 7.4.1. 
225 The following is based on information given on the respective websites of each organization, 
during personal interviews and in annual reports and other materials: PDCS (1997); PDCS (1998); 
PDCS (1999); PDCS (2000); PCDS (2001), PCDS (2002).  
226 In the year 2000 PDCS’s activities focused for example on (1) the support to the nonprofit sector 
including the preparation of strategic planning and trainings for NGOs, (2) on alternative conflict 
resolution and human rights education in schools, (3) support to ethnic tolerance and (4) support to 
cross-sector cooperation and community initiatives as part of its joint program with ETP Slovakia 
“Support to Local Initiatives” launched in 1997.  
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One has to note, however, that the advancement of the NGO sector is often not the sole 
operational focus of the organizations. More often than not, they further operate in other 
issue areas. Prominent examples are the Slovak Academic Information Agency – Service 
Center for the Third Sector (SAIA-SCTS), and Ekopolis/ETP Slovakia.  
The Slovak Academic Information Agency (SAIA) was established through the initiative of 
Pavol Demeš, a biologist, who was at that time in charge of the Department of Foreign 
Relations of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (now the Ministry of Education and 
Science). David Daniel, a historian and a Third Sector enthusiast from the U.S., contributed 
to the creation of the SAIA. SAIA’s stated objective is to assist the development of education 
in Slovakia and to support civil society in Slovakia.227 From the very beginning a main field of 
activity concentrated on facilitating international academic exchange. In this area, SAIA for 
example provides information for Slovaks interested in studying abroad, organizes 
scholarship competitions, or administers international educational programs. In 1993 SAIA 
extended its activities with the establishment of the Service Center for the Third Sector; a 
sub-section of SAIA that provided programs and services to non-governmental organizations. 
Since then SAIA-SCTS for example organizes the Stupava Conferences, acts as a secretary 
for the ”Gremium of the Third Sector”, provides information and training for NGOs, publishes 
a monthly magazine for NGOs in Slovakia called NonProfit, maintains an electronic database 
of NGOs in Slovakia, and publishes several directories and other publications of concern for 
NGOs. SAIA-SCTS also operates NGO service centers in various regions in Slovakia. When 
asked to what extent the establishment of SAIA-SCTS was influenced by international and 
foreign actors, the executive director of SAIA-SCTS made the following point:  
“Certain organizations proved less important than single individuals, mainly 
Canadian volunteers or American Third Sector activists” (interview with the author).  
The Environmental Training Partnership Foundation (ETP Slovakia) is a non-profit seeking, 
independent training, research and consulting organization. Registered in 1995, ETP 
Slovakia developed out of the international USAID funded program “Environmental Training 
Project for Central and Eastern Europe” managed in Slovakia by the University of Minnesota 
(CEE), which began in 1992 in 6 CEE countries and finished in 1998. Since 1992, ETP has 
operated offices in Bratislava and Košice, and in July 2001 a new office was opened in 
Spišká Nová Ves. ETP Slovakia aims to “contribute to sustainable development and civil 
society in Slovakia” by identifying and implementing “new models of cooperation and 
integrated management at the regional / local level that lead to sustainable development and 
227 The following is based on the SAIA website: www.saia.sk; on SAIA-SCTS (1994), SAIA-SCTS 
(1995), SAIA-SCTS (1996), SAIA-SCTS (1997), SAIA-SCTS (1998), SAIA-SCTS (1999), SAIA-SCTS 
(2000a), SAIA-SCTS (2001). 
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to improving the overall quality of life in the community” (website). ETP Slovakia is thus 
active in two main program areas. Firstly, it focuses on sustainable development and 
environmental issues. Secondly, it aims to strengthen the non-profit sector in Slovakia. 
Whereas activities in the first program area include the development of regional development 
strategies and capacity building in environmental project development, the second area 
includes lobbying for respective NGO legislation, grant-making to NGOs, and a variety of 
activities that aim to foster philanthropy in the country.  
As in Poland, in Slovakia foreign donors have supported thematically oriented organizations, 
whose major objective is issue-oriented rather than democracy or Third Sector-oriented. 
Examples include think tanks and independent research institutions such as the economic 
think tank MESA 10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses, the Social Policy Analysis 
Center (SPACE), or the think tank Institute for Public Affairs (IVO); youth organizations such 
as the Youth Council of Slovakia an association of more than 40 political, religious, ethnic 
and other youth organizations; thematically oriented foundations such as the Children of 
Slovakia Foundation, the largest domestic grant-making foundation in Slovakia whose 
endowment was built up with the help of a foreign sponsor (Vašečka 2002a: 13), or the Milan 
Simecka Foundation that promotes education and the extension and establishment of 
democratic values in society; social organizations such as the Association for the Assistance 
of People With Mental Handicaps in the Slovak Republic (ZPMP), a national umbrella 
organization that addresses the needs and rights of the handicapped, which received support 
from the USAID financed DemNet project; NGOs striving for regional self-administration such 
as the Association for Supporting Local Democracy, environmental organizations or human 
rights and minority issue-oriented organizations (see Demeš 2001: 486p). Like in Poland part 
of these organizations are connected to well-known figures from the opposition or academic 
circles. For example, Mikulas Dzurinda the oppositional leader who took office as prime 
minister in 1998 was one of the 10 founding members of MESA 10. One has to note, 
however, that thematic organizations may also be initiated from abroad. The Children of 
Slovakia Foundation, for example, was established in 1995 by the International Youth 
Foundation as part of a worldwide network of national foundations. What is most striking 
about thematically oriented NGOs in Slovakia is their close affiliation with the “Third Sector”. 
Much unlike in Poland, NGOs in Slovakia see themselves as Third Sector activists no matter 
in what field they are active.228 This is demonstrated by the fact that a variety of different 
228 This fact became evident to the author by the opposing answers of two organizations in Poland 
and Slovakia when asked whether they regard themselves as a “NGO”. Whereas the Foundation in 
Support of Local Democracy (FSLD) in Poland answered that they are no real NGO (being too 
professional, too large and too little “grassroots”), the economic think tank MESA 10 in Slovakia 
insisted that it is a “real” NGO and nothing else. 
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NGOs were active in the civic campaign ”OK ‘98“, for example the Council of Slovak Youth, 
the Institute for Public Affairs, the Association for Supporting Local Democracy, the 
Association of Organizations for the Handicapped Citizens of Slovakia, but also 
environmental NGOs such as the Association for Permanently Sustainable Life or 
Greenpeace and even the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) to name just a few 
(Vašečka 2002c: 4).  
We can thus conclude that in Slovakia, like in Poland, the previously identified three types of 
“main recipients” are visible. However, one has to note, that the distinction is not always so 
clear-cut. Democracy Promoters quickly embraced the concept of a Third Sector; 
Infrastructural NGOs such as ETP Slovakia or SAIA-SCTS often fulfill a double objective. 
ETP Slovakia’s statutory objective stresses both building a respective framework for NGO 
activities and tackling issues of sustainable development and the environment. The same 
holds true for SAIA-SCTS. Initially a thematically oriented organization active in the area of 
international education, it expanded its activity in 1993 and subsequently was one of the 
most important Third Sector advocacy NGOs in Slovakia. It is worthwhile to note that SAIA 
ended part of the third-sector support activities in 2003 and since then sees its major area of 
activity in the advancement of international educational cooperation. Thematically oriented 
NGOs finally strongly identified themselves with the Third Sector at least until the elections in 
1998.  
8.4.2 Sustainability of NGOs in Slovakia  
Turning to the question of the self-sustainability of NGOs in Slovakia one limitation is in 
place. Most donors extended their commitment in Slovakia until the year 2003. The self-
sustainability of NGOs and main recipients can therefore be assessed only tentatively. 
Especially well-positioned organizations that are familiar with international tender procedures 
still profit from foreign donors. The organization Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia, 
for example, received institutional support in 2002 from the Trust for a Civil Society in Central 
and Eastern Europe for three years (PDCS 2002). Only after the full withdrawal of foreign 
donors can the question of sustainability be answered. This even more so since in Slovakia, 
like in Poland, NGOs consider the lack of financial resources to be the major problem of 
NGOs in the country (72% of questioned NGOs see this fact as very problematic: see 
appendix 8, table 26, question 12). This problem is intensified by a lacking philanthropic 
culture (ibid). With only limited state funds available and few domestic foundations, foreign 
funds and externally financed foundations remain the main source of income of NGOs.  
Despite this pessimistic background, a positive trend is visible. First of all, it can be stated 
that all interviewees of the author agreed that the sector of NGOs in Slovakia will survive 
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even after the end of foreign commitment and the stop of foreign funds. Zdenka Mansfeldová 
points out that people in Slovakia start to organize and that an increased awareness of the 
possibilities and importance of self-organized action is visible. This is partly the effect of 
NGOs that built up capacity and act in a professional manner (interview with the author).  
Secondly, the problem of NGO financing is addressed from various sides. Public financing is 
limited but exists. In the year 2000 altogether 978 million Slovak Crowns were allocated to 
civic associations, foundations, and similar organizations by 10 different ministries and four 
state funds mainly in the form of direct financial support.229 However, NGO activists criticize 
that the transparency of the decision-making bodies allocating the funds remains poor. Clear 
criteria for the distribution of grants are largely lacking (SAIA-SCTS 2000c: 69). Moreover, 
the practice of contracting out services is only slowly developing (ibid: 9). A positive sign is 
the introduction of the so-called 1% law. This law provides possibility for citizens to dedicate 
1% of their income tax for NGO operations. Finally there are endeavors to build up domestic 
foundations supporting NGO initiatives. Examples are the Ekopolis foundation and the 
Foundation for the Children of Slovakia that have an endowment of 13 and 26 million Slovak 
Crowns respectively and are thus among the largest domestic foundations in the country. 
Further examples are so-called community foundations, i.e., community philanthropy 
organizations “formed in order to collect, manage and distribute charitable resources” with 
the aim “to improve the quality of life in a geographic area” (see Sacks 2003). As the third 
largest endowment of domestic foundations in Slovakia with an endowment of eight million 
Crowns, the community foundation “Healthy Town of Banská Bystrica” demonstrates that 
these endeavors bear fruit (Demeš 2001: 475). Nonetheless, one has to admit that the 
majority of foundations in Slovakia still function as intermediaries that rely on foreign sources.  
Although sustainability remains a pressing problem, it can be stated that the main recipients 
characterized above have few difficulties ensuring their existence. Firstly, they are best 
equipped to access existing funds. Secondly, like their Polish counterparts, Slovak NGOs 
whose major objective has been the advancement of democracy and civil society in Slovakia 
started to export their experiences. Especially the prominence of the “OK ‘98” campaign 
provides a model eagerly sought and bought abroad. This happened in Serbia where a group 
229 The following ministries provided direct financial support to civic associations and NGOs in 
2000: The General Treasury Administration (3.2 million Slovak Crowns), Ministry of Education (3.2 
million Slovak Crowns), the Ministry of Culture, (1.8 million Slovak Crowns), the Office for the Strategy 
for Development of Society, Science and Technology (0.75 million Slovak Crowns), the Ministry of the 
Interior (0.5 million Slovak Crowns), the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family (0.4 million Slovak 
Crowns), the Office of the Government (0.45 million Slovak Crowns), the Ministry of Agriculture ( 0.12 
million Slovak Crowns), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Health Care, 
The Slovak Academy of Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment, Regional 
offices (below 0.05 million Slovak Crowns each) (SAIA-SCTS 2000c). 
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of Slovak NGOs and activists consulted and accompanied a NGO campaign entitled “SOS 
Serbia” (Demeš 2001: 489). Since 1993 PDCS has been providing training and facilitation 
services in other countries. According to their annual report in 1997, alone PDCS lecturers 
and trainers have worked in 22 countries outside Slovakia (PDCS 1997). Some organizations 
also entered the commercial sphere with part of their activity. PDCS for example established 
the firm ARK Ltd that provides prevention and conflict resolution seminars to the business 
sector. MESA 10 became more commercial after the elections of 1998. They provide 
expertise and political consultancy in the field of economic restructuring, socio-economic 
reform measures or regional self-administration.  
8.4.3 Legitimacy of Main Recipients 
According to public opinion surveys the public image of NGOs is prevailingly positive 
(Bútorová / Gyárfášová, 1997 cit. in: Demeš 1999: 347). In an representative survey 
conducted in March 2001 NGOs ranked fourth after the church, president, and self-
government as most trusted institutions, leaving the police, courts, government and 
parliament far behind (Focus 2001, cit. in: ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 8). However, the survey 
further depicts a high level of uncertainty towards NGOs. A substantial share, namely 23%, of 
Slovaks do not know whether they trust or distrust NGOs (ibid), a figure that reveals that a 
significant proportion of the population is still uncertain about the basic functioning of NGOs 
(ibid). NGOs and the Third Sector also gained wide media attention especially during the 
civic campaign “OK ‘98”. Here the activities of NGOs were prevailingly connected in most 
newspapers with a vibrant civil society. By contrast, government-friendly newspapers, which 
described NGOs as intruders under Western influence, had little effect on public opinion 
(Fialová cit. in Bútora / Demeš 1998: 14p). All in all, we can state that NGOs and major 
recipients of aid are largely accepted in Slovak society.  
Moreover, evidence suggests that international contacts do not undermine the credibility of 
recipients. Like in Poland, Slovak NGOs regard contacts to international actors, especially to 
non-governmental international actors, as valuable and positive. A majority of Slovak NGOs 
(60%) assesses international cooperation as very important (see appendix 8, table 26, 
question 10). It comes as a surprise that the positive echo towards international contacts is 
greater among non-recipients: 80% of the NGOs that had no international partner reported 
that international cooperation would have been very important. We can conclude that, like in 
the Polish case, international contacts do not undermine but instead boost the reputation of 
recipients.  
 246
8.4.4 Main Recipients as Carriers of Civil Society? 
The following investigates the role of main recipients in advancing the structural and cultural 
dimension of civil society. The question is to what extent do main recipients act as carriers of 
civil society in Slovakia triggering the rise of civil society in Slovakia described in chapter 8.2. 
The section briefly summarizes the services main recipients provide for NGOs in Slovakia, 
thus contributing to their organizational and institutional capacity, but also to their integration 
and unity. Secondly, the section highlights the role of Western supported Slovak NGOs in 
raising civic participation, mainly ahead of elections. And finally, the section investigates the 
extent to which Western-financed NGOs have been contributing to and succeeded in 
establishing the NGO sector as a countervailing power and major oppositional force during 
the Mečiar regime.  
Service Provision 
Just like their Polish counterparts, main recipients in Slovakia provide services to NGOs. As 
already indicated by the description of their major activities (see chapter 8.4.1.),“democracy 
promoters” and “infrastructural NGOs”, in particular, regard the provision of services to NGOs 
as well as capacity building and institution building of Slovak NGOs as a major objective of 
their work: 
Throughout the years, one major program area of “Partners for Democratic Change 
Slovakia” (PDCS) has been support to the NGO sector. Activities in this area involved 
training, consultation and mediation offers to various NGOs and individuals, including ETP 
Slovakia, the Institute for Public Affairs and the G3S. With the provision of several training 
courses for NGOs in the area of conflict management, strategic planning, strengthening of 
organizational capacity and moderation, PCDS contributed to the institutional stabilization 
and the building up of capacity of these NGOs.  
In the case of SAIA – SCTS the service orientation is even indicated by the name of the 
organization – “Slovak Academic Information Agency - Service Center of the Third Sector”. 
Just like the Polish organizations KLON or BORDO, SAIA-SCTS provides important 
information to NGOs on legal issues, funding possibilities and recent developments 
concerning the sector via bulletins, publications and its monthly magazine NonProfit. The 
Internet plays a major role in the distribution of information. Moreover, SAIA-SCTS informs 
the public or international actors on the state of the NGO sector via its database on Slovak 
NGOs and several directories. In doing so, SAIA-SCTS is ready to respond to the needs of 
NGOs in Slovakia. After the change of the law on foundations in 1996, Slovak NGOs faced 
the question of re-registration and were in need of legal advice. In response to this demand 
and the governmental pressure SAIA-SCTS together with the Center for Assistance to Local 
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Activism and the SPACE foundation established a system of information and legal counseling 
for NGOs. Legal counseling was provided by the journal NonProfit. Moreover, four legal 
counseling centers were founded (Košice, Banská Bystrica, and two braches in Bratislava) 
where lawyers assisted NGOs in legal concerns.230 These immediate measures eased the 
negative effects of the repressive activities of the government. Michal Vašečka (2002a: 10) 
makes the point that the quick response of what is called here “infrastructural NGOs” to 
governmental pressure demonstrates “…that the centralized pressure of the government only 
had the effect of increasing the level of cooperation and professionalism in the Third Sector”.  
As already noted, besides its information and counseling services, SAIA-SCTS also 
organizes the Stupava conferences (see in detail chapter 8.2.6) and acts as a secretary of 
the G3S. In this function, SAIA-SCTS coordinated the major campaigns of NGOs in 
Slovakia.231 Due to these functions, one can say that SAIA-SCTS is the most important NGO 
active in the area of NGO and Third Sector development in Slovakia in the period under 
investigation. The Stupava conferences proved to be important platforms for contact and 
debate where major discussions concerning the future of NGOs in Slovakia, their identity and 
political role took place (see again chapter 8.2.6.). In doing so, SAIA-SCTS facilitated with its 
actions the integration and unity of NGOs in Slovakia. Furthermore, with its support for the 
G3S it assisted an institution that acted as and was accepted as a representative body of 
NGOs in Slovakia. Nonetheless, the organization was cautious not to call itself an umbrella 
organization of NGOs. It had no membership but acted solely as an advocacy NGO. As 
Katarina Koštálová, executive director or SAIA-SCTS in 2000, points out:  
“People in Slovakia were still afraid of centralized organizations due to the 
communist past. Therefore no umbrella organization was founded, but instead the G3S 
as a representative body of individuals” (interview with the author).  
It still remains to be said that at least until 1998 before the process of fragmentation took 
place the NGO sector in Slovakia spoke with one voice that was legitimated by democratic 
elections conducted at the Stupava conferences. By these means SAIA-SCTS also facilitated 
lobbying processes that strove for a new NGO-friendly legal environment.  
ETP Slovakia also provides services that support Slovak NGOs mainly by administrating and 
implementating major donor programs (e.g. “Your Land” from USAID) and by grant- making. 
Moreover, ETP Slovakia is active in ensuring long-term funding opportunities for NGOs in 
Slovakia. Just like SAIA-SCTS and the G3S, ETP Slovakia and especially its director, Boris 
230 It is worthwhile to note that the set-up of these centers was financed by NPOA with EU funds 
(see section 8.3.1). 
231 The most prominent of them were  the “SOS” campaign, the “OK ‘98” campaign, as well as 
recent campaigns on corruption and volunteerism (Demeš 2001: 484). 
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Strecansky, have been highly involved in the process leading to the adoption of the 1% law 
(see 8.4.2) and in lobbying for a new foundation law. ETP Slovakia together with the Ekopolis 
foundation additionally played a major part in bringing the concept of community foundations 
to Slovakia. It initiated for example the Community Foundation “Healthy Town of Banská 
Bystrica”, the largest foundation in Slovakia, and worked on the Community Philanthropy 
Development Initiative, a joint endeavor of donors and NGOs to promote the concept of 
community foundations in Slovakia that further assisted the establishment of community 
foundations in the country (ETP/Ekopolis 2002: 3pp). In doing so, ETP Slovakia acted as an 
intermediary that passed on and implemented Western funds. 
Raising Public Awareness / Mobilizing the Public 
Chapter 8.2.4. points out that Slovakia experienced an increase in political mobilization in 
1998, which manifested itself in a high voter turnout to parliamentary elections. In addition, 
starting from 1997 Slovakia experienced a rise in volunteerism and other forms of civic 
participation (ibid). This rising interest of the public in politics combined with a growing belief 
that democratic elections and other forms of civic participation can make a difference is 
widely attributed to the activities of Slovak NGOs during the pre-election campaign “OK ‘98”. 
The “Third Sector SOS campaign” that responded to the new law on foundations passed in 
1996 also proved decisive. In the following both campaigns are briefly portrayed. It will be 
evident that main recipients were the main driving force behind the campaigns.  
The “Third Sector SOS Campaign” 
In 1996 the G3S organized the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” in order to oppose the 
controversial new Law on Foundations, which forced foundations to re-register. This 
legislative measure was perceived by NGOs as politically motivated with the aim of ending 
the activity of some oppositional NGOs (see chapter 8.2.6). The campaign, which involved 
several NGOs among them SAIA-SCTS, ETP Slovakia and IVO, aimed to stop the new law 
and to stir a public debate on its provisions. Moreover, the campaign aimed to raise public 
awareness of civic society issues and to stimulate a public debate on the regulative and 
social context in which NGOs in Slovakia operate. The campaign involved intensive lobbying, 
the preparation of opposing draft laws, Slovak wide public information meetings and 
expertise on the proposed law and media coverage.  
The G3S as the representation and organ of the Third Sector approached parliamentarians 
and distributed its critical statement and draft amendments to all deputies in parliament. 
Additionally, it provided foreign external opinion on the draft law and organized an extensive 
campaign on the law of foundations that gained Slovak-wide media attention. Despite all 
these lobbying efforts, none of the proposed amendments found their way into the new 
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legislation and the whole law has been passed in its original version (see Bútova / Demeš 
1998: 9p).232  
The campaign was the first extensive and systematic public advocacy action in support of 
civil society since the establishment of the Slovak Republic. It gained intensive media 
coverage in Slovakia and abroad and succeeded in raising public awareness of NGO 
activities and civil society issues. Nearly 500 newspaper articles were published concerning 
the legislation or the campaign during its one month duration (Bútova / Demeš 1998: 4). 
During the same period over 6000 articles focused on the Third Sector or individual NGOs 
(ibid). The campaign did not achieve its main goal of stopping the adoption of the new law. 
The bill requiring the re-registration of foundations was passed.233 Nonetheless civil society 
activists assess the campaign predominantly positive. Thanks to the campaign, the issues of 
NGOs as well as the term “Third Sector” became known in the wider public. A majority of the 
population (52%) was aware of the campaign (ibid: 3) Moreover, the participating NGOs 
developed organizational skills and inter-organizational linkages. The various NGOs proved 
their ability to gain public attention and to unite against governmental action. The campaign 
also triggered the foundation of NGO coalitions modeled on the G3S on a regional level.234 
Katarina Koštálová, executive director or SAIA-SCTS in 2000, describes the importance of 
the campaign as follows:  
“Then we learned how to do this; how to reach compromises inside the sector; how 
to organize publicly. This experience consolidated the role of the Gremium (of the Third 
Sector). We further learned how to invite international groups to express solidarity with 
Slovakia” (interview with the author). 
The Civic Campaign “OK ’98”  
In March 1998 major NGOs launched the Citizen Campaign “OK’ 98” as an open, non-
governmental, non-partisan initiative of NGOs in Slovakia with the main objective of ensuring 
free and fair parliamentary elections.235 Slovak NGOs thus responded to widespread 
                                                
232 One has to note, however, that despite the lacking willingness of the government to introduce 
amendments proposed by the Third Sector into legislation, it could not help to listen. This took place 
for example at a round-table on tax legislation for NGOs, organized by Europhil Truths, the information 
center of the Council of Europe and SAIA-SCTS in December 1996, in which lawyers, tax advisors, 
university experts, representatives of international institutions, NGOs and politicians participated. The 
government was represented by Katarina Tothova, the Deputy Prime Minister (Bútova / Demeš 1998: 
9p). 
233 As a result, only 357 of the previous 2634 foundations successfully re-registered as 
foundations, others transformed themselves into civic associations (259) or became none-investment 
funds or other legal entities (118) (Bútora / Demeš 1998: 6). 
234 During the spring of 1997, the first local gremia (committees) were created in the newly defined 
administrative regions of Slovakia. By 1998 all eight regions had their regional gremia (see section 
8.2.5). 
235 For a detailed case study of the campaign see: Vašečka (2002c); see also: (Bútora / Demeš 
1998: 4pp, 21p). If not otherwise noted, the following is based on these two sources.  
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concerns that the government might manipulate the 1998 elections.236 The campaign had the 
following goals: (1) to improve voter awareness and information about parliamentary and 
local elections in 1998; (2) to increase the voter turnout in the 1998 elections; (3) to increase 
the influence of citizens on the preparation of the election law and to ensure citizen oversight 
over the fairness of elections. The campaign, which officially ended in December 1998 just 
after the local elections, combined nearly 60 independent educational and monitoring 
projects of NGOs. These included e.g. a relay march called “Path for Slovakia” through 
Slovakia organized by GEMMA 93 during which 300 participants distributed booklets on the 
importance of citizens’ participation in the elections and on fundamental democratic principles 
and voting procedures; video clips produced by the association “Hlava 98” entitled “I vote 
therefore I am” shown at cinemas and broadcasted by the only private TV channel then, TV 
Markíza; or an initiative of the Foundation for Civil Society targeted at young people which 
entailed a media campaign and several rock concerts. Several NGOs additionally organized 
discussion forums with representatives of all relevant political parties which took place in all 
regions of Slovakia. These forums were a novelty in the country. Policy analysis on the 
performance of the Mečiar administration in various issue areas such as social security, the 
environment, public transportation or human rights as well as publications on the democratic 
state of Slovakia were an additional part of the campaign.237 The campaign also included 
several monitoring initiatives. The Helsinki Civic Association and the Association for 
Supporting Local Democracy launched a project called “MEMO ‘98” which monitored the 
most significant electronic and print media. The Association for Just Elections organized the 
participation of domestic observers in the elections (project OKO ’98) and the Anton Tunega 
Foundation trained members of electoral committees.  
236 Such fears where based e.g. on the experiences with the the May 1997 referendum on NATO 
membership and direct presidential elections. The call for direct presidential elections was initiated by 
opposition parties in December 1996 that launched a petition drive for a referendum, which gained 
over 500,000 signatures. President Kovač linked this referendum with a referendum on NATO 
membership called for by the parliament (ignoring the fact that Slovakia had not been invited to join 
the alliance) on a single ballot. The government opposed this procedure and removed the question on 
direct presidential elections. In consequence, the opposition successfully boycotted the referendum 
which was declared invalid due to low voter turnout (less than 10%) (see Bútora / Bútorová 1999: 
86p). Moreover, the amendment of election law following the formation of the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition in Summer 1997 raised public concern. The amendment stated among other things that each 
party in a coalition must receive 5% of the overall vote in order to qualify for parliamentary seats. This 
provision highly limited  the chances of the SDC and was criticized by national and international 
experts (ibid: 87). 
237 Numerous expert groups and thematically oriented NGOs were active in this regard, e.g. the 
Confederation of Trade Unions, the Association for Permanently Sustainable Life, Greenpeace, The 
Center for Supporting Local Activities, the Association of Organizations for the Handicapped Citizens 
of Slovakia, the Council for Social Counseling, Freedom of Animals, the G3S, the Forum of Student 
Solidarity of the Slovak Helsinki Committee.  
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Main recipients played a major role during the campaign. SAIA-SCTS together with the G3S 
were among the eleven NGOs that initiated the campaign and coordinated the almost 60 
separate activities. PDCS trained moderators of so-called pre-electoral discussion forums to 
inform citizens, 50 of which took place in Slovakia. Additionally, it provided technical support 
to the campaign and coordinated the various non-partisan pre-election activities (PDCS 
1998). Before the elections of 1998 and as part of its civic campaign “OK ‘98”, the G3S 
formed a “Democratic Round Table” together with the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ), 
the Union of Cities and Villages, and the Slovak Youth Council. Oppositional political parties 
joined this informal gathering to prevent electoral fraud and to ensure free and fair elections 
(Bútova / Bútorová 1999: 89). Several thematically oriented organizations also were active, 
providing expert analysis on governmental performance, activating the youth or monitoring 
the media or electoral procedures (see above).  
One can state that the campaign reached its major goal: increasing voter turnout. In 
particular, the high voter turnout of first voters – over 80% compared with 20% in 1994 - is 
largely attributed to the campaign with its various initiatives targeted at the youth (video clips, 
rock concerts, marches etc). Olga Gyarfášová makes the point:  
“What was exceptional about Slovak parliamentary elections was not only the 
relatively high overall participation but especially the high election participation on the 
part of the youngest voters which contributed to the decisive victory of the opposition. 
The barrier of young people’s apathy was broken by the activities of non-governmental 
organizations, which did not endorse any political party or candidates, but instead 
mobilized the young people to take part in the elections by staging very innovative non-
partisan campaigns” (cit. in: Vašečka 2002c: 5).  
The mobilizing effect of the campaign, which received intensive media coverage, is also 
evident in the rise of volunteerism to support several initiatives of the campaign. Moreover, 
the campaign enhanced the unity and cohesion among NGOs. Several NGOs that refused to 
join the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” were now active (e.g. the Slovak Youth Council).  
A Countervailing Power and Major Oppositional Force - The political role of Slovak 
NGOs 
Slovak NGOs developed as a major oppositional force during the Mečiar years (see also 
chapter 8.2.6). Oppositional Slovak intellectuals drew back from the political scene and took 
refuge in civil society. While the retreat of dissidents and intellectuals into the NGO sector 
may be seen as a mere survival strategy in the early years of Mečiar’s rule, in 1997 a 
process started that can be described as the politicization of Slovak NGOs.238 Slovak NGOs 
238 Vašečka (2002a: 2p) refers to this period as the “mobilization of NGOs”, as a period when 
“NGOs became serious partners for democratically oriented political parties” and when “activist 
potential of NGOs increased”.  
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increasingly developed a political consciousness, took on a political role and saw themselves 
as watchdogs of democratic procedures. This politicization process ended a predominant 
focus on Third Sector issues and complemented a previously dominant service-orientation of 
Slovak NGOs. This argumentation is supported by several observations:  
Firstly, the differences between the two major NGO campaigns, the “Third Sector SOS 
Campaign” and the pre-election Campaign “OK ‘98” demonstrate the political awakening of 
NGOs in Slovakia. Although the SOS Campaign has been criticizing governmental action, it 
was truly concerned with “Third Sector issues” for the most part. The main objective was a 
change in the legislation concerning NGOs with the aim of ensuring the free activities of 
NGOs. Single NGOs were concerned with politics in certain issue areas, but no combined 
action aimed at society at large. While the SOS campaign asked citizens to sympathize and 
back up the Third Sector, it did not intend to make citizens objects of its campaign. In 
contrast, the “OK ’98” campaign had exactly this objective. It aimed to inform citizens, to 
activate and mobilize citizens. Its major objective was to raise public awareness and to 
enhance public participation in politics. By doing so, the main objective of the “OK ’98” 
campaign, quite in contrast of the “SOS” campaign, was not the sector itself and better 
conditions for its functioning, but society at large. NGOs demonstrated with the “OK ’98” 
campaign that they increasingly comprehended the defense of democratic procedures and 
values as one of their main missions. The two campaigns thus mark a change in identity of 
Slovak NGOs from mere service-deliverers to watch dogs of democratic procedures. 
That fact that the “OK ’98” campaign marked a major shift in the identity of Slovak NGOs also 
became evident in the discussions among NGOs, but also among donors before the 
campaign. The fourth Stupava Conference in 1996, i.e. the annual gathering of NGOs, was 
entitled “We serve the citizens”, thus indicating the service-oriented character of NGOs. The 
fifth Stupava Conference in 1997, on the other hand, was labeled “The Third Sector – 
Actively Working for Democracy” (see chapter 8.2.5. table 9). At this conference the question 
whether NGOs should take up a political role or remain non-political stirred intensive debate. 
Katarína Koštálová, Executive Director of SAIA in 2000 remembered:  
“We were aware of the fact that the campaign had to be different than the SOS 
campaign. It involved the work with citizens and political parties. The question whether 
NGOs should be involved in such a campaign was discussed heavily. Divergent 
viewpoints existed on the question whether NGOs should be political or non-political” 
(interview with the author).  
At the end of the Conference, the stand of Slovak NGOs became clear: The final declaration 
of the conference emphasized the political responsibility of NGOs:  
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“By increasing the citizens’ participation, we wish to contribute further to the 
development of democracy in accordance with the principles of a state ruled by law” 
(cit. in: Bútora / Demeš 1998: 21). 
The participants further stated the need to improve citizens’ information about the upcoming 
elections in 1998 and called for the presence of international observers during both, the 
campaign and the electoral process (ibid).  
The discussion whether NGOs should take up a political role involved not only NGOs but 
also the donor community. It was clear to all that without the support of international donors 
the campaign could not be financed. Donors hesitated, however, to support indisputably 
political actions of NGOs (interview Katarína Koštalová). The founding of the Donors’ Forum 
at the 1997 Stupava Conference has to be seen in this light. This informal gathering of 
foreign and domestic granting and re-granting foundations and foreign governmental giving-
programs aimed to coordinate and enhance assistance to NGOs as well as provide a 
sufficient financial basis for the Campaign.  
The shift is further manifested by the fact that even typically service-oriented NGOs that 
regarded their major objective as the provision of services and training took on a more 
political role, as demonstrated by the example of PDCS. Moreover, Slovak NGOs also 
continued their watchdog and advocacy role after the 1998 elections.239  
In sum, it can be stated that main recipients in Slovakia acted as carriers of civil society. They 
provided several services to NGOs in Slovakia, thus strengthening the capacity and 
institutional integrity of NGOs. After 1998 they were further successful in advancing the so-
called infrastructure of the sector, that is, a respective and favorable legal environment as 
well as an increase in funding opportunities in form of e.g. community foundations. Moreover, 
main recipients contributed to the advancement of what has been called the “cultural 
dimension of civil society”. The annual Stupava Conferences provided not only a platform for 
debate between NGOs and contributed to the unity and cohesion of the sector Main 
recipients also actively searched for dialogue with other groups (trade unions, church 
organizations, institutes of education), thus establishing further cooperative ties within civil 
society. Main recipients also contributed to the rise in civic participation in 1997/98. The 
“Third Sector SOS Campaign” raised public awareness for NGO issues. The pre-election 
campaign “OK ‘98” went one step further. It mobilized the public and especially young people 
to go to vote. The resulting high voter turnout helped the oppositional forces to win the 
elections. Hence, during the “OK ‘98” campaign Slovak NGOs and especially main recipients 
239 Examples include the “Civic Initiative for a Respectable Law on Free Access to Information” 
established by the G3S, ETP Slovakia and others that contributed to the passing of a respective law in 
May, 2000 (see Demeš 2000: 485). Moreover, NGOs were also active in the elections 2002.  
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actively took up a political role, developing from mere service-providers to watchdogs of 
democratic procedures and values.  
The following section tackles the question to what extent recipients benefited from and were 
influenced by Western assistance in their various roles described above. 
8.4.5 Recipient Benefits – Did Civil Society Assistance Make a 
Difference? 
It will be evident in the following that the Slovak NGO sector, and especially main recipients, 
greatly benefited from and were shaped by Western assistance. Conversely, Western 
assistance was, however, also shaped by the peculiarities of the Slovak case, namely the 
repressive nature of the Mečiar regime. Three main “benefits” proved decisive for reasons 
outlined below (1) finances; (2) knowledge, i.e., the provision of information, training, 
techniques and know-how, and (3) moral support.  
Financial Support 
The provision of foreign funds was an essential pre-condition for the NGO sector in Slovakia 
to develop. A major part of Slovak NGOs would not have been able to carry out their various 
activities if it had not been for external financial support. As Bútora/Demeš (1998: 13) point 
out:  
“Foreign funds … represent an invaluable and necessary financial mechanism, 
without which many projects and NGOs in Slovakia could not continue their existence”.  
Still in 2001 Pavol Demeš (2001: 475) jumps to the conclusion that  
“(Slovak) NGOs are strongly dependent on funding from abroad”.  
Also Michal Vašečka (2002a: 12) makes the point:  
“Financial assistance of Western democracies, whether private and public, to NGOs 
has been instrumental in developing vital civil society in Slovakia.”  
The provision of finances thus guaranteed the very existence of NGOs. This point is of 
special importance in the light of the repressive character of the Mečiar regime. More often 
than not, foreign financial assistance prevented oppositional NGOs that faced repressive 
state measures to stop their activities. The experience of SAIA-SCTS is a case in point. In 
the early years of its existence SAIA-SCTS maintained good relations to the government. In 
1994, 22% of the SAIA-SCTS budget was financed by the Slovak government (SAIA-SCTS 
1995). In 1996 governmental support ceased due to a growingly hostile attitude of the Slovak 
government. As a result, SAIA-SCTS had to reduce its activities in 1996. In 1997, SAIA-
SCTS’s budget nearly reached its 1995 income thanks to foreign support. By these means, 
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the continuation of the activities of SAIA-SCTS was ensured.240 One can thus conclude that 
without external financial support, Slovak NGOs would hardly been able to emerge as an 
oppositional force as described above.  
In equal measure, the activities of main recipients would not have taken shape without 
external financial assistance. All of the training measures provided to NGO leaders, but also 
counseling and other services granted to NGOs were financed by Western funds. This holds 
equally true for the two major campaigns the “Third Sector SOS campaign” and the pre-
election campaign “OK ‘98”. All of the 60 activities carried out during the OK ’98 campaign 
were fully financed by foreign resources. Vašečka (2002c: 4) makes the point:  
“Despite the great amount of voluntary work the financial support was indeed very 
important for making these projects (of the ”OK ‘98” campaign) happen. Campaign 
financing was secured through the so-called Donors’ Forum that amalgamated various 
grant foundations supporting OK ‘98.” 
One may ask whether the dependence of Slovak NGOs will result in a drop in NGO activity 
once external donors withdraw from the scene. Donors are aware of this risk. Chapter 8.3.3. 
already pointed out, that the question of sustainability ranks high on the agenda of donors. 
As a result, donors did not only finance single projects and NGO activities, but additionally 
aimed to leave behind domestic foundations that may continue their work. These are on the 
one hand so-called community foundations such as e.g. the community foundation “Healthy 
Town of Banská Bystrica” but also other large domestic foundations such as the “Foundation 
for the Children of Slovakia” or the “Ekopolis Foundation”. In all three cases, the endowments 
were built up with the assistance of foreign sponsors (see also chapter 8.4.2.). Nonetheless, 
the prospects for the sustainability of Slovak NGOs would look rather dim, if the provision of 
Western funds had not been accompanied by the provision of information, training and know-
how, which donors usually refer to as “capacity building”.  
Capacity Building 
Besides money, the provision of information, ideas, concepts, techniques and (expert) know-
how proved decisive for the development of the NGO sector in Slovakia on the one hand, 
and the professionalism of single NGOs on the other. This form of assistance primarily came 
in the form of training and counseling. However, international role models and expert 
knowledge also proved decisive.  
240 The situation changed again after the 1998 elections. In the year 2000 contributions from the 
state budget comprised 21% of the SAIA-SCTS budget (without stipends that come primarily from the 
ministry of education) (SAIA-SCTS 2001: 38). 
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One can argue, that the service orientation of main recipients made evident above is highly 
influenced and assisted by Western actors. Main recipients learned the methods and 
techniques they apply from foreign donors. This is especially true in the cases where the 
establishment of single organizations was highly influenced and shaped by foreign actors 
(e.g. PDCS, ETP Slovakia, see chapter 8.4.1.). Yet the personnel of other organizations also 
benefited from Western training. According to Zdenka Mansfeldová the transfer of know-how 
was very important. People lacked the fundamental knowledge as to how to run a non-
governmental organization, how to raise funds or how to approach the government with 
legislative questions. In all these fields there was a great need to extend knowledge which 
was met by various ways of training donor organizations (interview with the author).241 This 
assessment is confirmed by the DPP survey among Slovak NGOs. The majority of NGOs 
that received training assess it as very important (57%).242  
Experiences with Western experts and the consultancy and counseling they provided have 
been less positive. According to Mansfeldová, Western experts were often of little use 
(interview with the author). Again this assessment is confirmed by the DPP survey. Only 36% 
of NGOs that received counseling and that were consulted by Western experts viewed it as 
important (see appendix 8, table 26, question 15). However, this does not imply that Western 
role models were irrelevant. Private contacts to Western NGO activists or volunteers proved 
more important than official experts, though. Single individuals often functioned as 
bridgeheads of foreign concepts and ideas and as role models and trainers. According to 
Katarína Koštálová, Executive Director of SAIA-SCTS, single individuals and especially 
Canadian and American volunteers were decisive in the early years of SAIA-SCTS’s 
existence as “mentors and suppliers of ideas and inspiration“ (interview with the author). In 
this regard, the Stupava Conferences once again played an important role. Each conference 
had not only domestic but also foreign participants. The conferences thus provided a platform 
for the transnational exchange between Slovak and foreign like-minded civil society activists 
that share values or “principled ideas”. It thus acted as a platform for debate between 
transnational “principled issue-networks”, which according to Kathryn Sikkink (1993) is a pre-
condition for the circulation of ideas and transnational learning (see chapter 4.4.2.). 
241 Also other interviewees, especially from recipient organizations, report that they had very 
positive experiences with the training they received.  
242 See appendix 8, table 26, question 15. It is worthwhile to note that NGOs who did not receive 
training regard its importance even higher. 61% of NGOs who did not receive training report that it 
would have been important. In sum, 67% of Slovak NGOs assess it as very important regardless 
whether they received training or not.  
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Finally, the provision of expert studies and reports contributed to the development of the 
NGO sector. In particular, legal expertise provided during the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” 
is a case in point.  
“Representatives of non-governmental organizations, legal experts, and diplomats 
from the United States and European Union member states not only lent moral support, 
but also provided essential background information on nonprofit law and, in some 
cases, even met personally with members of the government and National Council to 
discuss the role of foundations in their countries” (Vašečka 2002a: 7).  
Critiques and expert reports on the controversial Law of Foundations have been provided 
among others by the Washington-based International Center for Not-for profit Law, and the 
Brussels-based European Foundation Centre (EFC). A detailed analysis conducted by 
experts from the EFC identified the law’s most important inconsistencies and recommended 
several amendments (see Bútora/Demeš 1998: 3). External support also played a role in the 
legislative process on a new NGO law, the “Law on Nonprofit Organizations Providing 
Beneficial Public Services”, starting in 1999. Throughout the legislative process the Third 
Sector worked together with the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law in Washington. 
While the Slovak Parliament discussed the new law, the G3S distributed to all deputies in 
parliament its critical statements as well as a statement by the International Center for Not-
For-Profit Law in Washington, which had been requested by the ministry of justice (Vašečka 
2002a: 9). 
Moral Support 
Besides money and knowledge Slovak NGOs received a further form of external assistance 
that has been labeled above as “moral support” (see chapter 5.3). Starting in 1995 and 
especially during the campaigns in 1996 and 1998 international actors frequently expressed 
their solidarity with the Slovak Third Sector. Hillary Clinton, for example, conducted a 
roundtable discussion with Slovak NGO representatives during her July 1996 visit to 
Bratislava and sent a welcome note to the 1997 Stupava conference. USAID and the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States honored Juray Mesik, Pavol Demeš and Peter 
Huncik, each the head of one of the NGOs coordinating the “OK ‘98” campaign for their 
commitment during the campaign. The European Union and the USA awarded the 
“Democracy Award” to the G3S (Europäische Kommission (European Commission) 1997a: 
19).  
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Starting in 1995 the ambassadors of the European Commission, the United States of 
America, and Great Britain to Slovakia never missed participating in and greeting the annual 
Stupava conferences.243  
The various symbolic gestures and expressions of international solidarity made clear that 
international actors accepted and perceived Slovak NGOs as valuable international partners. 
This symbolism should not be underestimated. The evaluation of the Phare democracy 
program to Slovakia comes to the following conclusion:  
“… the PTDP (Phare Tacis Democracy Program) plays a very important role in 
Slovakia today in helping to support and develop … the NGO sector. …It is important 
for both financial and political reasons… the EU remains a crucial source of financial 
support. Politically the support is crucial for several reasons – EU grants give NGOs 
greater prestige and legitimacy vis-à-vis both the public, the government and potential 
sponsors, EU support exercises a restraining influence on the government, and EU 
support provides the sector with a vital perception that whatever the government’s 
standing with the EU they are part of the European project” (European Commission 
1997c: 160). 
Thus, the legitimacy and credibility of a donor seem to make a difference. The evaluation 
further makes the point:  
“Phare has much greater legitimacy than the Soros Foundation for instance as far 
as local private sponsors and other foreign foundations are concerned. Phare also has 
a greater political weight with the government” (European Commission 1997c: 159).  
Domestic observers also stress the importance of Western solidarity and Western contacts:  
“The fact that the democratic community in Slovakia had maintained communication 
with Western democracies during the Mečiar years also played a role in the political 
change …For civic activists in Slovakia, the identification with “global civil society” was 
no mere phrase. They had their natural partners abroad, and exchanged skills, 
technical advice, and moral encouragement with them. They also learned how to seek 
international support, including financial assistance from the United States and the EU 
countries designed to promote democratization … The West’s open emphasis on the 
need for democratization was of great importance in shaping public opinion. … a 
substantial segment of the population considered the criticism from abroad to be 
justified and saw democratization as a prerequisite for the integration of Slovakia into 
Euro-Atlantic structures” (Bútora / Demeš 1998: 89p). 
243 For example, in 1995 the Stupava conference was greeted by the Ambassador of the 
Delegation of the European Commission in the Slovak Republic, G. Zavvos and the Ambassador of 
the USA, T.E. Russell. In 1996 the conference was greeted by G. Zavvos, by the Ambassador of Great 
Britain in Slovakia, P. Harborne, and by P. Lerner, the director of USAID. In 1997 the conference was 
greeted by two resentatives of the Embassy of the USA and the Delegation of the European 
Commission. Also in 1998, ambassadors from the USA, Great Britain and the Delegation of the 
European Commission participated in the conference (see 
www.saia.sk/stupavska_konferencia/indexe.htm). 
 259
The DPP survey confirms this point. More than any other form of assistance, Slovak NGOs 
appreciated the importance of international networks and contacts. 61% of NGOs that report 
to have international contacts regard them as very important. In total, 67% of respondents 
stress the importance of international contacts and networks. Moral support is also viewed 
positively. 52% of respondents regard this form of assistance as valuable. Moreover, Slovak 
NGOs greatly appreciate the willingness of Western donors to act “as a partner that strives 
for the same goals”. 72% of all respondents indicate that this facet of external assistance has 
been very valuable (see appendix 8, table 26, question 15).  
8.4.6 Summary 
This section addresses the question of the output and the outcome of civil society assistance 
in Slovakia. It has been shown that civil society assistance in Slovakia made a difference. 
Firstly, it provided the financial resources necessary for NGOs to carry out their activities and 
thus contributed to the rise of NGOs in Slovakia. Secondly, it enabled oppositional NGOs to 
become a power countervailing the government, stirring civic participation, and acting as 
watchdog of the repressive Mečiar government. In this way, civil society assistance 
contributed to the structural and the cultural dimension of civil society in Slovakia.  
One has to note, however, that international support and in particular the provision of 
finances opened the door to harsh critic by governmental officials and government-friendly 
media that aimed to trigger animosities towards NGOs in the rural HZDS electorate. During 
the election campaign “OK ‘98” the HZDS friendly daily “Slovenská Republika” continuously 
attacked single NGOs and the Third Sector and saw them as puppets of Western (and 
Jewish) capitalists (Vašečka 2002b: 6): 
“The ”OK ‘98” project is an example of a coarse interference from abroad in 
domestic affairs of a sovereign state through Slovak non-governmental organizations. 
This project embodies the power interest in the elections on the part of the USA, while 
organizations from Great Britain and the Netherlands also participate in the project” 
(Article ”How to Assassinate Slovakia”, Slovenská Republika, July 21, 1998 cit. in: 
Vašečka 2002c: 5). 
As the prevailingly positive public image of NGOs depicted by public opinion surveys 
demonstrate (see chapter 8.4.3.), such attacks did not bear fruit though. The wide media 
attention NGOs gained during the campaign and the frequent connection of NGO activities 
and a vibrant civil society prevented a negative image of NGOs in the public. Furthermore, 
the prospect of EU enlargement, the desire to “return to Europe” on the one hand, and the 
fear of dropping out of the “Visegrad four” group, on the other hand, ensured a positive image 
of international and especially European actors.  
 260
One can thus conclude that international assistance supported and strengthened Slovak 
NGOs. The provision of money, knowledge and moral support enabled main recipients to 
assume their role as carriers of civil society described above. All three forms of assistance 
translated into political bargaining power in the domestic political struggle. Financial support 
guaranteed the existence of (oppositional) NGOs and enabled NGOs to provide services for 
the NGO sector and to act as watchdogs of an increasingly repressive government. Capacity 
building provided necessary techniques, concepts and role models to teach main recipients 
how to fulfill their tasks, and moral support and international solidarity enhanced the standing 
and legitimacy of NGOs in the domestic setting.  
8.5 Conclusion: Civil Society Assistance in Slovakia: Western 
Political Intervention From Below? 
The introduction to this chapter stressed the “deviant” character of the Slovak case. This 
character is grounded in the unfavorable historical pre-conditions of civil society development 
in Slovakia. The late national awakening and independence, the belated modernization as 
well as a repressive communist regime that did not leave much room for free spheres of civic 
activity prevented the evolvement of a respective cultural basis of civic activity, i.e. a “civic 
culture” or “civic ethos”. Slovak history largely lacks experiences with liberalism and 
democracy. Neither did the feeble national movement in the 19th century incorporate liberal 
trends nor did Slovakia experience a vibrant associational life throughout its history. On the 
contrary, authoritarian regimes prevailed each time Slovakia gained independence, as was 
the case between 1939 and 1945. Throughout the communist period an opposition was 
basically non-existent. Even the few liberal trends such as e.g. the Prague Spring or the 
Charter 77 were dominated by Czechs. The oppositional movement “Public Against Violence” 
that evolved during the velvet revolution of 1989 also included not only anti-communists, but 
also reform communists and former party apparatchiks. Keeping this historic development in 
mind, it hardly comes as a surprise that a populist-nationalistic right-left wing coalition came 
to power in 1994 in Slovakia. Ruled by the populist Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar, it 
increasingly embodied repressive and authoritarian tendencies, and found its loyal electorate 
of a steady 20% among the rural population.  
Despite these unfavorable historical pre-conditions the 1990s witnessed a rise in civic activity 
and associational life in Slovakia. Numerous NGOs sprang up in various issue areas, while 
civic participation increased and strong and cooperative bonds developed among NGOs. 
Moreover, a core of approximately 2000 highly committed NGOs evolved that actively strove 
for the strengthening of civil society and the protection of democratic procedures and values. 
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Campaigns such as the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” and even more so the pre-election 
campaign “OK ‘98” aimed to raise public awareness, to mobilize the public, and to trigger an 
understanding of democratic rules and procedures. The NGO sector, commonly referred to in 
Slovakia as the “Third Sector”, provided a platform for open debate and a refuge for political 
opponents and thus evolved as a countervailing power and major oppositional force during 
the Mečiar regime. This is demonstrated among other things by the fact that the pre-election 
campaign “OK ‘98” is widely perceived as a major contribution to the electoral defeat of 
Vladimir Mečiar in 1998. For all these reasons the NGO sector in Slovakia has been 
characterized as a “civil archipelago of positive action” that stands in stark contrast to the 
“islands of positive deviants” as independent civil activists were called by Slovak sociologists 
in the late 1980s (Vašečka 2002c: 2).  
It became clear that the rise of civil society in Slovakia has been greatly assisted and 
supported by external actors. Slovak NGOs have been receiving massive international 
support that augmented civil society assistance in other CEE countries. Whereas in Poland 
democracy assistance largely involved institution building measures, in the Slovak case 
donors placed a greater emphasis on the assistance to civil society in their endeavors to 
assist democracy. Without external financial assistance, a large part of NGOs would not have 
been able to carry out their various activities. Neither the “Third Sector SOS Campaign” nor 
the pre-election campaign “OK ‘98” would have been feasible without external funds. Not 
only the provision of financial resources, but also the provision of ideas, concepts, knowledge 
and techniques, international solidarity and moral support were important benefits of civil 
society assistance that enabled recipient organizations to fulfill their roles as public 
awareness raisers and watchdogs of democratic procedures outlined above. 
The question arises, however, whether civil society assistance to Slovakia is actually worthy 
of the name. Critics may point out that the massive inflow of international funds shortly before 
the elections of 1998 was aimed less at triggering civic activities than bringing about a 
change in government widely desired by Western actors. The objective was thus to a lesser 
extent to transplant long-term structures of civic and associational life but rather to “buy” 
political decisions. In this measure, civil society assistance deteriorates to a subtle form of 
(illegitimate) external intervention in the domestic affairs of a country, and the supported 
NGOs constitute neither a “civic archipelago” nor “islands of positive deviants” from which 
civil society can develop, but instead a politically motivated counter-elite that will enter the 
new government and leave NGOs without a mission, objectives and human resources. 
Empirical evidence outlined above suggests that these fears cannot be confirmed. Firstly, it is 
correct that donors supported the pre-election campaign “OK ‘98” and other oppositional 
activities of NGOs. However, they hesitated to do so. The decision to sponsor politically 
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motivated projects was only made after intensive debate between recipients and donors. 
Furthermore, although civil society assistance experienced a peak in 1997/98, donors 
continued and even intensified their commitment after the 1998 elections. Finally, and most 
importantly, the NGO sector in Slovakia did not evaporate after 1998. The sustainability of 
NGOs is guaranteed in the short run and is also an issue that is addressed from various 
sides. NGOs are regarded as legitimate domestic actors and are widely trusted by the 
population. Additionally, NGOs continue their activities and maintain their willingness to play 
a role in the political and social development of the country. Several new topics arose, 
spanning from the advancement of the NGO law, the freedom of information, anti-corruption, 
public administration reform to EU enlargement. Finally, the process of fragmentation and 
decentralization of the NGO sector is a signal that the dominance of Bratislava-based NGOs 
has come to an end and that rural NGOs have gained in weight. Secondly, the fragmentation 
demonstrates that the unity of an oppositional front “against” something (in this case Mečiar) 
has been replaced by thematically oriented issues and debates “for” something.  
Nonetheless one should not fall victim to the fallacy that roughly ten years after transition a 
vibrant and strong civil society is fully established in Slovakia. The above mentioned 
historical legacies are still visible in Slovak society: the rise in public participation in 1997/98 
quickly dwindled, and the optimistic expectations of the population evident in 1998/99 have 
been replaced by dissatisfaction and a disappointment of citizens with politics in face of 
political struggles inside the ruling coalition and a growing unemployment rate. Moreover, the 
social gap between a pro-democratic urban population and a conservative rural population 
and the socio-economic disparities between Western and Eastern Slovakia continues to 
exist. Having said this, we still must stress that NGOs in Slovakia act as carriers of civil 
society that continue to strive for the social and political development of the country.  
“Slovakia’s NGOs now constitute a vibrant and efficient “civil archipelago”, whose 
potential will be equally important in the near future as the society starts to deal with the 
problems inherited from Mečiar’s government. They will be a partner that the new 
government will have to reckon with, both as a prospective collaborator and as a 
potential opponent” (Bútora / Bútorová 1999: 89).  
To sum up, Slovakia is a case that suggests that democracy assistance from below, i.e., 
direct assistance to civil society, can make a difference. Moreover, civil society assistance 
seems to be a more successful strategy to support democratization than top-down 
approaches and a “carrot and stick” diplomacy. At a joint conference of the Munich-based 
Center for Applied Policy Research and the Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava on “Early 
Lessons from the Post-Cold War Era: Western Influences on Central and Eastern European 
Transitions” Martin Bruncko pointed out that the “erroneous belief (of the Mečiar 
administration) that the West could not afford to let Slovakia fall into the Russian sphere of 
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influence, rendered Western diplomatic pressure and the enticement of Western integration 
fruitless.” In contrast, he concludes, the attempt to support transition from the bottom up 
proved more successful in the Slovak case.244 This case study supports this view. 
One must note, however, that the effect of civil society assistance in the Slovak case 
depended on several factors (see also appendix 6, portray 13): 
Firstly, civil society assistance in Slovakia was not successful despite the repressive nature 
of the Mečiar regime, but instead thanks to the regime’s character. Chapter 8.2.6. points out 
that the establishment of the Third Sector as a major oppositional force was largely a 
response to the repressive nature of the Mečiar regime. Without the Mečiar regime, 
intellectuals and dissidents would not have felt the need to withdraw from politics and seek 
refuge in the NGO sector. Nor can we expect that the close unity and cohesion of the NGO 
sector to have developed if it had not been for the need to install a united front against a 
common enemy. Even the openness and eagerness with which Slovak NGOs sought 
Western partners was partly a result of their oppositional role. Not only were Slovak NGOs in 
need of allies against Mečiar, they also quickly learned the importance of international 
contacts as an effective way of enhancing their standing and applying pressure on the 
government. Slovak NGOs thus highly demanded civil society assistance. In contrast, the 
interest of international actors in a political change in Slovakia that enabled Slovakia’s 
integration in EU and NATO resulted in a massive level of civil society assistance.  
Secondly, although top-down measures of democracy assistance such as diplomatic 
pressure and the prospect of EU integration might have been fruitless in counteracting 
Mečiar’s policy, it did not fail to reach the population. If it had not been for the prospect of 
European integration, NGOs and the opposition movement in Slovakia would have been 
deprived of a major comparative advantage against the Mečiar administration. NGOs 
convincingly presented themselves as partners accepted by international and European 
actors, and the opposition parties were widely accepted as the guarantors of European 
integration. Without a basic consensus among the Slovak public about the desirability of 
Western integration, this strategy would have failed. The public desire to “re-join Europe” 
ensured that the several expressions of international solidarity with Slovak NGOs and the 
international contacts of Slovak NGOs resulted in a boost of legitimacy and ensured that the 
endeavors of the Mečiar regime to unveil Slovak NGOs as internationally directed intruders 
failed. Thirdly, one must note that a large part of the Slovak population may be labeled as 
democratically oriented ”silent opponents“ that positively assessed NGO activities. It has 
244 See Miller, Jeffrey, Bücherl, Wolfgang, 1/2001: Conference Summary: 
www.ivo.sk/sho_print.asp?ld=188  
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been pointed out that the electoral victory of Vladimir Mečiar in 1994 was less due to a strong 
backing in the population but rather to a disunited opposition and a high percentage of 
uncast votes and invalid ballots. In 1994 over 20% of votes were lost as they represented 
parties that did not pass the 5% threshold. This implies that the percentage of democratically 
oriented voters that critically assessed the Mečiar government augmented the number of the 
HZDS-SNS supporters.245 
Finally, the type of relationship between donor and recipient has been decisive. Slovak NGOs 
widely perceived their donors as “partners that strive for the same goals” (80% of 
respondents to the DPP survey agree with this point). Much more than their Polish 
counterparts, Slovak NGOs thus perceive foreign donors as equal partners that are informed 
about the social and political problems in the country.246 We must note that in the case of 
Slovakia, donors applied a more fine-tuned and political approach to civil society that relied 
on local intermediaries, micro-grants, a broad thematic focus, and a long-term commitment 
(chapter 8.3.3.). Decentralized donor strategies that relied on local organizations and local 
staff that implemented their programs, and individual personalities that involved in long-term 
contact with recipient organizations, proved to be of special importance. What evolved was a 
close network of donors and recipients that perceived each other as partners striving for the 
same goals. Regular contacts and cooperative ties among “partners” as well as a frequent 
debate and exchange at the Stupava conferences were important factors that ensured the 
exchange of ideas and triggered learning. This assessment is confirmed by the interviews of 
the author. All interviewees stress the point that Slovak NGOs did not see international 
assistance as indoctrination from above or as illegitimate interference in domestic affairs. On 
the contrary, Slovak NGOs are internationally oriented.  
In sum, Slovakia is a success story of civil society assistance. However, the success 
depended on both domestic as well as international factors. On the one hand, we have a 
domestic political constellation that stimulated a demand for external civil society assistance 
and a pro-European outlook, on the other hand, we observe a symmetric relationship 
between donors and recipients as well as a favorable international environment and a 
profound interest of donors resulting in a high level of assistance. Without these facilitating 
factors external donors may not have been able to call Slovakia their “success story”.  
245 One should note that in absolute numbers the HZDS-SNS even improved slightly in 1998 in 
comparison with 1994. Due to a higher voter turnout and fewer uncasted votes, the HZDS fell from 
25.9% in 1994 to 22.5 percent of votes in 1998, whereas the SNS improved from 4% in 1994 to 7.6% 
in 1998 (see Krivý 1999: 66p). 
246 In the DPP survey the majority of NGOs attest donors a good local knowledge (63%), and only 





This dissertation investigated the phenomenon of civil society assistance. It focused on the 
various efforts of external actors to trigger and support the development of civil society in the 
democratizing states of Central and Eastern Europe from the outside. Starting slowly in the 
1990s, civil society assistance became a major area of concern of development agencies in 
the middle of the 1990s. Until now it is and continues to be a prominent issue among actors 
that assist the political and economic development of states in East and South.  
To what extent were the efforts to assist civil society fruitful, were external actors able to 
contribute to a vibrant civil society or did their activities and applied strategies even hinder 
civil society development and what conditions of “successful” transfer could be identified 
were the main questions that inspired this dissertation.  
Critics doubt that external actors can contribute to civil society development in democratizing 
states. According to them, the deliberate, direct and explicit involvement of external actors 
into the domestic affairs of a country with the aim of strengthening civil society is bound to fail 
or may even yield unintended negative effects that hinder instead of triggering civil society 
development. Two main objections against civil society assistance have been made from 
differing standpoints.  
First, critics point to the cultural prerequisites of civil society. Civil society is visible in 
voluntary, independent and self-organized forms of social interaction such as non-
governmental organizations or associations. More important for civil society to flourish and to 
stabilize democracy are, however, moral qualities and patterns of behavior that ensure 
tolerance and mutual trust, peaceful conflict resolution among social groups, and an active 
citizenry capable and eager to participate in politics and to stand up for their rights. However, 
such a “civic ethos” (Offe 2000a), or “civilizational competence” (Sztompka 1993) is not open 
to deliberate design rather develops during long historical processes and is shaped by 
culturally defined habits and cognitive scripts. Consequently, civil society must be an 
indigenous product, embedded in the cultural and historical roots of a country and cannot be 
transplanted into settings that lack or even contradict this necessary cultural basis. Post-
communist states, however, often lack this spirit. The cultural heritages of the communist 
past left their mark on political traditions, attitudes and behavioral patterns apparent in post-
communist societies and are widely believed to inhibit the upspring of self-organized social 
activity. Piotr Sztompka (1993) even argues that state socialism not only hinders the 
emergence of “civilizational competence”, but results in the reverse, “civilizational 
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incompetence”. In particular the image of social homogeneity and a resulting lack of interest 
differentiation and representation, a thoroughly discredited image of associations, citizens’ 
passivity tied with exceeding claims toward the state as protector and care-taker, and a deep 
state-society divide have been identified as the major factors deterring civil society. Following 
this line of thought, civil society assistance cannot work in CEE. Civil society assistance will 
result into nothing more than a supplementary stratum of “donor-driven” NGOs that lack 
domestic constituencies. Such “DONGOs” do not respond to local needs but solely satisfy 
donor’s wants. From this perspective, civil society assistance is thus not a suitable instrument 
to facilitate democratization. No matter what concept, strategy or program donors employ, 
recipient responses and domestic settings will determine the success or failure of external 
assistance.  
In contrast to this first group of critics, scholars working on international assistance to 
democracy and civil society believe in the capacity of external actors to assist transformation 
processes abroad. They criticize donors, however, for their lack of concepts and 
inappropriate strategies. Mainly the overemphasis on institution building and a strong focus 
on project specific support yield unintended and even negative effects. More often than not, 
donors preliminarily conceive civil society as a plurality of non-governmental organizations. 
NGOs are thus supposed to be established, supported and institutionally strengthened. 
Thereby, donors neglect the fact that the support to single NGOs generates often envy and 
fierce competition among domestic NGOs. As a result, ties between NGOs and inside society 
are weakened instead of strengthened. Capacity building, i.e. the provision of training and 
know-how is part of donor strategies though, however, mainly in order to teach NGO activists 
how to do their job best. Additionally, project-specific support generates excessive 
dependence of local NGOs on donors and donors’ wants. Local NGOs often aim to satisfy 
donor rather than domestic needs. Moreover, there is a high risk that foreign assistance will 
have negative consequences, as it faces the problem of selectivity and legitimacy. Civil 
society assistance is not guided by altruism, but satisfies rational interests. The intention of 
donors is not to install and support civil society as a good in itself but as an instrument to 
achieve other ends such as democracy, peace and external stability. More often than not, 
donors thus deliberately pick recipients, which they assume to serve their interest best. The 
interest-driven and selective character of civil society assistance raises doubt about the 
credibility of the donor. International assistance is thus easily perceived as illegitimate 
interference into the domestic affairs of a country.  
This dissertation followed the first line of thought with regard to the importance of domestic 
settings and responses to international assistance. Like scholars of international assistance, 
it is however more optimistic with respect to the possible outcome of assistance. Rather than 
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questioning whether civil society assistance can contribute to civil society development at all, 
the dissertation investigated the conditions of successful transfer. When and how can 
external actors effectively support and assist civil society? In order to answer this question 
the study analyzed civil society assistance in Poland and Slovakia. Main recipients of 
international assistance, their activities and achievements were the main focus of research.  
9.1 Core Conclusions and Results 
Is it possible to promote and strengthen civil society from abroad? And is it feasible despite 
an interest-driven and selective approach of donors? Having examined civil society 
assistance in Poland and Slovakia, I can now answer this question with yes. In both cases, 
external assistance contributed to the development of civil society. External actors triggered 
the rise of non-governmental organizations, empowered non-state actors, transported ideas 
about the importance and role of civil society and assisted their recipients in acting as 
carriers of civil society. One must note, however, that in both cases certain conditions such 
as a favorable international environment, a domestic willingness to accept international 
assistance and long-time partnerships between donors and recipients based on trust were 
crucial.  
Both case studies reveal that donors are selective as the Polish case demonstrates in 
particular. Only 16% of Polish NGOs state that they benefit from foreign funding (BORDO 
1998). Donors thus do prefer certain recipients and leave others with little chance to receive 
funding. Three main types of major beneficiaries of aid have been identified in both cases, 
known as “thematic organizations”, “democracy promoters”, and “infrastructural NGOs”. In 
the early years of assistance in particular donors supported some “favored cliques” (Wedel 
1998), i.e., thematic organizations of well-known personalities of the Solidarity movement 
that received large scale funding.247 The supported organizations thus received a head start 
that ensured their privileged position in the domestic sphere. Donors additionally focused on 
“democracy promoters”, i.e. NGOs whose primary aim is the promotion of democracy. Civic 
education projects as well as training for NGO leaders are their major activities. In the middle 
of the 1990s donors widened their scope and increasingly focused on what has been called 
“infrastructural NGOs”, namely NGOs whose major aim is a vibrant civil society and a 
favorable environment for civil society activity.  
247 Examples of such thematically-oriented “main recipients” are the Helsinki Foundation of Human 
Rights (HFHR); The Foundation in Support for Local Democracy (FSLD) but also various think tanks 
such as the Institute for Public Affairs (ISP, Instytut Spraw Publicznych) or the Institute for International 
Relations (CIM).  
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This focus follows the insight that a vibrant civil society consists of more than a set of non-
governmental organizations. What is needed is a favorable environment, an “infrastructure” 
of civil society that consists of a respective legal framework, a supportive state policy, as well 
as networks of NGOs.  
Despite the selective approach of donors, the suspicion that civil society assistance will result 
in nothing more than a supplementary stratum of donor-driven NGOs could not be confirmed. 
In both case studies main recipients are rooted in domestic structures. One must note that 
main recipients live from the implementation of donor projects and have been highly 
influenced by donors especially if skills and applied techniques are concerned. Nonetheless 
all organizations under investigation have their own interests and agendas, are regarded as 
legitimate domestic actors, are sustainable in the long run, and act as carriers of civil society.  
In both cases main recipients are driven by domestic concerns. The NGO sectors additionally 
reflect country specific characteristics. In Poland nearly all of the examined organizations 
have roots in the Solidarity movement. Either main activists were already concerned with the 
statuary objective of their organizations throughout the 1980s248 or they have their roots in 
the civic committees initiated by Lech Wałęsa in 1989. And a further fact reveals that the 
Polish NGO sector is shaped by domestic concerns: The majority of registered NGOs in 
Poland are active in the area of social service provision. Especially in the early years of 
assistance such organizations hardly gained foreign funding. Rather than being donor-driven, 
they are the result of a strong charity tradition in catholic Poland. In order to receive funding, 
such organizations often took up the activities of what has been called ‘infrastructural 
organizations’. As a result, most infrastructural NGOs are not artificially created by external 
actors but are often aligned with and respond to the needs of social service oriented 
NGOs.249 In Slovakia as well, “democracy promoters” and “infrastructural NGOs” are not 
exclusively concerned with the promotion of democracy and civil society, but often have a 
second major objective such as education or the environment.250 In contrast to Poland, social 
service oriented organizations play a minor role in Slovakia, as the Mečiar government 
largely maintained the social security system of the communist state. As a result, there was 
no need for private organizations in this area. Instead organizations concerned with 
248 Such is the case e.g. with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights but also with several 
environmental organizations or the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy that was founded by a 
couple of Solidarity members who applied the concept of the “self-administrated republic” to local 
democracy.  
249 For example: BORIS, SPLOT, WROSZ. 
250 For example SAIA-SCTS, the main organization working for a favorable environment for NGO 
activity is also active in the field of international scholar exchange. ETP Slovakia, as second main 
infrastructural NGO works additionally for a sustainable environment.  
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education and research sprang up as the NGO sector served as a refuge for oppositional 
intellectuals.  
Bearing the domestic roots of main recipients in mind, it comes as no surprise that according 
to opinion polls such organizations are not perceived as puppets of alien influence but as 
legitimate domestic actors. Furthermore, international contacts and assistance did not 
undermine but instead boost the credibility and reputation of recipients. In both countries, 
international contacts are highly valued. The very fact that an organization has international 
partners is often taken as proof for its experience and competence.  
The domestic rooting of main recipients is also made evident by the fact that all of the main 
recipients under investigation succeeded in ensuring their existence after donor funding 
ended. Democracy promoters often started to work abroad where their experience with 
democratization was eagerly sought. International donors stopped funding in Poland and 
Slovakia, but they are more than willing to do so in countries further East such as 
Byelorussia or Ukraine. Other organizations commercialized part of their activities and sold 
their services to enterprises or to public administration. Moreover, in both countries public 
and private domestic funds are increasingly available. In this regard, the activities of main 
recipients have been decisive. In both countries various efforts have been made to establish 
community foundations. Finally, with the membership in the European Union NGOs from both 
countries can draw on structural funds of the EU. The withdrawal of American donors is thus 
partially absorbed by additional European funds.  
Furthermore, it became clear that the activities of main recipients contribute to civil society 
development. In both countries, main recipients provide services to other NGOs with the aim 
to facilitate NGO activities. A large share of NGOs benefit from training courses conducted by 
infrastructural NGOs and democracy promoters that impart skills in management, fund-
raising or lobbying. In both countries, infrastructural NGOs run an internet platform with NGO 
relevant information reporting on new legislation, new funding possibilities and major events. 
Moreover, main recipients struggle for a respective legal environment and funding 
possibilities. In Poland it took a long battle and intensive debate between NGO activists and 
governmental representatives until after several years a law on NGOs, the “Public Benefits 
Activity Act” was finally adopted in 2003.  
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Beforehand, public benefit oriented activities of NGOs were severely constrained by 
unfavorable tax regulations, an unclear legal situation, the coexistence of old and new legal 
regulations, and bureaucratic procedures.251 In Slovakia main recipients started a country-
wide campaign in response to a new law on foundations proposed in 1996. The law was 
widely believed to be a repressive measure by the Mečiar government aiming to oppress 
oppositional NGOs. The so-called “Third Sector SOS Campaign” failed to prevent the new 
law. Nonetheless, NGO activists point out that the campaign contributed to NGO 
development. The campaign raised public awareness for NGO issues and the importance of 
non-state activity. Moreover it proved that NGOs in Slovakia were capable of common action 
and unity against the government. Katarina Koštálová, executive director or SAIA-SCTS in 
2000, describes the importance of the campaign as follows:  
“Then we learned how to do this; how to reach compromises inside (the) sector; how 
to organize publicly. We additionally learned how to invite international groups to 
express solidarity with Slovakia” (interview with the author).  
Funding was a further pressing problem addressed by main recipients. Some of the 
organizations under investigation managed externally financed NGO support programs. They 
thus acted as intermediaries that passed on external civil society assistance and were 
recipients and donors at once.252 After the support scheme came to an end, they used their 
gained expertise and continued to work for the provision of funding to local NGOs. The 
establishment of domestic foundations (partially with the help of foreign donors) and 
community foundations that finance local initiatives were the result.  
Main recipients, however, did not restrict themselves to improving the structural conditions for 
NGOs. Besides the provision of services and the struggle for a better legal environment and 
funding possibilities, they sought to raise civic participation, develop ties and networks 
among NGOs and to act as a watch-dog of government. This has been especially the case in 
Slovakia. In contrast to Poland, non-governmental organizations, associations and 
foundations developed in Slovakia in face of an increasingly repressive government. In 
response to the repressive nature of the nationalist-populist coalition under Vladimir Mečiar 
elected in 1994, the NGO sector in Slovakia took up a political role and evolved as a major 
oppositional force.  
251 The new law regulates the cooperation between public administration and NGOs and makes it 
possible for the state administration to contract out the provision of public services. Additionally, it 
increases the possibility for NGOs to engage in economic activities that are still  tax-free  and allows 
for the possibility of transfering 1% of the personal income tax to public benefit organizations. The law 
thus increases the chances of NGOs  receiving funding, a further pressing problem that has been 
addressed by main recipients. 
252 Examples are the “Academy for Philanthrophy” in Poland, and ETP Slovakia in Slovakia.  
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In 1997 oppositional NGOs that largely received funding from abroad launched the pre-
election campaign “OK 98” with the aim of informing citizens about democratic procedures, 
increasing voter turnout, and ensuring the fairness of the 1998 elections. The campaign, 
which was fully financed from abroad, included almost 60 different NGOs and initiatives such 
as monitoring projects, video and television spots, rock concerts or a relay march. The 
campaign can be labeled a success: At 84% the voter turnout was high, especially among 
first voters (80% in comparison to 20% in 1994). Moreover, the campaign mobilized the 
public as manifested by the raise in volunteerism that supported several initiatives of the 
campaign. For all these reasons, the campaign largely contributed to the electoral defeat of 
Vladimir Mečiar in 1998. We can thus conclude that main recipients in both countries act as 
carriers of civil society.  
Despite everything said above, one may still doubt that external civil society assistance made 
a difference. Question arises with regard to the extent to which external assistance enabled 
main recipients to carry out the various activities summarized above. Did donors simply 
support organizations in doing what they had done anyway? In other words, was the 
apparent success of civil society assistance a success by accident or skill? The Slovak case 
raises a further suspicion. Critics may point out that the massive inflow of international funds 
shortly before the elections of 1998 aimed less to trigger civic activities than to bring about a 
change in government widely desired by Western actors. The objective was thus not so 
much to transplant long-term structures of civic and associational life, rather to “buy” political 
decisions. An analysis of the ways recipients benefited from external assistance quickly 
reveals that civil society assistance made a difference: Firstly, the provision of funds 
contributed to the rise of NGOs. More importantly, international assistance empowered 
democratically oriented NGOs that contrast with the strong organizations that already existed 
during communism. Secondly, civil society assistance transported ideas about the 
importance of civil society and the role of NGOs and triggered not only recipient but also 
donor learning.  
Without the massive inflow of Western funds, the rapid rise of non-governmental 
organizations would hardly have been feasible. Domestic funds were rare in the face of 
economic repression following economic transition. There was neither a philanthropic culture 
in existence, nor was the state willing to and capable of supporting citizens’ initiatives. After 
transition, state authorities and political elites largely lacked an understanding for the 
importance of civil society. Non-governmental organizations have been regarded as 
unwelcome and unnecessary competitors. The political will on behalf of the political elites to 
stimulate civil society development was widely lacking. In Poland state policy toward NGOs 
was ambiguous and often contraproductive for civil society development. In Slovakia, the 
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government suppressed the self-organization of society if it stood in opposition to the state. 
With the provision of financial means civil society assistance thus enabled NGOs to run their 
various activities. In the Slovak case, external support additionally protected oppositional 
NGOs and guaranteed their existence. External assistance thus stabilized new democracies 
by supporting the burgeoning rise of NGOs. The provision of funds is even more important if 
one focuses upon the peculiarities of post-communist countries. Alexander Smolnar (1996) 
pinpoints the fact that “the most extensive, strongest organizations, associations, 
cooperatives, political parties and trade unions come from the ancient regime” as one major 
obstacle of civil society development in post-communist countries. Also in Poland and 
Slovakia non-governmental organizations that already existed during communism are strong 
in the sense that they still have financial resources as well as contacts to authorities. The 
case studies revealed that these “old features” of self-organized social activity have been 
supplemented by “new features”. On the one hand, we have a rather limited number of 
financially powerful organizations, namely sports clubs, trade unions and other non-state 
organizations that were already active during communism and fall back on the assets 
accumulated during communist times. On the other hand, we observe a large number of 
newly created organizations whose objectives lie in areas such as environmental protection, 
human and minority rights, development or women issues as well as social services or 
education. These organizations who count themselves as belonging to the “Third Sector” or 
“the movement of non-governmental organizations” (Gliński 1998: 31) are influenced by 
ideas and concepts previously developed in the “new social movements” of the West, involve 
mainly young people (Gliński 1998: 31), largely rely on volunteers, and are financially 
supported by Western sources. Whereas the “old” features of the NGO sector have money 
and informal networks to administrative personnel, the “new” strand has the youth, 
volunteers and Western support. With the help of external assistance, the continuing 
existence of old structures is thus countered by the development of a variety and exceeding 
number of new organization established after the changes of 1989/1990. Furthermore, 
external support and international contacts empowered these new organizations. In 
consequence, NGOs gained political influence. This is demonstrated e.g. by the example of 
the legislative process in Poland leading to the new law on NGOs. In their attemts at creating 
a clear legal situation for NGOs, NGO activists had international allies and could e.g. draw on 
gratis expertise ordered by several donor organizations such as USAID or the EU-funded 
Phare Civic Dialogue Program. The Polish government that desired EU membership found it 
difficult to ignore the expertise financed by EU money. In equal measure, it could not deny 
negotiations with NGO representatives on a new law that was initiated by a US-American 
NGO. This example demonstrates how international support increased the visibility and 
political bargaining power of NGOs. 
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Civil society assistance additionally transported new ideas and an understanding of the 
functions and merits of NGOs and a vibrant civil society. The point has been made that 
NGOs in CEE face an identity crisis (Kuti 1999: 53). NGOs lack an understanding of their 
interests and needs, and for their position vis-à-vis the state and vis-à-vis other civil society 
organizations. They are often not willing to join forces or cooperate even if they have the 
same interests. Instead distrust and conflict between the various organizations is still deep 
(ibid: 54). The cases of Poland and Slovakia demonstrate that external assistance helped to 
overcome this identity crisis. In particular single individuals, continuing exchange and debate 
and what has been called “local donors” have been decisive in this regard. The Slovak NGO 
SAIA profited in its early years highly from American and Canadian volunteers that were 
“mentor and supplier of ideas and inspiration” for its founding members, as the Executive 
Director of SAIA Katarína Koštálova, puts it. This example demonstrates that especially in the 
early years international actors functioned as bridgeheads of foreign concepts and ideas and 
as role models and trainers. Regular debate and exchange of ideas was also important. This 
took place in long-term partnerships between donors and recipients but also at annual 
gatherings of NGOs such as the Slovak Stupava Conferences. Each year the conference 
addresses a different major issue of concern for NGOs.253 Having domestic as well as 
foreign participants, the conferences function as platform of debate and exchange between 
Slovak and foreign like-minded civil society activists. The Stupava Conferences play an 
important role for the development of the identity and self-image of Slovak NGOs. For 
example, the idea for the pre-electoral campaign “OK 98” was born at the Stupava 
Conference in 1997. The Slovak and international NGOs intensively debated whether Slovak 
NGOs should take on a political role and play an active part in the elections. Domestic 
organizations with local staff that implement donor projects also triggered the circulation of 
ideas and the development of NGO identity. Starting in the middle of the 1990s donors 
decentralized assistance and increasingly relied on local expertise and local staff. What 
evolved were “local donors” which implement donor programs.254 The local administration of 
the programs ensured close cooperation with domestic NGOs and their needs. This is even 
more so the case, as the NGO support programs and main recipients cultivated close 
personal links, which is demonstrated by the fact that staff of the former are often board 
253 Conference topics were for example: “Present and Future Perspectives of the Third Sector in 
Slovakia” (1994); “The Third Sector and Civil Society” (1995); “The Third Sector – We Serve the 
Citizens” (1996); “The Third Sector – Actively Working for Democracy” (1997); “Third Sector for 
Decentralization and Transparency” (1999).  
254 Examples include the Polish “Cooperation Fund” and the Slovak NGO “NPOA” that managed 
the Phare NGO support programs of the European Union; or the Foundation for Civil Society and ETP 
Slovakia who managed USAID NGO support programs. The Batory Foundation and the Open Society 
Foundation are a special case. Although financed from abroad by  the billionaire George Soros, both 
foundations are domestic and run with local staff.  
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members (or even founding members) of the latter or vice versa. Instead of strictly divided 
“donors” and “recipients” we thus observe a group of domestic and international activists that 
work together in order to advance civil society. Such transnational “activist networks”, or in 
the words of Kathryn Sikking (1993) “principled-issue networks” were a source of impetus 
and inspiration. Like that, donors impacted upon recipients’ orientations, and triggered 
learning process. It must be noted, however, that not only recipients benefited from the 
experience of donors and adopted Western concepts and ideas. Likewise, recipients 
impacted upon grant schemes and strategies of donors. This is demonstrated for example by 
the difference in strategies applied in the Polish and the Slovak case. The early period of civil 
society assistance to Poland was marked by a lack of strategy and a tremendous ignorance 
towards domestic contexts. Only in the middle of the 1990s did donors change their 
approach to civil society assistance in Poland and applied a more fine-tuned strategy. They 
became aware of the shortcomings of selecting a few recipients and increasingly provided 
small grants to a wider spectrum of NGOs active in a variety of thematic areas. Additionally, 
donors placed greater emphasis on “capacity building” with a focus on training, network 
building and a favorable regulatory environment for NGOs. Most importantly, donors learned 
that local knowledge and initiative was important to ensure success. In Slovakia, where civil 
society assistance started at a later point in time than in Poland, donors applied a more fine-
tuned approach from the beginning. Civil society assistance in Slovakia thus benefited from 
the lessons-learned in other cases as e.g. Poland. The discussion preceding the “OK 98” 
campaign in Slovakia further points to the learning processes of donors. Donors hesitated to 
support political actions of Slovak NGOs. Donors were eager to appear as neutral and 
unpartisan, and feared that the fact that the campaign was financed from abroad might 
undermine its credibility and effect. This has not been the case. Attempts by the Mečiar 
government to discredit Slovak NGOs as externally-driven traitors failed. Additionally, the 
close cooperation between donors and recipients ensured that the massive funding did not 
end after the electoral defeat of the Mečiar government. On the contrary, donors prolonged 
their assistance in order to stabilize the NGO sector. The continuing existence and activities 
of Slovak NGOs and main recipients demonstrates that the massive inflow of funds shortly 
before the elections did not target at a single event, but also stabilized the structures and 
rules of civil society.  
We can thus conclude that civil society assistance empowered and shaped Polish and 
Slovak NGOs and subsequently contributed to civil society development. However one must 
state a further point in conclusion. In both case studies facilitating factors were at work 
without which external assistance may not have contributed to an advancement of civil 
society. The following conditions were crucial:  
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First, the domestic context, and especially the existence of a “domestic pull” played a role. In 
both cases international assistance was highly welcome and eagerly sought. In the Slovak 
case, civil society assistance was successful not despite the repressive nature of the Mečiar 
regime, but thanks to the regime’s character. The establishment of NGOs as a major 
oppositional force was largely a response to the repressive nature of the Mečiar regime. The 
oppositional role of NGOs explains the openness and eagerness with which Slovak NGOs 
sought Western partners. Not only where Slovak NGOs in need of allies against their 
government, they also quickly learned the importance of international contacts as an effective 
way to apply pressure on the government. Slovak NGOs thus highly demanded civil society 
assistance. In Poland foreign support was largely perceived as legitimate and acceptable 
assistance. Based on the strong belief that Poland would have been a democratic and 
wealthy country similar to its Western neighbors if it had not been for the Soviet occupation, 
Western assistance was demanded by the Polish people as a way to re-install normality. Aid 
was not regarded as a pittance but as assistance to which Poland is entitled.  
Second, in both cases the international environment has been favorable to democratization 
processes. Multilateral or bilateral pressures did not counteract, rather supported civil society 
assistance. Civil society assistance benefited in particular from the prospect of EU 
membership. In Poland, the desired EU membership was an important leverage of NGO 
activists who were not tired of reminding their government of the importance of a vibrant civil 
society for EU entry. Thanks to European enlargement, the adoption of a new NGO law came 
in the range of appropriate policy options to governmental representatives. In the Slovak 
case, the prospect of EU membership had little influence on the Mečiar government. 
Diplomatic pressure remained largely without effect (Samson 2001). Although the attempt to 
stabilize democracy from the top down failed to influence Mečiar’s policies, it did reach the 
population. If it had not been for the prospect of European integration, NGOs and the 
opposition movement in Slovakia would have been deprived of a major comparative 
advantage against the Mečiar administration. NGOs convincingly presented themselves as 
partners accepted by international and European actors, and the oppositional parties were 
widely accepted as the guarantors of European integration. Without a basic consensus 
among the Slovak public about the desirability of Western integration, this strategy would 
have failed. The public desire to “re-join Europe” ensured that the various expressions of 
international solidarity with Slovak NGOs and their international contacts established Slovak 
NGOs as reputable domestic actors. As a result, the strategy of the Mečiar regime to unveil 
Slovak NGOs as internationally directed intruders failed. Moreover, the interest of external 
actors in political change in Slovakia and in Slovakia’s integration into EU and NATO resulted 
in a massive level of civil society assistance. In other words, in both cases civil society 
 276
assistance was carried by an interest of donors and recipients alike. The domestic pull was 
supplemented by an international push.  
Finally, the type of relationship between donor and recipient has been decisive. Both case 
studies depict that long-term partnerships based on trust, ongoing communication, and a 
“core consensus” are more promising than ready-made short-term measures. “Local donors”, 
as well as single individuals that enterred in long-term partnerships with recipient 
organizations, proved to be of special importance. Moreover, the credibility and esteem of the 
donor was significant. In both cases, donors were widely regarded as trustworthy and 
credible partners. In Slovakia, recipients widely perceived their donors as “partners that strive 
for the same goals” (80% of respondents to the DPP survey agree to this point). In Poland, in 
particular American donors were highly appreciated thanks to the massive support they 
granted already during the 1980s. 
In sum, civil society assistance is a valuable tool if it comes to promote or protect democracy 
from below. In both cases external assistance contributed to the development of civil society. 
Without external financial assistance the rise of non-state activity taking place in both 
countries after 1989/1990 would hardly have been feasible. Civil society assistance thus 
fostered “new” features of organized civil activity in post-communist countries that 
supplemented the various organizations already in existence in the previous regime. Part of 
these newly established organizations, namely what has been called “main recipients” acted 
as intermediaries that ensured that a wider range of NGOs benefited from Western support in 
the form of finances, training and a favorable environment. In the Slovak case, civil society 
assistance additionally supported and strengthened a counter-elite that opposed the populist-
nationalist government, and acted as a watchdog for democratic procedures. International 
assistance and solidarity increased the political bargaining power of these actors. 
Furthermore, transnational networks between donors and recipients resulted in cognitive 
convergence and learning processes on both sides. In other words, external assistance 
contributed to the development of civil society via the mechanisms empowerment and 
learning.  
This is not to say that the cultural legacies of communist rule such as a passive citizenry, a 
deep state-society divide, and prevailing distrust leave no marks. In Poland distrust between 
NGO activists on the one side and politicians on the other is still visible. NGO activists often 
regard politics as something dirty; politicians see NGOs as superfluous and a waste of 
money. In Slovakia civic participation that rose enormously in 1997/98 quickly dwindled 
afterwards. The optimistic expectations of the population evident in 1998/99 turned into 
dissatisfaction and disappointment among citizens with politics in the face of political 
struggles inside the ruling coalition and a growing unemployment rate. Furthermore, the 
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social gap between a pro-democratic urban population and a conservative rural population 
and the socio-economic disparities between Western and Eastern Slovakia continue to exist. 
Having said this, though in both countries a group of highly motivated and active NGOs still 
are in existence and continue to strive for the social and political development of the 
countries. These organizations critically watch the continuation of democratic reforms and the 
compliance with newly established democratic rules. They strive for the expansion of citizens’ 
rights, and the inclusion of marginalized groups into politics. Additionally they trigger public 
debate. Finally, they raise political awareness and activism especially among young people. 
For all these reasons, these NGOs that flourished with the assistance from abroad contribute 
to the consolidation of democracy in Poland and Slovakia.  
9.2 Implications for Practitioners of Civil Society Assistance 
What lessons can be drawn from the conclusions above? First and foremost, this study 
suggests that civil society assistance is not a waste of money, rather a valuable and 
important contribution to democratization. Nonetheless, donors still should keep certain 
factors in mind while devising programs of civil society assistance.  
First, donors will need to restrain from selecting recipients. Instead, donors should support a 
broad spectrum of thematically oriented organizations, no matter how convinced they are 
that certain organizations are better suited to advance civil society than others. Civil society 
consists of more than public policy-oriented advocacy groups. Civil society relies on active 
citizens that learn how to organize and represent their interests. This point is especially 
salient in post-communist states where the omnipresence of the state and the 
homogenization of societal interests suppressed citizens’ activity. Democracy is not the main 
issue of concern of ordinary people, at least not in the long run. The daily little problems are 
often of greater importance, be it a new schoolyard, better working conditions, adequate 
public transport. Active citizens cannot only be found in human right groups or environmental 
organizations, but also in parent organizations, trade unions or sport clubs. Moreover, in 
different domestic contexts and circumstances different NGOs assume an oppositional role. 
Likewise, no society is confronted with the same given needs and interests. Depending on 
the domestic context, different issues are of importance. For example in Poland, the majority 
of newly founded NGOs are active in the area of social service provision. In Slovakia, 
organizations dedicated to the promotion of science and education play a leading role. In 
Hungary, environmental organizations directed public dissatisfaction with the ruling elite in 
1989/1990. For all these reasons, donors should not restrict their support to certain groups 
but assist existing organizations. More often than not, these are the ones that are triggered 
by domestic concerns.  
 278
Second, donors need to understand civil society assistance as a political undertaking. This 
involves acknowledging power relations and domestic actor constellations. Civil society 
assistance is always political as it empowers certain domestic actors and thus alters 
domestic actor constellations. This point seems obvious, if the paramount goal of civil society 
assistance is to stabilize a certain (namely democratic) political system. One must note, 
however, that donors often seem unaware of this fact or at least behave as if civil society 
assistance were politically neutral.  
“Traditionally, democracy aid has operated ignoring the realities of power and the 
intricacies of politics. It has relied on technical solutions to address political problems, 
adopting somehow a “therapeutic approach” and “benign idealism”” (Santiso 2001: 11). 
Non-governmental donors, in particular, are often eager to appear non-partisan and 
apolitical. McMahon (2004: 260) points out that non-governmental American donors even 
discourage their recipients from getting involved in politics. The reason lies in US tax 
regulations that prohibit charity organizations and philanthropic foundations from assisting 
political organizations. Similarly, the German political foundations are prohibited from 
(financially) supporting political parties. More important for explaining the neutral facade of 
donors is, however, the fear of donors that political action and partisanship will be rejected as 
external manipulation and illegitimate intrusion. For this reason, donors prefer to support 
organizations or actions that serve the public good or strive for mutually accepted and ethical 
objectives. Subsequently, donors either support the provision of services especially for the 
underprivileged, or they target advocacy groups or watchdogs of democratic procedures. 
More often than not, donors restrain from assisting political interest representation though. 
And if donors get involved in ‘dirty politics’, they avoid publicity. The German political 
foundations, for example, prefer not to publicize all their activities exactly for this reason. 
Despite the risk of rejection, donors need to adapt a transparent and open approach to this 
issue. They lose credibility if they demand transparency from recipients but fail to comply with 
the same standards. Moreover, donors need to be aware of the importance of politics. The 
case studies above made clear that the outcome of civil society assistance depends among 
other things on domestic actors and actor constellations. Donors thus can neither neglect the 
importance of domestic power struggles, interests and strategic options of political decision-
makers, nor can they distinguish between NGOs that are public-policy oriented and monitor 
the compliance with democratic procedures and other NGOs that exclusively provide 
services. If they do so, the former might have political influence but no constituency whose 
view they advocate, whereas the latter will have the constituency but no power. In this way, 
recipient organizations will fail to act as an effective means of civic participation.  
Third, donors will need to decentralize their assistance and rely on local know-how and 
expertise. Local management of NGO support programs ensures a greater flexibility and 
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responsiveness to local needs. Moreover, local administration results in local ownership. As a 
result, the effects of civil society assistance are not regarded as externally imposed but as 
domestic achievements. The theoretical chapter of this dissertation referred to the problem of 
re-designing institutions (chap. 4.3.). Institutions are man-made, but they derive the support 
and loyalty of their members and their legitimacy from tradition, habits, and convention. 
Deliberate design raises the suspicion of individual interest, manipulation, enrichment or 
imperfection. This even more so if the designers are foreign, and thus not connected to the 
domestic society by bonds of solidarity or trust. External assistance thus always risks being 
perceived as illegitimate intrusion, no matter how skillful and thought-through civil society 
assistance might be and how genuine the motives of donors are. People doubt that external 
donors are altruistically motivated, and fear external manipulation. Consequently, they may 
refuse external assistance and advice. For this reason the involvement of local actors in the 
implementation of civil society assistance is not only important because local know-how will 
increase the appropriateness of external assistance and ensures responsiveness to local 
needs. New structures and ideas are also more easily accepted and adopted if they are put 
forward and carried by domestic actors.  
Fourth, donors need to invest in trust-building measures and long-term partnerships without 
expecting immediate results. Civil society assistance is an endeavor with an uncertain 
outcome. There is no guarantee that the support to non-state actors will translate into stable 
democracy. Whether civil society assistance will contribute to democratization depends first 
and foremost on recipient organizations. If donors fail to find trustworthy and reliable 
domestic partners who are driven by domestic concerns, civil society assistance will have 
little impact. And even if such partners have been found, the outcome of assistance is still not 
certain. Domestic actor constellations as well as the strategic options and interests of other 
actors in the political game decide whether major recipients and their orientations find their 
way into the decision-making arena. Donors might support NGOs in an authoritarian state for 
years without any liberalization tendencies in sight. Nonetheless, civil society assistance is 
not a waste of money, rather an investment whose return comes at an indefinite point in time. 
As made clear by the case of Slovakia, civil society assistance protects, strengthens and 
empowers a democratically oriented counter-elite. Moreover, it prevents the emigration of 
dissidents. If democracy takes root in a country, this is of utmost importance. The availability 
of educated and skilled people that are willing to assume political responsibility may decide 
whether newly established democracies will actually consolidate. For this reason civil society 
assistance is a rewarding long-term investment. Fifth, national donors will need to resort to 
NGOs of the donor country as implementers of assistance. Civil society assistance granted 
by non-state actors and NGOs is more effective than assistance implemented by state 
agencies. For this reason, NGOs of the donor country should carry out civil society 
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assistance measures and not specialized “democracy promoters” or developmental 
agencies. The analysis revealed that the type of relationship between donors and recipients 
decides upon the effectiveness of civil society assistance. A long-term partnership that is 
based on a core consensus and a common understanding ensures that learning can take 
place. In this way, ideas about the importance and the role of NGOs and civil society in a 
democratic system shape recipient organizations. Additionally, the assistance itself improves. 
The ones best suited to evaluate civil society assistance are recipients. The constant 
dialogue between donors and recipients ensures permanent feedback about the relevance, 
significance and appropriateness of strategies, programs, projects and instruments of civil 
society assistance. In this way, donors improve their instruments at hand. Moreover, close 
cooperation between donor and recipient ensures that civil society assistance meets local 
demands. For all these reasons, like-minded organizations that are active in the same issue 
area are best suited to assist their counterparts abroad. Organizations that share 
professional backgrounds or principles generally also share a system of beliefs and the 
above cited “core consensus” which facilitates communication as well as the transfer of 
values and ideas. State agencies should therefore rely on NGOs as civil society promoters.  
Sixth, donors will need to appreciate that their own credibility is decisive. This entails 
sensitivity for the common history of the donor and recipient country and the history of 
assistance. More often than not, donors are not aware that their credibility and reputation in 
the recipient country shape the way in which assistance is perceived and accepted by 
recipients and the population alike. What recipients expect from donors and from external 
assistance is dependent on past experiences with donors and former donor activities. Both 
case studies demonstrate that external assistance is largely accepted by the population and 
also highly welcomed and eagerly sought. International contacts even raised the esteem of 
recipients rather than undermining their credibility. In both countries these perceptions have 
been shaped by the feeling of belonging to Europe and thus to the Western world. In Poland, 
American donors in particular enjoy an excellent reputation. This is largely due to the 
massive support the Solidarity movement received from the USA in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
one has to keep in mind that the Polish people predominantly regarded communism as the 
result of Soviet occupation. The USA as the main opponent to the Soviet Union was thus 
seen as an ally. In both cases, previous experiences with donors and major donor countries 
were thus favorable to civil society assistance. In other countries the history with donors 
might not be seen in such a positive light. If donors are regarded as former aggressors or 
previous enemies, civil society assistance will not be taken as genuine assistance but rather 
as subtle form of manipulation and intervention. This is not to say that civil society assistance 
in countries that had negative experiences with donors is bound to fail. However, donors 
need to recognize the importance of previous experiences and past contacts and need to 
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plan the assistance accordingly. In such cases it might be decisive to be especially sensitive 
to national feelings, extend the time-horizon of assistance and place greater emphasis on 
trust-building measures.  
Seventh, the credibility of donors is not only dependent on past experiences but also on the 
current bilateral relations between the donor and the recipient country. For this reason, 
donors may need to lobby for a respective foreign policy of their own governments in order to 
bring top-down pressures on recipient countries in line with bottom-up measures of civil 
society assistance. Although the dissertation focused on transnational relations and bottom-
up measures aiming to support civil society, this does not imply that multilateral and bilateral 
relations and top-down measures are without any effect. On the contrary, both case studies 
revealed that a favorable international environment and especially the prospect of EU 
membership were salient factors that facilitated civil society assistance. One thus has to note 
that state to state relations and transnational relations are mutually dependent and may 
reinforce or counteract each other. Top-down measures to democratization such as 
conditionality or sanctions impact upon the orientations of domestic actors. As a result, 
recipients may be more willing to take part in civil society support programs. Along with that, 
recipient governments may be more open to the demands of non-state actors, as has been 
the case in the process leading to a new NGO law in Poland. This example demonstrates 
that domestic decision-makers are more open to the advice of external experts if they already 
decided to adapt to international standards, in this case, the standards put forward by the 
European Union. Furthermore, the integration into international institutions and regimes 
stimulates the establishment of transnational partnerships and networks and thus leads to a 
rise of transnational forms of civil society assistance. Bearing this interdependence in mind, 
one has to conclude that bottom-up approaches to civil society assistance are more likely to 
be fruitful if they are escorted by respective top-down measures. Along the same lines, state-
to-state relations may hamper transnational activities to foster civil society. For example, 
economic sanctions that put pressure not only on the governing elite but also on the 
population may counteract efforts to strengthen a domestic opposition. Bottom-up efforts to 
assist civil society are thus highly affected and often facilitated but also nullified by state-to-
state relations and the foreign policy of the donor state. We can thus conclude that 
transnational relations are most effective if they are embedded in a coherent multilateral 
framework.  
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Donors need to be aware of this fact and lobby their governments for respective foreign 
policies toward recipient states if they do not want to lose credibility. 255  
Finally, donors should not lose sight of other forms of democracy assistance. A stable 
democracy consists of more than a vibrant civil society. Political parties, an effective 
executive branch, a parliamentary system and state of law are other important features. As 
donors are under pressure to present immediate results, they often lack the patience needed 
for democracy assistance to be effective, As a consequence, democracy assistance tends to 
be subject to trends and fashions. In the early 1990s donors placed major emphasis on 
institution building and the assistance to parliaments, administration, political parties or 
courts. The disillusionment with these measures led to a shift to non-state actors as the main 
recipients of assistance and to the rise of civil society assistance. This is even more so the 
case when compared to institution building; civil society assistance seems to yield more 
immediate results. Finding a group of young people, convincing them to establish a NGO, 
and filling them with enthusiasm for moral issues such as human rights, democracy or the 
environment is a more easy undertaking, than reforming existing institutions and 
administrations that have been shaped by communist practices for a long time. Replacing an 
initial emphasis on institutions with an exclusive focus on civil society actors is, however, the 
wrong approach. A mix of different forms of assistance that supports the various features of 
democracy is better suited to promote and protect democracy in a given country.  
9.3 Research Outlook  
Civil society can be nurtured and strengthened from abroad through the direct, deliberate 
and explicit involvement of external actors. This is the main result of this analysis.  
Past experiences shape the orientations of actors. For this reason the development of civil 
society is constrained in countries that suffer from the legacies of communism. Communism 
might have failed to build a “new socialist man”. However, it was surprisingly successful in 
bringing about passive citizens who retreat to private life, have little hope for change and who 
regard “those above” as the ones responsible for everything, and the scapegoat for all evil. 
Nonetheless the cases of Poland and Slovakia demonstrate that civil society took root in 
post-communist settings. This is most surprising in the case of Slovakia, where historical pre-
255 The fact that actors are influenced by activities taking place on supra-national, national and sub-
 national levels and that state-to-state relations and transnational relations are mutually 
dependent has been described in the international relations literature as “two-level games” (Evans et 
al 1993) or – in the context of the European Union – “multi-level games” (Jachtenfuchs / Kohler-Koch 
1996).  
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conditions for civil society development were highly unfavorable. Factors such as a late 
national awakening and independence, a belated modernization, and a repressive 
communist regime that left little room for free spheres of civic activity largely hampered the 
upspring of civil society. Nonetheless, this study revealed that self-organized forms of civic 
activity play a decisive role in present Slovakia, as the elections of 1998 and the pre-election 
campaign of Slovak NGOs for free and fair elections demonstrated in particular. More 
importantly for this study is the insight that external actors assisted and contributed to the rise 
of civil society in both countries. In contrast to assumptions of critics inspired by a 
sociological understanding of institutions who assume that external involvement and 
intentionally driven transfer cannot effect domestic transformation processes or even expect 
outright rejection and nationalistic backlashes, external actors thus can make a difference.  
However, one may critically question to what extent Poland and Slovakia have been lucky 
cases whose favorable circumstances enabled civil society assistance to work. Is it not so 
that the prospect of EU membership, in particular, enormously facilitated transnational efforts 
to strengthen civil society? And here, the author has no other option than to answer “further 
research is needed”. As made clear in chapter five, the research design chosen for this study 
limits the comparability of its findings. In order to hold the influence of top-down pressures on 
democratization constant, a most similar systems design has been chosen. In other words, 
since both cases under investigation face similar international adaptation and integration 
pressures, the findings are only valid in cases that depict multilateral and bilateral pressures 
impacting on the domestic system in a way similar to the EU integration process. If we want 
to test to what extent the findings are valid beyond the range of countries facing such a 
favorable international environment, additional research in countries where international 
pressures to democratize are more ambiguous, e.g. in the former Soviet Union, is necessary. 
The recent events and the so-called orange revolution in Ukraine give hope that civil society 
assistance can also contribute to democratization in countries without the prospect of EU 
membership. Such cases need to be carefully evaluated and assessed.  
In doing so, scholars and donors alike can draw on furthers insight from this study. A 
respective evaluation and assessment of civil society assistance needs to focus on 
recipients. Did donors choose the right partners? To what extent did recipient organizations 
change during the partnership? Is a change in behavior and orientation observable? To what 
extent did recipients benefit from external assistance? Did external assistance meet domestic 
demand? These are questions that donors and scholars interested in the outcome of 
assistance need to raise. An assessment of civil society assistance needs to grasp the 
peculiarities of domestic settings just as much as the peculiarities of external involvement. 
For this reason, evaluations of civil society assistance need to investigate the impact of 
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assistance without looking too closely at differences in donor strategies and techniques. 
Even more important than this are recipient responses. The outcome of assistance is always 
the result of a magnitude of different projects conducted by various donor organizations. 
Additionally, the outcome of assistance is often only visible after a certain time period has 
passed. What is thus needed are evaluations and case studies on civil society assistance 
that focus on the combined efforts of international actors in certain issue areas some time 
after donor activities came to end.  
A further point can be stated regarding the validity of the findings summarized above. 
Although the empirical findings of this study are not valid for cases that lack an international 
environment favorable to democratization, this conclusion does not hold for the further likely 
influence on civil society development: the necessity of respective cultural and historical 
reconditions of civil society. As pointed out in the methodology of this study, a most different 
systems design helps to reject systemic explanations if similar processes of change can be 
identified in dissimilar cases. In other words, since the cultural and historical preconditions of 
civil society differ in Poland and Slovakia, this factor cannot be responsible for the rise of self-
organized forms of civil activity in both cases. This is not to say that institutional legacies, 
informal rules and culturally defined cognitive scripts do not play a role. However, such 
factors do not determine the fate of a country in transition. History matters but it does not 
determine our future. Agency and even externally driven agency can trigger change if certain 
conditions apply. The answer to transforming societies asking for advice is thus not “get a 
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Appendix 1 The German Political Foundations  
Portray 1 The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 
The FES focuses on economic and social policy (social aspects of a market economy, 
effective social security systems), the creation of decentralized administration, and trade 
union cooperation. It applies the instruments of civic education and management such as 
seminars, round-table talks, conferences, publications but also technical assistance and 
political advising. The projects are drafted in the head quarter in Germany in close 
cooperation with the field offices. Project management is left to the field offices. The projects 
are implemented in cooperation with domestic partners. Main partners are trade unions, 
social-democratic parties, research institutes, administrative bodies and NGOs.  One can 
conclude therefore that the strategy is interactive with an elite focus. The FES is active and 
runs field offices in all the respective countries with the exception of Slovakia where only an 
office with local staff exists.  
Portray 2 The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) 
The KAS focuses on economic policy and development (in particular small- and medium 
enterprises), legal assistance, decentralization and local self-administration. The project 
management is carried out in the same manner as in the FES. Partners are the church, 
parties, administrative bodies, research institutes, universities. The instruments applied 
resemble the instruments of the FES. The strategy has an elite focus, and is proactive. The 
KAS runs field offices in all the respective countries, with the exception of Slovakia where 
only a field office with local staff exists.  
Portray 3 Hans Seidel Stiftung (HSS) 
Besides the activities of civic education the HSS mainly focuses on institution building and 
administrative reform. Main instruments are training of civil servants and other usual 
instruments (technical assistance, seminars, conferences). Partners are administrative 
bodies (regional and local administrations, interior ministry, the police), research institutes, 
universities and to a lesser extent NGOs (foundations, associations). The projects are carried 
out in close cooperation with the respective partners which are chosen according to the 
projects. The HSS is active in all of the respective countries with the exception of Poland 
(closed the office in 1995 due to financial reasons). In contrast to the FES and KAS, the HSS 
was not active in the region before 1990. 
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Portray 4 The Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) 
The priority areas of the FNS are centered around the topics: decentralization / local 
government, the role of the state in the economy, human rights and the rule of law and civic 
culture. The projects are drafted and coordinated from the regional office in Budapest. 
Domestic project-partners are NGOs, liberal research centers and organized liberal forces.  
Main instruments are seminars and conferences but also the creation of ‘liberal forums’ or 
‘liberal academies’ in order to foster liberal forces. In the 1990s the FNS changed its strategy, 
in particular in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. While the FNS previously exclusively 
cooperated with one (liberall) party, this approach has been given up as liberalism is not 
deeply rooted in CEE. Liberal parties either ceased to exist or changed into conservative and 
Christian-democratic parties. In response, the FNS concentrates on the support to think 
tanks and the establishment of liberal forums in order to bring together liberal persons from 
different parties. The FNS is active in all of the respective countries but only runs offices in 
Prague (responsible for Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Budapest (main office), 
Poland and Sofia (Bulgaria and Romania). 
Portray 5 The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) 
The HBS differs from the other German foundations in many respects. First, the areas of the 
projects are different. The HBS carries out projects in the following fields: support of 
democratic women movement, environment, human rights. The partners of the HBS are 
exclusively NGOs, in particular NGOs striving for women rights and sustainable environment. 
The HBS thus aims to build democracy from the bottom-up. The HBS is active in Poland (5 
projects), Rumania (2 projects), Slovakia (1 project), Czech Republic (3 projects). The 
projects are coordinated from the only field office in CEE located in Prague.  
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Appendix 2 Overall Assistance to Poland and Slovakia: Selected Donors 
Table 1 Distribution of the German Transform-Program by  country in 
1998 
 
M it t e lve rt e i lu n g  1 9 9 8
( in  %  d e s  G e s a m tb e tr a g e s )
0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0
R u ss . F öd .
U k ra in e
W e iß ru ß l.
P o le n
U n g arn
B u lg ar ie n
T s c h . R ep .
S lo w a k e i
S lo w e n ie n
E s tla n d
Le t tla n d
L ita u e n
Ü b erre g io na l
 
 
Table 2 Distribution of Transform Allocations by Area of Assistance, 1998 
 























Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (BMWi), 1998: Das Transform-Program der 
Bundesregierung für Osteuropa, p. 23 
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Table 3 Phare Funding by Area in Poland, 1990-1997 
Financial Aid 
1990-1997 (Mio. ECU) 
1990-
93 










58,6 21,5 2 0 35,5 117,6 8%      3 ECU 
civil society and democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 ECU
education and research 104,3 39 37 30 20 230,3 15% 5,9 ECU 
restructuring of agriculture 165 2,5 13 14 8 202,5 13%  5,2 ECU 
urgent aid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 ECU
environment and nuclear 
security 
75 12 22 5 0 114 7% 2,9 ECU 
infrastructure (energy, 
transport, telecomm. 
105,4 93,8 91 117 69,4 476,6 31% 12,2 ECU 
private sector, financial 
sector, regional measures 




45,2 9 0 0 0 54,2 4% 1,4 ECU 
others (general, 
multidisciplinary and 
technical assistance)  
30 0 0 0 0 30 2% 0,8 ECU 
in total 802,7 208,8 174 203 147,9 1536 100% 39,4 ECU 
Source:  The European Commission, 1997: Phare Annual Report 1997 
Note: The figure for civil society and democracy is misleading as it neglects the contributions of the 
Phare “Civil Dialogue Program” and the Phare horizontal programs “Democracy”, “Lien” and 
“Partnership” (see table 6).  
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Table 4 Phare Funding by Area in Slovakia, 1990-1997 
Financial Aid 
1990-1997 (Mio. ECU) 






administrative reform, public 
sector, consumer protection, 
legal homogenization 
0 4 5,3 0 0 9,3 5% 1,9 ECU 
civil society and democracy 0 0 0,5 0 3 3,5 2% 0,7 ECU
education and research 5 9 5 4,5 4 27,5 16%  5,5 ECU 
restructuring of agriculture 3 5 2,6 0 4 14,6 8% 2,9 ECU
urgent aid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 ECU
environment and nuclear 
security 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1% 0,2 ECU
infrastructure (energy, 
transport, telecomm. 
5 6,5 8,2 0 0 19,7 11% 3,9 ECU
private sector, financial sector, 
regional measures 
19 5 18,7 0 25 67,7 39% 13,5 ECU
social development, 
employment, public healthcare 
3 5,5 4,4 0 6 18,9 11% 3,8 ECU
others (general, 
multidisciplinary and technical 
assistance)  
5 5 0,3 0 1 11,3 7% 2,3 ECU
in total 40 40 46 4,5 43 173,5 100% 34,6 ECU
Source:  The European Commission, 1997: Phare Annual Report 1997 
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Table 5 USAID Overall Assistance by Area in Poland and Slovakia, SEED 
Program, 1990-2000 
Area of Assistance Poland Slovakia 








Stabilization Fund 199,1 20,7 - - 
Polish-American / Slovak-American Enterprise Fund 
(SME support) 
254,5 26,5 53,6 28 





Social Sector / Improvement of the Quality of Life 




Democratic Institutions 77,8 8,1 32,3 17 
Cross-Sectoral Activities / Multisector Support 31,8 3,3 7,0 4 
Total 960,5 100 188,9 100 
Source: Own calculations based on USAID (2000a: Projectlist), USAID (2000b: 40p)  
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Appendix 3 Phare Civil Society Assistance to Poland and Slovakia 
Table 6 Phare Programs in Favor of Civil Society Development in Poland 








Partnership 6,9 4,0 Own estimation based on the involvement of Polish and 
Slovak NGOs in Partnership (PPP) projects as partner or 
lead organizations as named in the PPP Evaluation 





8,3 3,9 The evaluation of the Phare Democracy Program  notes 
that 18% of all PHARE Macro Project grants (56 Mill. 
ECU) went to Poland (7,1 MECU), and 9% to Slovakia 
(3,5 MECU) (European Commission 1997b: 36). Micro 
grants in Poland amount to 1,2 MECU, in Slovakia to 0,4 
MECU (see table 7).  
NGO / LIEN 4,6 0,29+? 1 million micro grants (Mendza-Drozd 2000:29). 
An estimated 3,6 million for NGO / LIEN partnership 
programs (27 projects were selected from Polish project 
proposals between 1993-1997; a project was supported 
with an average grant of 133,5 thousand ECU (see 
homepage of the European Volunteer Center that 
administered the Phare, Tacis Lien Programme 
(http://www.cev.be/lien/what_is_phare.htm)) 
Unfortunately no figures could be found on NGO/LIEN 
partnership projects in Slovakia 




5 4,9 see Table 6 and 7 
Total  26,2 13,1+? 1,7% of total Phare allocations to Poland (estimation)
Source: Own calculations. One must note, that the sums are rough estimations based on various 
sources (PPP evaluation (European Commission 1998); information of the European Volunteer Center 
that administered the Lien Program, and table 7). Unfortunately no clear figures on civil society 
assistance can be found.  
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Table 7 Allocations and Number of Phare Democracy, Lien and Partnership 
Micro Grants Awarded in Poland and Slovakia (in 1000 Euro) 
Program Poland Slovakia 
 Amount No. of grants Amount No. of grants 
Democracy 1993 200 29 70 14 
Democracy 1994 320 42 100 17 
Democracy 
1995/96 
350 45 110 21 
Democracy 
1996/97 
360 49 110 15 
LIEN 1995/96 400 90 120 30 
LIEN 1996/99 449 64 170 27 
Partnership 1999   100 10 
Total 2 079 484 780 134 
Source: Mendza-Drozd (2000: 29), Richterová (2000: 47) 
 
Table 8 Civic Dialogue Phare Program (Poland) – Allocations and Number 
of Grants Awarded (Implementation Period 1992-1998) 
Program Total Amount in 
Euro 
Amount for 
Grants in Euro 
No. of Awarded 
Grants 
Civil Dialogue Program 1991 3 000 000 1 300 000 302 
Civil Dialogue Program 1994 2 000 000 1 000 000 242 
Total 5 000 000 2 300 000 544 
 Source: Mendza-Drozd (2000: 29)  
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Table 9 Regional Disparity of NGO directed Phare Programs in Poland in 
1996/97  
Voivodship awarded grants (% of total) registered NGOs (% of total) 
Warsaw 27,0 17,0 
Wrocław 6,7 3,9 
Gdańsk 5,9 5,5 
Katowice 5,7 7,2 
Lublin 5,7 2,8 
Łódź 3,8 4,1 
Poznań 3,8 3,9 
Białystok 3,3 1,6 
Source: Own calculations based on: Cooperation Fund (1998: 12+14) 
Note: NGOs in the following voivodships received less than 3,3% of total awarded grants: Bielsko 
Biała, Byddonorszcz, Częstochowa, Elblag, Donorrzów, Jelenia Góra; Kielce, Konin, Koszalin, Krosno, 
Legnica, Leszno, Łomza, Nowy Sacz, Olsztyn, Opole, Ostrołeka, Piła, Piotrków,Płock, Przemysl, 
Radom, Rzeszów, Siedlce, Skierniewice, Słupsk, Szczecin, Tarnobrzeg, Tarnów, Troruń, Wałbrzych, 
Włocławek, Zamosc, Zielona Gróra. NGOs in the following voivodships had not been awarded any 
grants: Chełm, Ciechanów, Kalisz, Sieradz, Suwałki. 
 
Portray 6 Activities of the Cooperation Fund – Local  Implementation of NGO 
directed Phare Programs in Poland 
The Cooperation Fund was founded by the Polish government in 1990 with the aim to 
administer various foreign assistance programs. Since 1992 the Fund is also responsible for 
the implementation of the Phare Civic Dialogue Program, launched at the end of 1991 
following an agreement between the European Commission and the Polish Government. 
Polish NGOs participated in the preparation of the program. The program had two rounds, 
the first starting in 1992 equipped with ECU 3 million, the second starting in 1994 with a 
further 2 million ECU. Its basic objective was to “provide support for civil society by means of 
help for NGOs that are recognized to be the manifestation of civic activity and the inevitable 
part of any modern democratic society” (Mendza-Drozd 2000: 31). Additionally the 
Delegation of the European Commission to Poland that was appointed to administer the 
micro grants of the Phare Democracy and the Phare Lien Program handed the administration 
of the micro grant schemes over to the Cooperation Fund. The following gives an overview of 
the main activities of the Fund in the area of civil society assistance. 
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Major Activities of the Cooperation Fund  
Civil Dialogue  
▪ no restrictions as to thematic scope  
▪ selective criteria focused upon ▪ substantive content ▪ economic viability ▪ 
possible impact on organization, NGO sector, local community 
▪ three types of open contest (theme projects, projects regarding the financing of 
administrative costs; projects of newly established organizations (draft projects)) 
Democracy  
▪ thematic scope restricted to activities aiming to support democracy, civic 
participation and human rights  
▪ competitions operated according to the procedures of Civic Dialogue Program 
Grant-making 
Lien 
▪ thematic scope restricted to social activities 
▪ competitions operated according to the procedures of Civic Dialogue Program  
Development of 
the third sector 
infrastructure 
▪ support to first national forum of Non-governmental initiatives held in Warsaw in 
September 1996 
▪ discussions about issues of concern for the third sector  
▪ exhibition fairs   
▪ over 800 participants 
▪ support to regional NGO support centres (see appendix 7, table 19) 
▪ advancement of legal environment  
▪ provision of research and analysis (legal expert group preparing analysis of legal 
situation plus study draft of the legal act on non-profit organizations)  
▪ education and promotion ventures (provision of legal advice, lawyer at BORDO 
office); project of FIP “NGOs and legal regulations”, support to conference of 
Helsinki foundation on the subject 
Training 
activities 
▪ awarding grants to organizations running training programs for foundations and 
associations 
▪ awarding grants for publications intended for NGOs 
▪ publishing materials for training purposes 
▪ support to the post-graduate studies “Management of Self-Government 
Institutions and NGOs” at Warsaw university 
▪ Training of  trainers activities 
Information and 
Legal Services 
▪ establishment of BORDO -  an Information Center for Non-governmental 
organizations in 1993 
▪ publications and brochures addressed to NGOs (provided and conducted by 
BORDO) 
▪ library at BORDO information center (Polish and foreign publications related to 
NGO activities),  
▪ information on potential funding possibilities 
▪ support to Klon/Jawor database 
Source: Own illustration based on: Cooperation Fund (1998), Mendza-Drozd (2000) 
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Portray 7 Implementation of NGO directed Phare Programs in Slovakia - 
Activities of the Civil Society Development Foundation and Phare 
Macro Projects256 
The Civil Society Development Foundation (Nadácia pre podporu občskych aktivít, NPOA) is 
a non-governmental grant-giving organization established within the framework of the 
European Union’s program Phare. Its aim is to foster civil society development in Slovakia 
and to build partnerships among Slovak NGOs and their counterparts in CEE and European 
Union member states. Since its foundation in 1993 the foundation administers the Phare Civil 
Society Development Programs in Slovakia (FM 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999), and focuses on 
the development of a wide spectrum of Slovak non-governmental non-profit organizations. 
Moreover, NPOA administered the micro-grant schemes of Phare democracy, Phare Lien 
and Phare Partnership. Overall objectives of the CSD include: strengthening of NGOs, 
enhancing qualification of NGOs, promoting mutual co-operation of NGOs, improving the role 
of umbrella organizations, increasing political participation of NGOs, and improving the public 
awareness of NGOs. NPOA is also a founding member of the “Donors’ Forum” a monthly 
gathering of donor organizations that aims to improve the effectiveness of assistance (see 
appendix 3, portray 7).  
NGOs interested to obtain funding from the CSD Programs can apply for a grant in the 
following six categories: human rights and minorities, social services, health, volunteer 
development, environment, education. In light of a growing hostile attitude of the government 
towards NGOs this list was extended in 1997 by the categories “democracy” and “culture”. In 
the period 1992-1999 the majority of grants went to NGOs providing social services (23%), 
followed by volunteer development (16%), the environment (13%), health (12%), and 
education (11%). 9% of the grants were awarded to NGO projects aiming to promote 
democracy. Considering the fact that this category was only installed in 1997, this is a 
substantial share.  
256 The following is based on Richterová (2000: 50pp), and NPOA (2000) 
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The following gives a brief overview of major objectives and activities of the CSD Programs 
Program, 
Amount 
Objectives and Activities 
CSD 1992,  
1,36 Mecu 
• support to NGOs (229 grants) 
• improve the working environment of NGOs 
• training of NGOs 
• promote mutual co-operation of NGOs 
CSD 1995,  
0,4 MECU 
• support NGOs (100 grants) 
• support NGO political participation and advocacy 
• support infrastructure of NGOs 
• installment of four permanent legal counseling centers (provision of 
legal assistance to NGOs) in response to new foundation law of 1996 
(co-funded by US funded NGO “Foundation for a Civil Society” 
• support to Stupava Conference 
CSD 1997, 
3 MECU 
• inclusion of a democracy component to program 
• support to NGOs (397 grants) 
• improve public awareness of NGOs 
• enhance qualification of NGOs 
• improve role of umbrella organizations 
• support electronic massmedia network in order to promote NGO sector 
• support to civic campaign “OK 98” (NPOA supported 50% of the 57 
projects of the campaign) 
 
Phare Democracy Macro Projects 
The Phare Democracy Macro Projects are administered by the European Human Rights 
Foundation (EHRF) a Brussels based NGO which has a regional office in Prague. The 
contact person of the EHRF in Bratislava, the head of the Gremium of the 3. Sector until 
1999, Pavol Demeš, ensures the responsiveness of the program to local needs. In result, the 
administration of the Phare programs in Slovakia has been considered as working extremely 
well (European Commission 1997c: 156) 
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Appendix 4 The Stefan Batory Foundation and the Open Society Foundation 
Portray 8 History of a Local Donor with Foreign Funds – The Development of 
the Stefan Batory Foundation, 1988-2000 
The Polish Stefan Batory Foundation was established by George Soros in 1988 with the 
objective to support science and education in then communist Poland. At that time, it was 
already a breakthrough that the monopoly of the state was given up in the area of 
education.257  
Already one year later in October 1989 the Foundation broadened its objective in result of 
the new political situation. The new objective was to support the political, economic and 
social transformation in Poland. Nonetheless, the emphasis was still placed on support to 
education, research institutions and science. A couple of other programs such as 
Commission for Education on Alcoholism and other Addictions and the Central and East 
European Forum bringing together Politicians from the region were launched. Besides grant-
making, and the provision of scholarships, major activities were and continued to be the 
organization of conferences and workshops, training of journalists and the publication of 
books.  
The first years of the 1990s marked a period of rapid growth for the foundation in terms of 
areas of assistance, finances, operational rules and regulations, and cooperation partners.  
Each year the foundation launched several additional specialized programs thus steadily 
advancing its scope of activities including support for media, women, and NGOs. Culture and 
activities advancing international cooperation and East-East relationships became further 
major areas of assistance. Thereby the vast majority of programs were grant-making 
programs (60 – 80% of the annual budget). In 1992 the foundation established transparent 
and open grant-making procedures. Additionally, the foundation steadily increased its 
network of cooperation partners. Thereby several partner organizations were offspring of the 
Batory foundation. Several organizations have been established with financial support from 
the foundation as e.g. the Institute of Public Affairs or the Forum of Polish Foundations. The 
Batory foundation also increased its sources of financing. It received grants not only from the 
257  From the start, the foundation was run by a group of Polish sociologist that were affiliated with 
the oppositional movement Solidarity. The first board members were George Soros, Zbigniw 
Pelczynski, Roman Ciesielski, Marcin Krol, Henryk Wozniakowski, Grzedonorrz Bialkowski, Antonina 
Kloskowska, Aleksander Koj, Klemens Szaniawski and Tadeusz Syryczyk. In 1989 the new board 
members were: Zbigniew Bujak, Jozef Chajn, Krysztof Michalski, Adam Michnik, Andrzej Rychard, 
Ryszard Stemplowski and Andrzey Ziabicki.  Starting from 1991 Alexander Smolnar was president of 
the foundation.  
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Open Society Fund but also from other donors such as the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, the Foundation for Poland, or the World Bank.  
In the second half of the 1990s the foundation underwent a process of consolidation and 
concentration. This process was marked by a shift in priorities from education and culture to 
civil society and NGO support, and a focus on key priorities. 258 While in 1992 the majority of 
funds still benefited education, science and research, support to civil society and especially 
to NGOs steadily increased, and became the largest area of contributions by 1995. Although 
education and science as well as culture remain important issue areas of the foundation, the 
NGO support program is by far the largest program of the foundation, what makes civil 
society assistance a top priority of the foundation. Moreover, NGOs were recipients of most 
of the grants awarded by other Foundation programs. This is evident in the following figures. 
In 1999 66% of recipients were NGOs that received 77% of the total grants awarded by the 
Foundation (Stefan Batory Foundation 1999: 11). The shift from education to civil society and 
NGO support is also evident in the stated objectives and priority areas of the foundation, 
which name the support of civil society and civic initiatives a top priority before international 
cooperation, education and culture in 1999.  
The second half of the 1990s is also marked by a conceptualization of the support to civil 
society and NGOs. In 1995 the institutional grants have been introduced, with the aim to 
strengthen the professional standard of recipients. Since 1997, the foundation places special 
emphasis on advancing the infrastructure of the NGO sector (Stefan Batory Foundation 
1997:10). In 1998, the foundation introduced an award for organizations that contribute to 
civil society development (Stefan Batory Foundation 1998: 26). Additionally, it launched a 
community foundations project in collaboration with the Academy for the Development of 
Philanthropy in Poland. The aim is to guarantee financial support to local civic initiatives and 
NGOs and to establish a national network of community foundations by 2001. In 1999, 
launches a program that aims to facilitate the relationships among NGOs and local 
government and other important partners such as the media or businesses: “.. the principle 
258  Four priority areas have been identified: (1) democracy, justice, and civil society; (2) education; 
(3) international cooperation; and (4) culture. Several programs and activities have been reduced or 
closed Other activities have been outsourced and transferred to close cooperation partners. Already in 
1994 the foundation transferred certain programs and initiatives (including funds) to other 
organizations cooperating with the Batory foundation such as the Center for Further Education of 
Teachers, the Jozef Mianowski Fund, the Foundation for the Support of Science, or the Challenges 
Foundation. This process continued with the transfer of the public administration and social policy 
program to the Public Affairs Institute in 1995. In 1997 the educational programs operated by the 
foundation were absorbed by the Center for Youth Entrepreneurship which was granted a status of a 
national, non-public teachers’ training establishment. In the same year, the competitions of youth 
projects were ceded to the Polish Children and Youth Foundation and the Challenges Foundation. The 
program assisting scientist and research workers on trips abroad has been transferred to the Warsaw 
Scientific Society. 
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objective of this Program is providing support to initiatives aimed at institutional and structural 
strengthening of Polish NGOs and promoting higher professional standards within their 
operation, establishing a representation within the third sector advocating its rights and 
developing strategic cooperation with their potential partners, including local self-
governments, the media, universities and commercial enterprises” (Stefan Batory Foundation 
1999: 11). In order to advance the relationship among NGOs and other organizational 
bodies, the foundation also launched the “Let’s Act Together” competition with the aim to 
support the horizontal cooperation of the third sector.  
To sum up, throughout the 1990s the Stefan Batory foundation steadily evolved as a major 
player in the NGO sector in Poland. It was a major sponsor of NGO activities but also acted 
as a platform of discourse and stimulus of ideas through conferences, networks and 
initiatives. Thereby an initial focus on education and science was slowly replaced by a major 
emphasis of civil society development and NGO support. Most programs in the area of 
education, science and the youth were assigned to other foundations. From the very 
beginning the foundation was managed by Polish representatives. In result the first years did 
not only witness a focus on science and education because this was the only area possible 
on the start. This emphasis was also in line with the Polish sociological tradition and with the 
number of Polish social scientists in the board. The major asset of the Batory foundation 
throughout its history has been its human resources, networks and contacts. 
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Table 10 Objectives and Priority Areas of Assistance of the Stefan Batory 
Foundation, 1988 – 1999  






Support of Science, Education 
Scholarships for studies at Oxford and Cambridge; Assistance to universities and 
research institutions 





Support of political, social and economic transformation processes and 
cooperation in CEE (10/ 1989) 
Establishment of first operational programs (Commission for Education on 
Alcoholism and other Addictions, CEE Forum) 
Establishment of first grant-making programs (Eastern Europe Research program 
(until 1992), Program for Economic Research in CEE)  
Grants to 125 beneficiaries; Financial aid to 44 institutions 
750
1991 6 programs (see above + Media Program; + East East Program ) + first summer 
school of Economics 
Grants to 172 individual beneficiaries, 68 institutions and organizations;  
1600
1992 11 programs (see above + Contemporary Arts Center (until 12/1994)), + Higher 
Education Support Program; + Library Program (until 12/1994); + NGO Support 
Fund, NGO Support Program; + Social Reform Program; + Support for 
international conferences organized in Poland program) + Summer School 
Grants to 228 individuals and 198 institutions and organizations, 36 regional 
projects  
Largest share of allocations granted in the field of science (25% of budget); culture 
second largest share (24%) 
1650
1993 16 programs (see above, + Women’s Aid Program; + Youth and Education 
Program; + Publishing Program; + Program facilitating Training of Polish 
Professionals Abroad; + Scholarship Scheme for CEE Scholars + Summer School 
Grants to 445 individuals and 334 institutions and organizations  
3000
1994 18 programs (see above + Cultural Program; + Supplementary Grants Program + 
Public Administration Reform Program; + Medical Program and Health Education 
Program 
+ International Summer School of Political Science, + Summer School of Young 
Social and Political Leaders 




1995 24 programs (see above + Internet program; + Students Initiatives Support 
Program + Training for Social Workers + Karl Popper Scholarship Competition + 
Summer Schools) 
Grants to 900 individuals and 920 institutions and organizations (including first 
institutional grants. The foundation also took part in the establishment of the Public 
Affairs Institute, the Social Policy Reform and Public Administration Programs 
became part of this new unit)  
28% of grant budget allocated for support for NGOs; 27% to higher education, 
culture 20%, youth education 10%. Other areas (women, charity program, media 
and internet) < 5% each 
7000
1996 Identification of 4 priority areas: (1) democracy, justice, and civil society; (2) 
education; (3) international Cooperation; (4) culture.  
Integration of programs Outsourcing of some programs to cooperation partners 
(e.g. all programs targeting at scientists, researchers and students integrated in 
Academic Program 
Grants to 800 individuals and 1000 organizations and institutions; The Batory 
Foundation received a grant of 2,5 mio US$ from the Ford foundation for 
organizational development (over a period of 5 years). 
8000
1997 14 programs (+ Internet for Physicians Program; + Intervention Program at 
repairing flood damage; + Program for assistance to Belarus (substituting the 
closed Belarusian Soros foundation) 
Grants to 690 individuals, 1080 institutions and organizations  
26% of grants to NGO support program. 18% to academic program, 11% to 
cultural program, 9% to Youth and Education; Internet (8%), Publishing (7%), 
Women and Flood program (each 6%)  
10500
1998 16 programs (+ Legal Program + Center of Youth Entrepreneurship as 
independent program) 
450 scholarships and 1180 grants awarded 
24% of grant budget to education; 23% to NGO support, culture (13%), 
International Cooperation (11%); Medicine and Health (9%), Flood (6%), Law and 
Human Rights / Women / Social Welfare (3% each) 
11780
1999 Objective of supporting the development of a democratic, open society: priorities 
include: (1) fostering civic attitudes and initiatives; (2) increasing cooperation 
between nations; (3) advancing educational development; (4) supporting cultural 
activity 
16 programs in operation 
Grants to 159 individual and group applicants, 222 scholarships, 1092 grants to 
institutions and organizations. 
22% of overall budget was spent for NGO program, 11% for academic program; 
10% for cultural program; 9% for Internet program; 8% for Youth program; 7% for 
Central and East European Forum; 6% for Youth Entrepreneurships Center; others 
received 5% or less each 
10102
Source: Stefan Batory Foundation (1997), Stefan Batory Foundation (1995), Stefan Batory Foundation 
(1998), Stefan Batory Foundation (1999)  
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Portray 9 The Open Society Foundation, Bratislava 
The main objective of the OSF is the creation of an open society. Its priorities encompass the 
support of democracy and democratic institutions, education, human rights and minorities, 
and the sustainability of the third sector and cross-sector cooperation among non-profit and 
profit organizations and public administration (www.osf.sk). In order to achieve its objectives 
the OSF provides grants and engages in operative activities via various programs. For 
example in the year 2002 the OSF run 14 programs: Civil Society Development; 
Development of Democracy Program; East East Program (Partnership across borders); 
Education; Internet Program (Internet for High Schools program); Law Program; Library 
Programs; Media; Partners; Public Administration Reform; Public Health; Roma Programs; 
Skills Development; Women’s Program (www.osf.sk). Educational activities comprise the 
core of OSF activities with approximately one fourth of the funds (e.g. English language 
programs, Secondary School Scholarships, Internet Distance Education Program, University 
Scholarships to Cambridge and CEU). Arts and Culture, Information Technologies, and 
Public Health were further main areas of activity in the year 2000. Regarding civil society 
development, the OSF launched a Community Program in 1996. The program supports 
community foundations and funds and thus aims to foster local initiatives and activities. The 
program is coordinated with the USAID funded “Your Land” program managed by 
Ekopolis/ETP Slovakia. Besides the provision of grants to community foundations, OSF 
additionally provides technical assistance to local organizations in cooperation with the 
organization Partners for Democratic Change. The Development of Democracy Program, 
too, has the objective to create and develop civil society in Slovakia. This grant-giving 
program supports initiatives that foster the cooperation and dialogue among NGOs and 
between NGOs and local administration, and that contribute to the sustainability of NGOs 
(fund-raising abilities, strategic planning, quality improvement). The OSF is founding member 
of the Donors’ Forum (see www.osf.sk; Open Society Foundation 2000). 
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Total Expenditures of the Open Society Foundation Bratislava by types of activities in 
2000 
Program / Area of Activity Funding in million SK In % of total
Education 39,93 26% 
Children and Youth 9,31 6% 
Public Health 17,6 12% 
Law 4,79 3% 
Juridical Reform 0,32 0% 
National Minorities 0,0047 0% 
Roma Program 10,48 7% 
Women in Society 4,68 3% 
Public Reform 6,08 4% 
Economic Reform 1,58 1% 
Civil Society 3,82 2% 
Others (Institutional grants and miscellaneous) 5,38 4% 
Cooperation of East European Countries 5,18 3% 
Information and Information Technologies 17,04 11% 
Media 3,88 3% 
Arts and Culture 22,87 15% 
      
Total 152,95   
Administration Costs 15,89   
      
Total 168,84   
Source: Open Society Foundation (2000) 
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Appendix 5 US-American Civil Society Assistance 
Table 11 USAID Democracy Assistance per Area in Poland, SEED Program, 
1990-2000 
Area of Assistance  In 1000 US$ In % of 
Democracy 
Assistance 
In % of 
Overall 
Assistance 
Local Democracy 33479 43 3,5
Democratic Governance and Public 
Administration 
16853 22 1,8
NGO Development 128531 17 1,3
Trade Union Assistance (NSZZ Solidarnoćś) 10141 13 1,1
Media Assistance 2399 3 0,2
Political Party Assistance / Electoral Assistance 750 1 0,1
Legal Assistance / Rule of Law 536 1 0,1
Others 526 1 0,1
Source: own calculations based on USAID (2000a: projectlist ) 
Table 12 USAID Democracy Assistance per Area in Slovakia, SEED Program, 
1990-2000 
Area of Assistance  In 1000 US$ In % of 
Democracy 
Assistance 
In % of 
Overall 
Assistance 
Local Democracy 7347 23 3,9
NGO Development 6613 21 3,5
Urban and Regional Development 6526 20 3,5
School Education 3782 12 2,0
Political Party Assistance / Electoral Assistance 2142 7 1,1
Media Assistance 1821 6 1,0
Trade Union Assistance (KOZ) 1585 5 0,8
Legal Assistance / Rule of Law 1421 4 0,8
Others 976 3 0,5
Democratic Governance and Public 
Administration 
126 0,4 0,1
Source: own calculations based on USAID (2000b: 40) 
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Table 13 NED Funding by Area in Poland, 1990-1998 






Labor (Trade Union Assistance (NSZZ Solidarnoćś)) 13 3847 45
Electoral Assistance 3 1311 15
Economic Associations and Think Tanks 13 1111 13
Third Sector Development (incl. Civic Education) 14 1004 12
Decentralization 3 420 5
Civic education and awareness raising 8 319 4
Party Assistance 5 376 4
Support to Local and Ministerial Administration 5 203 2
Media Assistance 3 140 2
Legislative Assistance 3 79 1
Governmental Assistance 1 128 1
TOTAL 63 8620 100
Source: own calculations based on the publication of NED funded projects on the NED homepage 
www.NED.org 
Note: The above summary does not include regional grants focusing upon several CEE states such as 
e.g. the  NED financed Polish-Czech–Slovak Solidarity fund. In consequence, the actual commitment 
of the NED in Poland exceeds the above mentioned 8,6 mio US$. According to Quigley (1997) the 
NED assisted Poland with 10 mio US$ until 1994. 
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Table 14 NED Funding by Area in Slovakia, 1990-1999* 






Third Sector Development (incl. civic education) 19 1208 26
Electoral Assistance 9 9303 20
Economic Associations and Think Tanks / Business  10 5818 12
Labor 6 4057 9
Democracy 7 3644 8
Civic education and awareness raising 7 3320 7
Media Assistance 6 267 6
Parliamentary Assistance 1 220 5
Human Rights 4 127 3
Party Assistance 2 96 2
Local Governments 1 93 2
Donor Coordination 1 40 1
Academic Elites 1 15 0
TOTAL 74 4680 100
*Note that this sum includes 1,2 million US$ spent in then Czechoslovakia between 1990-1992 
Source: own calculations based on the publication of NED funded projects on the NED homepage 
www.NED.org  
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Table 15 NED Grants by Year and Area in Poland, 1990 – 1998 
 



























































































































Source: Own calculations based on the publication of NED funded projects on the NED homepage 
www.NED:org 
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Table 16 NED Grants by Year and Area in Slovakia, 1990 – 1999 
 
N ED  Grants to C ze choslov akia 199 0 (T otal 1, 2 million U S $)
Civic Forum, Public 






































































































Source: own calculations based on the publication of NED funded projects on the NED homepage 
www.NED.org 
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Portray 10 The USAID funded Democracy Network Project (DemNet) in 
Poland259 
The USAID funded Democracy Network Project (DemNet) supported public policy-oriented 
NGOs in Poland with a technical assistance and grant making program in four priority 
development sectors: democracy, the environment, enterprise development, and social 
sector restructuring / safety nets. The project had a duration of three years (1995-1998), its 
total budget amounts to 4,8 million US$.  
The project intended to ensure long-term sustainability of NGOs, to introduce a public 
advocacy orientation to organizations whose work previously focused on service provision, 
and to increase public awareness of the role of the third sector in a democracy. In order to 
attain the stated objectives the project was active in four different fields:  
1. Grant-Making 
Throughout its duration the Project provided 1,8 million US$ in direct grants to 67 NGOs for 
91 projects. The majority of grants (48%) were spent in the area of democracy, followed by 
the social sector with 24% and environmental protection and economic growth with 14% 
respectively. The initial focus of the project was on public policy oriented NGOs in the four 
priority areas. However, the project started to broaden its initial scope and concentrated 
additionally on thematic oriented NGOs in order to bring local and small NGOs into the 
project. Besides project grants DemNet provided intensive training and technical assistance 
to its grantees to improve their knowledge and skill in organizational development and 
management. Moreover the DemNet team provided the NGOs with individual consultation in 
order to prepare a two-year strategic plan.  
2. NGO Support Network 
To ensure sustainability DemNet aimed to strengthen NGO intermediary support centers that 
ought to ensure long term service provision for local and small NGOs. A lose network of 
already existing support centers, later known as SPLOT was subcontracted to conduct an 
informational and outreach campaign to help NGOs apply for DemNet grants. Preparation of 
SPLOT staff by means of training and advice as well as organizational development aimed 
not only to enhance the campaign but further to strengthen the capacity of SPLOT (USAID, 
1999: appendix C). 
259  The following is based on the following sources: Academy for Educational Development (1998), 
USAID (1999: appendix C and D) 
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3. Raising Public Awareness of NGOs Role in Civil Society  
Additionally, DemNet initiated several activities aiming to promote a better public awareness 
and understanding of NGOs: 
DemNet supported the first national NGO conference in Poland, the Forum for non-
governmental initiatives in 1996.  
In the first year of the program, a promotion and media campaign coordinated with the 
assistance of a prominent Polish media consultant was conducted to ensure the 
transparency of the Democracy Network Project, to increase public understanding and 
appreciation of the NGO sector, and to train NGO leaders in public relations. 
To promote better appreciation of the role of Polish NGOs in building a civil society, DemNet 
cooperated with the largest national daily newspaper and the European Union's PHARE 
Program to launch a nationwide competition for the best feature articles addressing the role 
of NGOs in a democratic society.  Three hundred articles entered the contest.  Three 
received first place awards and were published in Gazeta Wyborcza. Gazeta also published 
three additional entries. 
DemNet has provided extensive marketing/public relations training to its grantees. It has 
trained 31 representatives from 17 NGOs in Promotion and Media Relations, providing 
participants a completely new context for working with the media. The media in turn have 
praised the training for its practical examples in building an organization's image. 
4. Local Government Supported NGO Grant Programs 
Finally the Local Partnership Program aimed to increase local government support for local 
NGOs by instituting NGO grant-making programs at the local level. DemNet staff worked in 
15 communities, identified local partners among NGOs and local authorities and aimed to 
persuade local decision-makers to institutionalize local government approved programs of 
funding for activities conducted by NGOs by providing information and conducting several 
seminars. By 1998 DemNet has been successful in establishing such model programs in 
seven Polish cities. The efforts of DemNet to promote local funding possibilities for NGOs are 
continued by the DemNet successor organizations the Academy for the Development of 
Philanthropy that has been founded by former DemNet staff. The Academy is thus headed by 
Pawel Łukasiak, the former Project Director of DemNet. The main objective of the Academy 
is to provide support to communities in establishing community foundations, to promote local 
philanthropy in Poland and thus to ensure sustainability of NGOs.  
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Portray 11 The USAID funded Democracy Network Project (DemNet) in 
Slovakia 
The USAID NGO support program “DemNet Project” operated in Slovakia from 1996 to 
1999. It has been implemented by the NGO “Foundation for a Civil Society”. DemNet aimed 
to enhance NGO’s willingness and ability to participate in the political process by influencing 
the formulation or implementation of public policy in the areas of democracy, social sector 
restructuring, economic development and the environment. In order to do so, DemNet 
worked closely with a network of 48 NGOs. Additionally, it supported NGO development via 
the provision of grants, training to NGO leaders and so called organizational development 
and professionalization grants that were intended to ensure the sustainability of grantees 
(USAID 2000b: 17p). As in Poland, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
implemented a project focusing on the legal framework of NGO operations. It prepared a 
guide for NGOs on Slovakia’s laws and assisted draft legislation. The DemNet program 
ended in 1999, the project of ICNL ended in 2000. 
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Appendix 6 The German Political Foundations in Poland and Slovakia – An 
illustrative Overview260 
Portray 12 The Activities of the FES and KAS in Poland 
Like other donors the German political foundations quickly responded to the democratization 
processes in Poland and opened offices in Warsaw in 1989/90 with the aim to support the 
Polish transformation processes, and to support Polish civil society. Regarding the rapidity of 
the operational start it comes as no surprise that concepts and strategies on how to assist 
Poland were largely lacking. Moreover, the foundations found neither their experiences in 
developing countries nor their activities in industrialized countries applicable to the Polish 
and in general the post-communist cases. In Poland there was no need to assist the 
development of basic infrastructure such as radio stations or farm cooperatives as in 
developing countries. However, it was also not possible to conduct joint activities and enter 
cooperations with local partners (mainly parties and political elites) as is the case in 
industrialized countries. Local structures and organizations were constant flux, finding 
appropriate partner organizations was a major problem. The foundations thus largely relied 
on individuals, so-called “multipliers” such as scholars or journalists and to a lesser extent on 
former contacts.261 Finding suitable partners and making contacts to members of the elite 
was thus a priority of both foundations in the initial period. Both foundations restricted from 
working closely with parties, because the unconsolidated party system hampered long-term 
partnerships. Instead, they concentrated on reform-oriented politicians and offered advice 
and training. In the words of Hermann Bünz, head of the Polish office of the FES in Warsaw: 
“We trained everything and everybody. Whoever required training got it” (interview with the 
author, own translation). In the initial period of assistance until 1993 the FES shed away from 
working together with post-communist politicians and only started closer contacts with its 
sister party, the left-wing SLD in 1993/94. The conservative KAS was close to individual 
politicians of the AWS and the right-wing coalition ruling until 1993. The new political elite had 
hardly any previous political and administrative experience and thus eagerly sought 
information and political expertise. In this period, assistance thus concentrated on 
260  The following is largely based on the interviews conducted by the author with representatives 
from both KAS and FES (see appendix 9), on respective donor material (KAS (1994), KAS (1996), 
KAS (1999)), and on information provided by the homepages of the two foundations: www.kas.de, 
www.fes.de  
261  Both foundations supported Poland throughout the 1980s via scholarship programs. The FES 
run an exchange and scholarship program targeting Polish journalists, the KAS issued research 
scholarships to Polish scholars via the Catholic University Lublin. Moreover it held  contacts to the 
Academy for Catholic Theology in Warsaw. The KAS continued its contacts with the two universities, 
however, ended its cooperation with the Academy for Catholic Theology in 1995. 
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governmental and parliamentary assistance such as study trips for parliamentarians and 
experts, reports on reform issues or transnational working groups on reform issues, and 
training.  
If one focus upon the main activities of the foundations one has to note that these are quite 
similar. Both foundations aim at “civic” and “political education” and largely rely on the 
provision of information and expertise, on training in specific issue areas, on conferences, 
seminars and work-shops and to a lesser extent on financial support to non-state actors. 
Thereby both make use of their contacts to German and European politicians and 
representatives of interest groups and associations. Moreover, in contrast to American 
donors or local grant-making foundations the German political foundations do not run grant-
making schemes organized by open competitions or tenders. Both prefer close cooperative 
ties with supported organizations. The KAS and FES thereby traditionally employ two 
different strategies (see also chapter 5.1.3.). In line with its partner-centered strategy that 
implies contractual based long-term relationships with local organizations and institutional 
grants providing for salaries and equipment the KAS prefers to work closely with a few 
partner organizations (see list of partner organizations, appendix 7, table 17). The FES in 
contrast focuses on topics rather than partners and runs its activities with changing partner 
organizations. The FES thus works “partner-oriented, not partner-tied” (Bünz), cooperating 
and assisting a broader range of research institutes, universities, and NGOs. However, also 
the KAS slightly restrained from its partner-principle at the end of 1993. Since then the 
foundation also conducts its own activities. This strategic shift was partly due to the change in 
the Polish government to the post-communist coalition of SLD and the Polish Peasant Party 
(PSL). In order to continue working on topics that did not rank high on the agenda of the new 
left-wing government the KAS started to organize conferences and work-shops or issued 
publications.  
Regarding the thematic orientation of assistance the work of the two foundations is largely in 
line with the stated priority areas of each foundation (see also chapter 5.1.3). From the very 
beginning until 1995 decentralization and local self-government was the thematic priority 
area of the KAS. Already in early 1990 the foundation organized a one-week seminar for a 
Polish drafting-group on community law in St. Augustin at the headquarters of the 
Foundation. The KAS invited a variety of German experts on constitutional and community 
law and on local self-government to the event. Two weeks later the Polish drafting-group 
finished the draft law whose sketch had been developed in St. Augustin (interview Dr. Dill). 
The provision of expertise on local self-government and decentralization continued to be a 
major activity of the KAS until the governmental turn in 1993. Afterwards the foundation 
chose to cover the topic in the form of self-organized conferences and seminars. A further 
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major topic was the transformation to a market economy in Poland. After 1995 the KAS 
shifted its thematic priority and increasingly focused on European integration and NATO 
membership of Poland. The shift in priorities is also evident in the partner organizations of 
the KAS. Until 1995 the supported activities of the partner organizations largely aimed at the 
provision of education and training in the area of local and regional policy (University Lublin, 
FSLD regional center) or economics (University Lublin, Academy for Catholic Theology, 
Warsaw). Additionally, partner organizations of the KAS provided research and publication in 
the two priority areas (Gdansk institute of Macro-economics, Foundation “Ius Europae”, 
Warsaw). Since 1995 the KAS built up a different partner structure. In 1999 three out of five 
partner organizations focused on the thematic priorities international relations and European 
integration (Center for international relations (CIM), Warsaw; Polish Robert-Schuman 
Foundation, Warsaw; Konrad-Adenauer Center for European Integration, University 
Wrocław) (see appendix 7, table 17).  
In contrast to the KAS, the FES did not run one „country project“ in Poland, but had four, after 
1994 three, distinct projects in the country that also determine the priority areas of the 
foundation. These were (1) socio-political cooperation (since 1990); (2) economic and social 
policy (since 1991); (3) trade union cooperation (since 1991); and (4) the regional 
development of Silesia (since 1993). The first two projects have been merged into one in 
1994. Activities in the traditional priority area of the FES “trade union cooperation” are 
conducted in close cooperation with German trade unions. In the first years the FES worked 
exclusively with the NSZZ Solidarnoćś. Only in later years, attempts have been made to 
cooperate with the formerly state run trade union OSZZ. This is, however, a difficult 
undertaking as it might offend sensibilities of the NSZZ. Trade union assistance initially 
concentrated on organizational development and capacity building and training. The FES 
assisted the NSZZ Solidarnoćś to fulfill its new tasks that were rather distinct from the 
previous activities as an oppositional movement.262 The FES further aimed to strengthen the 
branch secretaries of the union in existence since 1991, and to intensify social dialogue 
among trade unions and employer organizations. Both objectives were, however, difficult to 
attain. NSZZ Solidarnoćś was not only a trade union but also had political ambitions. For this 
reasons, an organizational structure along regional lines instead of branches was more 
appropriate for its leaders. The social dialogue suffered from the disparity between a strong 
and political active trade union on the one hand, and weak and just developing employer 
262  Although Solidarnoćś is an exceptional case one has to note that trade unions in communist 
countries played a totally different role to trade unions in the West. Representing the interests of 
workers was not the main objective of trade unions, instead the unions ought to ensure the 
identification of the workers with the ruling regime and ideology (see Ost 1993). For this reason, trade 
unions in CEE had difficulties to accept their new role after transition.  
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associations on the other hand. In consequence thereof, the FES started to work with 
employer associations. Together with the Polish Foundation to promote Small and Medium 
Enterprises (PFSME) the FES run, for example, several seminars with Polish employer 
associations and its counterparts from Berlin/Brandenburg and hold seminars on social 
security systems and Polish SME policy. Also it conducted a study on “employer associations 
in Poland”.  
A further topic of the FES in the first half of the 1990s was regional development and regional 
policy especially in the region of Silesia. In 1992/93 the FES supported NARDA, the 
association of regional development agencies. In 1993 the FES started a organizationally 
distinct regional development project in Silesia equipped with an office and staff in the region. 
The project worked together with local communities, NGOs and universities in the region. 
The aim was to create a regional network and to strengthen the standing of the region via 
Warsaw. Moreover, the transfer of know-how in economic and industrial development was a 
further priority. In this respect, the project cooperated with a cross-regional project of the 
Land North Rhine Westphalia and the German association of counties (Deutscher 
Landkreistag).  
In the second half of the 1990s, the integration of Poland into the European Union became a 
thematic priority for the FES, too. Together with national and international organizations the 
FES, for example, assisted the training of 200 local and regional civil servants in the area of 
EU funding and regional policy. A further project aimed at the installment of nation-wide Info-
points on the European Union in schools, libraries and local authorities.  
Both foundations did not leave Poland at the end of the 1990s like other donors. However, 
the emphasis of their work changed. As already mentioned, in Poland the foundations had to 
find a middle way between the activities they carry out in developing countries and their 
activities in industrialized (and democratic) countries, that is, to use the German terminology, 
a middle way between Aufbau- and Verbindungsarbeit, a middle way between assistance 
and cooperation. In Poland, it has always been both, assisting the transformation and reform 
processes, and entering close transnational cooperation with parties and non-state actors. In 
the future, emphasis will be less on assistance but more on cooperation with an important 
member of the European Union.  
Portray 13 The Activities of the KAS in Slovakia – A Case Study 
 ‘Slovakia’, was the answer of all persons interviewed at the KAS asked for the greatest 
success of their foundation in CEE. It can be doubted that the turn-over of government in 
1998 and the electoral defeat of the authoritarian government of Vladimir Mečiar was solely 
the achievement of one foreign foundation. Nevertheless, the prompt answers suggest that 
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Western donors played a decisive role in the opposition’s electoral victory. The following 
highlights the goals, strategies and measures of the KAS in Slovakia before the elections 
(promotion) and after the elections (protection). This is followed by a brief assessment of the 
factors that influenced and brought about this ‘success’. 
Democracy Promotion 
Before 1998 the major goal of the KAS in Slovakia was the return of democracy in the 
country. This goal translated in four concrete strategies (1) to unite the opposition, (2) to 
support and strengthen the opposition, (3) to undermine the legitimacy of the authoritarian 
regime abroad and make the ‘Slovak’ case public, and (4) to strengthen and support civil 
society (interview Stuth).  
To unite the opposition is in face of clientele parties and personal rivalries that often 
determine the political scene in CEE  not an easy task and it is hard to assess whether and 
to what extent the KAS influenced the final agreement of the four opposition parties to build a 
electoral coalition. Also in Slovakia the KAS followed the strategy not to polarize but to offer a 
neutral platform for discussion. It attempted to bring rivals together by inviting them to 
seminars or to special work-shops.263  
The KAS aimed to support the opposition in two ways. First, it offered financial support, 
training and advice to oppositional leaders and organizations. Secondly, it aimed to raise the 
reputation and recognition of the opposition. In Slovakia the KAS was often confronted with 
the request of domestic NGOs to put its name on invitation posters, even if the KAS did not 
provide funding for the event. It was important for domestic NGOs to demonstrate that they 
were accepted by and worked together with international actors. This international 
recognition improved the standing of the respective organizations inside the country. 
Furthermore, the KAS used its European network. High-ranking European politicians gave 
speeches on events of the partners organizations. The KAS also organized several meetings 
between the leading figure of the opposition – Miklas Dzurinda – and European politicians 
and a picture session with Dzurinda and then German chancellor Kohl. As a result, Dzurinda 
was positioned as the partner not only of the KAS but of Europe.  
The KAS further used its contacts and networks both in Germany as well as on the European 
level to undermine the international recognition of the Mečiar regime. 
263  The FNS, for example, organized shortly before the elections a two-day work-shop with the aim 
to unite the opposition parties. The FNS claimed that it was the result of this work-shop, and the 
political consultant running it, to bring about the final umbrella coalition (interview Thebaud). 
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 They prevented, for example, an invitation of Mečiar to Germany. In this question, the KAS 
stood against the foreign ministry whose foremost priority were good bilateral relations. One 
can assume that it helped that Slovakia is a small and geo-strategically less important 
country. Furthermore, at that time the German government was conservative, a fact that 
resulted in good contacts to government and Chancellor’s office. On the European level, the 
network of contacts was used to make the Slovak case public. Meetings between high level 
European politicians such as Süßmuth, Jean-Claude Junker, Wolfgang Schüssel, Wilfried 
Martens etc. and Dzurinda were organized.  
The KAS further aimed to promote and support civil society in Slovakia. Following the 
‘partner-principal’ approach, the KAS cooperates in Slovakia with several organizations (see 
appendix 7, table 18). Some organizations also were established on initiative of the KAS 
such as the Center for European Policy. An important partner organization was MESA 10, an 
economic institute that was founded by 10 leading figures of the opposition including Miklas 
Dzurinda. The KAS financed the monthly report of the institute and by doing so contributed to 
its existence.  
Democracy Protection 
After the change in government in 1998, the KAS identified the following new goals:  
• political stability 
• consolidation of the coalition 
• a strong conservative party  
• strong civil society.  
The strategy taken to achieve those goals encompassed four points: (1) strengthen the 
competence of partners in new policy areas, (2) European integration, (3) provide neutral 
platform for conflicting parties, and (4) continue cooperation with partner organizations and 
search for new ones (interview Spengler). 
Directly after the new government took office the KAS invited a German expert from the 
German chancellor’s office to help organizing the Slovak counterpart. The main task of the 
expert was to address and answer questions to internal communication, communication with 
parties and management. A further measure to increase the professionalism of the partners 
took already place before the elections. 60 young opposition members were identified that 
were possible candidates for administrative posts in government or parliament. These 60 
benefited from an intensive training preparing them for their future work as heads of cabinet, 
press officer or political advisers. Study-trips to Austria and Germany were organized and 
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different experts such as the speaker of Vaclav Havel were invited. More than half of the 
people trained actually entered the anticipated post.  
After the election, the new leadership was in need of concrete technical assistance and 
information. The KAS thus provided technical assistance in on new policy areas of interest 
such as regionalization and the territorial restructuring of the country. Another important topic 
was European Integration. The KAS also helped Slovakia lobbying in Brussels. It organized, 
for example, a meeting in Brussels with Western investors active in Slovakia and assured 
that a relevant audience was listening. In this sense, the new Slovak leadership still profits 
from the international contacts of the KAS. A further goal was political stability and the 
consolidation of the coalition. The KAS provided a platform for discussion, and aimed to 
moderate in conflicts inside the KDH. This was, however, not always possible. Here the limits 
of an outside actor without actual powers are visible.  
Assessment 
The case of the KAS activities in Slovakia demonstrates that donors can play a decisive role 
in the transition / democratization phase. Especially, four factors can be identified that proved 
important for the described ‘success’.  
(1) A good relationship between donor and recipient 
The relationship between the KAS represented in the person of the head of the office – 
Reinhardt Stuth – and the opposition parties, especially the KDH (Christian Democratic 
Movement) can be classified as extremely good even resulting in a personal friendship 
between Stuth and Dzurinda. This shall not suggest that DPP can only be successful if close 
personal relations are involved, however, the question of trust is definitely at stake. Only if the 
expert – in this case the donor – enjoys the trust of the recipient – trust in his loyalty and 
competence – a good relationship can be achieved. If DPP requires the recipient’s trust in 
the foreign expertise, areas in which this is the case have to be identified. One can assume 
that the foreign expertise is more valued and trusted in questions such as EU enlargement or 
NATO enlargement rather than in ‘typical’ internal problems that stand outside of the 
experience and technical knowledge of the donor. Furthermore, a common cultural or 
ideological background supports a good relationship as demonstrated by the presented case: 
both sides – the KAS and the KDH - share a Christian-conservative perspective. Again this 
does not determine per se a good relationship. In the Czech Republic the KAS did not 
manage to create good relations with the ODS party of Vaclav Klaus. On the contrary, the 
work of the KAS in Prague extremely suffers from a cumbered relationship.  
(2) The political will and interest of the recipient or a stated ‘demand’ 
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In Slovakia the opposition obviously had an interest to cooperate with the KAS as it profited 
from the cooperation in a double way. First, the different NGOs and organizations benefited 
from the financial support as well as from the technical expertise that was provided. In this 
way, recipients succeeded in increasing professionalism. Moreover they could guarantee the 
own existence in face of a repressive government. As some organizations such as MESA 10 
faced repressive measures by the government that made it nearly impossible to receive 
orders, the support of the KAS and other foreign donors was their only financial means. 
Second, the cooperation with the KAS increased the legitimacy and reputation of the partner 
organizations and the whole opposition movement. Especially the network of German and 
European contacts was extremely important for the Slovak partners. Being a small country, it 
was not that easy to make the Slovak case public and gain international attention. This 
attention and recognition in turn resulted in an better profile and standing in the domestic 
public opinion. However, not in every cultural setting and country a pro-international or pro-
Western image will be positive for the opposition. In Slovakia the population was increasingly 
alarmed by the possibility that the Meciar government will prevent a ‘Return to Europe’ and 
that Slovakia will ‘fall back’ in the circle of countries such as Romania or Bulgaria (RFE/RL). 
The elections of 1998 were as much a vote for or against certain parties as for or against 
European integration. Without this public perception the strategy to position Dzurinda as a 
Western partner might not have been so successful or even negative.  
The interest of the donor – the supply side 
The objectives of the KAS namely democracy, social market-economy and European 
Integration corresponded with the interest of the Slovak opposition. Moreover, the Slovak 
case further strengthened the foundation’s role as information and contact provider at home. 
Being geographically close to Germany and a potential candidate for European enlargement 
Slovakia is an interesting although not extremely important country for Germany. 
Consequently, good bilateral relations are desirable. For the KAS this fact translates in a 
demand for foreign policy expertise on Slovakia back home. Furthermore, the activities of the 
KAS resulted in a network of contacts in Slovakia from which the KAS and the CDU can 
profit. How important this factor is for the KAS is demonstrated if one imagines that not a 
right-wing but a left-wing coalition had won the elections. One may doubt that in this case the 
KAS had ever called Slovakia a success.  
(4) Respective Partners 
The partner-principle approach that is followed by the KAS is facilitated by the existence of 
appropriate partner organizations. If few NGOs, institutes or associations exist, the work of 
the foundations is constrained. Such a ‘civic landscape’ was present in the Slovak case. As 
 352
Reinhard Stuth pointed out: “In Slovakia civil society is manifold and diverse, much more 
than in the Czech Republic.” Consequently, it was possible to find partners and support them. 
Without at least a basic civic commitment or an emerging civil society, civil society assistance 
is thus heavily constrained. In Bulgaria the head of the FES office complains that no bridge to 
the society can be found. The measures only reach a limited number of (mainly already pro-
Western, highly educated) people and have no echo in the population (interview Weichert). 
This is not the case in Slovakia. Discussions organized by the ‘Citizen Clubs’ of the SKOI are 
even in small cities attended by up to 50 people (interview Stuth).  
To sum up, the stated ‘success’ of the KAS in Slovakia was possible because of a symmetric 
interest of donor and recipient, a good relationship based on trust, at least a minimum 
acceptance of civic rights by the government that allowed organized civic activity to emerge 
and a pro-European public opinion.  
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Appendix 7 Polish and Slovakian Recipients of Civil Society Assistance by 
Donor 
Table 17 Examples of Partner Organizations of the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation in Poland 
Name Supported Activities Year 
Catholic University Lublin 
(CUL) – Foundation for the 
development of the CUL 
Business school  
Center for Community Policy (provision of training to 




Foundation of the Academy 
for Catholic Theology – 
Institute for Social Market 
Economy, Warsaw 
Institute of Social Market Economy  
Seminars on social market economy by German 
professors 




Foundation in Support of 
Local Democracy (FSLD) – 
Center for Local Self-
Government, Jelenia Góra 
Education and training of local civil servants 1991-
1996 




Foundation “Ius Europae” 
(FIE), Warsaw 
Manual on community policy  1992-
1993 
Gdansk Institute for Market 
Economics (GIME) 











Center of International 
Relations (CIM), Warsaw 
Public policy oriented research with focus on 









Source: Matzke (1997: 36). 
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Table 18 Examples of Partner Institutions of the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation in Slovakia 
Name Focus KAS involvement 
SKOI (Permanent 
Conference of the 
Institute of Education 
Association of regional ‘citizen clubs’ 
organizing public political discussions  
financial and 
organizational support 
ZEP (Center for 
European Policy)  
‘Train the trainer’ measures in questions of 
European Integration 
 
initiated creation of ZEP 
in order to prepare EU 
accession; financial and 
organizational support   
SFPA- Slovak 
Society of Foreign 
Policy 
Civic education measures in questions of 
foreign policy (seminars, conferences, 
debating societies in schools) 
financial and 
organizational support 




Diplomatic education, used to be pro-
Meciar 
funding for books, 
events, KAS insisted 
that opposition members 
are accepted as 
students  
Source: Interview Stuth 
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Table 19 Phare “Infrastructural” Recipients in Poland 
Recipient Project Title, Supported Activity 
Foundation for the Development 
of Civic Society in Gdynia 
Subsidies for the project “Creation of Local Infrastructure 
for Non-governmental Organizations” implemented by the 
Centre of Support for NGOs.  
• provision of advisory services, training, information 
and technical knowledge for local NGOs.  
• advancement of co-operation between NGOs and 
self-governments  
Support Office for the 
Movement of Self-Help 
Initiatives BORIS, Warsaw 
“Co-operation of NGOs and self-government authorities 
from the municipality of central Warsaw”.  
• consultations, advisory services and information to  
NGOs 
• working team for co-operation with local self-
government, especially in social area 
The Central European Center 
for Behavioral Economic 
Foundation in Lublin 
“Support for Co-operation between NGOs and self-
government authorities in Lublin Voivodship” 
• aimed to increase the activities of NGOs and 
• their participation in the creation and implementation 
of socio-economic policies in local communities 
BRIDGE Regional NGO Support 
Centre in Katowice 
“Advice and Information Services for NGOs” 
• increase of professional standard of NGOs in nine 
voivodships 
• publication of the newspaper “Sedno-Most” 
The Association for the Forum 
of Non-governmental Initiatives, 
Warsaw (FIP) 
“Integration and Strengthening of NGOs in Poland” 
• improve the flow of information between various 
organizations in the country 
ASOCJACJE – The Association 
of Support for Social Initiatives, 
Warsaw 
Exhibition prepared in cooperation with the Voivodhsip 
Office in Warsaw. The presentation regarded the 
cooperation between NGOs and state administration and 
was entitled “For Common Benefit”. 
Civil Society Development 
Foundation, Warsaw 
“Support for Local Communities  - GALICJA” 
• supporting the region Galicja in the South of Poland 
• publication of a manual regarding local funding 
possibilities of social activities 
• consultation for loca 
Regional Information and NGO 
Support Center in Gdańsk 
“The Regional Center – Service Point for NGOs from the 
Seacoast Region” 
Source: Cooperation Fund (1998: 24p) 
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Table 20 Examples of Phare Recipients in Slovakia 
Recipient Project Title, Year 
SKOI (Permanent Civic     
Institute Conference) 
Establishment of democratic civic clubs (1995, Democracy 
Macro grant) 
The Syndicate of Slovak   
Journalists 
Maintain free media, independence of journalists (1995;   
Democracy Macro grant) 
Association of Landowners 
and Agrarian Entrepreneurs of 
Slovakia 
Reconstruction of social relations in the countryside (1995, 
Democracy Macro Project) 
Slovak Union of Blind and 
Partially Sighted  
Defense of the interests of the blind (1994, Democracy   
Macro Project) 
Milan Simecka Foundation  Assistance to a running civic education program (1994    
Democracy Micro Project) 
Slovakia Foreign Policy 
Foundation 
Documentation / publication of two seminars aiming to 
increase public understanding of foreign affairs (1994, 
democracy micro grant) 
A-Project Centre for the Revival and Development of Mountain Area 
Resources,  
Interactive community planning in rural micro-regions 




Institutional development of the Centre for Economic 
Development, 1998-2000 
Educational Centre Study program “Economy and Management of NGOs” , 
1998-2000 
ETP Slovakia Promotion of co-operation and access to information of 
NGOs in the process of European Integration in the area of 
the environment and regional development, 1998-2000 
MEMO ‘98 Monitoring minorities’ rights, 1998-2000 
New Generation – Youth Club Service Centre for Minority NGOs 
Partners for Democratic 
Change Slovakia 
Training on effective functioning of organizations with 
programs promoting Roma and non-Roma coexistence, 
1998-2000 
The Board for Social Work 
Counselling 
Establishing a branch in Kosice, 1998-2000 
ROAD Institutional and staff development, 1998-2000 
Trencin Informal Group (TIG) Several projects and programs, e.g. institutional 
development of the TIG community fund 
Source: European Commission (1997c: 148pp), NPOA (2000) 
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Table 21 Examples of NED Non-Governmental Recipients in Poland (1990-
1998) 
Recipient Area of Activity 
Polish Institute of Arts and Science (PIAS) art and science 
Stefan Batory Foundation civic education 
Foundation for Education for Democracy (FED) civil society, civic education 
Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) civil society, democracy  
Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (FSLD) decentralization, local democracy 
Foundation for Social and Economic Initiatives in Poland 
(FSEIP) 
economy  
Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (GIME) economy 
Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) economy 
Polish Society of Market Economics (PSME) economy 
Polish Council of Economic Societies (PCES) economy / privatization 
Krakow Industrial Society (KIS) economy / privatization 
Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) economy / privatization 
Institute for Private Enterprise and Democracy (IPED) economy / privatization 
Higher School of Business (HSP) education / economic 
Polish Citizens Committees election 
Independent Center for International Studies (ICIS) research institute, think tank 
Institute for Southeastern Studies (ISES) research Institute, think tank 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) trade union 
NSZZ Solidarity (Rural branches, Social Fund, economic 
foundation, abroad)  
trade union 
Polish Children and Youth Foundation (PCYF) youth 
Source: own illustration based on the information distributed on the NED website: www.ned.org 
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Table 22 Examples of NED Non-Governmental Recipients in Slovakia (1993-
2000) 
Recipient Area of Activity 
Jan Hus Educational Foundation civil society, civic education, academic support 
Documentation Center for the Promotion of 
Independent Slovak Literature civic education, third sector 
Center for Independent Journalism media 
Milan Simecka Foundation human rights, civic education, third sector 
Bratislava Center for Social Analysis civic education, third sector 
MESA 10 business 
Foundation for the Upper Nitra Region civic education, third sector 
Entrepreneur Association of Slovakia business 
The Permanent Committee of the Civic 
Institute (SKOI) 
civic education, third sector, network of civic 
clubs 
Center  for Economic Development business 
Association for Support of Local 
Democracy elections, third sector, decentralization 
Association Obcianske Oko (Civic Eye) youth, democracy 
Association of Regional Press Publishers 
media, publication of "civic letters" which report 
on Slovakia's democratic transition 
People and Water democracy 
MEMO 98 monitoring and assessing media coverage 
Presov Civic Forum elections, civic education in Eastern Slovakia 
SAIA-SCTS third sector, NGO development 
Open Society Foundation third sector, NGO development 
Pro Democracy Association (APD) 
monitoring reform processes, public opinion 
polls on youth issues, civic education 
Foundation for a Civil Society (FCS) civic education, election, third sector 
Institute for Public Affairs survey on Slovakias transition 
Presov Community Foundation promotion of local NGOs 
Transparency International Slovakia  anti-corruption 
Source: own illustration based on the information distributed on the NED website: www.ned.org 
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Table 23 Examples of USAID Non-Governmental Recipients in Poland  
Year  Recipient and Supported Activities 
1990 FSLD receives its first support from USAID 
1990 NED begins distributing USAID funds to a variety of institutions to meet the 
needs of pro-democratic forces, independent cultural and publishing groups 
1990 IDEE organizes the first competition for local press. Since then, more than 300 
local press received funding by USAID. Since 1994 IDEE has provided training, 
advisory services and scholarships for NGOs and journalists from the region 
(CEE and NIS). 
1990 East Central European Scholarship Program is established, providing U.S.-
based training programs for Polish leaders in democratic leadership, public 
administration, public policy, health care administration and reform, rural 
development, finance and banking, business administration, and education. 
1990 KLON/JAWOR database on NGOs receives start-up assistance from USAID 
1991 YMCA receives USAID grant providing funding for youth leadership to address 
problems of social, environmental and economic concerns. 
1991 Newly established CASE foundation, now a leading macro-economic think-tank, 
receives USAID funding 
1991 Warsaw Journalism Center is established with USAID funding 
1992 The environmental training project begins, focusing on training private business 
owners, environmental NGOs, academicians and local government officials 
1993 Support Office for the Movement of Self-Help Initiatives (BORIS) is established to 
provide support to the NGO sector with a start-up grant from USAID. BORIS 
provides technical assistance in management issues, program planning, 
proposal writing, and fundraising. By June 2000, BORIS will have helped 
establish 60 Local Initiatives Centers that help communities organize for local 
problem solving. 
1995 DemNet is launched assisting 65 NGOs; helping among others SPLOT (Network 
of NGO support and resource centers) to improve the standard of its services; 
supporting e.g. the first national NGO conference in Poland (FIP) 
  Source: own illustration based on USAID (2000a:  102-175) 
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Table 24 Examples of USAID Non-Governmental Recipients in Slovakia 
Activities and Programs 1990 - 2002 
Year  Recipient and Supported Activities 
1991-1993 Slovak Institute of Public Administration receives management training from the 
US Institute of Public Administration 
1990-1993 NED distributes USAID funds to communities and NGOs with the aim of NGO 
development 
1991-1994 The Association of Towns and Communities is supported by the international 
City-County Management Association in order to strengthen local public 
administration 
1999-2000 Transparency International Slovakia receives funding for a corruption 
awareness campaign 
1996-2000 Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia receive funding for a market 
mediation training 
1997-1999 The International Foundation for Election Systems distributes USAID funds to 
NGOs in order to raise public awareness of the elections 
1992-1996 The German Marshall Fund distributes USAID funds to Slovak NGOs with the 
aim of strengthening citizens and human rights 
1996-1999 The Foundation for a Civil Society supports local NGOs with the DemNet 
program  
1999-2002 Ekopolis Foundation / ETP Slovakia manages the “Your Land” program 
1995-2000 The International Center for Non-for-Profit law works with NGOs and several 
ministries on a legal framework for NGOs 
Source: USAID (2000b: 40) 
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USAID Legacy Institutions in Slovakia  
The following organizations have been established or strengthened with the assistance of 
USAID:  
Recipients USAID funded international counterparts 
Orava Association for Democratic Education  University of Northern Iowa 
Environmental Training Partnership 
Foundation (ETP Slovakia) 
University of Minnesota 
TRG Slovakia  The Recovery Group 
Local Self-Government Assistance Center  ICMA 
Slovak Management Training Center The Recovery Groups, IESC 
Slovak Association of Industrial 
Environemtnal Managers 
World Environment Center 
Slovak Pollution Prevention Center  World Environment Center 
Citizens Action  National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
Obcianske Oko National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
Slovak City Managers Association RTI, ICMA 
Slovak Judges Association ABA / CEELI 
Slovak Advocates Association ABA / CEELI 
Association of Towns and Communities ICMA, IESC, VOCA 
Slovak Syndicate of Journalists  IREX ProMedia 
MEMO ‘98 IREX ProMedia 
Gremium for the Third Sector International Center for Non-Profit Law 
Association of Slovak Teachers of English USIA 
Center for Independent Journalism USIA, IREX 
MESA 10 RTI, DemNEt 
Source: USAID (2000b: 42-43) 
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Table 25 Recipients of the Stefan Batory Foundation (Institutional Grants 
only) 
 1995 USD 1996 USD 1997 USD 1998 USD 1999 USD 
Public Policy Institute, Warsaw 359,109 217,228 312,500 307,874 266,199 
Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, 
Warsaw 
136,842 137,453 147,031  102,041 
Charta Center Foundation, Warsaw 93,117 82,397 68,750 258,621  
Socio-Economic Inititives Foundation, 
Warsaw 
76,923     
Polish Humanitarian Organization, 
Warsaw 
65,587 60,674 46,875 28,736  
International Center for Development of 
Democracy, Cracow 
48,583 89,888  57,471  
Polish Roberta Schuman Foundation, 
Warsaw 
38,462 59,551 46,875  25,510 
Polish Foundations Forum, Warsaw 36,802   10,057  
Borderland Foundation, Sejny 32,389 33,708  43,103 127,551 
NGO Parliament, Poznan 29,798  12,500   
Food Bank Foundation, Warsaw 20,243  15,625  16,582 
Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw 12,672 9,363   6,378 
National Association of the Friends of 
Lithuania, Warsaw 
10,121 11,236 9,375 10,057 8,929 
  New in 96    
Environmental Partnership Fundation, 
Cracow 
 97,378  100,575  
CASE Foundation, Warsaw  74,906    
School of Leaders Association, Warsaw  67,416 24,625 57,471 63,776 
Judaica Foundation - Jewish Culture 
Center, Cracow 
 63,670 50,000 48,851 38,265 
Institute for Democracy in Eastern 
Europe, Warsaw 
 52,434  57,471  
BORIS Office for the Servicing of the 
Self-Aid Initiative Movement, Warsaw 
 34,906 93,750  20,408 
National Association of Soltys, Konin  29,963    
Center of Political Though, Cracow  9,925  11,006 12,755 
   New in 97   
Synapsis Foundation, Warsaw   62,500   
Fundation for Support of Local 
Democracy, Warsaw 
  56,250 51,724  
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Foundation for Help to Children with 
Neoplastic Diseases, Warsaw 
  46,875  12,755 
Polish Pen Club, Warszawa   31,250 22,989  
 1995 USD 1996 USD 1997 USD 1998 USD 1999 USD 
Public Policy Institute, Warsaw 359,109 217,228 312,500 307,874 266,199 
Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, 
Warsaw 
136,842 137,453 147,031  102,041 
Charta Center Foundation, Warsaw 93,117 82,397 68,750 258,621  
Socio-Economic Inititives Foundation, 
Warsaw 
76,923     
Polish Humanitarian Organization, 
Warsaw 
65,587 60,674 . 46,875 28,736  
International Center for Development of 
Democracy, Cracow 
48,583 89,888  57,471  
Polish Roberta Schuman Foundation, 
Warsaw 
38,462 59,551 46,875  25,510 
Polish Foundations Forum, Warsaw 36,802   10,057  
Borderland Foundation, Sejny 32,389 33,708  43,103 127,551 
NGO Parliament, Poznan 29,798  12,500   
Food Bank Foundation, Warsaw 20,243  15,625  16,582 
Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw 12,672 9,363   6,378 
National Association of the Friends of 
Lithuania, Warsaw 
10,121 11,236 9,375 10,057 8,929 
  New in 96    
Environmental Partnership Fundation, 
Cracow 
 97,378  100,575  
CASE Foundation, Warsaw  74,906    
School of Leaders Association, Warsaw  67,416 24,625 57,471 63,776 
Judaica Foundation - Jewish Culture 
Center, Cracow 
 63,670 50,000 48,851 38,265 
Institute for Democracy in Eastern 
Europe, Warsaw 
 52,434  57,471  
BORIS Office for the Servicing of the 
Self-Aid Initiative Movement, Warsaw 
 34,906 93,750  20,408 
National Association of Soltys, Konin  29,963    
Center of Political Though, Cracow  9,925  11,006 12,755 
   New in 97   
Synapsis Foundation, Warsaw   62,500   
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Fundation for Support of Local 
Democracy, Warsaw 
  56,250 51,724  
Foundation for Help to Children with 
Neoplastic Diseases, Warsaw 
  46,875  12,755 
Polish Pen Club, Warszawa   31,250 22,989  
Women's Support Center Foundation, 
Warsaw 
  31,250   
Social Foundation of the Powisle 
District, Warsaw 
  31,250   
Wegajty Country Theater Association, 
Wegajty 
  28,125   
Civic Education Center, Warsaw   18,750  51,020 
Bene Vobts Foundation, Warszawa   18,750   
La Strada Fund at ion Against 
Trafficking in Women, Warsaw 
  16,875   
Society for Social Prevention, 
Bydgoszcz 
  15,625   
The Mikolow Fundation, Mikolow   14,063   
Foundation for Help to Single Mothers, 
Poznan 
  14,063  8,929 
Barge Foundation for Mutual 
Assistance, Poznan 
  12,500   
    New in 98  
International Relations Center, Warsaw    86,207 102,041 
FIP Association (Nongovernmental 
Initiatives Forum), Warsaw 
   68,966 25,510 
Center for the Monitoring of Freedom of 
Press (Polish Journalists Association), 
Warsaw 
   34,483  
Foundation for Education for 
Democracy, Warsaw 
   31,609  
Federation of Polish Food Banks, 
Warsaw 
   28,736  
Polish Work Foundation, Lodz    28,736  
Heart Association for Sick Children, 
Swidnica 
   28,736  
Borussia Cultural Association, Olsztyn    25,862  
Association for Family Development, 
Opole 
   24,425  
eFKa Women's Foundation, Cracow    20,230  
Foundation for Poland, Warsaw    20,115  
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Cracow Hamlet Foundation, Cracow    20,115  
Horse-Riding Therapy Foundation for 
Aid to Disabled Children, Warsaw 
   18,621  
National Fund on Behalf of Children, 
Warsaw 
   14,368 38,265 
Sharing What We Have Association, 
Stoczek Lukowski 
   14,368 12,755 
Polis Association of Young Journalists, 
Warsaw 
   14,224  
National Autism Society, Cracow    11,494  
Altenative Education Studio, Lodz    7,184  
Ancient Music Association, Jaroslaw    7,184  
     New in 99 
Junior Achievement Fundation, Warsaw     178,571 
Amazons Federation of Polish Clubs of 
Women after Mastectomy, Warsaw 
    26,786 
Kana Cathilic Center of Youth 
Education, Gliwice 
    25,510 
Regional Information and Support 
Center of NGO, 
    25,510 
Lublin Center of Self-Aid Association, 
Lublin 
    20,408 
Most Association of NGO Support, 
Katowice 
    20,408 
Art of Disabled Foundation, Cracow     12,755 
Wielkopolska Region Information and 
Suppor Center of NGO, Poznan 
    12,755 
Borderland Music Association, Lublin     12,755 
Organization of the Friends of Children     11,480 
My Point of View Association, Bystrzyca 
Klodzka 
    8,929 
Total amout of grants 960,648 1,132,097 1,226,031 1,571,667 1,295,536 
      
Number of grants 13 17 25 33 29 
Average amount of grant 73,896 66,594 49,041 47,626 44,674 
      
Exchange rate 2.47 2.67 3.20 3.48 3.92 
Source: Stefan Batory Foundation (2000:13-15) 
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Appendix 8 Survey on Non-Governmental Organizations in Poland and 
Slovakia  
The following survey investigated the situation of NGOs in Poland and Slovakia, and the 
relationship between non-governmental recipients of foreign assistance and their donors. 
The survey was part of the research project “Democracy Promotion and Protection in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa” conducted jointly by the Humboldt 
University, Berlin and the European University Institute, Florence and headed by Professor 
Claus Offe and Professor Philippe Schmitter. The survey encompassed three set of 
questions inquiring on  
• description of NGOs: location, year of foundation, number of employees, area of activity, 
level of activity, type of activity, budget  (questions 1-9),  
• self-assessment of NGOs’ role and situation in the country: relationship with other actors, 
importance of NGOs, main problems of NGOs (question 10-12), 
• relationship with foreign actors / donors:  main donors,  number of annually funded 
projects, benefits of cooperation, assessment of cooperation, main problems of 
cooperation (questions 13-17). 
A Representative Sample 
In Poland the sample involved 300 arbitrarily selected NGOs from the Klon/Jawor 
database.264 The internet based survey has been conducted in 2002. 72 valid questionnaires 
returned (24%). Because of the relatively low return, and the rather small sample the findings 
of the survey have been double-checked with a comparison of key indicators of the 
KLON/JAWOR survey (see below). This comparison reveals that the sample presents a 
representative picture of the NGOs of the Klon/Jawor database. Key indicators (paid staff, 
budget, main area of activity roughly correspond with the findings of the Klon/Jawor survey of 
1997.  
In line with the findings of the Klon/Jawor survey of 1997, the vast majority of questioned 
NGOs is rather small with no more than 5 paid staff (69%), and an annual budget of up to 
20.000 US$ (53%) (see tables below). One has to note that the findings concerning core 
area of activity are not easily comparable as slightly different categories have been used in 
the two surveys and as the Klon/Jawor questionnaire allowed more than one answer. 
Nevertheless both surveys depict that the major share of NGOs in Poland are active in the 
264  Approximately every 40th NGO that was according to the data in the database still active (and 
did reply to the last questionnaire of the Klon/Jawor survey) was selected.  
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field of social services, youth, culture and education. Also decentralization and local/regional 
development is a main area of activity of Polish NGOs.265 One has to note, however, that 
rather few NGOs active in ecology, science and concerned with issues of the mass media 
participated in our survey. Also the share of professional groups and organizations active in 
the area of “state, law and politics” is rather low.  
The Slovak sample is based on the databank of the Slovak organization SAIA. One has to 
note that the database on NGOs provided by the Slovak NGO SAIA-SCTS is not a complete 
list of NGOs active in Slovakia. The database only includes those organizations that choose 
to register with SAIA. Consequently the database thus not fully represent certain types of 
organizations such as sport and hobby clubs. Unfortunately alternative data by the Statistical 
office is not available. All NGOs that had an e-mail address (400) have been selected. 92 
valid answers have been received (23%). Again the portray given by our sample corresponds 
with the findings of the SAIA database. Most NGOs are located in the capital (although the 
DPP survey has a slight bias towards capital-based NGOs (44% instead of 35% in the SAIA 
database). The majority of NGOs focus on youth, culture and education (see for an 
interpretation of the SAIA statistics: Demeš (2001: 471pp). A detailed comparison of our 
findings and findings of SAIA is, however, not possible, as the SAIA statistics only allow a 
limited analysis.  
 
Indicator 1: Number of Paid Staff of Polish NGOs 
 
                                                
265  The higher share of NGOs active in this area in our survey may well be due to the later date of 
the survey. The territorial reform of 1999 opened up possibilities for NGOs in this field. A tendency that 
NGOs concerned about decentralization and local development sprang up was already evident in the 
1997 survey which noted that “the share of organizations connected with issues of regional 
development is … clearly rising” (BORDO 1998: 60). 
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Indicator 2: Approximate Annual Budget (in US $) 
 
Indicator 3: Main Area of Activity of Polish NGOs (in %) 
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Table 26 Results of the Survey on NGOs in Poland and Slovakia in % 
1. Location of organizations (per inhabitants)  
Poland (72) > 1 Mio > 450.000 450.000- 
100.000 
< 100.000 
 19 32 4 44 
Slovakia (89) Capital > 100.000 100.000-80.000 < 80.000 
 44 9 9 36 
 
 2. Year of foundation  
 before 1989 89-92 93-96 97-00 
Poland (64) 6 38 23 33 
Slovakia (90) 7 19 44 30 
 
3. Do you publish annual reports?   
 Yes No 
Poland (58) 47 53 
Slovakia (90) 57 43 
 
4. Approximate budget in the year 2000 (in US $) (65) 





Poland (65) 28 25 23 23 2 
Slovakia (88) 27 28 30 14 1 
 
5. Number of paid staff (72) 
 0-5 6 – 15 16 – 50 > 50 
Poland (72) 69 15 13 2 




6. Number of volunteers  
 0 1-10 11-20 21-50 >50 
Poland (72) 24 40 18 8 10 
Slovakia (92) 16 41 12 13 17 
 
7. Are active members of your rrganization in command of English?  
 Yes No 
Poland (72) 72 28 
Slovakia (89) 72 28 
 
8. At which territorial level are you mainly active?  
 Local Regional  National International 
Poland (72) 33 36 22 8 




9. What is your main area of activity?   









social services 30 15 19 11 
youth, culture and education 24 19 32 20 
decentralization, regional / local 
development 
17 8 9 8 
economic development 10 6 4 5 
support of the NGO-sector 3 19 4 15 
human rights/minorities 3 6 8 10 
international issues, European Union 3 6 2 7 
science 3 6 6 3 
professional group 3 5 3 9 
ecology 1 3 11 8 
women 1 2 1 3 
media 1 0 0 1 
labor rights 0 2 0 0 
state, law, politics 0 5 1 1 
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10. How do you assess your relationship with the following group of actors? 
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
 no relationship existing relationship no relationship existing relationship 















19 83 26 74 local and regional authorities 
(70/86) 0 19 10 73 5 21 44 30 
79 21 89 12 
political parties  (71/84) 
55 24 14 7 60 29 10 2 
61 38 43 57 governmental authorities 
(70/87) 11 50 7 31 14 29 35 23 
49 51 35 66 
international NGOs  (69/89) 
1 48 6 45 8 27 33 33 
79 21 68 32 international organizations  
(68/85) 19 60 3 18 22 46 18 14 
84 16 70 30 foreign governmental agencies  
(65/86) 29 55 2 14 27 43 22 8 
61 39 76 24 
business  (66(83) 
9 52 6 33 40 36 16 8 
30 70 18 82 
Media  (69/89) 
4 26 6 64 6 12 47 35 
19 81 21 79 other domestic non-
governmental actors (69/87) 0 19 9 72 6 15 46 33 
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11. What do you think, why is a vivid NGO-Sector in your country important? 
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
 disagree agree fully agree disagree agree fully agree 
NGOs are important because they control state activities and 
constitute a countervailing power to the state. (67/90) 22 43 34 5 31 63 
NGOs are important because they are more efficient in 
supplying public services than the state. (69/90) 4 16 80 3 33 63 
NGOs are important because they guarantee citizen 
participation in the political process. (66/89) 33 32 35 17 43 40 
NGOs are important because they function as important 
intermediaries between state and society. (70/90) 4 39 57 2 52 45 
NGOs are important because they foster public discourse and 
provide a platform for public debate. (66/90) 9 47 44 0 34 66 
NGOs are important because they help to overcome social 
conflict. (67/90) 15 39 46 13 56 31 
NGOs are important because they foster democratic practices 






12. What are in your opinion the main problems of NGOs in your country? 
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
 1- no problem 
2 -relatively 
problematic 
3 - very 
problematic 
1 - no 
problem 
2 - relatively 
problematic 
3 - very 
problematic 
lack of financial sources   (68/90) 1 15 84 3 24 72 
lacking governmental support (68/88) 3 26 71 7 47 47 
deficient cooperation among NGOs and business 
(68/87) 7 31 62 20 40 40 
deficient cooperation among NGOs and state 
institutions  (68/87) 7 37 56 7 51 43 
lacking philanthropic culture in your country  
(65/88) 8 40 52 9 46 46 
unclear legal situation  (70/87) 16 41 43 25 63 12 
missing legal regulations  (70/86) 19 31 50 20 65 15 
Deficient cooperation among NGOs  (70/86) 19 41 40 30 59 11 
lack of international contacts   (69/86) 16 42 42 41 44 15 
lack of information about NGO-relevant topics   
(67/86) 15 48 37 34 59 7 
lacking voluntarism  (68/88) 18 47 35 16 55 30 
lack of professional and qualified staff  (65/89) 28 42 31 28 45 27 




13. Main reported donors (more than one possible) 
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
no answer 15    
no donors 5    
Phare / European Commission 10 11%   
(Local) Business 11 11%   
Stefan Batory Foundation 16 20%   
Polish-American Freedom Foundation 5 4%   
Academy in Support of Local Philanthropy 4 5%   
USAID (US Embassy) 3 4%   
Local Administration / Government 8 10%   
Other Polish Foundation (Polish Children and Youth Foundation, Pastwowy Fundusz Rehabilitacji) 19 24%   
Other foreign donors  8 10%   
 
79 reports 
on donors 100% 
  
 
13a. Number of reported donors 
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
no report 15    
no donors 5 11%   
one reported donor 10 23%   
more than one reported donor 29 66%   
 44 100%   
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13b. Ratio domestic to foreign sources of funding  
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
No reports 15    
No donors 5 10%   
Domestic sources only  22 42%   
Foreign sources only 6 12%   
Foreign + domestic sources 19 37%   




14. How many projects are funded by donor organizations annually?   
 0 1-3 4-10 More than 10 
Poland (67) 6 42 46 6 










15. Why is the cooperation with foreign organizations important for you? 
POLAND SLOVAKIA 
not received received not received received 


















39 60 43 58 
expertise/consultancy   (68/78) 
1 38 1 59      18 24 37 21 
42 58 68 33 
institutional grants   (67/73) 
6 36 3 55      28 40 22 11 
36 64 47 53 
project grants  (69/70) 
4 32 3 61       14 33 26 27 
23 77 24 77 
networks/contacts   (70/81) 
0 23 1 76      4 20 30 47 
46 54 28 72 
training/workshops (69/86) 
4 42 6 48 11 17 31 41 
50 50 24 67 
moral support   (66/83) 
21 29 12 38 16 18 33 34 
71 29 63 37 protection from governmental  arbitrariness 
(66/76) 53 18 2 27 47 16 21 16 
83 17 55 45 assistance in applying pressure towards 
government  (60/75) 75 8 2 15 31 24 29 16 
34 66 19 80 cooperation is important as the foreign 
organization is a partner who strives for the 
same goals (68/87) 9 25 4 62      3 16 24 56 
43 58 49 50 cooperation is important as one can profit from 
reputation of donor  (63/77) 16 27 10 48 26 23 36 14 
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16. How do you describe your donors?  
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
Donor ... Not the 
case 




partially Yes, in all 
cases 
... is an equal partner  (48/72) 25 50 25 17 49 35 
... ist mainly  financier  (51/72) 16 41 43 6 49 46 
... is teacher  (47/62) 53 36 11 47 40 13 
… leaves necessary space concerning project design and implementation  
(44/71) 55 39 7 7 51 42 
... is informed about the social and political problems in the country   
(47/70) 36 36 28 4 43 53 
 
17. What are the main problems concerning the cooperation with the foreign donors?  
 POLAND SLOVAKIA 
Donor ... Not the 
case 




partially Yes, in all 
cases 
... does not know enough about the country  (48/70) 54 38 8 56 41 3 
   ... lacks credibility  (49/69) 88 12 0 88 7 4 
  ...  intervenes too much into projects   (47/71) 64 28 9 51 39 10 
   ...  is too bureaucratic  (51/72) 35 45 20 29 54 17 
   ...  is guided by his/her own interests rather than by a real interest in the 
goals of your organization.   (49/74) 45 43 12 55 35 10 
  ... prefers a few highly professional NGOs. The major share of NGOs has 
little chance to receive financial support.   (49/71) 35 51 14 38 49 13 
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Table 27 Interpretation of Results 
 I. The Polish and Slovak NGO Sector in Comparison  
According to the DPP survey the majority of Polish NGOs is active in the area of social 
services (30%), youth, culture and education (24%), decentralization (17%), and economic 
development (17%). Only 3% classify their main activity as “support of the NGO sector”, 
however a rather high amount of NGOs, namely 19%, see support of the NGO sector as a 
further important area (question 8). The majority of NGOs is rather small with less than five 
paid staff and an annual budget below 20.000 US $ and relies to large extent on volunteers 
(76% of NGOs have volunteers) (questions 4,5,6). The survey also covered a rather high 
number of local NGOs. 44% reside in cities with less than 100.000 inhabitants and the 
majority (69%) reports that they are mainly active on the local and regional level (question 1, 
8). The largest share of NGOs has been established between 1989-1992 (38%) (question 2). 
In Slovakia most NGOs are active in the area youth, culture and education (32%) and social 
services (19%). In contrast to Poland, decentralization does not rank high on the agenda of 
Slovak NGOs (only 9% of NGOs active in this area), neither does economic development 
(4%). Instead, ecology with 11% of NGOs and human rights issues (8%) are important topics. 
4% of NGOs aim to support the NGO sector, and 15% regard it as a further important area of 
activity. Similar to the Polish case, the Slovak NGO sector is shaped by small NGOs. 55% of 
Slovak NGOs have an annual budget below 20.000 US$, 73% have up to five paid staff and 
84% operate with volunteers. A remarkable difference between the two cases concerns the 
location of NGOs and their main level of activity. In contrast to Poland, most Slovak 
respondents are located in the capital (44%). Moreover, 48% report to mainly operate on the 
national level. A surprising share of 14% (Poland: 7%) even states the international level as 
their main field of operation. While in Poland, predominantly small and local NGOs were 
covered by the survey, in Slovakia capital-based and nationally operating NGOs prevail. A 
further difference between the cases concerns the year of foundation. In contrast to Poland, 
the largest share of Slovak NGOs has been established at a later time in the 1990s. Only 
20% of the surveyed NGOs report to be founded between 1989-1992. The largest share 
(44%) started to operate between 1993-1996.  
II. Self-Assessment of NGOs’ Role and Situation 
Question 10. Relationship with other Actors 
One can note that Polish NGOs deeply distrust political parties. The majority of NGOs (79%) 
report that they have no contact to political parties. Moreover, the largest share of them 
(70%, 55% of total) do not regard such relations as important. The ones that hold contacts to 
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political parties largely assess them as less important (33% of the ones with contact, 14% of 
total). Concerning other domestic actors, Polish NGOs are least connected with 
governmental authorities and business. 61% of NGOs report to have no relationship with 
both. Half of them regret this. If international contacts are concerned, one has to note that the 
vast majority of surveyed NGOs have no contacts to foreign governmental agencies (84%), 
nor to international organizations (79%). As the majority (69%) reports to be mainly active on 
the local or the regional level, this is not surprising. More surprising is the large number of 
NGOs that  report to hold contacts to international NGOs (51%). Moreover, such contacts are 
overwhelmingly assessed as very important (93% of total report that they are or were of great 
importance). Polish NGOs are well connected to local authorities, other non-governmental 
actors and the media. These are also the relationships valued the most. A vast majority 
(83%) holds contact to local authorities and assesses those as very important (88%, 79% of 
total). Additionally, NGOs that do not report to have contacts to local authorities regret this 
with no exception. A similar picture is presented by the relationships among NGOs; 81% hold 
such contacts and value them highly (89%, 72% of total), all of the ones with no such 
contacts wish for them. The same, although to a lesser extent holds true for the media (70% 
hold contacts, the ones who have not contact mostly desires them). 
Also in Slovakia NGOs hold mostly contact to local authorities, the media and other NGOs. 
However, slightly less contacts to local governments are observable (74%), and those are 
also not that much valued than in Poland. In contrast to Poland, the number of NGOs having 
contact to governmental authorities is rather high (58%), and relatively well valued (41% with 
contacts regard them as very important). The deep distrust toward political parties is evident 
in Slovakia, too. Only 12% of NGOs report to engage in relationships with parties. Only 17% 
of those value those contacts as important. In Slovakia even less NGOs have contacts to 
business than in Poland (only 24%). Half of the NGOs without contacts wish for them. The 
surveyed NGOs are very well internationally connected, and much more so than their Polish 
counterparts. The majority, namely 66%, report relations with international NGOs. 
Additionally, nearly one third have contacts to international organizations (32%), and to 
foreign governmental agencies (30%).  
Question 11: Role and Importance of NGOs 
If Polish NGOs are asked why NGOs are important, major emphasis is given to the efficiency 
of NGOs (80% fully agree that NGOs are important as they are more efficient in supplying 
public services than the state). We can thus note that Polish NGOs are rather service 
oriented. Additionally, NGOs see their role as a “school for democracy”. A vast majority (82%) 
fully agrees that NGOs are important because they foster democratic practices and values in 
society. Also the role of NGOs as intermediaries between state and society is regarded as 
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important (57% fully agree, 39% agree). In contrast, Polish NGOs are skeptical towards the 
participatory role of NGOs. One third of questioned NGOs disagree that NGOs guarantee 
citizen participation in the political process. Also the role of NGOs as a countervailing power 
to the state is assessed rather pessimistically. 22% disagree to this statement. There is also 
not much accord with the statement that NGOs foster public discourse and provide a platform 
for public debate. While Polish NGOs are pessimistic if it comes to questions of citizen 
participation and the countervailing of the state, they see their role mainly outside the state as 
service providers and transmitters of democratic values in society.  
If we turn to the answers of Slovak NGOs we observe a slightly different picture. Major 
emphasis has been given to the role of NGOs in fostering democratic practices and values in 
society (72% fully agree, 24% agree). Also NGOs are regarded as important because they 
foster public discourse and provide a platform for debate (66% fully agree, 34% agree). The 
efficiency of NGOs is named only as the third important reason for NGOs (63% fully agree, 
31% agree). In contrast to Poland, Slovak NGOs also stress the role of NGOs in 
countervailing state powers (64% fully agree, 31% agree). They also have a more optimistic 
view on NGOs as facilitators of public participation in politics (40% fully agree, 17% 
disagree). The role of NGOs in overcoming social conflict is, however, assessed rather 
pessimistically (31% fully agree, 13% disagree). Keeping the latest history of Slovakia in 
mind, and especially the role Slovak NGOs played in the elections voting Meciar out of office, 
the high accord to the countervailing power of NGOs is especially remarkable. It clearly 
shows that the experiences of Slovak NGOs with the SOS campaign and the OK98 
campaign shaped their self-assessment and thus left a legacy. 
Question 12: Main problems of NGOs 
The majority of NGOs in Poland and Slovakia agree that the lack of financial resources is a 
major problem of NGOs in their countries. 84% in Poland and 72% of the Slovak NGOs 
consider the lack of financial sources as very problematic. In general, Polish and Slovak 
NGOs name the same problems with slight exceptions, Polish NGOs, however, judge their 
situation more pessimistically than the Slovak NGOs. The question on major problems of 
NGOs reveals especially the big frustration with the government among Polish NGOs. 71% 
judge the lacking governmental support as very problematic (47% in Slovakia). The lacking 
cooperation between NGOs and business is named as the third main problem by Polish 
NGOs (62%). In Slovakia, in contrast, the deficient cooperation with business does not rank 
as high on the agenda of main worries, only 40% name it as very problematic, 20% see a 
deficient cooperation with business as no problem for Slovak NGOs at all. Again the lacking 
cooperation with government is regarded as troublesome in both countries (56% of Polish 
and 43% of Slovak NGOs see it as very problematic), as is the lack of a philanthropic culture 
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in the country (52% and 46%). The unclear legal situation and a lack of legal regulations as 
well as a deficient cooperation among NGOs are matters of moderate concern in Poland. A 
substantial 40-50% of NGOs regard those issues as very problematic. In Slovakia in contrast, 
only between 11-15% agree that these are issues of major concern. 20-30% do not regard 
those points as problematic. A negative public opinion about NGOs is no issue in both 
countries.  
III. Relationship with Foreign Actors / Donors 
As was evident in question 10, Polish and Slovak NGOs have frequent contacts to 
international actors, in particular non-state actors. The following bundle of questions aims to 
investigate how Polish and Slovak NGOs assess the cooperation with foreign donors.  
Question 15: Why is the cooperation with foreign organizations important for you? 
Questioned on why foreign cooperation has been or would have been important, the majority 
of replying NGOs in Poland report that they received benefits from international organizations 
in the form of networks and contacts (77%), project grants (64%), expertise/consultancy 
(60%), institutional grants (58%), and training / workshops (54%). All these benefits have 
been highly valued by all NGOs no matter whether they received them or not. A share of 90% 
or more reported that the benefits had either been very important or would have been 
important. The picture looks different if one asked for “moral support”, “protection from 
governmental arbitrariness” or “assistance in applying pressure towards government”. These 
factors are obviously not regarded by Polish NGOs as important merits of international 
contacts. The bulk of NGOs (50%, 71% and 83%) reports that they did not receive such form 
of assistance. While moral support is nonetheless valued by 67% of NGOs, “protection from 
governmental arbitrariness” and “assistance in applying pressure towards government” is 
widely regarded as superfluously. The majority of NGOs (58%) see the foreign donor as a 
partner that strives for the same goals, a fact that is highly valued (87%). Also most NGOs 
agree that one can profit from the reputation of the donor organization (75%).  
The picture looks rather different if Slovak NGOs are concerned. Firstly, one has to note that 
Slovak NGOs received less financial support in the form of institutional or project grants (only 
33% of NGOs report that they receive institutional grants; 53% received project grants). 
Instead with 72% much more NGOs underwent training. “Network/contacts” and 
“expertise/consultancy” are on an equal high with 77% and 58% respectively. Slovak NGOs 
do not assess the received assistance as positive as the Polish NGOs did. The most valued 
benefits are the provision of “networks/contacts” which are considered as important by 66% 
of Slovak NGOs, the importance of having a “partner that strikes for the same goals” (73% of 
NGOs esteem the cooperation with foreign organizations for that reason), “project grants” 
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(60% valued them), and “training” (58% regard training as important). All other benefits are 
condemned as “unnecessary” by half or more of the NGOs covered.  
Question 16: How do you describe your donor? 
If asked not about the received benefits but the donor himself, the majority regards them 
mainly as financier (84% in Poland, 95% in Slovakia). Slovak NGOs tend to see their donors 
in a more positive light than Polish NGOs. Whereas 55% of Polish NGOs report that donors 
do not leave necessary space concerning project design and implementation only 7% of 
Slovak NGOs think this is the case. Similarly, 36% of Polish NGOs agree that their donors 
are not informed about the social and political problems in the country. Only 4% of Slovak 
NGOs put forward the same criticism. Still, 75% of Polish NGOs agree that some or all of 
their donors are equal partners. 84% of Slovak NGOs see at least some of their donors as 
equal partners.  
If asked about the major problems of the cooperation with foreign donors it becomes, 
however, evident that in Poland as well as in Slovakia foreign donors are mainly assessed 
positively. Main criticism is put forward toward the bureaucracy of some or all donors (65% in 
Poland, 71% in Slovakia regard donors as too bureaucratic). The NGOs also largely agree 
that donors tend to prefer a few highly professional NGOs leaving the major share of NGOs 
with little chance to receive financial support (65% of NGOs in Poland; 62% of NGOs in 
Slovakia see this point confirmed at least if some of their donors are concerned). 55% of 
Polish NGOs put forward that donors at least partially are guided by their own interests rather 




Appendix 9 List of Interview Partners 
Table 28 List of Interview Partners relevant for the Polish Case 
Interview Partner Organization  Date 
Slawomir Nalecz  
 
The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project; Institute of Political Studies 
expert 7.2.2001 
Piotr Glinski Polish Academy of Science  expert 21.2.2001 
Roland Freudenstein  Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,  donor 9.2.2001 
Hermann Bünz Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw donor 16.2.2001 
Jan Saloni, Programme 
Manager 
Cooperation Fund, Phare Civic Dialogue Program donor 19.2.2001 
Lidia Kolucka, Consultant Ford Foundation, Warsaw donor 26.2.2001 
Izabella Rybka, Coordinator  Batory Foundation, NGO Program donor 14.2.2001 
Jakub Boratynski Batory Foundation, European Program donor 14.2.2001 
Jacek Wojnarowski, Executive 
Director 
Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern 





Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) recipient 14.2.2001 
Urszula Doroszewska, 
Program Director 
Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) recipient 14.2.2001 
Kuba Wygnanski, Director Regardless of Bad Weather Foundation, 
(Klon/Jawor Database on Polish NGOs), Board 
member FIP, Batory, 
recipient 15.2.2001 
Lukasz Domagala SPLOT  recipient 15.2.2001 
Katarzyna Morawska Fondation dla Polska, now Batory Foundation recipient 19.2.2001 
Katarzyna Wiechowska, 
International Officer 
Wrzos (Working of Associations of Social NGOs) recipient 23.2.2001 
Renata Kozlicka Regardless of Bad Weather Foundation 
(Klon/Jawor), European Program 
recipient 22.2.2001 
Agnieszka Mazur-Baranska Forum Inicjatyw Pozarzadowych (FIP) (Forum for 
non-governmental initiatives) 
recipient 26.2.2001 
Krzysztof Stanowski,  Foundation for Education for Democracy recipient 20.2.2001 
Danuta Przywara Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights recipient 20.2.2001 
Lidia Kuczmierowska Civil Society Development Foundation recipient 21.2.2001 
Rosa Thun Robert Schumann Stiftung recipient 22.2.2001 
Zbigniew Wejcman BORIS (Service Büro der sozialen 
Organisationen) 
recipient 22.2.2001 
Piotr Jaworski, Coordinator  Institut for Public Affairs, European Programme recipient 27.2.2001 
Witold Monkiewicz, Board 
President 
Foundation in Support of Local Democracy 
(FRDL) 
recipient 28.2.2001 
Pawel Lukasiak, Programme 
Director 





Table 29 List of Interview Partners Relevant for the Slovak Case 
Interview Partner Organization  Date 












Maire Saša Linau Director, ProFem, Czech Republic Recipient 5.10.1999 
(Prague) 
Zdenka Mansfeldova Institute of Sociology, Academy of 
Sciences of the Czech Republic 
expert 02/2002 
(Berlin) 
Katarína Koštálová,  Executive Director, Slovak Academic 
Information Agency – Service Center 
for the Third Sector 
recipient 13.02.2002
(Bratislava)
Boris Strečanský Executive Director, ETP Slovakia intermediary 15.02.2002
(Bratislava)




Ivana Tóthová Project Manager, Partners for 
Democratic Change Slovakia 
recipient 12.02.2002 
(Bratislava)








Jarmila Sviteková Department for International 
Development, British Embassy 
donor 14.02.2002
(Bratislava)
Monika Holečková Department for International 
Development, British Embassy 
donor 14.02.2002
(Bratislava)




Marek Jacoby MESA 10 recipient 12.02.2002
(Bratislava)




Table 30 List of Interviewees in Germany 
Interview Partner Organization  Date 
Arnold Wehmhörner Department International Dialogue, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, Bonn 
donor 22.2.2000 
Uwe Optenhögel Director International Cooperation, FES donor 23.10.2001
H. Weber Coordinator Poland, FES donor 3.11.1999 
Michael Dauderstädt Coordinator Slovakia, FES donor 3.11.1999 
Dr. Rüdiger Pintar International Dialogue, Department 
Central and Eastern Europe, FES 
donor 3.11.1999 
Michael Weichert Projektleiter Regionalbüro Sofia, FES Donor 5.11.1999 
Jan Senkyr Referatsleiter, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
Department International Cooperation 
donor 4.11.1999 
Dr. Günter Dill Referent Local Government, Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation 
Donor 4.11.1999 
von Hausen Deutscher Landkreistag donor 4.11.1999 
Jürgen Henkel Foundation for Economic Development 
and Vocational Training (SEQUA), Project 
Manager 
donor 2.11.1999 
Almut Thébaud Director Department Planning and 






Hiermit erkläre ich, Christine Abele, an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation  
“Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe – the Cases of Poland and Slovakia” 
selbstständig verfasst habe und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel 
benutzt wurden.  
Sämtliche wissentlich verwendete Textausschnitte, Zitate oder Inhalte anderer Verfasser 
wurden ausdrücklich als solche gekennzeichnet. 
 
Christine Abele 
